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Seminar Games, Mechanisms, and Social Networks

The seminar deals with issues at the intersection of computer science, artificial intelligence and economics. We discuss results of our group members from game theory (cooperative and non-cooperative), social choice theory, mechanism design and social network analysis.

The seminar takes place roughly every 2 weeks. Once a month (usually on the first Thursday of the month), the seminar is held remotely and is connected with AGH.


Organizers

Information

Thursdays, 12:15 p.m. , room: 4050

Home page

https://aiecon.mimuw.edu.pl/research/research-seminar/

Research fields

List of talks

  • Sept. 26, 2019, 10:15 a.m.
    Michał Godziszewski
    Proportionality and Consistency in Judgment Aggregation and Belief Merging
    Proportionality of a voting rule can be characterized as the ability to reflect all shades of political opinion of a society within the winning committee. The purpose of our project is to apply the voting …

  • June 27, 2019, 10:15 a.m.
    Joanna Kaczmarek (Uniwersytet Adama Mickiewicza w Poznaniu)
    Generalised Nash bargaining solution in multiplayer games on graphs
    The presentation is about the algorithm of Jon Kleinberg and Éva Tardos for multiplayer coalition games. Its purpose is to create two-person coalitions and to divide the gain between the players. These games are represented …

  • June 13, 2019, 10:30 a.m.
    Gleb Polevoy (Instytut Informatyki, UW)
    Solutions to Games, Transitions and Efficiency
    For any solution concept, we extend the solution set of a strategic-form game to a transition set. This set contains profiles where various agents simultaneously follow different solutions, e.g. different Nash equilibria. This models the …

  • June 6, 2019, 10:15 a.m.
    Kajetan Chmielewski (Instytut Filozofii, Uniwersytet Warszawski)
    Percepcja i rozumienie znaków przez przedstawicieli różnych kultur
    Z powodu coraz częstszego wprowadzania pojazdów autonomicznych do ruchu w przestrzeni publicznej, których liczba ma do 2020 roku osiągnąć ponad 10 milionów 1, zauważyliśmy potrzebę stworzenia i wprowadzenia sytemu znaków informacyjnych biorących pod uwagę nowe …

  • May 30, 2019, 10:15 a.m.
    Dorota Celińska-Kopczyńska (Wydział Nauk Ekonomicznych, UW)
    Applying non-Euclidean geometries to Social Network Analysis
    Most data analysts take it for granted to use some subregions of a flat space as their data model, which means utilizing constructs that follow the principles of the Euclidean geometry. However, it is not …

  • April 25, 2019, 10:15 a.m.
    Marcin Waniek (New York University Abu Dhabi)
    Hiding in Multilayer Networks
    Multilayer networks allow for modeling complex relationships, where individuals are embedded in multiple social networks at the same time. Given the ubiquity of such relationships, these networks are increasingly gaining attention in the literature. We …

  • April 11, 2019, 10:15 a.m.
    Michał Jaworski (Instytut Informatyki, UW)
    Multiwinner Elections - model with Issues
    We study a model of Multiwinner Elections with Issues, in which we assume that an instance consists of a set of individuals (voters and candidates), desired committee size k and p Issues, which will be …

  • March 28, 2019, 10:15 a.m.
    Tomasz Wąs (Instytut Informatyki, UW)
    An Axiomatic Approach to the Manipulability of Centrality Measures
    Centrality measures are among the most fundamental tools for social network analysis. Since network data is often incomplete, erroneous, or otherwise manipulated, increasing attention has recently been paid to studying the sensitivity of centrality measures …

  • March 7, 2019, 10:15 a.m.
    Piotr Skowron (Instytut Informatyki, UW)
    Proportionality Degree of Multiwinner Rules
    We study multiwinner elections with approval-based preferences. An instance of a multiwinner election consists of a set of alternatives, a population of voters---each voter approves a subset of alternatives, and the desired committee size k; …

  • Jan. 24, 2019, 10:15 a.m.
    Michał Godziszewski (Instytut Informatyki, UW)
    Judgement Aggregation and Multiwinner Elections
    In most general terms, the theory of judgement aggregation (JA) investigates rules for making consistent collective judgements on a set of propositions on the basis of the group members' individual judgements on these propositions. A …

  • Dec. 6, 2018, 10:15 a.m.
    Grzegorz Pierczyński (Instytu)
    Approval-based elections and distortion of voting rules
    We consider elections where both voters and candidates can be associated with points in a metric space and each voter prefers candidates that are closer to him/her to those that are further away. Such a …

  • Nov. 22, 2018, 10:15 a.m.
    Oskar Skibski (Instytut Informatyki, UW)
    Attachment Centrality: Properties and Computation
    Centrality indices aim to quantify the importance of nodes or edges in a network. Much interest has been recently raised by the body of work in which a node’s connectivity is understood less as its …

  • Nov. 8, 2018, 10:15 a.m.
    Tomasz Wąs (Instytut Informatyki UW)
    Random Walk Decay Centrality
    We propose a new centrality measure, called the Random Walk Decay centrality. While most centralities in the literature are based on the notion of shortest paths, this new centrality measure stems from the random walk …

  • Oct. 26, 2018, 12:15 p.m.
    Dominik Peters (Department of Computer Science, University of Oxford)
    Allocation of Indivisible Items with Connected Bundles
    Suppose a collection of indivisible goods are arranged in a line, and we wish to allocate these items to agents so that each agent receives a connected bundle (an interval). This makes sense when the …

  • Oct. 18, 2018, 10:15 a.m.
    Marcin Dziubiński (Instytut Informatyki, UW)
    How to hide in a network
    We propose and study a strategic model of hiding in a network, where the network designer chooses the links and his position in the network facing the seeker who inspects and disrupts the network. We …