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Seminarium dotyczy zagadnień z pogranicza informatyki, sztucznej inteligencji i ekonomii. Omawiane są wyniki pracowników grupy z teorii gier (kooperacyjnych i niekooperacyjnych), teorii wyboru społecznego, teorii mechanizmów i analizy sieci społecznych.

Seminarium odbywa się średnio co 2 tygodnie. Raz w miesiącu (zwykle w pierwszy czwartek miesiąca) seminarium odbywa się zdalnie i jest łączone z AGH.

Organizatorzy

dr hab. Oskar Skibski
dr hab. Piotr Skowron

Informacje

czwartki, 12:15 , sala: 4050

Strona domowa

https://aiecon.mimuw.edu.pl/research/research-seminar/

Dziedziny badań

Lista referatów

24 stycznia 2019 10:15
Michał Godziszewski (Instytut Informatyki, UW)
Judgement Aggregation and Multiwinner Elections
In most general terms, the theory of judgement aggregation (JA) investigates rules for making consistent collective judgements on a set of propositions on the basis of the group members' individual judgements on these propositions. A …
6 grudnia 2018 10:15
Grzegorz Pierczyński (Instytu)
Approval-based elections and distortion of voting rules
We consider elections where both voters and candidates can be associated with points in a metric space and each voter prefers candidates that are closer to him/her to those that are further away. Such a …
22 listopada 2018 10:15
Oskar Skibski (Instytut Informatyki, UW)
Attachment Centrality: Properties and Computation
Centrality indices aim to quantify the importance of nodes or edges in a network. Much interest has been recently raised by the body of work in which a node’s connectivity is understood less as its …
8 listopada 2018 10:15
Tomasz Wąs (Instytut Informatyki UW)
Random Walk Decay Centrality
We propose a new centrality measure, called the Random Walk Decay centrality. While most centralities in the literature are based on the notion of shortest paths, this new centrality measure stems from the random walk …
26 października 2018 12:15
Dominik Peters (Department of Computer Science, University of Oxford)
Allocation of Indivisible Items with Connected Bundles
Suppose a collection of indivisible goods are arranged in a line, and we wish to allocate these items to agents so that each agent receives a connected bundle (an interval). This makes sense when the …
18 października 2018 10:15
Marcin Dziubiński (Instytut Informatyki, UW)
How to hide in a network
We propose and study a strategic model of hiding in a network, where the network designer chooses the links and his position in the network facing the seeker who inspects and disrupts the network. We …
10 maja 2018 10:15
Tomasz Wąs (Instytut Informatyki, UW)
Axiomatization of the PageRank centrality
We propose an axiomatization of PageRank. Specifically, we introduce five simple axioms – Foreseeability, Outgoing Homogeneity, Monotonicity, Merging, and Dummy Node – and show that PageRank is the only centrality measure that satisfies all of …
12 kwietnia 2018 10:15
Piotr Skowron (Instytut Informatyki UW)
Approximating Optimal Social Choice under Metric Preferences
We consider voting under metric preferences: both voters and alternatives are associated with points in a metric space, and each voter prefers alternatives that are closer to her to ones that are further away. In …
29 marca 2018 10:15
Krzysztof Rządca (Instytut Informatyki, UW)
Collective Schedules: Scheduling Meets Computational Social Choice
When scheduling public works or events in a shared facility one needs to accommodate preferences of a population. We formalize this problem by introducing the notion of a collective schedule. We show how to extend …
15 marca 2018 10:15
Jadwiga Sosnowska (Instytut Informatyki UW)
Path Evaluation and Centralities in Weighted Graphs – An Axiomatic Approach
We study the problem of extending the classic centrality measures to weighted graphs. Unfortunately, in the existing extensions, paths in the graph are evaluated solely based on their weights, which is a restrictive and undesirable …
25 stycznia 2018 10:15
Rahul CS (Instytut Informatyki, UW)
Group Activity Selection parameterized by the Number of Agent Types
We study the parameterized complexity of GASP (Group Activity Selection Problem) and its variant gGASP w.r.t. the number of different agent types as a parameter. We show that GASP can be solved in polynomial time …
11 stycznia 2018 10:15
Oskar Skibski (Instytut Informatyki, UW)
A Pseudo-Polynomial Algorithm for Computing Power Indices in Graph-Restricted Weighted Voting Games
Weighted voting games allow for studying the distribution of power between agents in situations of collective decision making. While the conventional version of these games assumes that any agent is always ready to cooperate with …
21 grudnia 2017 10:15
Marcin Waniek (Khalifa University of Science and Technology)
Strategic Network Diffusion
Spreading of ideas in a social network is usually modelled in the literature as a stochastic process. However, in many real-life applications the exact course of the diffusion can be guided by a certain individual …
7 grudnia 2017 10:15
Jan Woźnica (Instytut Informatyki, UW)
Strategic Evasion of Centrality Measures
Among the most fundamental tools for social network analysis are centrality measures, which are designed to rank nodes according to various criteria. Similarly to other tools, they were built around the assumption that individuals in …
30 listopada 2017 10:15
Marcin Dziubiński (Instytut Informatyki, UW)
Hide and seek game with heterogenous hiding places
We study a conflict with multiple battlefields where two players, the hider and the seeker, choose their respective numbers of hiding places. The hiding places have different values and the score of the hider is …