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The Solid Coalition Refinement Rule: Tractability and Extensions

Prelegent(ci)
Grzegorz Kwacz
Afiliacja
University of Warsaw
Język referatu
angielski
Termin
28 maja 2026 12:30
Pokój
p. 4060
Seminarium
Seminarium „Ekonomia algorytmiczna”

The Solid Coalition Refinement rule was recently proposed for ranked voting setting. It main goal was to guarantee proportionality and satisfy committee monotonicity. We study the computational complexity of the rule, proposing fixed parameter tractable algorithms for the main parameters. We also extend the rule and provide proportionality guarantees to the matroid constrains, which generalize the many other settings, including public decisions and committee elections with attributes or negative votes. Lastly, we conduct experiments, comparing the rule to other popular ranked voting rules, including Single Transferable Vote and Expanding Approvals Rule.