Seminarium „Ekonomia algorytmiczna”

Organizatorzy

• dr hab. Oskar Skibski, prof. ucz.
• dr hab. Piotr Skowron, prof. ucz.

Informacje

Strona domowa

Dziedziny badań

• Ekonomia algorytmiczna
• Sztuczna inteligencja i systemy wieloagentowe

Lista referatów

• 5 stycznia 2023 12:00
  Piotr Faliszewski (AGH University in Kraków)
  Map of Elections: Diversity, Polarization, and Agreement In Elections (+ some more)
  In this talk I will present the idea of the map of (ordinal) elections and argue what it is good for. First, we will spend considerable amount of time on understanding diversity, polarization, and agreement …

  ---

• 15 grudnia 2022 12:15
  Stanisław Kaźmierowski (University of Warsaw)
  Algorithm for solving the attack and interception game on networks
  The paper "Attack and interception in networks" (F. Bloch, K. Chatterjee, B. Dutta, 2022), describes a game where a single attacker chooses a target and a path and each node chooses a level of protection. …

  ---

• 8 grudnia 2022 12:00
  Piotr Skowron (Uniwersytet Warszawski)
  Proportionality in General Social Choice Models
  We consider a model where a number of candidates need to be selected subject to certain feasibility constraints. The model generalises committee elections (where there is a single constraint on the number of candidates that …

  ---

• 17 listopada 2022 12:15
  Piotr Skowron (University of Warsaw)
  Proportional Participatory Budgeting with Additive Utilities
  We study voting rules for participatory budgeting, where a group of voters collectively decides which projects should be funded using a common budget. We allow the projects to have arbitrary costs, and the voters to …

  ---

• 3 listopada 2022 12:00
  Łukasz Janeczko (AGH)
  Ties in Multiwinner Approval Voting
  We investigate ties in multiwinner approval voting both theoretically and experimentally. Specifically, we analyze the computational complexity of 1) determining if there is a tie in a given election for a given rule, and 2) …

  ---

• 20 października 2022 12:15
  Jannik Peters (TU Berlin)
  Proportional Participatory Budgeting with Approval-Based Satisfaction Functions
  The ability to measure the satisfaction of (groups of) voters is a crucial prerequisite for formulating proportionality axioms in approval-based participatory budgeting elections. Two common -- but very different -- ways to measure the satisfaction …

  ---

• 13 października 2022 12:15
  Michał Tomasz Godziszewski (University of Warsaw)
  Election control for VCR Euclidean preferences
  Election control problems model situations where some entity (traditionally called the election chair) wants to ensure some agent's victory (the so-called, Constructive Control) or loss (the so-called Destructive Control) by either adding or deleting candidates …

  ---

• 6 października 2022 12:00
  Marcin Dziubiński (University of Warsaw)
  Selecting a Winner with Impartial Referees
  We consider a problem of mechanism design without money, where a planner selects a winner among a set of agents with binary types and receives outside signals (like the report of impartial referees). We show …

  ---

• 6 lipca 2022 16:00
  Stanisław Szufa (AGH University in Kraków)
  Numerical Experiments in Computational Social Choice
  While many papers in computational social choice are theoretical, the number of experimental works is rapidly growing. During the tutorial, we will focus on experiments related to voting and participatory budgeting. We will discuss most …

  ---

• 8 czerwca 2022 16:00
  Marcin Waniek (New York University Abu Dhabi)
  Social diffusion sources can escape detection
  Influencing (and being influenced by) others through social networks is fundamental to all human societies. Whether this happens through the diffusion of rumors, opinions, or viruses, identifying the diffusion source (i.e., the person that initiated …

  ---

• 26 maja 2022 10:15
  Dorota Celińska-Kopczyńska (Instytut Informatyki, UW)
  Non-Euclidean Self-Organizing Maps
  Self-Organizing Maps (SOMs, Kohonen networks) belong to neural network models of the unsupervised class. Most data analysts take it for granted to use some subregions of a flat space as their data model. However, assuming …

  ---

• 12 maja 2022 10:15
  Michał Jaworski (Uniwersytet Warszawski)
  Phragmen Rules for Degressive and Regressive Proportionality
  We study two concepts of proportionality in the model of approval-based committee elections. In degressive proportionality small minorities of voters are favored in comparison with the standard linear proportionality. Regressive proportionality, on the other hand, …

  ---

• 28 kwietnia 2022 10:15
  Dominik Peters (Université Paris Dauphine-PSL)
  Fast Preference Elicitation and Fairness in Voting
  Talk 1: Many decision making systems require users to indicate their preferences via a ranking. It is common to elicit such rankings through pairwise comparison queries. By using sorting algorithms, this can be achieved by …

  ---

• 14 kwietnia 2022 10:15
  Tomasz Wąs (Instytut Informatyki, UW)
  Understanding Distance Measures Among Elections
  Motivated by putting empirical work based on (synthetic) election data on a more solid mathematical basis, we analyze six distances among elections, including, e.g., the challenging-to-compute but very precise swap distance and the distance used …

  ---

• 31 marca 2022 10:15
  Marcin Dziubiński (Instytut Informatyki, UW)
  Discrete Two Player All-Pay Auction with Complete Information
  We study discrete two player all-pay auction with complete information. We provide full characterization of mixed strategy Nash equilibria and show that they constitute a subset of Nash equilibria of discrete General Lotto game. We …

  ---