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Seminar Algorithmic Economics

The seminar deals with issues at the intersection of computer science, artificial intelligence and economics. We discuss results of our group members from game theory (cooperative and non-cooperative), social choice theory, mechanism design and social network analysis.

Once a month (usually on the first Thursday of the month), the seminar is held remotely and is connected with AGH.


Organizers

Information

Thursdays, 12:15 p.m. , room: 4060

Home page

https://aiecon.mimuw.edu.pl/research/research-seminar/

Research fields

List of talks

Date
Date
  • Nov. 26, 2026, 12:15 p.m.
    Piotr Kępczyński (University of Warsaw)
    Multi-Attribute Representation is Compatible with Proportional Clustering
    In this talk, we study the problem of proportional selection of representative rows from a table. We show that multi-attribute representation and proportional clustering are both desirable properties in this problem. However, using standard methods …

  • Nov. 19, 2026, 12:15 p.m.
    Krzysztof Rogowski (University of Warsaw)
    Search and Verification for Strategyproof Facility Location on Metric Graphs
    We study automated design of strategyproof (SP) mechanisms for randomized facility location on continuous metric graphs, with the objective of minimizing total distance. We develop methods for computing upper and lower bounds on the optimal …

  • Nov. 5, 2026, noon
    Artem Tsikiridis (University of Warsaw)
    The Impact of Outliers on Strategic Facility Location
    We study facility location problems with n strategic agents in the presence of outliers, where the mechanism may exclude z agents from the social cost. Discarding outliers is particularly meaningful when some agents have extreme …

  • Oct. 29, 2026, 12:15 p.m.
    Evangelos Markakis (Athens University of Economics and Business)
    Algorithms for Constrained Fair Division Problems
    In this talk, we will provide an overview of recent research on fair division of indivisible resources in the presence of constraints. In contrast to the classic fair division setting, we will discuss two variations …

  • Oct. 22, 2026, 12:15 p.m.
    Marcin Waniek (University of Warsaw)
    Group and Flow-Based Centralities for Power Grids
    Identifying the power-grid components whose failure can cause the greatest disruption is challenging, especially when several outages interact in ways that simple node-by-node analyses cannot capture. In this talk, I will discuss centrality-based approaches that …

  • Oct. 15, 2026, noon
    Šimon Schierreich (AGH University of Science and Technology)
    Nearly Group-Separable Elections
    We study the problem of computing how close a given election is to being group-separable, measuring proximity by swaps of adjacent candidates in the votes. We also consider several other domains, including caterpillar group-separable, balanced …

  • Oct. 8, 2026, 12:15 p.m.
    Anton Baychkov (University of Warwick)
    Overrepresentation Axioms in Multi-Winner Voting
    In the recent social choice literature on proportional representation, much attention has been given to the question of avoiding underrepresentation in approval-based multi-winner voting. In our work, we explore the largely overlooked complementary question of …

  • June 25, 2026, 2 p.m.
    Krzysztof Rogowski (University of Warsaw)
    Automated Mechanism Design for Facility Location
    We study the design of strategyproof (SP) mechanisms for facility location on metric graphs, with the objective of minimizing the total cost of agents. We develop a computational method that heuristically approximates the optimal mechanism …

  • June 11, 2026, 12:15 p.m.
    Grzegorz Kwacz (University of Warsaw)
    The Solid Coalition Refinement Rule: Tractability and Extensions
    The Solid Coalition Refinement rule was recently proposed for ranked voting setting. It main goal was to guarantee proportionality and satisfy committee monotonicity. We study the computational complexity of the rule, proposing fixed parameter tractable …

  • May 28, 2026, 12:30 p.m.
    Maciej Wojtala (University of Warsaw)
    Centralized-to-Decentralized Policy Distillation for Efficient Multi-Agent Reinforcement Learning
    Centralized Training with Decentralized Execution (CTDE) is the dominant paradigm in multi-agent reinforcement learning (MARL), enabling agents to act independently at test time while leveraging additional information during training. However, the most prominent methods within …

  • May 21, 2026, noon
    Krzysztof Sornat (AGH University of Science and Technology)
    Polynomial-Time Algorithm for Thiele Voting Rules with Voter Interval Preferences
    We present a polynomial-time algorithm for computing an optimal committee of size k under any given Thiele voting rule for elections on the Voter Interval domain (i.e., when voters can be ordered so that each …

  • May 14, 2026, 12:15 p.m.
    Johannes Fichte (Linköping University)
    Model Counting: Solving, Complexity, and Applications
    In this talk, I will consider model counting, which asks to output the number of solutions to a given input instance. I will present recent complexity results and a solving approach that employs structural parameters …

  • May 7, 2026, 12:15 p.m.
    Hannaneh Akrami (Max Planck Institute for Informatics and University of Bonn, Germany)
    Matroids are Equitable
    We show that if the ground set of a matroid can be partitioned into k≥2 bases, then for any given subset S of the ground set, there is a partition into k bases such that …

  • April 16, 2026, 12:15 p.m.
    Artem Tsikiridis (Technical University of Munich)
    Learning-Augmented Mechanism Design with and without Money
    While the worst-case analysis of algorithms provides useful robust guarantees, it often leads to uninformative bounds or impossibility results that may not reflect real-world obstacles. The learning-augmented framework aims to overcome the limitations of worst-case …

  • April 9, 2026, noon
    Nidhi Rathi (University of Warsaw)
    Achieving EF1 and Epistemic EFX Guarantees Simultaneously
    We study the fundamental problem of fairly dividing a set of indivisible goods among agents with additive valuations. Here, envy-freeness up to any good (EFX) is a central fairness notion and resolving its existence is …