Seminarium „Gry, mechanizmy i sieci społeczne”

Organizatorzy

• dr hab. Oskar Skibski
• dr hab. Piotr Skowron, prof. ucz.

Informacje

Strona domowa

Dziedziny badań

• Ekonomia algorytmiczna
• Sztuczna inteligencja i systemy wieloagentowe

Lista referatów

• 10 kwietnia 2025 12:00
  Bartosz Kusek (AGH University of Science and Technology)
  Bribery Can Get Harder in Structured Multiwinner Approval Election
  We study the complexity of constructive bribery in the context of structured multiwinner approval elections. Given such an election, we ask whether a certain candidate can join the winning committee by adding, deleting, or swapping …

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• 3 kwietnia 2025 12:15
  Nidhi Rathi (Max-Planck-Institut für Informatik)
  New Fairness Concepts for Allocating Indivisible Items (New Fairness Concepts for Allocating Indivisible Items)
  We study the fundamental problem of 'fairly' dividing a set of indivisible items among agents with varied valuations/preferences. But what does “fairly” mean? There is no single answer here and different ways of interpreting “fairly” …

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• 27 marca 2025 12:15
  Maciej Wojtala (University of Warsaw)
  Attention-based communication for multi-agent reinforcement learning (Attention-based communication for multi-agent reinforcement learning)
  In multi-agent reinforcement learning, problems that attract most research include action-value function decomposition and inter-agent communication. In most studies, these problems are addressed separately. In this paper, we introduce the aggregation of messages from all …

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• 20 marca 2025 12:15
  Mikołaj Czarnecki, Michał Korniak (University of Warsaw)
  Indivisible Shapley Value
  We consider the problem of payoff division in indivisible coalitional games, where the value of the grand coalition is a natural number. This number represents a certain quantity of indivisible objects, such as parliamentary seats, …

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• 13 marca 2025 12:00
  Tomasz Wąs (University of Oxford)
  The Squared Kemeny Rule for Averaging Rankings
  For the problem of aggregating several rankings into one ranking, Kemeny (1959) proposed two methods: the median rule which selects the ranking with the smallest total swap distance to the input rankings, and the mean …

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• 23 stycznia 2025 12:15
  Grzegorz Lisowski (AGH University of Science and Technology)
  Two-Sided Manipulation Games in Stable Matching Markets
  The Deferred Acceptance algorithm is an elegant procedure for finding a stable matching in two-sided matching markets. It ensures that no pair of agents prefers each other to their matched partners. In this work, we …

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• 16 stycznia 2025 12:00
  Piotr Faliszewski (AGH University of Science and Technology)
  Learning Real-Life Approval Elections
  We study the independent approval model (IAM) for approval elections, where each candidate has its own approval probability and is approved independently of the other ones. This model generalizes, e.g., the impartial culture, the Hamming …

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• 8 stycznia 2025 16:00
  Dominik Peters (CNRS, LAMSADE, Université Paris Dauphine - PSL)
  Generalizing Instant Runoff Voting to Allow Indifferences
  Instant Runoff Voting (IRV) is used in elections for many political offices around the world. It allows voters to specify their preferences among candidates as a ranking. We identify a generalization of the rule, called …

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• 19 grudnia 2024 12:15
  Tomasz Wąs (University of Oxford)
  Method of Equal Shares with Bounded Overspending
  In participatory budgeting (PB), voters decide through voting which subset of projects to fund within a given budget. Proportionality in the context of PB is crucial to ensure equal treatment of all groups of voters. …

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• 12 grudnia 2024 12:00
  Piotr Kępczyński (University of Warsaw)
  A Characterization of Additive Utility Functions on Indivisible Goods
  We provide an axiomatic characterization of preference relations on indivisible goods that can be represented by additive utility functions. Specifically, we demonstrate that an ordinal preference relation can be represented by some additive utility function …

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• 28 listopada 2024 12:15
  Marcin Dziubiński (University of Warsaw)
  General Lotto solvable cases of the Colonel Blotto game
  We derive new equilibrium strategies for the discrete Colonel Blotto game for all the numbers of resources and battlefields for which the game can be solved using the discrete General Lotto game of [Hart, 2008]. …

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• 7 listopada 2024 12:00
  Krzysztof Sornat (AGH University of Science and Technology)
  An O(loglog n)-Approximation for Submodular Facility Location
  In the Submodular Facility Location problem (SFL) we are given a collection of n clients and m facilities in a metric space. A feasible solution consists of an assignment of each client to some facility. …

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• 17 października 2024 12:15
  Krzysztof Rogowski (University of Warsaw)
  Strategy proof location mechanisms on graphs with a cycle
  The facility location problem involves selecting an optimal point on a graph to serve a group of agents, who may act strategically by misreporting their preferences to maximize their individual utility. This behavior motivates the …

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• 3 października 2024 12:00
  Georgios Papasotiropoulos (University of Warsaw)
  As Time Goes By: Adding a Temporal Dimension Towards Resolving Delegations in Liquid Democracy
  In recent years, the study of various models and questions related to Liquid Democracy has been of growing interest among the community of Computational Social Choice. A concern that has been raised is that the …

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• 16 maja 2024 12:45
  Łukasz Janeczko (AGH University of Science and Technology)
  Discovering Consistent Subelections (Discovering Consistent Subelections)
  We show how hidden interesting subelections can be discovered in ordinal elections. An interesting subelection consists of a reasonably large set of voters and a reasonably large set of candidates such that the former have …

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