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Seminarium dotyczy zagadnień z pogranicza informatyki, sztucznej inteligencji i ekonomii. Omawiane są wyniki pracowników grupy z teorii gier (kooperacyjnych i niekooperacyjnych), teorii wyboru społecznego, teorii mechanizmów i analizy sieci społecznych.

Seminarium odbywa się średnio co 2 tygodnie. Raz w miesiącu (zwykle w pierwszy czwartek miesiąca) seminarium odbywa się zdalnie i jest łączone z AGH.

Organizatorzy

dr hab. Oskar Skibski
dr hab. Piotr Skowron

Informacje

czwartki, 12:15 , sala: 4050

Strona domowa

https://aiecon.mimuw.edu.pl/research/research-seminar/

Dziedziny badań

Lista referatów

4 listopada 2021 10:15
Oskar Skibski (Instytut Informatyki, UW)
Closeness Centrality via the Condorcet Principle
We uncover a new relation between Closeness centrality and the Condorcet principle. We define a Condorcet winner in a graph as a node that compared to any other node is closer to more nodes. In …
21 października 2021 10:15
Krzysztof Apt (Centrum Wiskunde & Informatica, Amsterdam, i Instytut Informatyki, UW)
Coordination Games on Graphs
For the past five years we have been studying a natural class of coordination games. In these games the players are nodes in a (possibly directed), each with a finite set of strategies, and the …
7 października 2021 10:15
Grzegorz Pierczyński (Instytut Informatyki, UW)
Core-Stable Committees under Restricted Domains
We study the setting of committee elections, where a group of individuals needs to collectively select a given size subset of available objects. This model is relevant for a number of real-life scenarios including political …
17 czerwca 2021 10:15
Krzysztof Apt (Centrum Wiskunde & Informatica i Instytut Informatyki, UW)
Well-founded extensive games with perfect information
We consider extensive games with perfect information with well-founded game trees and study the problems of existence and of characterization of the sets of subgame perfect equilibria in these games. We also provide such characterizations …
29 kwietnia 2021 10:15
Marcin Waniek (New York University Abu Dhabi)
Disinformation attacks on cities
Disinformation continues to raise concerns due to its increasing threat to society. Nevertheless, a disinformation-based attack on critical infrastructure has never been studied to date. In this line of work we consider two possible attack …
15 kwietnia 2021 10:15
Tomasz Wąs (Instytut Informatyki, UW)
An Axiom System for Feedback Centralities
In recent years, the axiomatic approach to centrality measures has attracted attention in the literature. However, most papers propose a collection of axioms dedicated to one or two considered centrality measures. In result, it is …
18 marca 2021 10:15
Grzegorz Pierczyński (Instytut Informatyki, UW)
Market-Based Explanations of Collective Decisions
We consider approval-based committee elections, in which a size-k subset of available candidates must be selected given approval sets for each voter, indicating the candidates approved by the voter. A number of axioms capturing ideas …
4 marca 2021 10:15
Dorota Celińska-Kopczyńska (Instytut Informatyki, UW)
Discrete Hyperbolic Random Graph Model
The hyperbolic random graph model (HRG) has proven useful in the analysis of scale-free networks, which are ubiquitous in many fields, from social network analysis to biology. However, working with this model is algorithmically and …
28 stycznia 2021 10:15
Oskar Skibski (Instytut Informatyki, UW)
Signed Graph Games: Coalitional Games with Friends, Enemies and Allies
We extend the well-known model of graph-restricted games due to Myerson to signed graphs, where the link between any two players may be either positive or negative. Hence, in our model, it is possible to …
17 grudnia 2020 10:15
Michał Godziszewski (Instytut Informatyki, UW)
An Analysis of Approval-Based Committee Rules for 2D-Euclidean Elections
We study approval-based committee elections for the case where the voters' preferences come from a 2D-Euclidean model. We consider two main issues: First, we ask for the complexity of computing election results. Second, we evaluate …
3 grudnia 2020 10:15
Michał Lewandowski i Paweł Kalczyński (Zakład Analizy i Wspomagania Decyzji, SGH, College of Business and Economics, California State University – Fullerton)
Carpooling games
We define a new carpooling game (or more generally a task completion game) as an extension of the cost-sharing game and propose optimization algorithms to find stable allocations, i.e. match players to carpools and determine …
19 listopada 2020 10:15
Michał Jaworski (Instytut Informatyki, UW)
Phragmén Rules for Degressive and Regressive Proportionality
We study two concepts of proportionality in the model of approval-based committee elections. In degressive proportionality small minorities of voters are favored in comparison with the standard linear proportionality. Regressive proportionality, on the other hand, …
12 listopada 2020 10:15
Tomasz Wąs (Instytut Informatyki UW)
PageRank vs. Random Walk Decay Centrality
PageRank is one of the most important measures of node importance. However, multiple methods of manipulating PageRank have been identified. Recently, Random Walk Decay centrality was introduced as a harder to manipulate alternative to PageRank. …
22 października 2020 10:15
Grzegorz Pierczyński (Intytut Informatyki, UW)
Proportional Participatory Budgeting with Cardinal Utilities
We study voting rules for participatory budgeting, where a group of voters collectively decides which projects should be funded using a common budget. We allow the projects to have arbitrary costs, and the voters to …
8 października 2020 10:15
Marcin Dziubiński (Instytut Informatyki, UW)
Peer selection with external referees
The problem of peer selection is a problem facing a social planner who aims to choose a project of the highest quality from the set of projects submitted by a number of strategic agents. To …