Strategic Cost Selection in Participatory Budgeting

Prelegent(ci)

Grzegorz Lisowski

Afiliacja

AGH University of Science and Technology

Termin

9 listopada 2023 12:00

Informacje na temat wydarzenia

online seminar

Seminarium

Seminarium „Gry, mechanizmy i sieci społeczne”

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We study strategic behaviour of project proposers in the  context of approval-based participatory budgeting, assuming that the votes are fixed and known and the proposers want to set as high project prices as possible, provided that their projects get selected and the prices are not below the minimum costs of their delivery. We study the existence of pure Nash equilibria in such games, for a number of voting rules. While such equilibria might not exist, we provide several positive results for intuitive restrictions of voters’ preferences. Furthermore, we report an experimental study of strategic cost selection on real-life election data.

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