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Two-Sided Manipulation Games in Stable Matching Markets
- Speaker(s)
- Grzegorz Lisowski
- Affiliation
- AGH University of Science and Technology
- Language of the talk
- English
- Date
- Dec. 5, 2024, 12:15 p.m.
- Room
- room 4050
- Title in Polish
- Two-Sided Manipulation Games in Stable Matching Markets
- Seminar
- Seminar Games, Mechanisms, and Social Networks
The Deferred Acceptance algorithm is an elegant procedure for finding a stable matching in two-sided matching markets. It ensures that no pair of agents prefers each other to their matched partners. In this work, we initiate the study of two-sided manipulations in matching markets as non-cooperative games. We introduce the accomplice manipulation game, where an agent from one side misreport their preferences to help an agent on the other side obtain a better partner, whenever possible. We provide a polynomial time algorithm for finding a Nash equilibrium and show that our algorithm always yields a stable matching, although not every Nash equilibrium corresponds to a stable matching. Additionally, we show how our analytical techniques for the accomplice manipulation game can be applied to other manipulation games in matching markets, such as one-for-many and standard self-manipulation games. We complement our theoretical findings with empirical evaluations of different properties of Nash equilibria.
