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The seminar deals with issues at the intersection of computer science, artificial intelligence and economics. We discuss results of our group members from game theory (cooperative and non-cooperative), social choice theory, mechanism design and social network analysis.

The seminar takes place roughly every 2 weeks. Once a month (usually on the first Thursday of the month), the seminar is held remotely and is connected with AGH.

Organizers

dr hab. Oskar Skibski
dr hab. Piotr Skowron

Information

Thursdays, 12:15 p.m. , room: 4050

Home page

https://aiecon.mimuw.edu.pl/research/research-seminar/

Research fields

List of talks

Oct. 5, 2023, noon
Oskar Skibski (University of Warsaw)
Vitality Indices and Game-Theoretic Centralities
Vitality indices form a natural class of centrality measures that assess the importance of a node based on the impact its removal has on the network. In this talk, we will discuss the connection between …
June 22, 2023, noon
Jarosław Flis (Uniwersytet Jagielloński)
Ordynacja Proporcjonalno-Lokalna - ordynacja dla Polski?
Opracowanie to przedstawia oryginalny projekt ordynacji proporcjonalno-lokalnej (dalej „ordynacji PL”), będący odpowiedzią na postulat wprowadzenia w Polsce ordynacji mieszanej. Proponowany system jest możliwie zbliżony do obecnego, choć jednocześnie wprowadza starannie przemyślane nowe elementy. Nawiązuje zarówno …
May 18, 2023, 12:15 p.m.
Natalia Kucharczuk (University of Warsaw)
Group Vitality Indices and the Shapley Value
We will start the presentation by showing a link between Vitality Indices and Shapley Value-based induced game-theoretic centralities. It is a foundation of our current research regarding extending vitality indices into groups. We propose novel …
May 4, 2023, noon
Grzegorz Pierczyński (University of Warsaw)
Market-Based Explanations of Collective Decisions
We consider approval-based committee elections, in which a size-k subset of available candidates must be selected given approval sets for each voter, indicating the candidates approved by the voter. A number of axioms capturing ideas …
March 23, 2023, 12:15 p.m.
Jorge Salas (Pontificia Universidad Católica de Chile & University of Edinburgh)
How Do Centrality Measures Choose the Root of Trees?
Centrality measures are widely used to assign importance to graph-structured data. Recently, understanding the principles of such measures has attracted a lot of attention. Given that measures are diverse, this research has usually focused on …
March 16, 2023, 12:15 p.m.
Stanisław Szufa (AGH, Kraków)
Spoiler Susceptibility in Party Elections
An electoral spoiler is usually defined as a losing candidate whose removal would affect the outcome by changing the winner. So far spoiler effects have been analyzed primarily for single-winner electoral systems. We consider this …
March 2, 2023, noon
Sonja Kraiczy (University of Oxford)
Properties of the Mallows Model Depending on the Number of Alternatives: A Warning for an Experimentalist
The Mallows model is a popular distribution for ranked data. We empirically and theoretically analyze how the properties of rankings sampled from the Mallows model change when increasing the number of alternatives. We find that …
Feb. 2, 2023, noon
Oskar Skibski (University of Warsaw)
Closeness centrality via the Condorcet principle
We provide a characterization of closeness centrality in the class of distance-based centralities. To this end, we introduce a natural property, called majority comparison, that states that out of two adjacent nodes the one closer …
Jan. 12, 2023, 12:15 p.m.
Michał Pawłowski (University of Warsaw)
Optimizing ride-hailing fares using computational microeconomy tools
Pricing ride-hailing fares sparked a rich line of work in computer science due to its complexity and multidimensionality of aspects. We add to this line of research by considering the model presented by Hikima et …
Jan. 5, 2023, noon
Piotr Faliszewski (AGH University in Kraków)
+ some more (Map of Elections: Diversity, Polarization, and Agreement In Elections)
In this talk I will present the idea of the map of (ordinal) elections and argue what it is good for. First, we will spend considerable amount of time on understanding diversity, polarization, and agreement …
Dec. 15, 2022, 12:15 p.m.
Stanisław Kaźmierowski (University of Warsaw)
Algorithm for solving the attack and interception game on networks
The paper "Attack and interception in networks" (F. Bloch, K. Chatterjee, B. Dutta, 2022), describes a game where a single attacker chooses a target and a path and each node chooses a level of protection. …
Dec. 8, 2022, noon
Piotr Skowron (Uniwersytet Warszawski)
Proportionality in General Social Choice Models
We consider a model where a number of candidates need to be selected subject to certain feasibility constraints. The model generalises committee elections (where there is a single constraint on the number of candidates that …
Nov. 17, 2022, 12:15 p.m.
Piotr Skowron (University of Warsaw)
Proportional Participatory Budgeting with Additive Utilities
We study voting rules for participatory budgeting, where a group of voters collectively decides which projects should be funded using a common budget. We allow the projects to have arbitrary costs, and the voters to …
Nov. 3, 2022, noon
Łukasz Janeczko (AGH)
Ties in Multiwinner Approval Voting
We investigate ties in multiwinner approval voting both theoretically and experimentally. Specifically, we analyze the computational complexity of 1) determining if there is a tie in a given election for a given rule, and 2) …
Oct. 20, 2022, 12:15 p.m.
Jannik Peters (TU Berlin)
Proportional Participatory Budgeting with Approval-Based Satisfaction Functions
The ability to measure the satisfaction of (groups of) voters is a crucial prerequisite for formulating proportionality axioms in approval-based participatory budgeting elections. Two common -- but very different -- ways to measure the satisfaction …