You are not logged in |
The seminar deals with issues at the intersection of computer science, artificial intelligence and economics. We discuss results of our group members from game theory (cooperative and non-cooperative), social choice theory, mechanism design and social network analysis.
The seminar takes place roughly every 2 weeks. Once a month (usually on the first Thursday of the month), the seminar is held remotely and is connected with AGH.
Organizers
- dr hab. Oskar Skibski, prof. ucz.
- dr hab. Piotr Skowron, prof. ucz.
Information
Thursdays, 12:15 p.m. , room: 4060Home page
https://aiecon.mimuw.edu.pl/research/research-seminar/Research fields
List of talks
-
May 28, 2026, 12:30 p.m.
Grzegorz Kwacz (University of Warsaw)
The Solid Coalition Refinement Rule: Tractability and Extensions
The Solid Coalition Refinement rule was recently proposed for ranked voting setting. It main goal was to guarantee proportionality and satisfy committee monotonicity. We study the computational complexity of the rule, proposing fixed parameter tractable …
-
-
May 14, 2026, 12:15 p.m.
Johannes Fichte (Linköping University)
Model Counting: Solving, Complexity, and Applications
In this talk, I will consider model counting, which asks to output the number of solutions to a given input instance. I will present recent complexity results and a solving approach that employs structural parameters …
-
May 7, 2026, noon
Krzysztof Sornat (AGH University of Science and Technology)
Polynomial-Time Algorithm for Thiele Voting Rules with Voter Interval Preferences
We present a polynomial-time algorithm for computing an optimal committee of size k under any given Thiele voting rule for elections on the Voter Interval domain (i.e., when voters can be ordered so that each …
-
April 16, 2026, 12:15 p.m.
Artem Tsikiridis (Technical University of Munich)
Learning-Augmented Mechanism Design with and without Money
While the worst-case analysis of algorithms provides useful robust guarantees, it often leads to uninformative bounds or impossibility results that may not reflect real-world obstacles. The learning-augmented framework aims to overcome the limitations of worst-case …
-
April 9, 2026, noon
Nidhi Rathi (University of Warsaw)
Achieving EF1 and Epistemic EFX Guarantees Simultaneously
We study the fundamental problem of fairly dividing a set of indivisible goods among agents with additive valuations. Here, envy-freeness up to any good (EFX) is a central fairness notion and resolving its existence is …
-
March 26, 2026, 12:30 p.m.
Marcin Dziubiński (University of Warsaw)
Production, Attack, and Defence in Networks
We develop a framework for the study of production and appropriation. There are two stages. In the first stage, agents decide how much to invest in production. In the second stage, they allocate the remaining …
-
March 19, 2026, 12:15 p.m.
Stanisław Kaźmierowski (University of Warsaw)
Equilibrium President in Restricted Domains
We study strategic candidate nomination by parties in elections decided by Plurality voting. Each party selects a nominee before the election, and the winner is chosen from the nominated candidates based on the voters’ preferences. …
-
March 12, 2026, noon
Šimon Schierreich (AGH University of Science and Technology)
Fair Allocation of Indivisible Items with Externalities
We study the problem of fairly allocating indivisible items under externalities, where each agent can receive utility or disutility from items allocated to other agents. This allows us to capture scenarios in which agents benefit …
-
March 5, 2026, 12:15 p.m.
Oskar Skibski (University of Warsaw)
Sequential Elimination for Group Assessment in Coalitional Games
Two straightforward methods to extend an assessment of individual elements to groups are to sum individual assessments or to treat the group as a single merged element and assess it accordingly. In this work, we …
-
Feb. 12, 2026, noon
Georgios Papasotiropoulos (University of Warsaw)
Representation in Peer Selection: A Liquid Democracy Perspective
Suppose the members of MIMUW are electing a committee of size k from among themselves to represent the department at a university meeting. I only know a handful of people in the department, so figuring …
-
-
Jan. 8, 2026, 2 p.m.
Dominik Peters (CNRS, Université Paris Dauphine)
Computing Lindahl Equilibrium for Public Goods with and without Funding Caps
Lindahl equilibrium is a solution concept for allocating a fixed budget across several divisible public goods. It always lies in the core, meaning that the equilibrium allocation satisfies desirable stability and proportional fairness properties. We …
-
Dec. 11, 2025, 12:15 p.m.
Marcin Dziubiński (University of Warsaw)
Peer Selection in a Network: A Mechanism Design Approach
A planner wants to select one agent out of n agents on the basis of a binary characteristic that is commonly known to all agents but is not observed by the planner. Any pair of …
-
Dec. 4, 2025, noon
Kristýna Pekárková (University of Warsaw)
Identifying Imperfect Clones in Elections
In elections, perfect clones are groups of candidates that appear indistinguishable from the voters’ perspective – either they are ranked consecutively by every voter (in ordinal elections), or they are approved by exactly the same …
