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Seminarium „Ekonomia algorytmiczna”

Seminarium dotyczy zagadnień z pogranicza informatyki, sztucznej inteligencji i ekonomii. Omawiane są wyniki pracowników grupy z teorii gier (kooperacyjnych i niekooperacyjnych), teorii wyboru społecznego, teorii mechanizmów i analizy sieci społecznych. 

Seminarium odbywa się średnio co 2 tygodnie. Raz w miesiącu (zwykle w pierwszy czwartek miesiąca) seminarium odbywa się zdalnie i jest łączone z AGH.

 


Organizatorzy

Informacje

czwartki, 12:15 , sala: 4060

Strona domowa

https://aiecon.mimuw.edu.pl/research/research-seminar/

Dziedziny badań

Lista referatów

  • 17 marca 2022 10:15
    Adrian Górecki
    Proportional Public Decisions
    We consider a setting where a group of individuals make a number of independent decisions. The decisions should proportionally represent the views of the voters. We formulate new criteria of proportionality and analyse two rules, …

  • 3 marca 2022 10:15
    Balázs Sziklai (Centre for Economic and Regional Studies & Corvinus University of Budapest)
    Expert selection in recommendation networks
    The Weighted Top Candidate (WTC) algorithm is an expert identification method that presents an alternative for network centralities. Its main advantage is its axiomatic characterization that shows why it is especially suitable for a number …

  • 27 stycznia 2022 10:30
    Michał Godziszewski (Instytut Informatyki, UW)
    Attacking Similarity-Based Sign Prediction
    Adversarial social network analysis explores how social links can be altered or otherwise manipulated to obscure unwanted information collection. Thus far, however, problems of this kind have not been studied in the context of signed …

  • 16 grudnia 2021 10:15
    Wiktoria Kośny (Instytut Informatyki, UW)
    Comparative Theoretical Analysis of Medial Centrality Measures
    We study medial centrality measures that assess the role of a node in connecting others in the network. We focus on a setting with one target node t and several source nodes. We consider four …

  • 2 grudnia 2021 10:15
    Stanisław Kaźmierowski (Instytut Informatyki, UW)
    Computing equilibria in conflicts with multiple battlefields and majoritarian objectives
    We consider computation of Nash equilibria in conflicts with multiple battlefields and majoritarian objectives. Conflicts with multiple battlefields are zero-sum two player games with succinct representation: the number of strategies of each player is exponential …

  • 18 listopada 2021 10:15
    Jorge Salas (University of Edinburgh)
    A family of centrality measures for graph data based on subgraphs
    Graph structured data are stored in specialized databases called graph databases. These systems let us efficiently compute queries over the graph such as looking for paths or patterns in it. Conjunctive queries are one kind …

  • 4 listopada 2021 10:15
    Oskar Skibski (Instytut Informatyki, UW)
    Closeness Centrality via the Condorcet Principle
    We uncover a new relation between Closeness centrality and the Condorcet principle. We define a Condorcet winner in a graph as a node that compared to any other node is closer to more nodes. In …

  • 21 października 2021 10:15
    Krzysztof Apt (Centrum Wiskunde & Informatica, Amsterdam, i Instytut Informatyki, UW)
    Coordination Games on Graphs
    For the past five years we have been studying a natural class of coordination games. In these games the players are nodes in a (possibly directed), each with a finite set of strategies, and the …

  • 7 października 2021 10:15
    Grzegorz Pierczyński (Instytut Informatyki, UW)
    Core-Stable Committees under Restricted Domains
    We study the setting of committee elections, where a group of individuals needs to collectively select a given size subset of available objects. This model is relevant for a number of real-life scenarios including political …

  • 17 czerwca 2021 10:15
    Krzysztof Apt (Centrum Wiskunde & Informatica i Instytut Informatyki, UW)
    Well-founded extensive games with perfect information
    We consider extensive games with perfect information with well-founded game trees and study the problems of existence and of characterization of the sets of subgame perfect equilibria in these games. We also provide such characterizations …

  • 29 kwietnia 2021 10:15
    Marcin Waniek (New York University Abu Dhabi)
    Disinformation attacks on cities
    Disinformation continues to raise concerns due to its increasing threat to society. Nevertheless, a disinformation-based attack on critical infrastructure has never been studied to date. In this line of work we consider two possible attack …

  • 15 kwietnia 2021 10:15
    Tomasz Wąs (Instytut Informatyki, UW)
    An Axiom System for Feedback Centralities
    In recent years, the axiomatic approach to centrality measures has attracted attention in the literature. However, most papers propose a collection of axioms dedicated to one or two considered centrality measures. In result, it is …

  • 18 marca 2021 10:15
    Grzegorz Pierczyński (Instytut Informatyki, UW)
    Market-Based Explanations of Collective Decisions
    We consider approval-based committee elections, in which a size-k subset of available candidates must be selected given approval sets for each voter, indicating the candidates approved by the voter. A number of axioms capturing ideas …

  • 4 marca 2021 10:15
    Dorota Celińska-Kopczyńska (Instytut Informatyki, UW)
    Discrete Hyperbolic Random Graph Model
    The hyperbolic random graph model (HRG) has proven useful in the analysis of scale-free networks, which are ubiquitous in many fields, from social network analysis to biology. However, working with this model is algorithmically and …

  • 28 stycznia 2021 10:15
    Oskar Skibski (Instytut Informatyki, UW)
    Signed Graph Games: Coalitional Games with Friends, Enemies and Allies
    We extend the well-known model of graph-restricted games due to Myerson to signed graphs, where the link between any two players may be either positive or negative. Hence, in our model, it is possible to …