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The seminar deals with issues at the intersection of computer science, artificial intelligence and economics. We discuss results of our group members from game theory (cooperative and non-cooperative), social choice theory, mechanism design and social network analysis.

The seminar takes place roughly every 2 weeks. Once a month (usually on the first Thursday of the month), the seminar is held remotely and is connected with AGH.

Organizers

dr hab. Oskar Skibski
dr hab. Piotr Skowron, prof. ucz.

Information

Thursdays, 12:15 p.m. , room: 4050

Home page

https://aiecon.mimuw.edu.pl/research/research-seminar/

Research fields

List of talks

Jan. 23, 2025, 12:15 p.m.
Grzegorz Lisowski (AGH University of Science and Technology)
Two-Sided Manipulation Games in Stable Matching Markets
The Deferred Acceptance algorithm is an elegant procedure for finding a stable matching in two-sided matching markets. It ensures that no pair of agents prefers each other to their matched partners. In this work, we …
Jan. 16, 2025, noon
Piotr Faliszewski (AGH University of Science and Technology)
Learning Real-Life Approval Elections
We study the independent approval model (IAM) for approval elections, where each candidate has its own approval probability and is approved independently of the other ones. This model generalizes, e.g., the impartial culture, the Hamming …
Jan. 8, 2025, 4 p.m.
Dominik Peters (CNRS, LAMSADE, Université Paris Dauphine - PSL)
Generalizing Instant Runoff Voting to Allow Indifferences
Instant Runoff Voting (IRV) is used in elections for many political offices around the world. It allows voters to specify their preferences among candidates as a ranking. We identify a generalization of the rule, called …
Dec. 19, 2024, 12:15 p.m.
Tomasz Wąs (University of Oxford)
Method of Equal Shares with Bounded Overspending
In participatory budgeting (PB), voters decide through voting which subset of projects to fund within a given budget. Proportionality in the context of PB is crucial to ensure equal treatment of all groups of voters. …
Dec. 12, 2024, noon
Piotr Kępczyński (University of Warsaw)
A Characterization of Additive Utility Functions on Indivisible Goods
We provide an axiomatic characterization of preference relations on indivisible goods that can be represented by additive utility functions. Specifically, we demonstrate that an ordinal preference relation can be represented by some additive utility function …
Nov. 28, 2024, 12:15 p.m.
Marcin Dziubiński (University of Warsaw)
General Lotto solvable cases of the Colonel Blotto game
We derive new equilibrium strategies for the discrete Colonel Blotto game for all the numbers of resources and battlefields for which the game can be solved using the discrete General Lotto game of [Hart, 2008]. …
Nov. 7, 2024, noon
Krzysztof Sornat (AGH University of Science and Technology)
An O(loglog n)-Approximation for Submodular Facility Location
In the Submodular Facility Location problem (SFL) we are given a collection of n clients and m facilities in a metric space. A feasible solution consists of an assignment of each client to some facility. …
Oct. 17, 2024, 12:15 p.m.
Krzysztof Rogowski (University of Warsaw)
Strategy proof location mechanisms on graphs with a cycle
The facility location problem involves selecting an optimal point on a graph to serve a group of agents, who may act strategically by misreporting their preferences to maximize their individual utility. This behavior motivates the …
Oct. 3, 2024, noon
Georgios Papasotiropoulos (University of Warsaw)
As Time Goes By: Adding a Temporal Dimension Towards Resolving Delegations in Liquid Democracy
May 16, 2024, 12:45 p.m.
Łukasz Janeczko (AGH University of Science and Technology)
Discovering Consistent Subelections (Discovering Consistent Subelections)
We show how hidden interesting subelections can be discovered in ordinal elections. An interesting subelection consists of a reasonably large set of voters and a reasonably large set of candidates such that the former have …
May 16, 2024, noon
Grzegorz Pierczyński (AGH University of Science and Technology)
Single-Winner Voting with Alliances: Avoiding the Spoiler Effect
We study the setting of single-winner elections with ordinal preferences where candidates might be members of alliances (which may correspond to e.g., political parties, factions, or coalitions). However, we do not assume that candidates from …
April 11, 2024, 12:15 p.m.
Piotr Kępczyński (University of Warsaw)
Extending node centrality measures to group centrality measures
During the presentation I will talk about the problem of creating group centrality measures based on node centrality measures. I will show previously known and obvious extension methods and discuss their pros and cons. I …
March 21, 2024, 12:15 p.m.
Krzysztof Apt (CWI, Amsterdam and University of Warsaw)
Characterization of Incentive Compatible Single-parameter Mechanisms Revisited
We review the characterization of incentive compatible single-parameter mechanisms introduced by Archer and Tardos in 2001. We argue that the claimed (and often cited) uniqueness result has not been established in the computer science literature …
Feb. 29, 2024, 12:15 p.m.
Sonja Kraiczy (University of Oxford)
Stability in Random Hedonic Games (Stability in Random Hedonic Games)
Partitioning a large group of employees into teams can prove difficult because unsatisfied employees may want to transfer to other teams. In this case, the team (coalition) formation is unstable and incentivises deviation from the …
Feb. 1, 2024, noon
Tomáš Masařík (University of Warsaw)
A Generalised Theory of Proportionality in Collective Decision Making
We consider a voting model, where a number of candidates need to be selected subject to certain feasibility constraints. The model generalises committee elections (where there is a single constraint on the number of candidates …