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Seminar Games, Mechanisms, and Social Networks

The seminar deals with issues at the intersection of computer science, artificial intelligence and economics. We discuss results of our group members from game theory (cooperative and non-cooperative), social choice theory, mechanism design and social network analysis.

The seminar takes place roughly every 2 weeks. Once a month (usually on the first Thursday of the month), the seminar is held remotely and is connected with AGH.


Organizers

Information

Thursdays, 12:15 p.m. , room: 4050

Home page

https://aiecon.mimuw.edu.pl/research/research-seminar/

Research fields

List of talks

  • Jan. 25, 2024, 12:15 p.m.
    Piotr Faliszewski (AGH University of Science and Technology)
    Guide to Experiments in COMSOC (Guide to Experiments in COMSOC)
    In this talk I will discuss how numerical experiments on elections were typically performed in computational social choice and what we can learn from it. In particular, we will see what election sizes were considered …

  • Dec. 7, 2023, 10:15 a.m.
    Tomasz Wąs (LAMSADE, Paryż)
    Terrible) Chore (Fairly Allocating Goods and)
    We study the fair allocation of mixtures of indivisible goods and chores under lexicographic preferences—a subdomain of additive preferences. A prominent fairness notion for allocating indivisible items is envy-freeness up to any item (EFX). Yet, …

  • Nov. 30, 2023, 12:15 p.m.
    Marcin Dziubiński (University of Warsaw)
    Interconnected Battles
    We study a model of multibattle contest with two players and spillovers of efforts between battles. The players distribute their costly efforts across the battles. Each battle receives effort assigned to it directly (real efforts) as well as …

  • Nov. 23, 2023, 12:15 p.m.
    Marcin Waniek (University of Warsaw)
    Modelling global market access using networks
    In this (very much in progress) work we use network science techniques to model access of different locations around the world to the global market. It was shown in the literature that it is possible …

  • Nov. 9, 2023, noon
    Grzegorz Lisowski (AGH University of Science and Technology)
    Strategic Cost Selection in Participatory Budgeting
    We study strategic behaviour of project proposers in the  context of approval-based participatory budgeting, assuming that the votes are fixed and known and the proposers want to set as high project prices as possible, provided that their …

  • Oct. 19, 2023, 12:15 p.m.
    Georgios Papasotiropoulos (Athens University of Economics and Business)
    Conditional Approval Voting: Winner Determination, Strategic Control and Proportionality Considerations
    Picture a group of friends in Warsaw deciding on a shared meal: a starter and a main course. One among them loves pierogi and would like to go for bigos afterwards--easy to vote for in the classical approval voting …

  • Oct. 9, 2023, 10:15 a.m.
    Makoto Yokoo (Kyushu University)
    Matching Market Design with Constraints
    Two-sided matching deals with finding a desirable combination of two parties, e.g., students and colleges, workers and companies, and medical residents to hospitals. Beautiful theoretical results on two-sided matching have been obtained, i.e., the celebrated Deferred Acceptance mechanism is …

  • Oct. 5, 2023, noon
    Oskar Skibski (University of Warsaw)
    Vitality Indices and Game-Theoretic Centralities
    Vitality indices form a natural class of centrality measures that assess the importance of a node based on the impact its removal has on the network. In this talk, we will discuss the connection between …

  • June 22, 2023, noon
    Jarosław Flis (Uniwersytet Jagielloński)
    Ordynacja Proporcjonalno-Lokalna - ordynacja dla Polski?
    Opracowanie to przedstawia oryginalny projekt ordynacji proporcjonalno-lokalnej (dalej „ordynacji PL”), będący odpowiedzią na postulat wprowadzenia w Polsce ordynacji mieszanej. Proponowany system jest możliwie zbliżony do obecnego, choć jednocześnie wprowadza starannie przemyślane nowe elementy. Nawiązuje zarówno …

  • May 18, 2023, 12:15 p.m.
    Natalia Kucharczuk (University of Warsaw)
    Group Vitality Indices and the Shapley Value
    We will start the presentation by showing a link between Vitality Indices and Shapley Value-based induced game-theoretic centralities. It is a foundation of our current research regarding extending vitality indices into groups. We propose novel …

  • May 4, 2023, noon
    Grzegorz Pierczyński (University of Warsaw)
    Market-Based Explanations of Collective Decisions
    We consider approval-based committee elections, in which a size-k subset of available candidates must be selected given approval sets for each voter, indicating the candidates approved by the voter. A number of axioms capturing ideas …

  • March 23, 2023, 12:15 p.m.
    Jorge Salas (Pontificia Universidad Católica de Chile & University of Edinburgh)
    How Do Centrality Measures Choose the Root of Trees?
    Centrality measures are widely used to assign importance to graph-structured data. Recently, understanding the principles of such measures has attracted a lot of attention. Given that measures are diverse, this research has usually focused on …

  • March 16, 2023, 12:15 p.m.
    Stanisław Szufa (AGH, Kraków)
    Spoiler Susceptibility in Party Elections
    An electoral spoiler is usually defined as a losing candidate whose removal would affect the outcome by changing the winner. So far spoiler effects have been analyzed primarily for single-winner electoral systems. We consider this …

  • March 2, 2023, noon
    Sonja Kraiczy (University of Oxford)
    Properties of the Mallows Model Depending on the Number of Alternatives: A Warning for an Experimentalist
    The Mallows model is a popular distribution for ranked data. We empirically and theoretically analyze how the properties of rankings sampled from the Mallows model change when increasing the number of alternatives. We find that …

  • Feb. 2, 2023, noon
    Oskar Skibski (University of Warsaw)
    Closeness centrality via the Condorcet principle
    We provide a characterization of closeness centrality in the class of distance-based centralities. To this end, we introduce a natural property, called majority comparison, that states that out of two adjacent nodes the one closer …