Group 1 | Szarkowska Magdalena | Pierczynski Grzegorz | 20.03.2017 | 08.05.2017 |
Group 2 | Łabęcki Łukasz | Rymarz Piotr | 13.03.2017 | 24.04.2017 |
Group 3 | Graczykowski Michał | Poskrobko Paweł | 13.03.2017 | 05.06.2017 |
Group 4 | Banaszkiewicz Michał | Knopik Tomasz | 20.03.2017 | 05.06.2017 |
Group 5 | Konefał Grzegorz | Kopański Jan | 27.03.2017 | 15.05.2017 |
Group 6 | Izert Piotr | Woźnica Piotr | 06.03.2017 | 10.04.2017 |
Group 7 | Okrasa Michał | Maczkowska Marta | 06.03.2017 | 24.04.2017 |
Group 8 | Józefowicz Zuzanna | Milewski Jakub | 03.04.2017 | 08.05.2017 |
Group 9 | Kończyk Marcin | Retyk Michał | 10.04.2017 | 22.05.2017 |
Group 10 | Sienkiewicz Paweł | Preibisch Michał | 03.04.2017 | 22.05.2017 |
Group 11 | Baranowski Maciej | Zaręba Mariusz | 27.03.2017 | 15.05.2017 |
Lecture 01 (27.02.2017) INTRODUCTION
Lecture 02 (06.03.2017) COMPUTATIONAL SOCIAL CHOICE
Group 7 | Okrasa Michał | Maczkowska Marta | |
"Preference Handling in Combinatorial Domains: From AI to SocialChoice" | |||
Group 6 | Izert Piotr | Woźnica Piotr | |
Y. Chevaleyre et al. A Short Introduction to Computational SocialChoice. Proc. SOFSEM-2007, Springer-Verlag, 2007. |
Lecture 03 (13.03.2017) ARROW'S THEOREM & BEYOND
Group 2 | Łabęcki Łukasz | Rymarz Piotr | |
Computer Aided Proof of Arrow's Theorem | |||
Group 3 | Graczykowski Michał | Poskrobko Paweł | |
A Straightforward Proof of Arrow's Theorem |
Lecture 04 (20.03.2017) MECHANISM DESIGN - INTRODUCTION
Group 1 | Szarkowska Magdalena | Pierczynski Grzegorz | |
Capital in the XXI century by Piketty | |||
Group 4 | Banaszkiewicz Michał | Knopik Tomasz | |
A Simple Proof of Gibbard-Satherwhite Theorem |
Lecture 05 (27.03.2017) MECHANISM DESIGN - CONT.
Group 5 | Konefał Grzegorz | Kopański Jan | |
Girvan-Newman algorithm | |||
Group 11 | Baranowski Maciej | Zaręba Mariusz | |
J. Bartholdi, III, C. Tovey, and M. Trick. Computational difficulty of manipulating an election. Social Choice and Welfare, 6(3):227–241, 1989. |
The material for lectures 03, 04, and 05 can be found in the Nisan N., "Introduction to Mechanism Design for Computer Scientists"
Lecture 06 (03.04.2017) REVELATION PRINCIPLE
Group 8 | Józefowicz Zuzanna | Milewski Jakub | |
Babaioff et al. "Impersonation-Based Mechanism" |
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Group 10 | Sienkiewicz Paweł | Preibisch Michał | |
Criticism of Piketty also read text1 and other sources from the internet about the 26-yo graduate who challenged Piketty |
Lecture 07 (10.04.2017) AUCTION FORMATS
Group 11 | Kończyk Marcin | Retyk Michał | |
"Auction fever: Rising revenue in second-price auction formats" by K |
Group 6 | Izert Piotr | Woźnica Piotr | |
"Reducing Costly Information Acquisition in Auctions" by Kate Larson |
Lecture 08 (24.04.2017) AUCTIONS WITH EXTERNALITIES
Group 7 | Okrasa Michał | Maczkowska Marta | |
P. Jehiel, B. Moldovanu, and E. Stacchetti. How (not) to sell nuclear weapons. Amer. Econ. Review, 86(4):814–29, 1996 | |||
Group 2 | Łabęcki Łukasz | Rymarz Piotr | |
The biggest auction ever... |
Lecture 09 (08.05.2017) GARRY BECKER
Group 8 | Józefowicz Zuzanna |
Milewski Jakub |
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Children + Krytyka Garego Beckera |
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Group 5 | Konefał Grzegorz | Kopański Jan |
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http://www.eecs.harvard.edu/cs286r/courses/fall09/... |
Lecture 10 (15.05.2016) TRUTH REVELATION IN APPROX. EFFICIENT COMB. AUCTIONS
Group 1 | Szarkowska Magdalena | Pierczynski Grzegorz | |
http://www.dbc.wroc.pl/dlibra/doccontent?id=24918 | |||
Group13 |
Grycuk Maria |
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Lecture 11 (22.05.2016) POWER INDICES
Group 3 |
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Group 7 |
Wojtek Mandrysz |
Maciej Kieroń |
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Sekcja o "Generating functions" z http://www2.warwick.ac.uk/fac/soc/economics/research/workingpapers/2008/twerp644.pdf |
Lecture 12 (30.05.2016) GRAPH-RESTRICTED POWER INDICES
Group 2 |
Bartosz Szopa |
Piotr Kozłowski |
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Group 9 |
Krzysztof Imianowski |
Wojciech Rybak |
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Lecture 13 (6.06.2016) ROBERT'S THEOREM
Group 12 | Anna Persona | Konrad Sloniewski | |
Ethics in self-driving cars. | |||
Group 13 | Krzysztof Pachacz | Krzysztof Kiewicz | |
The model description and the key findings from here. |
Lecture 14 (13.06.2016) TBA
Group 12 | |||