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Efficient assignment mechanism with endowments and distributional constraints
- Prelegent(ci)
- Takamasa Suzuki
- Afiliacja
- Kyushu University
- Termin
- 13 października 2016 10:15
- Pokój
- p. 1780
- Seminarium
- Seminarium „Gry, mechanizmy i sieci społeczne”
We
consider an assignment problem of multiple types goods to agents, where
each type of a good has multiple copies (e.g., multiple seats of a
school). Each agent is endowed with a good. Some distributional
constraints are imposed on the allocation (e.g., minimum/maximum quotas,
the balance of racial/gender distributions within a school). We develop
a mechanism that is based on the Top Trading Cycles mechanism, which is
strategy-proof, feasible (always satisfies distributional constraints),
Pareto efficient, and individually rational, assuming the
distributional constraints are represented as an M-convex set.
