Seminarium „Gry, mechanizmy i sieci społeczne”

Organizatorzy

• dr hab. Oskar Skibski
• dr hab. Piotr Skowron, prof. ucz.

Informacje

Strona domowa

Dziedziny badań

• Ekonomia algorytmiczna
• Sztuczna inteligencja i systemy wieloagentowe

Lista referatów

• 5 października 2017 10:15
  Tomasz Janus (Instytut Informatyki UW)
  On Strong Equilibria and Improvement Dynamics in Network Creation Games
  We study strong equilibria in network creation games. These form a classical and well-studied class of games where a set of players form a network by buying edges to their neighbors at a cost of …

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• 22 czerwca 2017 10:15
  Krzysztof Puchta (Instytut Informatyki, UW)
  A cooperative solution for the three-nation problem of exploitation of the southern bluefin tuna
  W trakcie seminarium zaprezentowany zostanie artykuł "A Cooperative Solution for the Three-Nation Problem of Exploitation of the Southern Bluefin Tuna" autorstwa J. Krawczyka i B. Tolwinskiego W pracy: 1.) Rozwiązano problem gry kooperacyjnej. Do dalszych …

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• 18 maja 2017 10:15
  Jadwiga Sosnowska (Instytut Informatyki, UW)
  Attachment Centrality for Weighted Graphs
  Measuring how central nodes are in terms of connecting a network has recently received increasing attention in the literature and a few dedicated centrality measures have been proposed. One of them is the Attachment Centrality …

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• 11 maja 2017 10:15
  Oskar Skibski (Instytut Informatyki, UW)
  Axiomatic Characterization of Distance-based Centralities
  I will present our initial results concerning the characterization of the distance-based centralities. First, we characterize distance based centralities using Sabidussi's operations of adding and moving edges. Then, by adding one axiom we obtain a …

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• 20 kwietnia 2017 10:15
  Tomasz Michalak (Instytut Informatyki, UW)
  Strategic Social Network Analysis
  How can individuals and communities protect their privacy against graph-theoretic network analysis tools? How do criminals or terrorists organizations evade detection by such tools? Under which conditions can these tools be made strategy proof? These …

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• 6 kwietnia 2017 10:15
  Marcin Waniek (Instytut Informatyki, UW)
  On the Construction of Covert Networks
  Centrality measures are widely used to identify leaders of covert networks. We study how a group of such leaders can avoid being detected. In more detail, we study the hardness of modifying the network in …

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• 30 marca 2017 10:15
  Marcin Dziubiński (Instytut Informatyki, UW)
  Spectrum of equilibria in Colonel Blotto game
  We study Nash equilibria of a symmetric Colonel Blotto game. In this game two players, with N≥1 units of resources each, distribute their resources simultaneously across K≥2 battlefields. We introduce a characteristic of equilibria in …

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• 9 marca 2017 10:15
  Oskar Skibski (Instytut Informatyki, UW)
  Axiomatic Characterization of Game-Theoretic Network Centralities
  In this work, we focus on the game-theoretic approach to centrality analysis. While various centrality indices have been proposed based on this approach, it is still unknown what distinguishes this family of indices from the …

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• 12 stycznia 2017 10:15
  Marcin Dziubiński (Instytut Informatyki, UW)
  Strategy of Conquest
  Players are endowed with resources. A player can engage in conflict with others to enlarge his resources. The set of potential conflicts is defined by a contiguity network. Players are farsighted and aim to maximize …

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• 15 grudnia 2016 10:15
  Piotr Dworczak (Stanford University)
  Mechanism Design with Aftermarkets
  I study a model of mechanism design in which the mechanism is followed by an aftermarket, that is, a post-mechanism game played between the agent and other market participants. The designer has preferences that depend …

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• 1 grudnia 2016 10:15
  Piotr Skowron (University of Oxford)
  Multiwinner Election Rules: Axioms and Applications
  We consider multiwinner election rules and discuss some of their properties. In particular we discuss the concept of proportional representation of multiwinner election rules. Informally, proportional representation requires that the extent to which a particular …

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• 27 października 2016 10:15
  Marcin Waniek (Instytut Informatyki UW)
  On Hiding Communities and Evading Link Prediction in Social Networks
  Community detection and link prediction are two of the main research problems in social network analysis. While various private and public institutions are interested in identifying communities, it raises serious privacy issues as well as …

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• 13 października 2016 10:15
  Takamasa Suzuki (Kyushu University)
  Efficient assignment mechanism with endowments and distributional constraints
  We consider an assignment problem of multiple types goods to agents, where each type of a good has multiple copies (e.g., multiple seats of a school). Each agent is endowed with a good. Some distributional …

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• 19 maja 2016 12:15
  Oskar Skibski (Wydział MIM UW)
  k-Coalitional Cooperative Games
  In most previous models of coalition structure generation, it is assumed that agents may partition themselves into any coalition structure. In practice, however, there may be physical and organizational constraints that limit the number of …

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• 5 maja 2016 12:15
  Piotr Skowron (University of Oxford)
  Axiomatic Characterization of Committee Scoring Rules
  We provide an axiomatic characterization of committee scoring rules, analogues of the scoring rules for the multiwinner elections. We show that committee scoring rules are characterized by the set of four standard axioms, anonymity, neutrality, …

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