Organizatorzy

dr Oskar Skibski
dr hab. Piotr Skowron

Informacje

czwartki, 10:15 , sala: 4050

Dziedziny badań

Lista referatów

5 maja 2016 12:15
Piotr Skowron (University of Oxford)
Axiomatic Characterization of Committee Scoring Rules
We provide an axiomatic characterization of committee scoring rules, analogues of the scoring rules for the multiwinner elections. We show that committee scoring rules are characterized by the set of four standard axioms, anonymity, neutrality, …
14 kwietnia 2016 12:15
Oskar Skibski (Instytut Informatyki, Wydział MIM UW)
Attachment Centrality: An Axiomatic Approach to Connectivity in Networks
In many social networks, certain nodes play more important roles than others. Consequently, the concept of centrality index has been extensively studied in the literature. More recently, a number of new centrality indices have been …
31 marca 2016 12:15
Marcin Waniek (Instytut Informatyki, Wydział MIM UW)
The Dollar Auction with Spiteful Bidders
Shubik's (all-pay) dollar auction is a simple yet powerful auction model that aims to shed light on the motives and dynamics of conflict escalation. Common intuition suggests that the dollar auction is a trap, inducing …
17 marca 2016 12:15
Piotr Skowron (University of Oxford)
Committee Scoring Rules: Axiomatic Classification and Hierarchy
We present and advertise the class of committee scoring rules, recently introduced as multiwinner analogues of single-winner scoring rules. We present a hierarchy of committee scoring rules (while includes all previously studied subclasses of committee …
3 marca 2016 12:15
Marcin Dziubiński (Instytut Informatyki, Wydział MIM UW)
Network elicitation in adversarial environment
We consider a problem of a defender who wants to protect a network against a contagious attack. The defender could only protect a fixed number of nodes and does not know the network. Each of …
7 stycznia 2016 12:15
Jaideep Roy (Deakin University)
Optimal size of majoritarian committees under persuasion
We analyse the `optimal' size of non-deliberating majoritarian committees with no conflict of interest among its members when committees can be persuaded by a biased and informed expert. We find that when this bias is …
17 grudnia 2015 12:15
Piotr Skowron (Google)
Multi-Winner Elections: What do we Elect Committees for?
We present a brief overview of several interesting multi-winner election rules and we identify a broad natural class of multi-winner score-based rules (called committee-scoring rules), and we show that several existing interesting rules can be …
19 listopada 2015 12:15
Qiang Zhang (Instytut Informatyki, Wydział MIM UW)
Truthful Cake Cutting Mechanisms with Externalities
Cake cutting is a fundamental problem that studies fair resource division among agents. In this talk, I will review some classical cake cutting algorithms and discuss research directions in cake cutting problems. In particular, we …
5 listopada 2015 12:15
Tomasz Michalak (Instytut Informatyki, Wydział MIM UW)
Game-Theoretic Centrality Measures
In this talk, we discuss the computational properties of game-theoretic centrality measures. The key idea behind game-theoretic approach to network analysis is to treat nodes as players in a cooperative game, where the value of …
29 października 2015 12:15
Jakub Pawlewicz (Instytut Informatyki, Wydział MIM UW)
Game of Hex - Solving 10x10 board
Hex is a famous board game with very simple rules invented by Piet Hein in 1942 and independently by John Nash in 1948. Since finding a winning strategy is PSPACE-complete it is unlikely that we …
22 października 2015 12:15
Marcin Waniek (Instytut Informatyki, Wydział MIM UW)
Disguising centrality
Various centrality measures have been developed to identify key members of a social network. We study how such members can escape detection without giving away much of their influence on the network.In our work, we …
8 października 2015 12:15
Oskar Skibski (Institute of Informatics, University of Warsaw)
Full Additivity with Basic Division Imply the Shapley Value
The principle of Additivity states the sum of payoffs in two separate games should equal the payoff in the combination of those games. Typically, the literature considers limited version of this principle in which both …