Carpooling games

Prelegent(ci)

Michał Lewandowski i Paweł Kalczyński

Afiliacja

Zakład Analizy i Wspomagania Decyzji, SGH, College of Business and Economics, California State University – Fullerton

Termin

3 grudnia 2020 10:15

Informacje na temat wydarzenia

Seminarium 2020-12-03 10:15:00

Seminarium

Seminarium „Gry, mechanizmy i sieci społeczne”

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We define a new carpooling game (or more generally a task completion game) as an extension of the cost-sharing game and propose optimization algorithms to find stable allocations, i.e. match players to carpools and determine the distance they traveled. The game key features include: coalition size is restricted, optimal matching of players to carpools should be partition-feasible, cost depends not only on the carpool, but on the driver as well, solution is Pareto-efficient: nobody drives more than alone. If utility is transferable, transfers are determined as the nucleolus. We determine optimal solutions as well as suggest heuristics for large problems that ensure close-to-optimal solutions.

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