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Seminarium dotyczy zagadnień z pogranicza informatyki, sztucznej inteligencji i ekonomii. Omawiane są wyniki pracowników grupy z teorii gier (kooperacyjnych i niekooperacyjnych), teorii wyboru społecznego, teorii mechanizmów i analizy sieci społecznych.

Seminarium odbywa się średnio co 2 tygodnie. Raz w miesiącu (zwykle w pierwszy czwartek miesiąca) seminarium odbywa się zdalnie i jest łączone z AGH.

Organizatorzy

dr hab. Oskar Skibski, prof. ucz.
dr hab. Piotr Skowron, prof. ucz.

Informacje

czwartki, 12:15 , sala: 4060

Strona domowa

https://aiecon.mimuw.edu.pl/research/research-seminar/

Dziedziny badań

Lista referatów

6 czerwca 2019 10:15
Kajetan Chmielewski (Instytut Filozofii, Uniwersytet Warszawski)
Percepcja i rozumienie znaków przez przedstawicieli różnych kultur
Z powodu coraz częstszego wprowadzania pojazdów autonomicznych do ruchu w przestrzeni publicznej, których liczba ma do 2020 roku osiągnąć ponad 10 milionów 1, zauważyliśmy potrzebę stworzenia i wprowadzenia sytemu znaków informacyjnych biorących pod uwagę nowe …
30 maja 2019 10:15
Dorota Celińska-Kopczyńska (Wydział Nauk Ekonomicznych, UW)
Applying non-Euclidean geometries to Social Network Analysis
Most data analysts take it for granted to use some subregions of a flat space as their data model, which means utilizing constructs that follow the principles of the Euclidean geometry. However, it is not …
25 kwietnia 2019 10:15
Marcin Waniek (New York University Abu Dhabi)
Hiding in Multilayer Networks
Multilayer networks allow for modeling complex relationships, where individuals are embedded in multiple social networks at the same time. Given the ubiquity of such relationships, these networks are increasingly gaining attention in the literature. We …
11 kwietnia 2019 10:15
Michał Jaworski (Instytut Informatyki, UW)
Multiwinner Elections - model with Issues
We study a model of Multiwinner Elections with Issues, in which we assume that an instance consists of a set of individuals (voters and candidates), desired committee size k and p Issues, which will be …
28 marca 2019 10:15
Tomasz Wąs (Instytut Informatyki, UW)
An Axiomatic Approach to the Manipulability of Centrality Measures
Centrality measures are among the most fundamental tools for social network analysis. Since network data is often incomplete, erroneous, or otherwise manipulated, increasing attention has recently been paid to studying the sensitivity of centrality measures …
7 marca 2019 10:15
Piotr Skowron (Instytut Informatyki, UW)
Proportionality Degree of Multiwinner Rules
We study multiwinner elections with approval-based preferences. An instance of a multiwinner election consists of a set of alternatives, a population of voters---each voter approves a subset of alternatives, and the desired committee size k; …
24 stycznia 2019 10:15
Michał Godziszewski (Instytut Informatyki, UW)
Judgement Aggregation and Multiwinner Elections
In most general terms, the theory of judgement aggregation (JA) investigates rules for making consistent collective judgements on a set of propositions on the basis of the group members' individual judgements on these propositions. A …
6 grudnia 2018 10:15
Grzegorz Pierczyński (Instytu)
Approval-based elections and distortion of voting rules
We consider elections where both voters and candidates can be associated with points in a metric space and each voter prefers candidates that are closer to him/her to those that are further away. Such a …
22 listopada 2018 10:15
Oskar Skibski (Instytut Informatyki, UW)
Attachment Centrality: Properties and Computation
Centrality indices aim to quantify the importance of nodes or edges in a network. Much interest has been recently raised by the body of work in which a node’s connectivity is understood less as its …
8 listopada 2018 10:15
Tomasz Wąs (Instytut Informatyki UW)
Random Walk Decay Centrality
We propose a new centrality measure, called the Random Walk Decay centrality. While most centralities in the literature are based on the notion of shortest paths, this new centrality measure stems from the random walk …
26 października 2018 12:15
Dominik Peters (Department of Computer Science, University of Oxford)
Allocation of Indivisible Items with Connected Bundles
Suppose a collection of indivisible goods are arranged in a line, and we wish to allocate these items to agents so that each agent receives a connected bundle (an interval). This makes sense when the …
18 października 2018 10:15
Marcin Dziubiński (Instytut Informatyki, UW)
How to hide in a network
We propose and study a strategic model of hiding in a network, where the network designer chooses the links and his position in the network facing the seeker who inspects and disrupts the network. We …
10 maja 2018 10:15
Tomasz Wąs (Instytut Informatyki, UW)
Axiomatization of the PageRank centrality
We propose an axiomatization of PageRank. Specifically, we introduce five simple axioms – Foreseeability, Outgoing Homogeneity, Monotonicity, Merging, and Dummy Node – and show that PageRank is the only centrality measure that satisfies all of …
12 kwietnia 2018 10:15
Piotr Skowron (Instytut Informatyki UW)
Approximating Optimal Social Choice under Metric Preferences
We consider voting under metric preferences: both voters and alternatives are associated with points in a metric space, and each voter prefers alternatives that are closer to her to ones that are further away. In …
29 marca 2018 10:15
Krzysztof Rządca (Instytut Informatyki, UW)
Collective Schedules: Scheduling Meets Computational Social Choice
When scheduling public works or events in a shared facility one needs to accommodate preferences of a population. We formalize this problem by introducing the notion of a collective schedule. We show how to extend …