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Potentials and their uses in strategic games

Prelegent(ci)
Krzysztof R. Apt
Afiliacja
Uniwersytet Warszawski
Termin
5 listopada 2014 14:15
Pokój
p. 4050
Seminarium
Seminarium Zakładu Biomatematyki i Teorii Gier

The idea of a potential was introduced in the influential paper of
Monderer and Shapley in 1994. It is a technique that allows one to conclude that a strategic game has a Nash equilibrium.  We shall discuss the main aspects of this paper and subsequently illustrate other uses of potentials in our recent work on coordination games on graphs.
In each such game the players are the nodes of a graph. Each node selects a colour from a set of colours (privately) available for it. The payoff to a node is the number of neighbours who chose the same colour.  These games capture the idea of coordination in a local setting strategies. We shall focus on the issue of existence of Nash equilibria, k-equilibria and strong equilibria.
This is a joint work with Mona Rahn, Guido Schaefer and Sunil Simon.