Organizatorzy

dr Oskar Skibski
dr hab. Piotr Skowron

Informacje

czwartki, 10:15 , sala: 4050

Dziedziny badań

Lista referatów

23 stycznia 2020 10:15
Piotr Skowron (Instytut Informatyki, UW)
Proportionality and the Limits of Welfarism
We study two influential voting rules proposed in the 1890s by Phragmen and Thiele, which elect a committee or parliament of k candidates which proportionally represents the voters. Voters provide their preferences by approving an …
9 stycznia 2020 10:15
Gleb Polevoy (Instytut Informatyki, UW)
Hiders' Game
A number of recent models in the literature studied various versions of the adversarial social network analysis problem. Generally speaking, this problem involves some members of a network---e.g. leaders of a covert network, political activists, …
19 grudnia 2019 10:15
Dorota Celińska-Kopczyńska (Instytut Informatyki, UW)
Hyperbolic pseudo-betweenness -- initial proposition
Centrality measures identify nodes that play an important role within the network. Betweenness centrality is interpreted roughly as the fraction of all shortest paths in the network between two nodes that contain the given node. …
17 października 2019 10:15
Oskar Skibski (Instytut Informatyki, UW)
Complexity of Computing the Shapley Value in Games with Externalities
We study the complexity of computing the Shapley value in games with externalities. We focus on two representations based on marginal contribution nets (embedded MC-nets and weighted MC-nets). We show that every embedded/weighted MC-nets rule …
26 września 2019 10:15
Michał Godziszewski
Proportionality and Consistency in Judgment Aggregation and Belief Merging
Proportionality of a voting rule can be characterized as the ability to reflect all shades of political opinion of a society within the winning committee. The purpose of our project is to apply the voting …
27 czerwca 2019 10:15
Joanna Kaczmarek (Uniwersytet Adama Mickiewicza w Poznaniu)
Generalised Nash bargaining solution in multiplayer games on graphs
The presentation is about the algorithm of Jon Kleinberg and Éva Tardos for multiplayer coalition games. Its purpose is to create two-person coalitions and to divide the gain between the players. These games are represented …
13 czerwca 2019 10:30
Gleb Polevoy (Instytut Informatyki, UW)
Solutions to Games, Transitions and Efficiency
For any solution concept, we extend the solution set of a strategic-form game to a transition set. This set contains profiles where various agents simultaneously follow different solutions, e.g. different Nash equilibria. This models the …
6 czerwca 2019 10:15
Kajetan Chmielewski (Instytut Filozofii, Uniwersytet Warszawski)
Percepcja i rozumienie znaków przez przedstawicieli różnych kultur
Z powodu coraz częstszego wprowadzania pojazdów autonomicznych do ruchu w przestrzeni publicznej, których liczba ma do 2020 roku osiągnąć ponad 10 milionów 1, zauważyliśmy potrzebę stworzenia i wprowadzenia sytemu znaków informacyjnych biorących pod uwagę nowe …
30 maja 2019 10:15
Dorota Celińska-Kopczyńska (Wydział Nauk Ekonomicznych, UW)
Applying non-Euclidean geometries to Social Network Analysis
Most data analysts take it for granted to use some subregions of a flat space as their data model, which means utilizing constructs that follow the principles of the Euclidean geometry. However, it is not …
25 kwietnia 2019 10:15
Marcin Waniek (New York University Abu Dhabi)
Hiding in Multilayer Networks
Multilayer networks allow for modeling complex relationships, where individuals are embedded in multiple social networks at the same time. Given the ubiquity of such relationships, these networks are increasingly gaining attention in the literature. We …
11 kwietnia 2019 10:15
Michał Jaworski (Instytut Informatyki, UW)
Multiwinner Elections - model with Issues
We study a model of Multiwinner Elections with Issues, in which we assume that an instance consists of a set of individuals (voters and candidates), desired committee size k and p Issues, which will be …
28 marca 2019 10:15
Tomasz Wąs (Instytut Informatyki, UW)
An Axiomatic Approach to the Manipulability of Centrality Measures
Centrality measures are among the most fundamental tools for social network analysis. Since network data is often incomplete, erroneous, or otherwise manipulated, increasing attention has recently been paid to studying the sensitivity of centrality measures …
7 marca 2019 10:15
Piotr Skowron (Instytut Informatyki, UW)
Proportionality Degree of Multiwinner Rules
We study multiwinner elections with approval-based preferences. An instance of a multiwinner election consists of a set of alternatives, a population of voters---each voter approves a subset of alternatives, and the desired committee size k; …
24 stycznia 2019 10:15
Michał Godziszewski (Instytut Informatyki, UW)
Judgement Aggregation and Multiwinner Elections
In most general terms, the theory of judgement aggregation (JA) investigates rules for making consistent collective judgements on a set of propositions on the basis of the group members' individual judgements on these propositions. A …
6 grudnia 2018 10:15
Grzegorz Pierczyński (Instytu)
Approval-based elections and distortion of voting rules
We consider elections where both voters and candidates can be associated with points in a metric space and each voter prefers candidates that are closer to him/her to those that are further away. Such a …