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Seminarium dotyczy zagadnień z pogranicza informatyki, sztucznej inteligencji i ekonomii. Omawiane są wyniki pracowników grupy z teorii gier (kooperacyjnych i niekooperacyjnych), teorii wyboru społecznego, teorii mechanizmów i analizy sieci społecznych.

Seminarium odbywa się średnio co 2 tygodnie. Raz w miesiącu (zwykle w pierwszy czwartek miesiąca) seminarium odbywa się zdalnie i jest łączone z AGH.

Organizatorzy

dr hab. Oskar Skibski
dr hab. Piotr Skowron

Informacje

czwartki, 12:15 , sala: 4050

Strona domowa

https://aiecon.mimuw.edu.pl/research/research-seminar/

Dziedziny badań

Lista referatów

17 października 2024 12:15
Krzysztof Rogowski (University of Warsaw)
Strategy proof location mechanisms on graphs with a cycle (Strategy proof location mechanisms on graphs with a cycle)
The facility location problem involves selecting an optimal point on a graph to serve a group of agents, who may act strategically by misreporting their preferences to maximize their individual utility. This behavior motivates the …
3 października 2024 12:00
Georgios Papasotiropoulos (University of Warsaw)
As Time Goes By: Adding a Temporal Dimension Towards Resolving Delegations in Liquid Democracy
In recent years, the study of various models and questions related to Liquid Democracy has been of growing interest among the community of Computational Social Choice. A concern that has been raised is that the …
16 maja 2024 12:45
Łukasz Janeczko (AGH)
Discovering Consistent Subelections
We show how hidden interesting subelections can be discovered in ordinal elections. An interesting subelection consists of a reasonably large set of voters and a reasonably large set of candidates such that the former have …
16 maja 2024 12:00
Grzegorz Pierczyński (AGH)
Single-Winner Voting with Alliances: Avoiding the Spoiler Effect
We study the setting of single-winner elections with ordinal preferences where candidates might be members of alliances (which may correspond to e.g., political parties, factions, or coalitions). However, we do not assume that candidates from …
11 kwietnia 2024 12:15
Piotr Kępczyński (University of Warsaw)
Extending node centrality measures to group centrality measures
During the presentation I will talk about the problem of creating group centrality measures based on node centrality measures. I will show previously known and obvious extension methods and discuss their pros and cons. I …
21 marca 2024 12:15
Krzysztof Apt (CWI, Amsterdam and University of Warsaw)
Characterization of Incentive Compatible Single-parameter Mechanisms Revisited
We review the characterization of incentive compatible single-parameter mechanisms introduced by Archer and Tardos in 2001. We argue that the claimed (and often cited) uniqueness result has not been established in the computer science literature …
29 lutego 2024 12:15
Sonja Kraiczy
Stability in Random Hedonic Games
Partitioning a large group of employees into teams can prove difficult because unsatisfied employees may want to transfer to other teams. In this case, the team (coalition) formation is unstable and incentivises deviation from the …
1 lutego 2024 12:00
Tomáš Masařík (University of Warsaw)
A Generalised Theory of Proportionality in Collective Decision Making
We consider a voting model, where a number of candidates need to be selected subject to certain feasibility constraints. The model generalises committee elections (where there is a single constraint on the number of candidates …
25 stycznia 2024 12:15
Piotr Faliszewski (AGK University of Science and Technology)
Guide to Experiments in COMSOC
In this talk I will discuss how numerical experiments on elections were typically performed in computational social choice and what we can learn from it. In particular, we will see what election sizes were considered …
7 grudnia 2023 10:15
Tomasz Wąs (LAMSADE, Paryż)
Fairly Allocating Goods and (Terrible) Chore)
We study the fair allocation of mixtures of indivisible goods and chores under lexicographic preferences—a subdomain of additive preferences. A prominent fairness notion for allocating indivisible items is envy-freeness up to any item (EFX). Yet, …
30 listopada 2023 12:15
Marcin Dziubiński (University of Warsaw)
Interconnected Battles
We study a model of multibattle contest with two players and spillovers of efforts between battles. The players distribute their costly efforts across the battles. Each battle receives effort assigned to it directly (real efforts) as well as …
23 listopada 2023 12:15
Marcin Waniek (University of Warsaw)
Modelling global market access using networks
In this (very much in progress) work we use network science techniques to model access of different locations around the world to the global market. It was shown in the literature that it is possible …
9 listopada 2023 12:00
Grzegorz Lisowski (AGH University of Science and Technology)
Strategic Cost Selection in Participatory Budgeting
We study strategic behaviour of project proposers in the context of approval-based participatory budgeting, assuming that the votes are fixed and known and the proposers want to set as high project prices as possible, provided that their …
19 października 2023 12:15
Georgios Papasotiropoulos (Athens University of Economics and Business)
Conditional Approval Voting: Winner Determination, Strategic Control and Proportionality Considerations
Picture a group of friends in Warsaw deciding on a shared meal: a starter and a main course. One among them loves pierogi and would like to go for bigos afterwards--easy to vote for in the classical approval voting …
9 października 2023 10:15
Makoto Yokoo (Kyushu University)
Matching Market Design with Constraints
Two-sided matching deals with finding a desirable combination of two parties, e.g., students and colleges, workers and companies, and medical residents to hospitals. Beautiful theoretical results on two-sided matching have been obtained, i.e., the celebrated Deferred Acceptance mechanism is …