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A Mechanism of Dynamical Interactions for Two-Person Social Dilemmas

Speaker(s)
Krzysztof Mogielski i Tadeusz Płatkowski (MIMUW)
Affiliation
Uniwersytet Warszawski
Date
March 10, 2010, 4:15 p.m.
Room
room 5820
Seminar
Seminar of Biomathematics and Game Theory Group

We propose a new mechanism of interactions between game - theoretical
agents in which the weights of the connections between interacting
individuals are dynamical, payoff - dependent variables.
Their evolution depends on the difference between the payoff of the agents
from a given type of encounter and their average payoff. The mechanism is
studied in the framework of two models: agents distributed on a random
graph
and a mean field model. Symmetric and asymmetric connections between the
agents are introduced. Long time behavior of both systems is discussed for
the Prisoner's Dilemma and the Snow Drift games.