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The seminar deals with issues at the intersection of computer science, artificial intelligence and economics. We discuss results of our group members from game theory (cooperative and non-cooperative), social choice theory, mechanism design and social network analysis.

The seminar takes place roughly every 2 weeks. Once a month (usually on the first Thursday of the month), the seminar is held remotely and is connected with AGH.

Organizers

dr hab. Oskar Skibski
dr hab. Piotr Skowron, prof. ucz.

Information

Thursdays, 12:15 p.m. , room: 4050

Home page

https://aiecon.mimuw.edu.pl/research/research-seminar/

Research fields

List of talks

May 11, 2017, 10:15 a.m.
Oskar Skibski (Instytut Informatyki, UW)
Axiomatic Characterization of Distance-based Centralities
I will present our initial results concerning the characterization of the distance-based centralities. First, we characterize distance based centralities using Sabidussi's operations of adding and moving edges. Then, by adding one axiom we obtain a …
April 20, 2017, 10:15 a.m.
Tomasz Michalak (Instytut Informatyki, UW)
Strategic Social Network Analysis
How can individuals and communities protect their privacy against graph-theoretic network analysis tools? How do criminals or terrorists organizations evade detection by such tools? Under which conditions can these tools be made strategy proof? These …
April 6, 2017, 10:15 a.m.
Marcin Waniek (Instytut Informatyki, UW)
On the Construction of Covert Networks
Centrality measures are widely used to identify leaders of covert networks. We study how a group of such leaders can avoid being detected. In more detail, we study the hardness of modifying the network in …
March 30, 2017, 10:15 a.m.
Marcin Dziubiński (Instytut Informatyki, UW)
Spectrum of equilibria in Colonel Blotto game
We study Nash equilibria of a symmetric Colonel Blotto game. In this game two players, with N≥1 units of resources each, distribute their resources simultaneously across K≥2 battlefields. We introduce a characteristic of equilibria in …
March 9, 2017, 10:15 a.m.
Oskar Skibski (Instytut Informatyki, UW)
Axiomatic Characterization of Game-Theoretic Network Centralities
In this work, we focus on the game-theoretic approach to centrality analysis. While various centrality indices have been proposed based on this approach, it is still unknown what distinguishes this family of indices from the …
Jan. 12, 2017, 10:15 a.m.
Marcin Dziubiński (Instytut Informatyki, UW)
Strategy of Conquest
Players are endowed with resources. A player can engage in conflict with others to enlarge his resources. The set of potential conflicts is defined by a contiguity network. Players are farsighted and aim to maximize …
Dec. 15, 2016, 10:15 a.m.
Piotr Dworczak (Stanford University)
Mechanism Design with Aftermarkets
I study a model of mechanism design in which the mechanism is followed by an aftermarket, that is, a post-mechanism game played between the agent and other market participants. The designer has preferences that depend …
Dec. 1, 2016, 10:15 a.m.
Piotr Skowron (University of Oxford)
Multiwinner Election Rules: Axioms and Applications
We consider multiwinner election rules and discuss some of their properties. In particular we discuss the concept of proportional representation of multiwinner election rules. Informally, proportional representation requires that the extent to which a particular …
Oct. 27, 2016, 10:15 a.m.
Marcin Waniek (Instytut Informatyki UW)
On Hiding Communities and Evading Link Prediction in Social Networks
Community detection and link prediction are two of the main research problems in social network analysis. While various private and public institutions are interested in identifying communities, it raises serious privacy issues as well as …
Oct. 13, 2016, 10:15 a.m.
Takamasa Suzuki (Kyushu University)
Efficient assignment mechanism with endowments and distributional constraints
We consider an assignment problem of multiple types goods to agents, where each type of a good has multiple copies (e.g., multiple seats of a school). Each agent is endowed with a good. Some distributional …
May 19, 2016, 12:15 p.m.
Oskar Skibski (Wydział MIM UW)
k-Coalitional Cooperative Games
In most previous models of coalition structure generation, it is assumed that agents may partition themselves into any coalition structure. In practice, however, there may be physical and organizational constraints that limit the number of …
May 5, 2016, 12:15 p.m.
Piotr Skowron (University of Oxford)
Axiomatic Characterization of Committee Scoring Rules
We provide an axiomatic characterization of committee scoring rules, analogues of the scoring rules for the multiwinner elections. We show that committee scoring rules are characterized by the set of four standard axioms, anonymity, neutrality, …
April 14, 2016, 12:15 p.m.
Oskar Skibski (Instytut Informatyki, Wydział MIM UW)
Attachment Centrality: An Axiomatic Approach to Connectivity in Networks
In many social networks, certain nodes play more important roles than others. Consequently, the concept of centrality index has been extensively studied in the literature. More recently, a number of new centrality indices have been …
March 31, 2016, 12:15 p.m.
Marcin Waniek (Instytut Informatyki, Wydział MIM UW)
The Dollar Auction with Spiteful Bidders
Shubik's (all-pay) dollar auction is a simple yet powerful auction model that aims to shed light on the motives and dynamics of conflict escalation. Common intuition suggests that the dollar auction is a trap, inducing …
March 17, 2016, 12:15 p.m.
Piotr Skowron (University of Oxford)
Committee Scoring Rules: Axiomatic Classification and Hierarchy
We present and advertise the class of committee scoring rules, recently introduced as multiwinner analogues of single-winner scoring rules. We present a hierarchy of committee scoring rules (while includes all previously studied subclasses of committee …