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THE NAMBAN TRADE

Merchants and Missionaries in 16th and 17th Century Japan

MIHOKO OKA

Series Editor: GEORGE BRYAN SOUZA

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By

Mihoko Oka

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Contents

General Series Editor's Preface

Over the past half millennium, from circa 1450 until the last third or so of the twentieth century, much of the world's history has been influenced in great part by one general dynamic and complex historical process known as European expansion. Defined as the opening up, unfolding, or increasing the extent, number, volume, or scope of the space, size, or participants belonging to a certain people or group, location, or geographical region, Europe's expansion initially emerged and emanated physically, intellectually, and politically from southern Europe—specifically from the Iberian peninsula—during the fifteenth century, expanding rapidly from that locus to include, first, all of Europe's maritime and, later, most of its continental states and peoples. Most commonly associated with events described as the discovery of America and of a passage to the East Indies (Asia) by rounding the Cape of Good Hope (Africa) during the early modern and modern periods, European expansion and encounters with the rest of the world multiplied and morphed into several ancillary historical processes, including colonization, imperialism, capitalism, and globalization, encompassing themes, among others, relating to contacts and, to quote the EURO series' original mission statement, "connections and exchanges; peoples, ideas and products, especially through the medium of trading companies; the exchange of religions and traditions; the transfer of technologies; and the development of new forms of political, social and economic policy, as well as identity formation." Because of its intrinsic importance, extensive research has been performed and much has been written about the entire period of European expansion.

With the first volume published in 2009, Brill launched the European Expansion and Indigenous Response book series at the initiative of well-known scholar and respected historian, Glenn J. Ames, who, prior to his untimely passing, was the founding editor and guided the first seven volumes of the series to publication. Being one of the early members of the series' editorial board, I was then appointed as Series Editor. The series' founding objectives are to focus on publications "that understand and deal with the process of European expansion, interchange and connectivity in a global context in the early modern and modern period" and to "provide a forum for a variety of types of scholarly work with a wider disciplinary approach that moves beyond the traditional isolated and nation bound historiographical emphases of this field, encouraging whenever possible non-European perspectives…that seek to understand this indigenous transformative process and period in autonomous as well as inter-related cultural, economic, social, and ideological terms."

The history of European expansion is a challenging field in which interest is likely to grow, in spite of, or perhaps because of, its polemical nature. Controversy has centered on tropes conceived and written in the past by Europeans, primarily concerning their early reflections and claims regarding the transcendental historical nature of this process and its emergence and importance in the creation of an early modern global economy and society. One of the most persistent objections is that the field has been "Eurocentric." This complaint arises because of the difficulty in introducing and balancing different historical perspectives, when one of the actors in the process is to some degree neither European nor Europeanized—a conundrum alluded to in the African proverb: "Until the lion tells his tale, the hunt will always glorify the hunter." Another, and perhaps even more important and growing historiographical issue, is that with the re-emergence of historical millennial societies (China and India, for example) and the emergence of other non-Western European societies successfully competing politically, economically, and intellectually on the global scene vis-à-vis Europe, the seminal nature of European expansion is being subjected to greater scrutiny, debate, and comparison with other historical alternatives.

Despite, or perhaps because of, these new directions and stimulating sources of existing and emerging lines of dispute regarding the history of European expansion, I and the editorial board of the series will continue with the original objectives and mission statement of the series and vigorously "… seek out studies that employ diverse forms of analysis from all scholarly disciplines, including anthropology, archaeology, art history, history (including the history of science), linguistics, literature, music, philosophy, and religious studies." In addition, we shall seek to stimulate, locate, incorporate, and publish the most important and exciting scholarship in the field.

Towards that purpose, I am pleased to introduce volume 34 of Brill's EURO series entitled: *The Namban Trade: Merchants and Missionaries in 16th- and 17th-Century Japan*. Authored by Mihoko Oka, originally, in Japanese and published by the University of Tokyo Press in 2010. Oka has performed extensive research and perceptive analysis, primarily, from a Japanese historiographical viewpoint and perspective that shed and still sheds new light and a clearer focus upon this important topic concerning Japan's early modern maritime trade and commercial contacts and encounters with European and Asian merchants, prior to the implementation by the Tokugawa of its reputed and contested "closure" policy. In this instance and in the interest of engaging and incorporating alternative non-English language historiographical perspectives towards the examination of issues in the history of European expansion and indigenous response, the series' approached this author and requested her translation and revision and actualization of her interesting and original work.

The EURO series is convinced that *The Namban Trade* fulfills the objective and the aspiration for its publication. The series' and the specific readership of this volume should and, perhaps, will concur with our objective and assessment. If not, hopefully, it will be engaged and incorporated into the English language literature on the topic.

George Bryan Souza

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I would like to express particular gratitude to those scholars who have generously assisted me with their insightful comments and suggestions in the long process of writing this book. These include the great former historians George Bryan Souza, Leonard Blusee, Kōichirō Takase, Takashi Gonoi, Hisashi Kishino, Masashi Haneda, François Gipouloux, Shiro Momoki, Hitomi Tonomura, Toru Hoya, Yoko Matsui, Fuyuko Matsukata and all those colleagues and friends who gave me special assistance in deepening my knowledge. I owe special thanks to my past supervisors, who guided me to the life of a historian, Sachiko Takeda, Haruko Wakita, and Engelbert Jorissen. In helping me to publish this work in English, Daniel Schley, Mitsuru Takaku and Elizabeth Stone of Bourchier have assisted with translation and editing. I am also grateful for the financial support from the University of Tokyo which granted me support for the writing of the book through an overseas training program (March–September 2018).

From 2000, the Japan Society for the Promotion of Science (JSPS) also provided various kinds of grants necessary for my research in foreign archives, enabling me to collect secondary sources. This book is the result of two projects in particular:

1 Study on Monsoon Records (*Livro das Monções*) and Portuguese Historical Sources as Materials for the Asian History (2014–2017). Grant-in-Aid for Young Scientists (A) 26704007
2 Japanese Jesuits in Japan, from analysis of former Buddhist monks (2018–2021). Grant-in-Aid for Scientific Research (C) 18K00905

Figures and Tables

Figures

Tables

Prologue

In the summer of 2016, I received an invitation from Professor Hitomi Tonomura at the University of Michigan to contribute to a new book series, *the Cambridge History of Japan*. She entrusted me with the writing of a chapter on Christianity in medieval Japan. Of course, there were many previous studies on the subject of the history of Christianity in Japan, but many of the sources consulted were in European languages, with the result that there has been a lot of research in the West over many years. The fact that I was asked to write on this research topic that has so much significance was largely thanks to my own good fortune and my knowledge of non-Western languages and sources.

Jurgis (George) Elisonas described the spread of Christianity in Japan through Christian *daimyō* in the "Early Modern" volume of the 1991 edition of *The Cambridge History of Japan*. This was a basic textbook on the history of Christianity in Japan, accompanying the same author's monumental work *Deus Destroyed* (Harvard University Press, 1988). However, in recent years, I have argued that the Christianity prevalent in Japan during this period should not be regarded as true "Christianity" but as a unique Japanese religion called "Kirishitan." This perspective is increasingly becoming standard in research on this subject in Japan. However, the notion of "Christianity in Japan" is still deep-seated in the West, and research on the history of Christianity in Japan tends to refer only to those studies that are written in English. For the chapter entrusted to me in the series, I wrote with the intention of introducing Western readers to the study of the history of Christianity in Japan, which spanned more than a hundred years.

The editors generally understood the purpose of the first manuscript; however, they indicated that "the fact that recent Western research had not been introduced at all is a serious problem." I had intended to catch up on contemporary Western research relating to the history of Christianity in Japan, but did not realize it was relevant to the focus of the chapter. My knowledge of and perspective on the history of Christianity has been heavily influenced by Takashi Gonoi.[1] Research on the history of Christianity in Japan, which was developed by European Jesuits in the early 20th century, was further developed by a Japanese research group led by Arimichi Ebisawa in the 1960s and 1970s

1 Gonoi has published a number of monographs on the history of Christianity in Japan. His representative work is: Takashi Gonoi, *Tokugawa Shoki Kirishitan Kenkyū* [Study on Kirishitan in the Early Tokugawa Period] (Tokyo: Yoshikawa Kōbunkan, 1992).

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that produced excellent Japanese researchers including Kōichirō Takase,[2] Takashi Gonoi, and Hisashi Kishino etc..[3] While these researchers were able to thoroughly interpret manuscripts written in European languages, they were largely indifferent to research being conducted in relevant fields outside Japan. There was also a dearth of research available in English. Thus, from the 1960s to the 1970s, it can be said that research on the history of Christianity in Japan evolved along its own trajectory.

In fact, during this time, the same process was taking place across the entire discipline of international relations in Japan. Therefore, it can be presumed that the independent development of the history of Christianity in Japan by Japanese researchers reflected the experience of the discipline of international relations history in Japan as a whole.

1 Japanese Scholarship on International Relations History from the 1970s

The study of the history of 16th- and 17th-century international relations in Japan was advanced in the 1970s. The starting point was the *Establishment of Sakoku* by Naohiro Asao.[4] Asao broadly classified the factors leading to the *Sakoku* (national seclusion policy) imposed by the Tokugawa Shogunate into five categories, with the existence of a "Japanese world order" philosophy as a common element among them. The term "Japanese world order" was coined to describe the theory that the Tokugawa Shogunate sought to isolate itself from the Chinese world order in which Japan was situated and from the imperial expansion of Europe with which Japan was beginning to see itself embroiled, and to choose independently its own international partners, thereby placing itself "at the top."

This notion was critical in the contemporary "Western-centric" research on the history of international relations, represented by Seiichi Iwao's *Sakoku*, which greatly influenced subsequent research on the history of international relations.[5] In his Introduction, Iwao stated that "Japan, an island nation almost entirely isolated from the world's major movements, was also thrust into the

2 Takase's valuable and remarkable works will be mentioned throughout this book.

3 Kishino's study has been used to link East Asia and the Jesuits' activity in Japan, namely his work on Francis Xavier: Hisashi Kishino, *Zabieru to Nihon* [Xavier and Japan] (Tokyo: Yoshikawa Kōbunkan, 1998).

4 Naohiro Asao, "Sakoku-sei no Seiritsu" [Establishment of *Sakoku*], in Rekishigaku Kenkyukai and Nihonshi Kenkyukai (eds.), *Kōza Nihonshi*, vol. 4 (Tokyo: University of Tokyo Press, 1970).

5 Seiichi Iwao, *Sakoku* [National Seclusion] (Tokyo: Chūō Kōronsha, 1966).

midst through their contact with the Europeans, and this has enormous direct and indirect impacts on politics, economy, military affairs, and ideology." The sense that from the Meiji Restoration "Japan lagged behind the modern Western culture due to its *Sakoku* policy" and the weight of the "Western impact," which arose from the "sense of defeat against Western civilization" after World War II, seems to have dominated the entire discipline of history during this period.

Around the same time that Asao published his *Establishment of Sakoku* in Kyoto, a study group was organized within the Historiographical Institute (Shiryō-hensanjo) of the University of Tokyo to research the history of premodern international relations. This research group included Takeo Tanaka,[6] Shōsuke Murai,[7] and Yasunori Arano,[8] all of whom eventually became leading researchers in the history of international relations in Japan. Their research decoupled 16th- and 17th-century Japan from globalization trends, limiting it to the world of "East Asia" and viewing foreign relations during the period through this lens. Their work attracted great interest internationally in the disciplines of Japanese history, and new books such as *The State and Diplomacy* (Princeton University Press, 1984) by Ronald Toby reconsidered the position of early modern Japan in the world of East Asia. This was also a period during which Japanese and international research trends became linked. The popular movement to "look at Japan in the context of East Asia" succeeded in expanding the world view of researchers who had previously regarded Japanese history only as "Japanese." At the same time, however, it induced among Japanese historians a somewhat lazy way of researching history, with the belief that "there is no need to look at anything other than East Asia" and that "one does not need to read European literature."

This series of developments was a reaction to the biased "Western-centric view of history" that predominated until the 1970s, and there can be no doubt that the perspective of the "world of East Asia" promoted new research. Concurrently, however, Japanese history was confined to a "world view" constructed by historical materials that could easily be deciphered by the Japanese people, which they then called the "world of East Asia." This created a risk of complacency.

The view of "Japan in East Asia," which became mainstream in the 1970s, is linked to the international environment of early modern Japan. The country's

6 Takeo Tanaka, *Wakō-umi no rekishi-* [The Woko-History of the Sea] (Tokyo: Kōdansha, 1982).

7 Shōsuke Murai, *Chūsei Wajin-den* [Records of Wa People in the Middle Ages] (Tokyo: Iwanami Shoten, 1993).

8 Yasunori Arano, *Kinsei Nihon to Higashi Asia* [Early Modern Japan and East Asia] (Tokyo: University of Tokyo Press, 1988).

defeat in World War II forced Japan to shift its relations with Western countries from the Meiji government's pursuit of "equality" to a position of "subordination." After Japan recovered its national strength to a certain extent, an important issue in Japanese diplomacy became the restoration of relations with Asian countries, which had suffered tremendous damage during the war. As Japan began to play a major political and economic role in Asia after its period of high economic growth, the country began to place more emphasis on historical and cultural ties with Asian countries. The attempt to reconsider Japanese history in the "world of East Asia" seems to be linked to this political movement. In other words, the major changes that occurred in the study of the history of premodern international relations in Japan in the 1970s were greatly influenced by the international environment of Japan at the time.

2 The Eurocentric View in Japan

Broadly speaking, the changes seen in the 1970s in the approach to the history of Japan's international relations were a precursor to the anti-globalization movements that have arisen more recently. At the time, skeptical views of the history of "Western-centric" globalization were increasingly heard in the United States as well. The school of thought commonly referred to as the California school criticized the Eurocentric historical view and developed historical views that relativized European history. A well-known example is Kenneth L. Pomeranz's *The Great Divergence*, which was translated into Japanese. Pomeranz argued that Europe had been a frontier region for much of human history, and that the civilizations of China and the Orient had been at the center of the world. The advocacy of a new and powerful historical view referred to as "global history" began to influence and facilitate the growth of other relevant historical disciplines.

For example, to place European history in context, the early California school emphasized the broad imperial structures and economic systems of the Mughal and Chinese dynasties, but less attention was paid to the rest of the world. Anthony Reid's *Southeast Asia in the Age of Commerce* (2 vols., Yale University Press, 1988 & 1993), which pointed to the importance of interregional networks in Southeast Asia in the era of proto-globalization, played a major role in making historians aware that "the world was not only composed of Europe and China." As noted by Reid, Southeast Asia was also historically significant in the sense that it was a region that linked China and Europe. In other words, the kingdoms of Southeast Asia, which were strongly influenced by the Hindu and Islamic civilizations from India while also being absorbed by the

Chinese world, were important because they were "regions that connect [these various civilizations]." The importance of observing the "nation-building" process in Southeast Asia, which has diverse cultural and ethnic backgrounds, is also made evident in the work of Victor Lieberman,[9] who argued that Southeast Asia, Europe, Japan, China, and South Asia all embodied idiosyncratic versions of a Eurasian-wide pattern.

The viewpoint that research emphasizing the importance of regions other than China and Europe and the "connected history" that links them, rather than the dichotomous world between European and Chinese culture, has become a trend in global history. The commercial forces of Europe, once a relativized entity, began to be "re-discovered" as "connecting forces." Outstanding research was published by Sanjay Subrahmanyam regarding the Portuguese in Asia,[10] and by Leonard Blussé on the activities of the Dutch East India Company (VOC) in Asia.[11] Many researchers continue to study the "Europeans who link the world's regions," such as the Portuguese and Dutch; however, the study of the VOC has experienced the most growth. Tonio Andrade,[12] Cátia Antune,[13] Xing Hang,[14] Kerry Ward,[15] and Adam Clulow[16] are currently active researchers in this area who have adopted the vision proposed by Blussé. A common thread in the research by Subrahmanyam and Blussé is not only the interpretation

9 Victor Lieberman, *Strange Parallels*, vol. 2: *Mainland Mirrors: Europe, Japan, China, South Asia, and the Islands: Southeast Asia in Global Context, c.800–1830*, Studies in Comparative World History (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2009).

10 Sanjay Subrahmanyam, *Explorations in Connected History: From the Tagus to the Ganges* (New Delhi: Oxford University Press, 2005).

11 Leonard Blussé, *Visible Cities: Canton, Nagasaki, Batavia, and the Coming of the Americans* (Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press, 2008); Blussé,"No Boats to China. The Dutch East India Company and the Changing Pattern of the China Sea Trade 1635–1690," *Modern Asia Studies* 30, no. 1 (1996): 51–76.

12 Tonio Andrade, *The Gunpowder Age: China, Military Innovation, and the Rise of the West in World History* (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 2016).

13 Cátia Antunes & Jos Gommans, *Exploring the Dutch Empire* (London: Bloomsbury Academic, 2015). Cátia Antunes & Amélia Polónia (eds.), *Beyond Empires:* Global*, Self-Organizing, Cross-Imperial Networks, 1500–1800*, European Expansion and Indigenous Response (Leiden: Brill, 2016).

14 Hang Xing, *Conflict and Commerce in Maritime East Asia: The Zheng Family and the Shaping of the Modern World, c.1620–1720*, Studies in Weatherhead East Asian Institute, Columbia University (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2015).

15 Kerry Ward, *Networks of Empire: Forced Migration in the Dutch East India Company*, Studies in Comparative World History (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2012).

16 Adam Clulow, *The Company and the Shogun: The Dutch Encounter with Tokugawa Japan*, Columbia Studies in International and Global History (New York: Columbia University Press, 2014).

of European manuscripts, which have been indispensable to studies in the area, but also the extensive use of historical references in the target "region."[17] Historical references in the local Asian language are not easy to decode for Western researchers, so the capabilities of the above-mentioned researchers must have been very useful in depicting a different presence of Europe in Asia. This research method, which combines historical references in the European and local languages, is the most powerful tool for the future development of global history.

3 Maritime History Research in Japan

The historical view of "seeing Japan in East Asia," which began in the 1970s, is still in development in the field of maritime history in Japan. Work that does not focus solely on the history of Japan's bilateral relations with other countries but also examines them in the context of Asian history. Japan's geographical position as an archipelago means its relationships with foreign countries are conducted across the sea. The historical narrative differs when the perspective is from Japan versus from another location, and at times these different perspectives can cause a conflict of views. "Maritime history" has an advantage in that setting the "sea" as the theme prevents the fixation on a single country or region, enabling a more neutral perspective. The first group of Japanese scholars to recognize the potential of maritime history was located at Osaka University and led by Shirō Momoki.[18] The fact that Momoki and Shigeru Akita,[19] recognized as partners in the study of global history in Japan, were historians at Osaka University was not unrelated to the trends of maritime history that developed in the same university. However, Momoki and Akita are historians from Kyoto University, and the trends overcoming the existing "in-Japan" historical framework can be traced back to the Kyoto School.[20] Historians from

17 A recent work by Blussé with Chinese scholars is a typical example of this method. Leonard Blussé & Nie Dening, *The Chinese Annals of Batavia, the Kai Ba Lidai Shiji and Other Stories (1610–1795)*, European Expansion and Indigenous Response (Leiden: Brill, 2018).

18 Momoki Shirō et al. (eds.), *Kaiiki Ajia-shi Kenkyū Nyūmon* [An Introduction to Maritime History] (Tokyo: Iwanami Shoten, 2008).

19 Shigeru Akita, Gerold Krozewski, & Shoichi Watanabe (eds.), *The Transformation of the International Order of Asia: Decolonization, the Cold War, and the Colombo Plan*, Routledge Studies in the Modern History of Asia (Abingdon: Routledge, 2014).

20 I am not referring to the Kyoto School accurately as a historical term, but the character created by the famous Kyoto School scholars remains among those who study in Kyoto.

Kyoto University tend to prefer a non-bounded method of thinking and try to create something new.

In contrast, the University of Tokyo has endeavored to uphold a relatively conservative approach to Japanese historiography. Despite incorporating some recent trends, the Historical Society of Japan, primarily consisting of associates from the University of Tokyo, annually publishes conventional historical research. Yet, Masashi Haneda, though associated with the University of Tokyo, initiated a major new trend in global history,[21] focusing on maritime history. In a sense this was a challenge to the mainstream historiography produced by the University of Tokyo. This trend has been further advanced by a group of young and ambitious researchers who received doctorates at Leiden University under L. Blussé, such as Ryūto Shimada[22] and Atsushi Ōta,[23] and has been increasingly adopted by Japanese historians. Masashi Haneda focused on the importance of maritime history, which is more familiar to Japanese researchers than global history, which is not a standard approach in Japanese historiography, and edited a volume titled *A Maritime History of East Asia*.[24]

Among historians of Japan, foreign researchers, who have interacted closely with 'liberal' maritime historians have included a wide range of topics from classical Japanese research in recent studies, and their work has been well received internationally. Active researchers include Robert Hellyer, Peter Shapinsky,[25] Adam Clulow and Birgit Tremml-Werner.[26] These scholars have the necessary language skills to read Japanese manuscripts (*komonjo*) and are contributing to the inclusion of micro-histories by Japanese historians in major discussions. However, they all seem to agree that "research by the Japanese is too fragmented." As in other countries, the humanities disciplines in Japan are in danger of disappearing. Meanwhile, the number of academic positions in

21 Haneda also inherited a freedom in way of thinking that can be traced back to the Kyoto School. Masashi Haneda, *Toward Creation of a New World History* (Tokyo: Japan Library, 2018).

22 Ryūto Shimada, The *Intra-Asian Trade in Japanese Copper by the Dutch East India Company during the Eighteenth Century* (Leiden: Brill, 2005).

23 Atsushi Ōta, *Changes of Regime and Social Dynamics in West Java: Society, State, and the Outer World of Banten, 1750–1830* (Leiden: Brill, 2006).

24 Masashi Haneda & Mihoko Oka (eds.), *A Maritime History of East Asia* (Kyoto: Kyoto University Press, 2019). This book is a showcase consisting of numerous works by Japanese historians on maritime history in recent years for international readers.

25 Peter Shapinsky, *Lords of the Sea: Pirates, Violence, and Commerce in Late Medieval Japan*, Michigan Monograph Series in Japanese Studies (Ann Arbor: Center for Japanese Studies, University of Michigan, 2014).

26 Birgit Tremml-Werner, Spain, China and Japan in Manila, *1571–1644: Local Comparisons and Global Connections* (Amsterdam: Amsterdam University Press, 2015).

university history departments has declined but has not yet disappeared, and lectures by historians for the general public and television programs that deal with history have remained popular. There are probably more than a thousand historians in Japan who have gained employment at universities. Further, each of them continues their research while searching for themes that differ from the rest. Therefore, Japanese historians can be exemplified as *meisters* who assemble small parts of large machines.

Some Japanese historians have been able to draw larger historical pictures by combining small historical findings. Examples include Seiichi Iwao,[27] Yoko Nagazumi,[28] Eiichi Katō,[29] and Yasuko Suzuki,[30] all of whom have been cited by international researchers who can read Japanese. They independently deciphered Dutch historical references and combined them with Japanese historical references to expand Japan's history of international relations in the early Edo period. Kōichiro Takase's research on the Namban trade,[31] which used historical references from the Society of Jesus, is unlikely to be surpassed in the near future. Furthermore, Hirofumi Yamamoto primarily used Japanese historical references and research by Katō to make enormous contributions to research on the *Sakoku* policy of Japan.[32] The problem has been that their research can be read only in Japanese.

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27 Besides *Sakoku*, mentioned above, Iwao has published monumental works on overseas Japanese in the early modern period. Seiichi Iwao, *Nanyō Nihonmachi no Kenkyū* [Japanese Quarters in Nanyō-Southeast Asia] (Tokyo: Iwanami Shoten, 1940; reprinted in 1966); Iwao, *Zoku Nanyō Nihonmachi no Kenkyū* [Japanese Quarters in Nanyō-Southeast Asia], vol. 2 (Tokyo: Yoshikawa Kōbunkan, 1987); Iwao, *Shuinsen Bōekishi no Kenkū* [Study on Red Seal Ship Trade] (Tokyo: Kōbundō, 1958).

28 Yōko Nagazumi, *Hirado Oranda Shōkan no Nikki-Kinsei Gaikō no Seiritsu* [The Diary of Dutch Factory in Hirado-Establishment of Early Modern Diplomacy] (Tokyo: Kōdansha, 2000).

29 Eiichi Katō, *Bakuhan-sei Kokka no Seiritsu to Taigai Kankei* [Formation of the Shogunate System State and Foreign Relations] (Kyoto: Shibunkaku Shuppan, 1998).

30 Yasuko Suzuki, *Japan-Netherlands Trade 1600–1800: The Dutch East India Company and beyond* (Kyoto: Kyoto University Press & Melbourne: Trans Pacific Press, 2012).

31 Takase has published several monumental works on the Jesuits' trade in Japan, which comprise the main resource of this book. His representative work is Kōichirō Takase, *Kirishitan Jidai Taigai Kankei no Kenkyū* [Study on the External Relations in the Kirishitan Period] (Tokyo: Yoshikawa Kōbunkan, 1994).

32 Hirofumi Yamamoto, *Sakoku to Kaikin no Jidai* [The Age of National Seclusion and Maritime Exclusion] (Tokyo: Azekura Shobō, 1995). Yamamoto had been a leading Japanese historian of the Edo period and published more than 100 books in his life.

4 Positioning Japanese History in World History

As the polycentric worlds of the nascent global system were reorganized during the Age of Exploration, when the Portuguese and Spanish expanded eastward and westward, so too did the political and economic system of Japan change in major ways. Recent distinguished anglophone research that discusses the specific content of these changes includes Adam Clulow's *The Company and the Shogun*. However, his argument relates to the beginning of the 17th century, when the VOC appeared in Japan, and his work does not address much of the important history that precedes this period. Although I have discussed these topics in Japanese, I have not yet treated them as a sole author. Thus, I cannot discuss them at length here.

It can be said, however, that Toyotomi Hideyoshi and Tokugawa Ieyasu, who succeeded in unifying domains in Japan, and their successive Tokugawa Shoguns had a clear vision of how they would handle their relationship with the world outside Japan. Although recent studies by Mark Ravina[34] and Robert Hellyer[35] have considered how Japan was positioned internationally at the end of the Edo period, they argue that the somewhat mysterious and special existence in world history of the "beginning" of Tokugawa Japan must be more clearly delineated. I am preparing to publish a single-author book on this topic in Japan in the near future. The present book does not deal much with the political problems in Christian missionary work, thus it lacks sufficient material for understanding this problem. The analysis of Christian missionary work and of the philosophies of central governments toward these missionaries is essential for positioning 16th and 17th century Japan in world history. However, as we shall see in this book, an overview of the activities of the Portuguese and their Jesuit associates in Japan, and how they ultimately came to an end, will be a major consideration for this topic in the future.

34 Mark Ravina, *To Stand with the Nations of the World: Japan's Meiji Restoration in World History* (New York: Oxford University Press, 2020.

35 Robert Hellyer, *Defining Engagement: Japan and Global Contexts, 1640–1868*, Harvard East Asian Monographs (Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press, 2010). Robert Hellyer & Harald Fuess, *The Meiji Restoration: Japan as a Global Nation* (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2020).

Introduction

The term 'namban' 南蛮 originally referred in Japanese to the region of India and Southeast Asia or people and goods from that region, but in the 16th century it began to be used to refer to Portuguese and Spanish merchants and their respective countries. From the latter part of the 16th century through to the first half of the 17th century, trade between Japan and China was carried out mainly by Portuguese merchants, people of mixed Eurasian blood, Japanese, Chinese, and other races who assembled mostly in Macao. This book attempts to depict certain aspects of the Portuguese trade in East Asia during that era by analyzing the activities of the merchants and Christian missionaries involved.[1] It also discusses the response of the Japanese regime in handling the systemic changes that took place in the Asian seas.

Extensive research into the Namban trade has been carried out in Japan and elsewhere since before World War II, including the detailed empirical research that has been undertaken by C.R. Boxer,[2] Yoshitomo Okamoto, and Kōichirō Takase.[3] However, in order to appreciate their studies, it is not only necessary to have a wide understanding of the history of Europe and the Far East as it pertains to Japanese history, but it is also essential to have in-depth knowledge of the history of economics, the spread of Christianity, and other related elements that are not restricted to a single field. Moreover, the large volume of information contained in these studies brings its own challenges, and it may be concluded that the full value of these works may not have been sufficiently exploited in the study of Japan's relations with other countries.

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1 The original text of this book in Japanese was published in 2010, by the University of Tokyo Press. I have added some more information in each chapter since then.

2 Charles Ralph Boxer, *The Great Ship from Amacon: Annals of Macao and the Old Japan Trade 1555–1640* (Lisbon: Centro de Estudos Históricos Ultramarinos, 1959). Boxer, *Christian Century in Japan 1549–1650* (Berkeley & Los Angeles: University of California Press, 1951). Boxer, *Fidalgos in the Far East 1550–1770* (Hong Kong: Oxford University Press, 1968).

3 Kōichirō Takase, *Kirishitan Jidai no Kenkyū* [Study on the Kirishitan Period] (Tokyo: Iwanami Shoten, 1977); Takase, *Kirishitan Jidai Taigai Kankei no Kenkyū* [Study on the External Relations in the Kirishitan Period] (Tokyo: Yoshikawa Kōbunkan, 1994); Takase, *Kirishitan Jidai no Bōeki to Gaikō* [Trade and Diplomacy in the Kirishitan Period] (Tokyo: Yagi Shoten, 2002); Takase, *Kirishitan Jidai no Bunka to Shosō* [Culture and Other Various Aspects of the Kirishitan Period] (Tokyo: Yagi Shoten, 2001); Takase, *Monsoon Monjo to Nippon: Jūnana Seiki Portugal Kōbunsho-shū* [Monsoon Documents and Japan: Collection of Portuguese Archives in the Seventeenth Century] (Tokyo: Yagi Shoten, 2006). Especially the last one is not only the first Japanese translation of Monsoon Documents, but basic articles of the Namban Trade System are explained in the Introduction.

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1 The Namban Trade and Christian Missionaries

We know from research carried out by James Boyajian and George Bryan Souza that the trade practiced by the Portuguese in Asia can be largely split into trade conducted under the right of voyage granted to a Capitão-mór (Head Captain) by the Kings of Portugal and trade conducted by groups that did not come under royal control, which took place simultaneously.[4] However, it cannot be stated categorically that an awareness of this fact has fully penetrated Japan, and there is hardly any research that can provide details about the relationships at each level.

Chapter 1 explores the close relationship between the private trading groups operated by Diogo Pereira and his subordinates, who were involved in smuggling along the Ningbo coast, and Francis Xavier, the first Jesuit missionary in Asia. Many of the Portuguese merchant seamen subordinate to Pereira died or were taken prisoner during campaigns against smugglers led by the Chinese commander Zhu Wan in Shuangyu, but Pereira nevertheless expanded his Malacca/China coastal merchant network in the 1550s to finally take control of the Portuguese community in the newly formed Macao. However, Pereira was operating outside the regulations and controls set by the Portuguese authorities. Because of this, it is thought that his private trading group provided the model for the self-governance of Macao in the 16th and 17th centuries, which was centered on influential merchants. Pereira and the government of Portuguese India were frequently at odds with each other, suggesting that Portuguese private trading groups in East Asia were not always incorporated into the governmental frameworks; at times their interests clashed and the two opposed each other.

In 1555 Portuguese traders acquired a permanent base at Lampacau on the Guangzhou coast and commenced private intermediary trading between Japan and China, after they had failed to return to Malacca and had spent their first winter at Lampacau. It is thought that changes such as this that occurred in the 1550s were brought about by renewed crackdowns on the Wokou pirates by the Jiajing emperor of the Ming dynasty.

In 1557 the Portuguese were given permission by Haidao-fushi (the deputy delegate) in Guangzhou to move to Macao. The Capitão-mór system had been adopted for sea voyages to Japan by this time, and the first of these appointees,

4 James Boyajian, *Portuguese Trade in Asia under the Habsburg 1580–1640* (Baltimore: The Johns Hopkins University Press, 1993). George Bryan Souza, *The Survival of the Empire: Portuguese Trade and Society in China and the South China Sea 1630–1754* (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1986).

Francisco Martins, arrived in Lampacau by ship. Later, the situation changed so that trade between Japan and Macao was carried out simultaneously by voyages entrusted to Capitão-mórs (official trade) and by the previous method of maritime commerce operated by private merchant vessels.

2 Private Merchants and Capitão-mórs

Historical documents with detailed observations on Asian trade carried out by the Portuguese (Chapter 2) indicate that Capitão-mórs generally received 10 percent of the profits of any single trading voyage. In other words, the privileges that Capitão-mórs enjoyed while at sea included receiving a handling charge consisting of 10 percent of the commission (in the case of raw silk) and other allowances received from the owners (unspecified numbers of Macao merchants) who entrusted their cargos to the ship. Most of the cargos loaded onto Capitão-mór vessels were commodities entrusted to the ships by trading merchants in Macao. This subcontracting system was probably established under the *armação* or *companhia* system in the 1570s, a system in which the investors received distributed profits corresponding to their invested volume.[5]

It has been estimated that in around 1560 Macao had a population of approximately 900, including people from Portugal, China, India, Japan, and Southeast Asia.[6] The Capitão-mórs were appointed in accordance with their military service to the kingdom, in the same way as rights of navigation were initially allocated through other Portuguese India territories, but this system was later changed so that such rights could be bought and sold. Private merchant vessels did not disappear after the Capitão-mór system was established but continued to operate between Japan and Macao alongside the cargo subcontractors who used Capitão-mór vessels. According to the list of European ships that sailed to Japan before 1590 compiled by Yoshitomo Okamoto,[7] private merchant vessels left Macao for Japan every year throughout the 16th century, as

5 This system, in which many unspecified individuals entrust their cargo to a specific ship and receive the distribution of profits afterwards, is very similar to the *commenda* agreements, widely used in many medieval Italian maritime cities. I discuss *commenda* agreements in Chapter 4.

6 Beatriz Basto da Silva, *Cronologia da História de Macao*, vol. 1 (Macao: Direcção dos Serviços de Educação, 1992), 49.

7 Yoshitomo Okamoto, *Kaiteizōho: 16 Seiki Nichi-Ō Kōtsū-shi no Kenkyū* [Study of the History of Interaction between Japan and Europe in the Sixteenth Century: Revised and Enlarged Edition] (Tokyo: Rokkō Shobō, 1942), 504–514.

did Capitão-mór vessels. It is thought that this state of affairs continued until around 1610.[8]

However, most of the activities carried out by private merchants in the 16th and 17th centuries were not documented, and it is extremely difficult to know for sure what activities they were involved in. An exception to this rule is the case of Bartolomeo Vaz Landeiro, who arrived in Kuchinotsu口之津 in the Arima 有馬 domain in 1580 and in Nagasaki 長崎 in 1581 as the captain-owner of his vessel. He was also the owner of vessels captained by André Feio and Vincent Landeiro (Bartolomeo's nephew),[9] who arrived in Japan around the same time as he did, and Lucio de Sousa confirms that Landeiro was known among the Spaniards in Manila as the King of the Portuguese in Macao,[10] having enormous influence in the 1580s. De Sousa points out that the Landeiro family were *conversos* (Jews forcibly converted to Christianity) who had been chased out of Portugal, and that in Macao society during its early years they formed a network based on blood ties linking the Sephardic merchants' new world with Europe.[11] While there is very little information concerning private merchant vessel owners, there is an abundance of information available on Landeiro as he was widely involved in trade between Manila and Macao, as recorded in Spanish documents, and as he was closely involved with the Jesuits, whose records outline his involvement.

Landeiro was instrumental in furthering the Jesuit policy of spreading the Christian faith through tacit agreements based on trade. Thus, in 1562 Portuguese vessels switched ports from Hirado to Yokoseura in the Omura domain in 1562, leading to Omura Sumitada's conversion to Christianity the following year. Similarly, in this spirit, Landeiro acted in compliance with a request from Father Visitador Alessandro Valignano S.J., who in turn was acting on behalf of the Father General of the Society of Jesus in the East Indies at the time. Valignano stated: "If we can obtain the interest of the ruler of the Arima with the lure of trade vessels, I believe that it will provide an opportunity to convert him to Christianity and allow us to spread the words of Christ via merchants from all over the country who will gather in the port."[12] Accordingly, Landeiro's vessel

8 Kōichirō Takase, "Kirishitan Jidai ni okeru 'Kyōshō'" ["Religious-Merchants" in the Kirishitan Period], in *Kirishitan Jidai Taigai Kankei no Kenkyū* [Study on the External Relations in the Kirishitan Period] (Tokyo: Yoshikawa Kōbunkan, 1994), 471–508.

9 Okamoto, *Kaiteizōho: 16 Seiki Nichi-Ō Kōtsū-shi no Kenkyū*, 511–515.

10 Ibid., 426.

11 Lucio de Sousa, *Early European Presence in China, the Philippines and South-East Asia, 1555–1590: The Life of Bartolomeu Landeiro* (Macao: Macao Foundation, 2010).

12 Letter of Lourenço Mexia to the Superior General of the Society of Jesus, dated 1580 (*Cartas de Japão* I. f. 462).

moored in Kuchinotsu in 1580, and Arima Shigezumi (Harunobu) converted to Christianity in the same year.

It is thought that private merchant ships disappeared almost completely after the 1610s following the sinking of the ship *Nossa Senhora da Graça*, under Capitão Mór André Pessoa, in the port of Nagasaki: the ship was attacked by the army of Arima Harunobu, a nobleman whose crew had been involved in a major conflict with the Portuguese in Macao in previous years. Although research indicates that this represented a turning point in the Tokugawa Shogunate's diplomatic policies,[13] resulting in the Jesuits in Japan falling immediately into debt owing to the huge value of the assets the ship contained,[14] and giving Macao society an enormous shock,[15] an examination of events before and after the incident reveals that it involved an extremely diverse range of issues. Although it is not discussed in depth in this book, there is no doubt the incident represented a huge turning point in the Namban trade from the historical point of view.

The effects of this incident were far-reaching: private merchant vessels disappeared, while Capitão-mór trade switched to using several small vessels called galiots with oars instead of a single large carrack. This change in about 1610 has conventionally been explained by the need for smaller and faster ships in order to establish offensive and defensive capabilities in the face of the Dutch fleet's strength on the seas.[16] However, the establishment of offensive and defensive capabilities as a counterbalance to Dutch shipping in the seas of Asia started earlier than 1610, and it is thought that this explanation lacks credibility. If anything, I am of the opinion that the transition to multiple smaller galiots took place because those involved in trading realized the need to lower the risk of losing large cargos that had been loaded onto single vessels. This probably led to the owners of private merchant vessels providing their ships to the Capitão-mór shipping organizations with themselves as captains, in order to secure the profits they had enjoyed in the past and to escape the problem of not being authorized to trade.[17]

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13 Eiichi Katō, *Bakuhan-sei Kokka no Seiritsu to Taigai Kankei* [Formation of the Shogunate System State and External Relations] (Kyoto: Shibunkaku Shuppan, 1998).

14 Kōichirō Takase, "Kirishitan Kyōkai no Macao Chūzai Zaimu Tantō Padre" [Father Procurador of the Kirishitan Church in Macao], in *Kirishitan Jidai Taigai Kankei no Kenkyū*; Takase,"Kirishitan Jidai ni okeru 'Kyōshō'" ["Religious-Merchants" in the Kirishitan Period], in *Kirishitan Jidai Taigai Kankei no Kenkyū*.

15 Takashi Gonoi, "1610 Nen Nagasaki-oki ni okeru Madre de Deus Gō Yakiuchi ni Kansuru Hōkokusho" [Report about the Ship *Madre de Deus*, Set on Fire off the Coast of Nagasaki in 1610], *Kirishitan Kenkyū* [Journal of Kirishitan Studies] 16 (1976): 301–364.

16 Boxer, *The Great Ship from Amacon*, 92.

17 At the moment this is just a hypothesis of the author and is not yet sufficiently verified by historical sources, but I raise the question here because I think it is very important when we think about the changes of private merchant ships.

3 Commodity Flows

Namban trade was an intermediary system of trade that involved Portuguese traders transporting Japanese silver to China and then transporting raw silk, silk fabrics, the ingredients for herbal medicines, Southeast Asian perfume, incense, and a wide range of other commodities back to Japan from Macao. Trade in Asia carried out by the Portuguese was not limited to Japan and China, but also involved trade with other regions that included nearly all the shipping lanes, with traders functioning as forwarding agents. Euro-Asian trade in which Asian commodities (especially from China) were transported to Europe via the Goa-to-Lisbon route was also carried out, but the exchange of commodities mutually required in Asia yielded higher profits, so trade within Asia was seen as more important.

Vasco da Gama made enormous profits from the pepper he shipped from Calicut to Europe in 1503, and the Portuguese who had control of Malacca began to transport pepper to China in 1511. It is said that pepper consumption in China at this time equaled consumption in the whole of Europe. It was mainly pepper from the Malabar region of India that was transported to Europe, and pepper from the Southeast Asian islands that was collected in Malacca that was consumed in China. Furthermore, the silver that people in China craved between the 16th and 17th centuries was transported from Japan by the Portuguese.

Other commodities exported from Japan included swords; military equipment; crafted commodities such as lacquerware, mother-of-pearl products, and folding fans; and other items that reflected Japanese society at that time, such as slaves.[18] But silver took precedence because of the value it had for Japan in allowing it to purchase goods from China. Chapter 2 examines this flow of commodities and their arrival prior to the development of trade within Asia as expedited by the VOC. The assumption is made that this distribution of goods provided the driving force for the globalization of the economy, and merchandise, customs duties, and sea routes are examined in detail.

It is difficult to say with conviction that sufficient academic research has been carried out into this issue since Yoshitomo Okamoto raised it and introduced historical documentation regarding the slave trade that was carried out in East Asia by the Portuguese.[19] Despite the lack of source material, Lucio de Sousa has been attempting to demonstrate the possibility that merchant

18 Hisashi Fujiki, *Zōhyōtachi no Senjō: Chūsei no Yōhei to Dorei-gari* [The Battlefields of Common Soldiers: Mercenaries and Slave Hunting in the Middle Ages] (Tokyo: Asahi Shimbun-sha, 2005; first published 1995).

19 Okamoto, *Kaiteizōho: 16 Seiki Nichi-Ō Kōtsū-shi no Kenkyū*, 727–778, 835–840.

ships returning to Macao after delivering vast quantities of Chinese merchandise to Japan also transported Japanese and Korean people on seasonal work contracts, mercenaries, and even male and female slaves as ballast to even out the comparatively light weight of the valuable silver they carried.[20]

There are also many historical documents indicating that Koreans transported to Japan during Hideyoshi's invasion of Korea were later transported to Macao at the end of the 16th century.[21] However, I do not have any firm insights into this at the present, and therefore do not mention slaves as a trade commodity in this book.

4 Investment and Maritime Loans

A Japanese warlord, converted to Roman Catholicism, Omura Sumitada, donated the port of Nagasaki to the Jesuits in 1580, and Namban vessels gathered there, turning it into the most important base for Japan's international trade as well as for Christian missionaries. Nagasaki was later confiscated by Toyotomi Hideyoshi and placed under a Daikan (chief administrator) system, which the Tokugawa Shogunate emulated, and a Nagasaki Bugyō (Nagasaki magistrate) was then appointed to gradually strengthen its function as a fiefdom under the control of the Shogunate. Nagasaki was a principality controlled by the Tokugawa Shogunate, with districts within the city limits coming under the jurisdiction of the magistrate and the outlying districts coming under the jurisdiction of the chief administrator.

The magistrate was replaced every few years, but the chief administrators originated from the city, lived their entire lives in Nagasaki, and took control of the town and its trade; it is said that they naturally had greater influence than the magistrate dispatched from the Edo court. Murayama Tōan, who was appointed chief administrator by Hideyoshi, was driven out of office by the court at the beginning of the 17th century, and his successor, Suetsugu Heizō (Masanao), took control of Nagasaki's politics and economy as the chief administrator and as a wealthy merchant who represented the so-called red-seal ships trade (these were *shuin-sen*/Japanese ships going to Southeast Asia with a patent issued by the Shogunate). Heizō's activities did not stop at refitting vessels for red-seal certificates and dispatching them to all regions of

20 Lucio de Sousa, *The Portuguese Slave Trade in Early Modern Japan: Merchants, Jesuits and Japanese, Chinese, and Korean Slaves* (Leiden & Boston: Brill, 2018).

21 Lucio de Sousa, "Dom Luis de Cerqueira e a Escravatura no Japão em 1598," *Bróteria* 165, no. 4 (2007): 245–263.

Southeast Asia; he also devoted himself to a method of merchandising that earned him a profit by financing foreign vessels sailing into Nagasaki.

Chapter 3 describes the background of the wealthy Suetsugu family of Nagasaki, which joined forces with the original Suetsugu family in Hakata to create an investment and trust mediation organization. It is thought that the Suetsugu family became the focus of trade investment and financing activities in Nagasaki because Heizō was deeply interested in the Namban trade, and his daily dealings with the merchants of Macao as well as his relationship with the trading organizations of Macao resulted in foreigners trusting him implicitly as the resident administrator. The power accorded him satisfied the demands of lenders who were looking for investment opportunities under advantageous conditions. It is also evident from Portuguese historical documents that the merchant families in Nagasaki involved in the red-seal ship trade, such as the Itoya family, participated in investments with the Portuguese, therefore overlapping with Seutsugu Heizō's investment group, despite the fact that the red-seal certificate trade and the Namban trade were competitors. In other words, the funds forming the basis of Namban trade transactions were not only provided by the Portuguese in Macao, but a large percentage was provided by trust banks and other loans from Japanese merchants represented by Heizō.

In addition, there were cases in which Macao merchants did not pay for goods on the spot, but were lent raw silk by the Chinese on credit. It was difficult for the Portuguese to increase their profits through mediated buying and selling because the Japanese and Chinese investors were an indispensable part of commerce at that time, and the Portuguese were becoming dependent on their capital—to the extent that it was impossible to purchase raw silk from China without the Japanese trust and investment banks. This resulted in enormous liabilities building up against Japan. Details about how the authorities and merchants of Macao coped with this debt issue amid the complex system of funding are given in Chapter 4.

The community in Macao established joint investment organizations known as *armação* or *companhia* as the basis of society in the period during which it traded with Japan. These organizations were first advocated by Bishop Merchior Carneiro of Macao. The system had flourished in the trading cities of Venice and Genoa since ancient times (under the system of *commenda*), and it began to be more widely adopted by the port towns of the Iberian Peninsula from the 13th century. Bishop Carneiro proposed abolishing the monopoly involving cargo contracts with Capitão-mór vessels owned by wealthy merchants and replacing it with a system that enabled the Portuguese citizens of Macao to invest in Capitão-mór vessels.

A similar system for sea loans (with the common characteristics of charging high interest rates and placing limited responsibility on borrowers for maritime disasters), which flourished in Europe's Mediterranean Sea trade during the Middle Ages and was later used frequently in trade linking the Iberian Peninsula with regions outside Europe in the same way as the *companhia*, started to be used in earnest in Nagasaki and Hakata at the beginning of the 17th century.

The Governor of Macao banned Macao merchants from borrowing silver in the form of sea loans from the Japanese in 1625, but this ban was ineffective as the investment banks were already central to the provision of merchants' funds, and the amount of money they owed when the severe maritime ban against the Portuguese went into effect exceeded 150,000 taels. The Macao city authorities attempted various improvements in the 1630s because of a belief that the Macao trade faced bankruptcy, and at the same time faced threats from the rise in power of the VOC and the crackdown on Christianity. In the end, though, they were unable to settle the debts and the Shogunate declared an end to relations with Macao.

5 The Creolization of Macao

As we know from the works by George B. Souza, the Portuguese living in Macao in the mid-16th century began to marry local Chinese, Southeast Asian, and Indian women, and later Japanese and Korean women from Japan as the spoils of war by Toyotomi Hideyoshi at the end of the 16th century. The long-term Portuguese residents in Asian port cities were called *casados* (which originally meant married). The children born from these unions were christened as Portuguese, and it is thought that this led to advances in the creolization of society. In other words, we have no choice but to believe that the crews of the Namban trading vessels consisted of groups of Macao and Portuguese mixed-blood merchants, the slaves in their service, and Chinese seamen.

The Indian viceregal government in Goa believed that the Capitão-mórs were the chief administrators of Macao until 1623, but many of these returned to Goa or Portugal after having been paid for voyages to Japan, and the people who actually held power in Macao at that time were the *casado* merchants who had been naturalized in Macao and had taken wives there. Having encountered resistance from powerful local merchants, Governor D. Francisco Mascarenhas, who was dispatched to Macao in 1624 by the Indian viceregal government, began to question the influence of the local Macao merchants who had made their fortunes after settling permanently in Macao in

the mid-16th century and ignoring the power of the state in order to build up their own system of governance.

The lists of individuals presented by all the churches located in Macao in 1625 indicate an ethnic divergence between the Portuguese nationals who had arrived from Portugal and the second- and third-generation mixed-blood Portuguese. An examination of the names of these individuals reveals the creoles who owed money to Japanese lenders (see Chapter 3), and what is possibly the name of a Japanese woman who was the mother of a wealthy merchant known to be a commercial agent for the Jesuits.

6 The Church in Macao

Chapter 5 explains how the might of Christianity, centered on the Jesuits, played a cushioning role in a society in which local *casado* merchants were influential and refused to yield to the Capitão-mórs and chief administrators dispatched from Goa. The Jesuits set up a vault in the College of São Paulo from which Macao's customs duties and trade profits were managed; this was, for all intents and purposes, the Society's headquarters in East Asia. The Society was sometimes called upon to intervene during arbitrations and diplomatic negotiations and it boasted significant influence in local society. It is also thought to have been intimately connected to the trade that formed the foundation of Macao's existence.

7 Missionaries and Trade

Chapter 1 explains how Jesuit missionaries forged close ties with local merchants from the start of their activities in East Asian waters, and there is no doubt that the propagation of Christianity in Japan was a result of their cooperation. The Macao authorities concluded a contract with the Jesuits in 1579 that stated 50 picos of raw silk would be traded within the *companhia/armação* system (mutual investment organizations) on behalf of the Society every year without fail, and it was agreed that the Society relied in part on trade between Nagasaki and Macao as its source of funds. It was at this time that Visitador priest A. Valignano S.J. established the position of *procurador* to be in charge of economic matters.

Chapter 6 observes that in reality the trade carried out by the Jesuits was not limited to the trivial activity authorized by the leaders of the Society, but was organized and indispensable to their economic viability, as mentioned in

a memorandum written by an experienced *procurador* of Japan. The details of the rebuttal that was prepared when the Society was denounced after other orders, including the Franciscans, had investigated why missionaries had been expelled from Japan, in accordance with the statement made by the Society's experienced *procurador*.

The Jesuits in Japan had become involved in trade, when in 1555 the Portuguese merchant Luís de Almeida,[22] a sailor and merchant under Captain Duarte da Gama who was active on the trading routes between the Chinese coast and the Kyushu islands (九州), donated his private fortune to the Jesuits in Japan on his enrollment in the organization. With this money as capital, investment in trade was able to commence, and gradually the profits accrued became the basis of a fund for missionary work.

The symbiotic relationship between the Macao merchants and the Jesuits made it difficult for the merchants to stop helping the Society, although when Jesuit missionaries were expelled from Japan and went underground after the edict banning Christianity was enacted (1612–14) we lose trace of their missionary activities. However, their participation in the *companhia* system continued, and it is thought that the Society received profits whenever a Namban vessel sailed to Nagasaki and completed a deal for raw silk.

Chapter 7 re-examines the background of an affair relating to an economic matter involving Macao society and Nagasaki merchants that is rarely referred to in historical research. Research into the breakdown of diplomatic relations between Japan and Macao as a direct consequence of the maritime bans (*sakoku* or seclusion policy) is exclusively based on Japanese documents that cover the activities of the Shogunate,[23] as well as analyses of historical documents that relate to the VOC, which represented a competitor.[24] There has been very little research carried out into the way the city of Macao responded to and acted in the face of this process. There is evidence to indicate that sailors who traveled to Nagasaki provided assistance to the missionaries who had gone underground after they were expelled from Japan during the investigation of the case of the priest Santos (a case proving that a Japanese priest was still involved in the Namban trade). It is clear from a document related to this case that the

22 According to a letter of Francisco Cabral, dated November 25, 1559, Almeida was from a family of *converso*, "New Christians" who converted from Judaism to Christianity. Iosephus Wicki (ed.), *Documenta Indica*, vol. IV, Monumenta historica Societatis Jesu, 78/ Monumenta missionum Societatis Jesu, 9, No. 53 (Rome: Monumenta Historica Societatis Iesu, 1956), 447.

23 Hirofumi Yamamoto, *Sakoku to Kaikin no Jidai* [The Age of National Seclusion and Maritime Exclusion] (Tokyo: Azekura Shobō, 1995); *Kan'ei Jidai* [Kan'ei Era] (Tokyo: Yoshikawa Kōbunkan, 1989).

24 Katō, *Bakuhan-sei Kokka no Seiritsu to Taigai Kankei*.

Shogunate maintained its ban on such activities with Macao merchants after 1626, and we know that of the three criminal activities that Macao was accused of in accordance with the Kareuta Oshioki no Hōsho (the final edict prohibiting Portuguese from coming to Japan), issued in 1639 when diplomatic relations were broken off, two of them were in response to the ban from 1626.

An examination of the affair of the priest Santos indicates that several letters were exchanged between Nagasaki administrator Suetsugu Heizō and the city authorities of Macao, but none of Heizō's advice was acted upon, and the Portuguese were ordered by the Shogunate to break off relations in 1639. The following year, the city of Macao sent a mission to appeal for the reinstatement of trade to Nagasaki and also to repay their debts to Japanese merchants in silver, but sixty-one of the seventy-four members of this mission (including powerful merchants) were executed, the only exceptions being thirteen lower-class seamen. The Macao city authorities had expected trade to be restarted after they repaid their debts, and it is thought that the execution of the mission members was totally unexpected.

The Macao city authorities held the Indian viceroy government responsible for the disastrous plight they faced after trade with Japan was broken off and demanded a relief payment, but this demand was refused because "Macao had operated as the self-government outside the jurisdiction of Portuguese India."[25]

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As outlined above, although the intermediary trade between China and Japan established by private Portuguese merchants and seamen in East Asia was seen as an extension of the Age of Exploration, it is not possible to capture the entire picture using only this framework. We have failed to recognize the true essence of the trade because we have imposed long-established biases with regard to, for example, so-called imperial commercial activities carried out with Portugal or the Indian viceroy as the main players. Although there seems to be a deep-rooted awareness that an intimate relationship existed between Namban trade and the propagation of Christianity, this is likely based on a traditional awareness of the official relationships between the two Iberian governments and Christian missionaries, which in turn is based on the right to protect the propagation of Christianity as well as the territorial ambitions of the two Iberian states and the Christian missionaries.

However, rather than being based on official relationships, the Portuguese Asian trade was governed by a relationship of profit and loss between

25 See Chapter 7.

merchants and missionaries, and it is worth noting that these activities developed synergistically. The Namban vessels that arrived in the port of Nagasaki were either junks built on the coast of China, in the case of private sea merchant groups, or the Capitão-mór vessels (carracks) depicted on Namban folding screens, which were mostly built in India.[26] Despite the description of the vessels of the VOC as "Dutch Vessels" in documents soon after the Company had commenced trade with Japan in the first half of the 17th century, the phrase "Portuguese Vessels" failed to make an appearance in Japan's historical documents. The ships that voyaged across from Macao at that time were exclusively listed in records as "Amakawa (Macao) Vessels" or "Namban Vessels."[27] In the same way, nearly all records name the merchants as "Amakawa-Jin" (People of Amakawa/Macao).[28] This does not refer solely to their port of departure, but probably also to the fact that Japanese people saw that the people who arrived from Macao were undoubtedly of mixed race, and they did not recognize any signs of Portuguese nationality in the groups with which they dealt.

Additionally, Macao was established on the condition that enormous sums of money be paid in taxes to the Ming dynasty from the beginning. It was therefore seen as having a single function in China's trading system, and the Kingdom of Portugal and the Indian viceroy were far distant from Japan both geographically and mentally. Furthermore, during most of the period when trade was carried out with Japan's ports, the commerce was operated by local authorities, having been set up by merchants with no direct link to the bureaucracy of Goa. It is also important to note that although the nationality involved in trading was Portuguese, the sense of belonging was based on a wide variety of factors. In this sense, Macao in the period studied here should be regarded as a half-independent port city state adjunct to China. The fact that Macao's authority was operated largely by powerful merchants signifies its character as a commercial city.

This book examines in detail the people and commodities involved in Namban trading, taking account of the issues outlined above as its point of departure, and it attempts to recreate a picture of world composed of many diverse elements.

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26 Takase, *Monsoon Monjo to Nippon*, 55.

27 Naoki Kimura, "Kinsei no Taigai Kankei" [External Relations in the Early Modern Period], in Satoru Fujita (ed.) *Shiryō wo Yomitoku: Kinsei no Seiji to Gaikō* [Reading the Historical Sources: Politics and Diplomacy in the Early Modern Period] (Tokyo: Yamakawa Shuppansha, 2008), 123–125.

28 Ōmura Shiryō-kan (Omura City Museum) collection, *Kariuta-sen Goyō Gohōsho Utsushi* (Copy of Magistrate Order about the Portuguese Galliots).

CHAPTER 1

The Portuguese in the East Asian Seas in the 16th Century

1 Portuguese Private Trade in the Extreme Orient

Since the 1970s, Japanese historical scholarship on the country's foreign affairs has focused on a separation from Eurocentrism, as mentioned in the Introduction. This has become the mainstream approach to the study of foreign affairs of both Japan and the surrounding East Asian area, especially regarding the 16th and 17th centuries. The correlation between Portuguese activities and those of Chinese merchants from the Chinese coastlands in this period has been noted by Shōsuke Murai.[1] Consequently, Yasunori Arano proposed the theory of a "Wokou-like state" to describe the chaotic situation in the East Asian seas in the 16th century, which was largely accepted among Japanese historians. According to the theory, the Portuguese are understood to have been a new power among the multi-ethnic Wokou (倭寇, Japanese pirates).[2] The true picture of the Portuguese as a separate Wokou group, however, has not been explored, and they are still perceived vaguely as "Europeans," commonly called *folangji* (仏狼機).[3]

1 Shōsuke Murai, *Chūsei Wajin-den* [Records of Wa People in the Middle Ages] (Tokyo: Iwanami Shoten, 1993); Murai, *Umi kara Mita Sengoku-Nihon: Rettō-shi kara Sekai-shi e* [Japan in the Sengoku Period Seen from the Sea: From the History of Islands to the History of the World] (Tokyo: Chikuma Shobō, 1997).

2 Yasunori Arano, "Tōjin Machi to Higashi Ajia Kaiiki Sekai" [China Town and the East Asian Maritime Region], in the Historical Science Society of Japan (ed.) *Minatomachi no Sekai-shi 3: Minatomachi ni Ikiru* [World History of Port Towns vol. 3: Living in a Port Town] (Tokyo: Aoki Shoten, 2006). Regarding Wokou, P. Shapinsky has published excellent work. Peter Shapinsky, *Lords of the Sea: Pirates, Violence, and Commerce in Late Medieval Japan*, Michigan Monograph Series in Japanese Studies (Ann Arbor: Center for Japanese Studies, University of Michigan, 2014).

3 *Folangji* is pronounced in Chinese as *fo-lang-ji*. According to one hypothesis (Charles Ralph Boxer, ed., *South China in the 16th Century* [Bangkok: Orchid Press, 2004; first published 1953], xix), this term may derive from *ferringhi*, a Malay word for the Portuguese. It is assumed that the presence of the Portuguese became known to the Ming dynasty in China when the Kingdom of Malacca was attacked and the expelled Sultan of Malacca sent an envoy to the Ming court asking for military help; thus the conversion of a Malay word into Chinese would be natural. The origin of the word *ferringhi* in Malay could be *frank*, a name commonly used

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In this chapter, I will analyze the movements of Portuguese trader groups by focusing on multi-ethnic smuggler groups in the East China Sea coastal port of Shuangyu (双嶼), called Liampó by the Portuguese, that existed during the Ming dynasty in spite of the policy of *hai-jin* (海禁, a ban on maritime activities).[4] Through this analysis I will offer a picture of the group's leader Diogo Pereira and of the rivalry between private maritime trade and the viceroy government of Portuguese India, and furthermore I will elucidate the physical and spiritual relationship between merchants and Jesuits during the time of their advance into the Far East.

Concerning the activities of Diogo Pereira and the Portuguese sea merchants under his command (the subject of this chapter), the Jesuit scholar Georg Schurhammer looks in detail at their relationship with Francis Xavier, the pioneer of Christian proselytism in the East.[5] Based on Schurhammer's work, Rui Manuel Loureiro reinvestigates merchants' correspondence in his study of the relations between Malacca and China.[6] Luis Gonzaga Gomez, who wrote an outline of the history of Macao, also points to Diogo Pereira as an important figure in Macao's dawning age. But his research is limited to information related to the period after Pereira settled down in Macao, and it is not noted in any detail that he was previously the leader of private trading groups at a smuggling base on the Chinese coast.[7]

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by Muslims to refer to Christians, after many battles fought on both sides of the Pyrenees between the Islamic Umayyad Caliphate, ruler of the Iberian Peninsula from the 7th to the 8th century, and the Merovingian Frankish Kingdom. So in my view it is likely that this term reflects the conflict between Portuguese and Islamic forces, particularly the Ottoman Empire, enacted in many parts of the Indian Ocean before the arrival of the Portuguese in Malacca.

4 Among the most important preceding studies are: Toyohachi Fujita, *Tōzai Kōshō-shi no Kenkyū: Nankai-hen* [An Investigation of the History of East and West Relations: Part of the Southern Sea] (Tokyo: Oka Shoin, 1932). Jin'ichi Yano, *Shina Kindai Gaikoku Kankei Kenkyū* [Study of External Relations of Modern China] (Tokyo: Kōbundō, 1928). Yoshitomo Okamoto, *16 Seiki Nichi-Ō Kōtsū-shi no Kenkyū* [Study of the History of Interaction between Japan and Europe in the Sixteenth Century] (Tokyo: Hara Shobō, 1974; first published Tokyo: Rokkō Shobō, 1942). John E. Wills, Jr., "Maritime Europe and the Ming," in John E. Wills, Jr. et al. (eds.) *China and Maritime Europe, 1500–1800: Trade, Settlement, Diplomacy, and Missions* (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2010), 24–77.

5 Georg Schurhammer, *Japan and China 1549–1552*, vol. 4 of *Francis Xavier: His Life, His Times*, trans. J. Costelloe (Rome: The Jesuit Historical Institute, 1982).

6 Rui Manuel Loureiro, "Prisioneiros portugueses e justiça chinesa," in *Fidalgos Missionários e Mandarins* (Lisbon: Fundação Oriente, 2000).

7 Luis Gonzaga Gomez, *Macau um Municipio da história* (Macao: Leal Senado de Macau, 1997).

2 The Trade Situation East of Malacca before and after the Portuguese Forays

Before examining Portuguese trade activities in East Asia in the mid-16th century, I would like to discuss their forays into Malacca, their first trading initiatives in Asia.

Barros, who wrote a history of the Portuguese in Asia titled *Décadas da Ásia* under João III (John III) of Portugal (reigned 1521–57),[8] noted that the party that advanced into the Indian Ocean through the Cape of Good Hope under Vasco da Gama discovered a ruined Chinese residential area, Kotta China,[9] on reaching Calicut (1498).[10] Furthermore, this party discovered that Chinese ceramics and silk textiles were being traded in a market in Calicut and recognized that most of these products were being brought from Malacca. After taking control of Kochi and Goa, the main ports on the Malabar Coast in India, the Portuguese turned their interest to Malacca, the hub for the China Seas and the Indian Ocean trade.

In 1509, Diogo Lopes de Sequeira was dispatched to Malacca by the order of Manuel I of Portugal. Sequeira was ordered to gather information about China, and it is obvious that the capture of Malacca by the Portuguese (1511) followed trade discussions with China.[11] In 1513, a Bendahara, the Chancellor of the former Malacca Sultanate, and a Portuguese Captain of Malacca jointly built trade relations with China. Their ship was a Chinese junk, which moored in Malacca; it is recorded that at least three Portuguese were on board.[12] There is a legend that the Malacca Sultanate was established by Parameswara, who was a prince of Palembang in the south of Sumatra in 1396. The first expedition fleet of Zheng He (鄭和) stopped there soon after the establishment of the Sultanate. On this occasion the Malacca Sultanate established trade with China and received a golden seal with 満剌加国王 (Sultan of Malacca) inscribed on it. The sultan himself visited the Yongle emperor (永楽帝) to show his loyalty,

8 João de Barros, *Ásia, Terceira Década* (Lisbon: Imprensa Nacional Casa da Moeda, 1992; facsimile of the original published 1563).

9 Kotta is pronounced as *Kotta* in Malayalam, local language of Calicut, and as *Kota* in Malay, and in both cases the meaning is "fortress" or "fortified city."

10 Barros, *Ásia, Terceira Década*, f. 247v.

11 Tomé Pires, *Tōhō Shokoku-ki* [*Suma Oriental que trata do Mar Roxo até aos Chins*], trans. and notes Ikuta Shigeru et al. (Tokyo: Iwanami Shoten, 1966). See Commentary; Tomé Pires, *The Suma Oriental of Tomé Pires and the Book of Francisco Rodrigues*, trans. and ed. Armando Cortesão (London: Hakluyt Society, 1944).

12 Okamoto, *16 Seiki Nichi-Ō Kōtsū-shi no Kenkyū*, 99–101.

and he converted to Islam in order to invite Muslim merchants to Malacca. As a result, he could gather products from both the Muslim trading area and the Chinese trading area in the west at the port of Malacca.[13]

Malacca's primary income came from tariffs imposed on ships that had to wait in port for the end of the monsoon season before crossing the South China Sea on their way to the Indian Ocean.[14] Though the Malacca Sultanate became the center of the Melayu world (the islands of Southeast Asia having a Muslim culture) as a result of the sultan's marriage to a princess of the Ming dynasty and the elimination of neighboring ports, the situation was drastically changed after a Portuguese fleet under the command of Afonso de Albuquerque attacked Malacca.[15] As the Sultan Mahmud escaped to the island of Bintan after this raid and established the Johor Sultanate, the Melayu world was not completely destroyed. However, the collection of customs in Malacca was entrusted to the Portuguese.

After the Portuguese had occupied Malacca, Muslim merchants from Gujarat, who were the main trading partners of the Malacca Sultanate and brought products from the Arabian Peninsula and India, moved to neighboring ports and small states, such as Ache in Sumatra and Demak, Jepara, and Banten in Java. These small states were then able to develop further and led Southeast Asia in the so-called Age of Commerce.[16]

The trades that were centered on Malacca and prospered during the 15th century were based on Arabian and Indian products that were brought there by Gujarat merchants from the Cambay region. In addition, raw silk, silk textiles, ceramics, spices such as cloves, nutmeg, and mace from Molucca, and papers from islands in Southeast Asia were brought from China by junks. It is thought that Chinese merchants, who arrived at the beginning of the Ming Era from Yunnan (雲南) and Fujian (福建) on these Southeast Asian islands, built the foundations of the Age of Commerce. Small states in Java were thus developed by the Chinese.

The book *Tratado dos Descobrimentos* by António Galvão, the Portuguese Captain of Malacca in the mid-16th century, reported on the Chinese who were in charge of trading on islands in Southeast Asia. In his report, Galvão stated

13 Masashi Hirosue, *Tōnan Ajia no Kōshi Sekai: Chiiki Shakai no Keisei to Sekai Chitsujo* [The World of the Port Polities of Southeast Asia: The Formation of Local Societies and the World Order] (Tokyo: Iwanami Shoten, 2004).

14 According to the *Suma Oriental* of Pires, "Many junks and ships come there and all pay the tax. Those who do not pay the tax give gifts almost equivalent to the tax." Pires, *Tōhō Shokoku-ki*, 417.

15 See Commentary in Pires, *Tōhō Shokoku-ki*.

16 Hirosue, *Tōnan Ajia no Kōshi Sekai*, 24–35.

that "Chinese with dark skin are people who came in ancient times. Those with fair skin did come recently."[17] Java in particular experienced an inflow of Chinese over the centuries. It is clear, therefore, that those Chinese who arrived earlier mixed with local people and were completely indigenized even though we refer to them today altogether as "Chinese." The Chinese trading network in the sea east of Malacca can be confirmed by descriptions in *Décadas da Ásia* by João de Barros, already quoted: "Chinese ruled trade relations between Sumatra and India,"[18] and "no one can outnumber Chinese ships in the waters close to the Molucca islands."[19]

After the occupation of Malacca, Lopo Soares de Albergaria, then Governor of Portuguese India, dispatched the diplomatic envoy Tomé Pires to the Ming dynasty to discuss trade demands with China. He arrived at Guangzhou (広州) in August 1517 but had to wait there for two and a half years before being invited by the court. During that period, an incident occurred involving another Portuguese group, led by Simão de Andrade. This group started building a fort without obtaining the necessary permission and plundered local people in Tuen Mun (屯門) near Guangzhou. When Pires finally reached the palace in Beijing (北京) in 1520, he could not obtain an audience with the Emperor of China, Zhengde (正徳帝), and was brought back to Guangzhou where the whole of his group was imprisoned. Their subsequent fate is not known.[20]

Following the failure of Pires's approach, the Portuguese were excluded from the Chinese coasts and gave up their attempts to establish official trade with the Ming dynasty. Instead, private trading merchants, who were not bound by political treaties, engaged in smuggling around islands off Zhangzhou (漳州) in Fujian province and in Ningbo (寧波) in Zhejiang province (浙江省), keeping away from the Guangzhou area.

It is known that some Portuguese prisoners were in Guangzhou around 1520. The correspondence of two Portuguese prisoners, translated into English and published by D. Ferguson as *Letters from Portuguese Captives in Canton*,[21]

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17 Okamoto, *16 Seiki Nichi-Ō Kōtsū-shi no Kenkyū*, 57–58; António Galvão, *Tratado dos Descobrimentos*, notes and comments Visconde de Lagoa (Lisbon: Livraria Civilização, 1987; first published 1944), 222–225. Antonio Galvano, *The Discoveries of the World, from their First Original unto the Year our Lord 1555*, ed. Richard Hakluyt (London: Hakluyt Society, 1601; originally published Lisbon, 1563).

18 Barros, *Ásia, Terceira Década*, f. 119v.

19 Barros, *Ásia, Terceira Década*, f. 135r.

20 Commentary in Pires, *Tōhō Shokoku-ki*.

21 These two letters were found by Donald Ferguson in Paris in 1900 and published as *Letters from Portuguese Captives in Canton*, with English notes. Rui Manuel Loureiro (ed.), *Cartas dos Cativos em Cantão* (Macao: Instituto Cultural de Macau, 1992), 17–18.

is an important source for information on the conditions of foreign prisoners, the Chinese legal system, and the general situation on the Chinese coast at this time. The two prisoners were captured in very different situations. Cristóvão Vieira, the first, visited Beijing as a member of Pires's group and went back to Guangzhou, where he was captured. Vasco Calvo, the second, was caught near Guangzhou and became a prisoner in 1521 when Pires's group was still in Beijing.[22] Calvo was a Portuguese merchant engaged in smuggling on the Guangzhou coast.[23] From this information we learn that the Portuguese were already actively smuggling on the Chinese coast around 1520, in parallel to the official negotiations with the Ming dynasty by Pires, who was seeking to gain permission for the passage of Portuguese merchant ships.

Many of the Portuguese engaged in smuggling are considered to have arrived at forts in Portuguese India as members of army units. After fulfilling their military terms, they left their units and shifted their activities to maritime trade.[24] As maritime merchants they grouped together, choosing a leader according to his military achievements, status, and financial power. They consequently formed trading networks centering on these leaders. Such groups also worked on the trade route between Malacca and China, and it is believed that their trading, together with that of Chinese, Japanese, and other traders,[25] was centered especially in the area around Shuangyu from the 1530s to the end of the 1540s. They were called *folangji* (仏郎機) in the Ming records.[26]

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22 It is said that conflicts broke out between Portuguese ships and the Chinese in 1519–22, and many Portuguese were taken captive. See Yano, *Kindai Shina Gaikoku Kankei Kenkyū*, 199.

23 Loureiro, *Cartas dos Cativos em Cantão*, 15.

24 A typical example of such a success story can be seen also in the record of Galvão, where he talks about the Portuguese who drifted ashore at Tanegashima Island. Galvão, *Tratado dos Descobrimentos*; Kazuo Enoki, *Min-matsu no Macao* [Macao in the Late Ming Era], vol. 5 of *Enoki Kazuo Chosaku-shū* [Works of Enoki Kazuo] (Tokyo: Kyūko Shoin, 1993), 315.

25 Gaspar da Cruz, *Chūgoku-shi* [*Tractado das cousas da China*], trans. Hino Hiroshi (Tokyo: Kōdan-sha, 2002; first published Tokyo: Shin Jinbutsu Ōrai-sha, 1996), 251–252. Hino Hiroshi also translated *Jūroku Seiki Kanan Jibutsu-shi* [*Tractado das cousas da China*], trans. Hino Hiroshi (Tokyo: Akashi Shoten, 1987).

26 For the term *folangji*, used to refer to the Portuguese from the 16th century, there were other transcriptions in Chinese characters, 仏狼機 and 仏浪機, often implying a meaning of bandits. On the other hand, in history books such as *History of Ming* (明史) and *Ming Shilu* (明實録, Veritable Records of the Ming), 仏郎機 is used in a relatively objective sense. Thus I use the transcription of 仏郎機 in this book, except when I cite from the historical sources.

3 The Portuguese in Shuangyu

3.1 *Wokou* and *Folangji*

During the 16th century, *Wokou* maritime forces (literally, 'Japanese pirates') were active primarily in the Chinese seas. This group originated among Japanese and Chinese maritime merchants who were prohibited from pursuing their individual trade interests because of the ban on maritime activities by Ming China.[27] They armed themselves for self-defense and began to fight for access to goods. As their main trade items were *karamono* (唐物), meaning Chinese products such as raw silks, silk textiles, and ceramics highly valued in Japan at the time, it is commonly understood that Wokou engaged in trade especially between China and Japan after the end of the official tributary trades.[28]

The Wokou smuggling bases were located on the Zhōushān islands (舟山列島) of Ningbo and in the coastal areas around Zhangzhou and Chaozhou (潮州). These sea regions overlapped partly with the Portuguese area of influence. It is said that the Portuguese entered this region under the guidance of Li Guangtou (李光頭) from Fuzhou (福州) and Xǔ Dong (許棟) from Xin'an (新安), whose families were already engaged in large-scale smuggling in the area.[29] The Xǔ family especially had an active business with Malacca and a deep connection with the Portuguese.[30]

It is thought that, following a major raid by Zhu Wan (朱紈) into Shuangyu in 1548–49, many smuggling bases were destroyed and the Portuguese consequently transferred their centers of operation to Shangchuan (上川) and then to Lampacau (浪白澳). The first voyage of the Portuguese to Japan occurred at this time. As recent research has clarified,[31] Portuguese traveling on Chinese junks alongside Chinese and others were no rarity in the mid-16th century.

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27 Hitoshi Yonetani, "Kōki Wakou kara Chōsen Shinryaku e" [From the Later Wakou to the Japanese Invasions of Korea], in Susumu Ike (ed.) *Tenka Tōitsu to Chōsen Sinryaku* [The Unification of Japan and the Japanese Invasions of Korea], Nihon no Jidai-shi [History of the Historical Periods of Japan], vol. 13 (Tokyo: Yoshikawa Kōbunkan, 2003), 125–158.

28 Takeo Tanaka, *Higashi Ajia Tsūshō-ken to Kokusai Ninshiki* [The East Asia Trade Zone and Its International Perception] (Tokyo: Yoshikawa Kōbunkan, 1997), 171–198.

29 Fujita, *Tōzai Kōshō-shi no Kenkyū*, 150.

30 For the contacts between the Chinese and the Portuguese in Malacca, see Okamoto, *16 Seiki Nichi-Ō Kōtsū-shi no Kenkyū*, 55–80. According to Okamoto, the Portuguese had contacts with Chinese merchants from the arrival of Diogo Lopes de Sequeira to Malacca in 1509 (p. 67).

31 The research trends of recent years are well summarized in Gakushō Nakajima, "Portugal-jin no Nihon Hatsu Raikō to Higashi Ajia Kaiiki Kōeki" [The First Voyage of the Portuguese to Japan and East Asian Maritime Trade], *Shien* 142 (2005): 33–72.

However, there is still debate over the image of the Portuguese that appears in the famous *Teppo-ki* (鉄炮記*Chronicle of harquebuses*), written in 1606 and concerning the introduction of firearms onto Tanegashima (種子島) island by Nampo Bunshi (南浦文之). One section states: "There were two head merchants among barbarians. One of them was Francisco (牟良叔舍) and another was Cristóvão da Mota (喜利志多佗孟太)."[32] The ship on which these two European merchants traveled was a junk owned by Wang Zhi（王直）, head of one of the Wokou groups. The *Teppo-ki* has been carefully examined by various researchers as it is the most reliable material from the Japanese side. Regarding the Western merchants' (賈胡) leaders, Francisco (牟良叔舍) and Cristóvão da Mota (喜利志多佗孟太), judging by their names and the records of Galvão who was then the Captain of Malacca, much evidence suggests they were Francisco Zeimoto and António da Mota respectively.[33]

> In the year of our Lord 1542, one Diego de Freitas being in the realm of Siam and in the city of Dodra (D'udia)[34] as captain of a ship, there fled from him three Portuguese in a junk towards China. Their names were António da Mota, Francisco Zeimoto and António Peixoto.[35]

G. Nakajima points out that information from the *Teppo-ki* does not entirely agree with that from *Tratado dos Descobrimentos*, and that the group departing from Ayutthaya in 1542 was not the one that reached Tanegashima in the following year, which went to the Ryukyu (琉球) islands (kingdom).[36] S. Matoba also does not believe the two books refer to the same persons. She tries to resolve the inconsistency by considering different years for these events, namely 1542 and 1543.[37] Matoba points out that Francisco (牟良叔舍) is a generalized name for the Portuguese and that the difference between Cristóvão

32 Nampō Bunshi, *Nampō Bun-shū* [Works of Nampo], 3 vols, edition transcribed by Nakano Dōhan in Keian 2 (1649), collection of the Historiographical Institute, University of Tokyo.

33 Usaburō Toyama, *Namban Bōeki-shi* [History of the Namban Trade] (Tokyo: Tōkō Shuppan-sha, 1943), 127–133; Okamoto, *16 Seiki Nichi-Ō Kōtsū-shi no Kenkyū*, 140–162; Shigetomo Kōda, *Nichi-Ō Tsūkō-shi* [History of the Trade between Japan and Europe] (Tokyo: Iwanami Shoten, 1942), 1–27.

34 This refers to present-day Ayutthaya in Thailand.

35 Galvão, *Tratado dos Descobrimentos*, 164–165.

36 Nakajima, Portugal-jin no Nihon Hatsu Raikō to Higashi Ajia Kaiiki Kōeki, 33–72.

37 Nakajima, Portugal-jin no Nihon Hatsu Raikō to Higashi Ajia Kaiiki Kōeki; Setsuko Matoba, *Zipangu to Nippon* [Zipangu and Japan] (Tokyo: Yoshikawa Kōbunkan, 2007), 108–135.

(喜利志多) and António cannot be solved only by relying on the family name da Mota (侘孟太).

As a result, many inconsistencies in the discussions about the year of the first arrival of the Portuguese in Japan seem to be resolved if one assumes that the information in the two books refers to the same event but to different groups. Such confusion shows how difficult it is to confirm the identities of those Portuguese who were with Chinese maritime merchants at that time.

More important than questions about specific times and distinct individuals is the fact that the Portuguese arrived in Japan by way of Wufeng Wang Zhi's (五峰王直) ship. Wang Zhi is known for his engagement in maritime trade even before he submitted in 1544 to Xǔ Dong, who sustained a wide network in Southeast Asia.[38] After Xǔ Dong was captured during a raid in Shuangyu, Wang Zhi became a leader of the Wokou. Research concerning Wang Zhi is much more detailed compared with that for other Wokou leaders, mainly because we have precise records in the *Ming Shizong Shilu* (明世宗〔嘉靖帝〕実録)[39] and *Chouhai tubian* (籌海図編),[40] edited by Hu Zongxian (胡宗憲). Hu was the Supreme Commander of Zhejiang and Fujian at the time. Wang Zhi called himself the King of Huei and dominated maritime trade in the eastern Asian sea around the Goto (五島) islands. In 1557 Hu ordered Wang Zhi to come to Ningbo, though he did not reveal his aim of executing him. Further details of Hu Zongxian's achievements can be learned from the *Chouhai tubian*, edited by Zheng Ruozeng (鄭若曾). This source provides basic material about Wang Zhi's activities as well as Wokou activities at the time.

The *Chouhai tubian* states that Wang Zhi built a large ship in Guangzhou in 1540 before submitting to Xǔ Dong. He sailed the ship to Japan and Southeast Asia to trade saltpeter, raw silks, cotton fabric, and other commodities. The source also states that "foreigners (夷人) deeply trusted him."[41] If we think

38 Murai, *Umi kara Mita Sengoku-Nihon*, 112–115.

39 I used in this book the edition of The Institute of History and Philology, Academia Sinica, Taiwan, 1962.

40 Formerly Hu Zongxian was considered as the editor, but Takeo Tanaka proved that the real editor was Zheng Ruozeng. Takeo Tanaka, *Chūsei Taigai Kōshō-shi no Kenkyū* [Study of the History of the Negotiations with Foreign Countries in the Middle Ages] (Tokyo: University of Tokyo Press, 1959). I used the *Chouhai tubian*, Wen-yuan-ge Edition, Siku Quanshu, Part of Histories 342, Geography (文淵閣四庫全書史部三四二地理類『籌海図編』) in this book.

41 *Chouhai tubian*, Wen-yuan-ge Edition of Siku Quanshu, Part of Histories 342, Geography, vol. 9, 244.

"foreigners" means Portuguese, we should think of Portuguese being aboard Wang Zhi's ship on its arrival at Tanegashima.[42]

Galvão further writes about those Portuguese who drifted ashore in Japan, having been aboard a Chinese junk in 1542 and first traveling to Liampó. This was a smuggling base on the islands off the Ningbo coast. The spelling originates, according to the aforementioned Barros, from the Portuguese saying Ningbo with a Portuguese accent.[43] However, it is also an established theory that Liampó does not refer to Ningbo but corresponds to the same Shuangyu port that appears in Chinese documents. This can be identified as a port on the east coast of Liuheng island (六橫島) in the Zhenhai District (鎮海縣) of Zhejiang province. Two small islands can certainly be seen from the coast.

The *Chouhai tubian* states that Jin Zi-Lao (金子老), a Chinese maritime merchant leader equal to Li Guangtou, took "Portuguese" (西番人) to Shuangyu and traded with them.[44] When this is taken together with the above-mentioned article by Galvão, it becomes clear that Shuangyu was a smuggling hub for multiple ethnic groups in 1542. In 1548 Shuangyu, as a center for the Wokou, suffered a raid by the Ming dynasty authority. From a combination of Portuguese and Chinese language materials, we can gain a picture of the Portuguese who were part of the Wokou at that time.

3.2 *The Activities of the Merchant Diogo Pereira*

Apart from the Portuguese, many dark-skinned mercenaries and slaves from Africa, India, and Southeast Asia appeared in the collection *Piyu-Zaji* (甓餘雜集)[45] as *hei-gui-fan* (黑蕃鬼, dark-skinned barbarian demons). We owe this report to Zhu Wan, who was the Grand Coordinator of Zhejiang and concurrently the Superintendent of Military Affairs for the Fujian Coastal Defense. He was in charge of the raid on smuggling groups in 1548–49, and reported on the raid in detail. Many of the *hei-gui-fan* were hired as combat personnel and

42 Recently Carioti researched the relationship between Wang Zhi and the Portuguese, focusing especially on the Portuguese drifting ashore at Tanegashima and on their call at Hirado Port (headquarters of Wang Zhi at that time) in 1550, and clarified the rise and fall of the sphere of influence of Wang Zhi. Patrizia Carioti, "The Portuguese Settlement at Macao: The Portuguese Policy of Expansion in the Far East, in Light of the History of Chinese and Japanese Intercourse and Maritime Activities,"*Revista de Cultura: International Edition* 6 (2003): 24–39.

43 Okamoto, *16 Seiki Nichi-Ō Kōtsū-shi no Kenkyū*, 126.

44 *Chouhai tubian*, Wen-yuan-ge Edition of Siku Quanshu, Part of Histories 342, Geography, vol. 8, 227.

45 *Piyu-Zaji*. Siku Quanshu Zongmu Tiyao, Part of Collections 78, Outside the Chinese Continent, collection of the Library of Tianjin, 1997, 1–314.

given a special payment because of their physical strength and bravery. I have made a list of those with Portuguese names in the *Piyu-Zaji*. Those identified by their names possibly had a higher position in the group and can thus be identified regardless of their birthplace. Apart from these, many *hei-gui-fan* and *folangji* appear only under their first name, such as António (安朶二) or Francisco (不礼舍職).

Those listed at fifth, sixth, and seventh place in the list were described as kings of the *folangji* (佛狼機國王). The word "king" does not mean a ruler over a realm but essentially a leader of a Portuguese group. These three leaders were described as encumbrances of a King of Malacca (麻六甲國王),[46] but who was this? The former Malacca royal family had established another sultanate in Johor after being removed by the Portuguese, so the king referred to here would thus appear to mean the Captain of Malacca, Dom Pedro da Silva da Gama, who should be considered the most politically powerful person there at the time. However, no record exists that he dispatched ships to China, although there was a fleet shipped from Malacca to the Chinese coast, led by the Portuguese Diogo Pereira (hereinafter Diogo). He seems to have come from Faial in the Azores in the Atlantic Ocean,[47] or was possibly of mixed blood from Kochi in India.[48] It also seems he was deeply involved with Xavier, the Jesuit missionary who introduced Christianity to Japan.[49] I would like to examine this relationship in detail by taking a closer look at the parts of Xavier's records that concern Diogo. He is first mentioned in a letter to John III of Portugal, which was sent from Kochi in 1548. It reads as follows:

> Diogo Pereira is a son of Tristão Pereira who has served your Highness here in India for twenty years. He was captain of a galley and galleon and was killed by Moors (Muslims) at a fort in Calicut. Compared to his sons his military achievements brought him no rewards. Yet Diogo

46 *Piyu-Zaji*, vol. 5, 42.

47 Charles Ralph Boxer, *Fidalgos in the Far East* (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1968), 32.

48 Georg Schurhammer, *Indonesia and India 1545–1549*, vol. 3 of *Francis Xavier: His Life, His Times*, trans. J. Costelloe (Rome: The Jesuit Historical Institute, 1980), 20–21.

49 All the letters of Francis Xavier have been transcribed and published by Schurhammer and Wicki, and this edition is translated into Japanese by Kono Yoshinori. Another Japanese translation of the letters of Xavier concerning Japan is published in the Series of Historical Sources of Overseas, edited by the Historiographical Institute, University of Tokyo. In this book, while referring to these two translations, I present my own translation based on the original text published by the Jesuit Historical Institute. Hereinafter, even if there are already Japanese translations, I will examine the original text when I cite Portuguese sources,

> Pereira fought quite well. As captain of the biggest ship of the fleet he destroyed the Acehnese ships by long cannons. His Indian soldiers [*lascarins*] defeated many Acehnese with their harquebuses. He needed to pay very large sums of money. Your Highness should therefore reward him as well as his father for their contribution to your Highness. Castilians from Nueva España [Mexico] were travelling on board of Diogo's ship via Molucca. They told me that it was very exhilarating to see Portuguese in India so excellent at a battle.[50]

The letter to the king from 1552 also refers to Diogo and his brother Guilherme:

> Guilherme Pereira and Diogo Pereira are two brothers, very rich and wealthy men. They are rendering much service to Your Highness with their properties and persons. Your Highness should send them a letter of thanks and honor them so that they are the more obliged to serve you. They are very good friends of mine, but I do not recommend them on the grounds of friendship, but because it pertains to the service of Your Highness. In the time of Simão de Melo,[51] Diogo Pereira spent and fought much in the destruction of the d'achens [Achinese].[52] (Letter from Xavier to D. João III, Cochin, January 31, 1552)

Xavier asked John III of Portugal to reward Diogo at least twice and contended that his treatment did not correspond to Diogo's achievements. The reference to the battle with the Acehnese pertains to that fought in 1547 in the area of the Perlis river in the Malay Peninsula.[53] Mendes Pinto states in his book *Peregrinação* that Diogo had been a servant of Gonçalo Coutinho, the commander of Molucca.[54] The reliability of the *Peregrinação* as a historical account has long

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50 Georgius Schurhammer & Iosephus Wicki, *Epistolae S. Francisci Xaverii*, tomus I, Monumenta historica Societatis Jesu, 68/Monumenta missionum Societatis Jesu, 2 (Romae: Monumenta Historica Societatis Iesu, 1944), Epistola 62, 412; Francisco Xavier, *Sei Francisco Xavier Zen Shokan-shū* [All the Letters of St. Francis Xavier], trans. Kōno Yoshinori (Tokyo: Heibon-sha, 1985), 293, letter 62.

51 Captain of Malacca, 1545–48.

52 Georgius Schurhammer & Iosephus Wicki, *Epistolae S. Francisci Xaverii*, tomus II (Romae: Monumenta Historica Societatis Iesu, 1945), Epistola 99, 305; Xavier, *Sei Francisco Xavier Zen Shokan-shū*, 565; Historiographical Institute, University of Tokyo (ed.), *Nihon Kankei Kaigai Shiryō: Jesuit Letters Concerning Japan*, vol. 1 (Tokyo: University of Tokyo Press, 1990), 246–249.

53 Schurhammer, *Japan and China 1549–1552*, 10–11.

54 Mendes Pinto, *Tōyō Henreki-ki* [*Peregrinação*], trans. Okamura Takiko, vol. 3 (Tokyo: Heibon-sha, 1980), 213. Gonçalo Coutinho was one of the commanders of Ternate Fortress,

been questioned, because Pinto not only turned his experiences into a more fictional story but also presented various events that he only heard of during his stay in Asia as his own experience. However, his descriptions of the Portuguese society, its people, and their activities in the 16th century are considered to be truthful and a valuable source for historical research.[55]

Schurhammer presents evidence that Diogo had Alonso Ramirez under his command. Ramirez was a crew member in the fleet of a Castilian named Ruy López Villalobos, who arrived in the Philippines via the new continental route through the Pacific Ocean in 1543.[56] He experienced defeat at a battle with Portuguese forces in Molucca and died as a prisoner in 1544 in the Ambon islands. Ramirez seems to be identical with a Castilian in Diogo's fleet who is referenced in the aforementioned letter by Xavier from 1548. Ramirez became a guard for Xavier, then worked for Diogo with Xavier's recommendation.[57] He is just one of a number of people from various areas, including Indian mercenaries and Castilians, who gathered together under Diogo's command. It seems fair to say they were altogether recorded as dark-skinned mercenaries in the aforementioned *Piyu-Zaji*.

Diogo left India in April 1548, commanding a fleet of two or more ships, and arrived at the Chinese coast,[58] having traveled via Malacca and Ayutthaya.[59] This fleet may be the one mentioned in the *Piyu-Zaji* in a paragraph from the 9th month, the 20th day, 1548 (lunar calendar), as the "two ships of the foreigners' king" (夷王船二隻) and the "Ships of the King of the *folangji* that came in a stream and gathered much more strength."[60] Diogo left behind two junks loaded with goods and made his way to Malacca at the end of the year.[61]

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the Moluccas, in 1535. Georg Schurhammer, *India 1541–1545*, vol. 2 of *Francis Xavier: His Life, His Times*, trans. J. Costelloe (Rome: The Jesuit Historical Institute, 1977), 257.

55 There is a Japanese translation, *Tōyō Henreki-ki*, by Okamura Takiko, but note that the supplementary information on the names of persons is very limited, and as to toponyms, the identification of modern place names is almost entirely lacking; thus sufficient knowledge of history and geography is required to use this translation as a historical source.

56 Georg Schurhammer, *Xaveriana* (*Gesammelte Studien*), Institutum Historicum Societatis Iesu (Lisbon: Centro de Estudos Históricos Ultramarinos, 1964), 665–679.

57 Schurhammer, *Japan and China 1549–1552*, 10–11.

58 Loureiro, "Prisioneiros portugueses e justiça chinesa,"424–425.

59 The Portuguese, in the same year as the attack on Malacca, sent an envoy to Ayutthaya, then gathered information about China and built a trade relationship with the Ayutthaya court. Ayutthaya became an important port of call for Portuguese ships that went from Malacca to the Chinese coast thereafter. A Portuguese settlement was established in Ayutthaya.

60 *Piyu-Zaji*, vol. 5, 54.

61 Loureiro, "Prisioneiros portugueses e justiça chinesa," 428; Cruz, *Chūgoku-shi*, 255.

Before he left he appointed a leader to control the crews. From these circumstances, it is appropriate to conclude that the leader who controlled Diogo's ships was the above-mentioned "foreigners' king" or "King of the *folangji*." Diogo, as the head of these kings, was subsequently recognized by the Ming dynasty authority as King of Malacca. Referring to their base, the *Piyu-Zaji* states that the "dominion of the *folangji*, [was] earlier called Samudera and originally governed by Siam."[62] This is understood to indicate that the Portuguese gathering around Shuangyu had their base at Malacca, located at the opposite side of Sumatra. From there they fought many battles against the Ayutthaya kingdom. Considering there were many "kings of the *folangji*" and that to be encumbrances of "the King of Malacca" was deemed important, these "kings of *folangji*" should be understood to have been in a lower position than "the King of Malacca."

3.3 *The Kings of the* Folangji

The entry for the 3rd month, the 20th day, 1549, in the *Piyu-Zaji* states:

> We took three kings of the Frank as captives. One of them is a strong king [矮王] whose name is Lang-sha-luo-di-bi-lie [浪沙囉的嗶咧] and who is a child of the King of Malacca. One of them is a small king [小王] whose name is Fo-nan-bo-er zhe [佛南波二者] and who is a grandchild of the king of Malacca. One of them is a second king [二王] whose name is Guo(wu)-liang-ba-lie [兀亮咧咧] and who is a brother of the King of Malacca.[63]

Thus three leaders are referred to as "kings of *folangji*" (佛狼機國王). They were in charge of controlling the ships left behind with loaded goods and were captured by Ke Qiao's soldiers (柯喬軍) on the 3rd month, the 20th day, 1549. Ke Qiao was a chief of the coastal defense of Fujian and served under Zhu Wan.

According to Alonso Ramirez, who belonged to the same group of captives and wrote a letter from Lampacau after his release in 1555, the captains of the two junks mentioned were Lançarote Pereira and Fernão Borges.[64] Therefore,

62 *Piyu-Zaji*, vol. 6, 7.

63 *Piyu-Zaji*, vol. 5, 42.

64 Original: A Carta de Alonso Ramiro, 1555. Arquivo Nacional Torre do Tombo, *Fragmentos*, Maço 24, f. 1; Transcription: Biblioteca da Ajuda, *Jesuítas na Ásia*, 49-IV-49, ff. 233v–234v; Schurhammer, *Xaveriana*, 673–678. The original text is very damaged; hence I had to analyze the content from the transcription.

Lang sha luo di bi lie (Lançarote Pereira) and Fo-nan-bo-er-zhe (Fernão Borges) obviously mean the strong king (矮王) and the small king (小王) respectively. The last one, Guo(wu)-liang ba-lie (兀亮咧咧), can be assumed from its pronunciation to refer to Galiote Pereira, who was captured as a member of Diogo's group in the same year. He wrote the *Algumas Cousas Sabidas da China* after his release.[65] All three men differed in their birthplace from Diogo and are not considered to be his real relatives, as the *Piyu-Zaji* states. It is certain that Diogo trusted them as his right-hand men, but what do we know about their actual background? About Lançarote Pereira de Abreu (hereinafter Lançarote) we have the most information. He was a *fidalgo*, meaning a member of the lower nobility of Portugal who came from Ponte de Lima, located on the border between north Portugal and Galicia in Spain.[66] His name appears in a letter that was sent from Mozambique by Francisco Xavier, who sailed out from Lisbon to Goa in 1541. According to Schurhammer, Lançarote was given the right to navigate between Sofala (in today's Mozambique) and Melinde (today Malindi in Kenya), located on the east coast of Africa.[67] This was a reward for his achievements in the naval battle of Diu in Gujarat in 1538. As Lançarote and Diogo served as soldiers in India at the same time, it is certainly possible that they became acquainted there.

Furthermore, Pinto attributed an important role to Lançarote in his *Peregrinação*, specifically in the episode of the Liampó (Shuangyu) raid by the Ming military:

> There was an honorable man there of good family background by the name of Lançarote Pereira, a native of the town of Ponte de Lima, who, they said, had given about thousands of cruzados worth of poor-quality merchandise on credit to some unreliable Chinese men who made off with the goods without ever giving him anything in return for it or ever being heard from again. In an effort to make up for this loss on those who were not to blame for it, he gathered together for that purpose some fifteen or twenty Portuguese idlers of evil conscience and perhaps worse judgement [...] The news of those outrageous deeds spread rapidly the next day throughout the entire countryside, and the inhabitants went to

65 *Algumas Cousas Sabidas da China* (Something Known about China). In Charles Ralph Boxer (ed.), *South China in the 16th Century* (Bangkok: Orchid Press, 2004; first published 1953), 3–43.

66 Pinto, *Tōyō Henreki-ki*, 239–240.

67 Schurhammer, *India 1541–1545*, 82–83.

> the Chumbin [Xunfushi巡撫使, Provincial Governor] of justice to lodge a complaint. [...] the Chaem [Duchayuan都察院, the chief of Court of Censors] of the government, who is the viceroy of that kingdom. He immediately dispatched an Aitao [Haidaofushi海道副使, the supreme commander], who is like an admiral among us, with an armada of three hundred junks and eighty oared boats with a company of sixty thousand men, which they got ready in seventeen days. These vessels fell upon this unfortunate enclave. Of the Portuguese one morning ... (following Rebecca Catz's translation, 1989).[68]

According to Pinto, this should have happened in 1542, but many researchers have made clear that this does not match the facts. Therefore, I will focus only on the description.

The Liampó (Shuangyu) raid seems to have had its origin in some kind of monetary dispute between Lançarote and Chinese merchants, and it subsequently led to the violent attack mentioned here that was visited by the Portuguese on a neighboring village. In Zheng Shun Gong's (鄭舜功) account *Quiong He Hua Hai* (窮河話海) on the "Hai shi" (海市) of *Riben-Yijian* (日本一鑑), he gives the background information that Xu Dong (Xu E許二) and Xu Zi (許梓 or 許四) of the Xu brothers guided the Portuguese and did not pay for the foreigners' goods, which caused strife in 1546 and led to the attack.[69] From the similarity of this information to Pinto's, the foreigner in question can be confirmed as Lançarote Pereira. The "Hai shi" of *Riben-Yijian* further says this trouble ignited the Wokou crisis and widespread suppression by Zhu Wan.[70] The predation by Lançarote can thus be considered to have been one of the main factors leading to the Wokou's subjugation by Zhu Wan.

About the small king Fo-nan-bo-er-zhe (小王佛南波二者), Fernão Borges, not much is known except that he was a powerful maritime merchant in 1548, equal to António de Faria,[71] the main character of Pinto's *Peregrinação*.[72] The second king Guo(wu) liang ba lie (二王兀亮咧咧), Galiote Pereira, from

68 Pinto, *Tōyō Henreki-ki*, 239–240.

69 Shun Gong Zheng (ed.), *Riben-Yijian*, private edition of Mikajiri Hiroshi, *Quiong He Hua Hai*, vol. 6, 462.

70 Ibid.

71 António was the *fidalgo* whom Pinto served when he left Pêro de Faria and became a merchant. António is also a protagonist of Pinto's *Peregrinação*. For a long time he was considered a fictional character created by Pinto, as in the study of Okamoto, *16 Seiki Nichi-Ō Kōtsū-shi no Kenkyū*, but his real existence has been confirmed. Loureiro, *Fidalgos Missionários e Mandarins*, 428.

72 Ibid., 428–429.

Arraiolos in Portugal, arrived in Portuguese India in 1534 accompanying Martim Afonso de Sousa, the Governor of Portuguese India. He was confirmed to work under the Captain of Malacca, Dom Pedro de Faria, in Malacca in 1539.[73] As Pinto himself arrived at Malacca together with Faria, they could have been acquainted with each other. Later, in 1548, Galiote joined Diogo's group in Malacca.[74] The following year Galiote was captured by Ke Qiao's army at Zoumaxi in Zhao'an, and was imprisoned in Guangzhou via Quanzhou and Guangxi. There he wrote the *Algumas cousas sabidas da China* on the legal system, administrative organization, and geography of the country based on his experiences during that time.[75] According to Schurhammer, the Portuguese crew numbered thirty men together with Indian soldiers (*lascarins*).[76]

3.4 *Disguised as King of Malacca and the Fourth King*

A Portuguese Dominican friar, Gaspar da Cruz, who stayed at Guangzhou for a few months in 1556 used Galiote's writing as the basis for his own detailed record of Chinese geography, law system, customs, and the activities of the local Portuguese.[77] Part of it refers to the enrichment of Lu Tang (盧鏜) who, in 1549 and together with Ke Qiao, led the suppression and the capture of the Portuguese:

> The chief Captain, which is the Luthissi [Lu Tang],[78] remained so vainglorious and so pleased with this victory. [...] He laboured to persuade four Portugals who had more appearance in their persons than the rest, that they should say that they were Kings of Malacca. [...] And finding among the clothes that he took a gown and a cap, and asking one of those Chinas who were taken with the Portugals what habit that was, they put in his head that it was the habit of the Kings of Malacca, wherefore he commanded forthwith to make three gowns by that pattern, and three

73 Ibid., 428.

74 Ibid., 428.

75 See note 68 above.

76 October 14, 1551, Letter from Gaspar Lopes. Arquivo Nacional Torre do Tombo, *Fragmentos*, Maço 30.

77 Gaspar da Cruz, *Tractado das Cousas da China* (Evora, 1569–1570).

78 Boxer, *South China in the 16th Century*, 195. For the expression "Luthissi," written in the Western alphabet, Boxer says this may be a combination of Lu, the family name of Lu Tang, and the name of the office "Tu-ssu (都司)." I agree with this analysis by Boxer, but I would like to note that Lu Tang was not actually the commander of the Coast Guard (備倭都指揮). According to the *Chouhai tubian*, the commander in this period was Liu Enzhi (劉恩至).

> caps, and so he appareled them all four in one sort, to make his deceit true, and his victory more glorious. [...] The Luthissi went with this prize through the country with very great majesty, and carried before him four banners displayed, on the which were written the names of the four Kings of Malacca. And when he arrived into the towns, he entered with great noise and majesty, with sound of trumpets, and with criers who went before, proclaiming the great victory which the Luthissi so-and-so had gotten of the four great Kings of Malacca.[79]

This information is considered an explanation of why the three Portuguese were called kings of the *folangji* in the *Piyu-Zaji*. Cruz says in his record that Lu Tang forced some eminent men among the captured Portuguese to call themselves "kings." News of the capture of four kings was spread from town to town, and they were escorted in a cage and exposed to the public. I infer that this episode was inserted in the *Piyu-Zaji* to symbolize the victory of the Ming dynasty authority over the Portuguese. Because they were forced to call themselves kings, these men must have held leadership positions among the Portuguese. The *Piyu-Zaji* further located the *Folangji* on the opposite coast of Sumatra, which would likely be Malacca. In contrast to the three "kings of Malacca" mentioned in the *Piyu-Zaji*, Cruz wrote of "four kings of Malacca." Three of them have been verified as Galiote, Lançarote, and Borges. Who, then, was the fourth?

In his *Peregrinação* Pinto wrote that four Portuguese leaders resided in Liampó.[80] Their names were Mateus de Brito, Lançarote Pereira, Jerónimo do Rego, and Tristan (Tristão) de Gá, with Mateus de Brito holding the most important position among them. Jerónimo do Rego and Tristan de Gá are referred to as "old and rich *fidalgo* (middle class nobles)." Barros's *Decadas da Asia* can confirm Tristan de Gá's existence. Barros also reports on Tristan de Gá's mission to Muzaffar Shah II of the Gujarat Sultanate to negotiate the building of a fort and factory in Diu in around 1512 on behalf of Albuquerque, the Viceroy of Portuguese India.[81] In other words, de Gá traveled the Asian ocean area for nearly forty years after the beginning of the Portuguese advance into the Indian Ocean. He stayed on the Chinese coast and directed his private trading group in his later years. He appeared as a ship owner who engaged in

79 Cruz, *Chūgoku-shi*, 256–258; Cruz, *Tractado das Cousas da China*, Chapter 24; Boxer, *South China in the 16th Century*, 195–196.

80 Pinto, *Tōyō Henreki-ki*, vol. 3, 241.

81 João de Barros, *Ajia-shi* [*Ásia, Terceira Década*], trans. Ikuta Shigeru & Ikegami Mineo, vol. 2 (Tokyo: Iwanami Shoten, 1981), 263.

the China–Malacca trades in another chapter of the *Peregrinação*.[82] As Jerónimo de Rego and Tristan de Gá do not match the three kings mentioned in the *Piyu-Zaji*, we cannot know where they were in 1548. However, Lançarote was an actual person and the information on him given in the *Piyu-Zaji* corresponds to other Portuguese material. The other king, Mateus de Brito, appears in various places in the *Peregrinação*:[83] he was among those entrusted to lead a fleet under Diogo's control. Therefore, it is certainly possible that the fourth king was Brito. Pinto, who was himself a Jesuit in 1555, mentions in a letter the Jesuits' efforts to liberate Brito, who had been captured and imprisoned in Guangzhou.

> Today, I arrived here in Macao from Lampacau, which is the port where we are staying at present. Macao is a place 6 leagues further ahead from Lampacau and the place where I found Father Master Belchior. He had arrived from Canton, where he stayed for twenty-five days to take charge of Mateus de Brito,[84] a man from an important family, and others. They had been kept as prisoners for over six years, and it cost 1,000 taels [equivalent to 1,500 cruzados] to negotiate their liberation.[85]

From this letter, we know about the release of Mateus de Brito and one further Portuguese in exchange for 1,000 taels thanks to the efforts of a Jesuit priest, Belchior Nunes Barreto, in 1555. Adding Brito to Lançarote, Galiote, and Borges, it seems these four were Diogo's right-hand men and that they helped him to lead his trading network east of Malacca but remained in a subordinate position. Furthermore, according to Cruz's record, they were forced to name themselves as "kings" by the regional commander, Lu Tao. Many Portuguese including these four were captured together with their ships at Yuegang in March 1549 and were first sent to Quanzhou.[86] Galiote wrote in detail on the movements of the *folangji* prisoners in his *Algumas Cousas Sabidas da China*. Boxer gives further details of this.[87] Galiote was released in 1553, and it has been confirmed that he did not die before 1557.[88]

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82 Pinto, *Tōyō Henreki-ki*, vol. 1, 61–62.

83 Ibid., 241.

84 He was captured in Zhangzhou in 1549 and was imprisoned in Guangzhou.

85 November 20, 1555, Macao, Letter from Br. Fernão Mendes Pinto to the Rector of the College in Goa, Historiographical Institute, University of Tokyo (ed.), *Nihon Kankei Kaigai Shiryō: Jesuit Letters Concerning Japan*, vol. 2 (Tokyo: University of Tokyo Press, 1996), 258–275.

86 Boxer, *South China in the 16th Century*, Introduction, li.

87 Ibid., liii.

88 Ibid., lv.

4 Francis Xavier's Plan for a Diplomatic Mission to China and the Prisoner Problem in Guangzhou

4.1 *Xavier's Plan for a Mission to China*

Ming dynasty officials perceived Diogo Pereira to be a leading person in Portuguese illegal trade on the Ningbo coast. Diogo was a friend of the Xavier from the time Xavier was planning his activities in China until his death while completing his missionary work in Japan. Letters written by Xavier and various other Jesuit documents can prove Diogo's movements. Although his followers were captured during Zhu Wan's clean sweep in 1548–49, he escaped by returning to Malacca before the battles became fierce. There he continued to trade between Malacca and the Chinese coast.

Xavier completed his missionary work in Japan in the autumn of 1551 and set out to return to India, traveling from Bungo on board Duarte da Gama's ship. On the way he coincidentally met his old friend Diogo, who was coming from the Sunda islands with a load of pepper, at Shangchuan near Guangzhou.[89] Xavier's activities in Japan had not been as successful as he had hoped when he had first gone there in the summer of 1549: Buddhism had already deeply penetrated society. Therefore he left in the autumn of 1551 after engaging in his mission in Kagoshima, Yamaguchi, Miyako (Kyoto), Hirado, and Bungo. Because China had a regional and cultural influence on Japan, Xavier decided to start a new mission of conversion there.[90] He thought that official amity between China and Portugal was a precondition for entering China and missionizing safely. He thus decided to go back to Goa to ask the Viceroy of Portuguese India for an official deployment in order to establish diplomatic relations.

Diogo met Xavier and agreed to his plan to set up an official mission (Diogo himself would be an ambassador), and he offered to take Xavier to China. Diogo told him: "if the Viceroy of Portuguese India approves, I would like to serve God and the king with my money and carrack."[91] In the following passage I intend to reconstruct the movements around Xavier relating to his envoy plan, mainly by using reports from the Jesuit Francisco Pérez,[92] who summarized Xavier's missionary activities.[93]

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89 January 21, 1555, Cochin, Letter from Fr. Francisco Pérez to Fr. Ignatius de Loyola in Rome. Historiographical Institute, *Jesuit Letters Concerning Japan*, vol. 2, 182–188 (= Letter of Pérez).

90 January 29, 1552, Cochin, Letter from Fr. Francisco Xavier to the Jesuits in Europe. Historiographical Institute, *Jesuit Letters Concerning Japan*, vol. 1, 210–233.

91 Letter of Pérez, 183.

92 Francisco Pérez.

93 Letter of Pérez, 182–188. This report was made after the death of Xavier, by order of Ignatius de Loyola, Superior of the Society of Jesus, who wanted the detailed information of the activity of Xavier in the East and the situation of his death.

Pinto's *Peregrinação* gives no clear information, but Pérez's report shows that Xavier's plan to send a mission to China had two motives:

> Portuguese captives in China informed Father Xavier about the following points through their letters: if an embassy were to be sent from the King of Portugal to Canton, we could reach a peaceful agreement with the Chinese; because they are governed by laws and cherish knowledge such an agreement would open a passage and a big gateway for us to propagate Christianity in China; [...] the Chinese would accept it more smoothly and retain longer our faith than the Indians. [94]

Xavier therefore had two goals in entering China as a member of an official mission: the establishment of amity between China and Portugal (including the liberation of prisoners) and the evangelization of the Chinese. Diogo in turn supported Xavier's intentions because he was looking for a chance to liberate his own people, who were imprisoned in Guangzhou after being captured during the crackdown in Shuangyu in 1548–49. In a letter sent to the King of Portugal from Goa in April 1552, Xavier wrote that "Diogo Pereira will go as a member of the mission to make a petition to release Portuguese prisoners and to establish peace and friendship between your Highness and the King of China."[95] It seems obvious that Diogo backed Xavier's plan in order to secure the release of the Portuguese prisoners rather than to establish amity between China and Portugal.

4.2 *Álvaro Ataíde da Gama's Intervention in the Mission*

Xavier changed from Gama's ship to Diogo's ship and was bound for Malacca. There he met Álvaro Ataíde da Gama (hereinafter Ataíde), the younger brother of Pedro da Gama, who was expected to succeed as Captain of Malacca. Xavier and Diogo consulted with him about their planned mission to China. Ataíde agreed to their plan and promised his support.[96] He and Xavier had known each other during the time they spent on the same ship sailing from Lisbon. Xavier stayed in Malacca for only two days and then headed for India with Diogo. Pérez wrote about Xavier's situation in Goa as follows:

> Father Xavier [...] negotiated with the viceroy that Diogo Pereira would go to China with the mission by accommodating himself with money.

94 Letter of Pérez, 183.

95 April 8, 1552, Goa, Letter from Fr. Francisco Xavier to Dom João III, King of Portugal. Historiographical Institute, *Jesuit Letters Concerning Japan*, vol. 1, 265–269.

96 Letter of Pérez, 184.

> The viceroy would issue an order for that. Because Diogo Pereira spent through his business staff much money for expensive gifts, Father Xavier returned to Malacca.[97]

However, the situation had changed when Xavier came back to Malacca. Ataíde, the succeeding Captain of Malacca who had promised to support the mission, prevented them from sailing by confiscating their ship's helm and confining Diogo.[98] As a result of further negotiations, only Xavier was allowed to sail to China; Diogo remained interned at Malacca. Xavier went to Shangchuan again, but he died on December 2, 1552, after having roamed around the Guangzhou coast:[99] he could not enter China either as an envoy or by slipping in another way. His body was sent to Malacca three months later and Diogo organized a large funeral for him.[100]

Some weeks before his death, on November 12, 1552, Xavier had sent a letter to Diogo from Shangchuan.[101] He told Diogo about the impossibility of entering China within the year and expressed his hope of finding a ship to China in Siam in order to rescue the Portuguese prisoners in China. With him was a released Portuguese prisoner named Manuel de Chávez.

It seems that Ataíde's interference with Xavier's envoy was the result of a feud between Ataíde and Diogo. Ataíde's father was Vasco da Gama, who had discovered the Indian route and was at that time a peer of the highest rank in Portuguese India. As Diogo dominated a Portuguese trading network in the east of Malacca, one cannot wonder that Ataíde tried to exclude him. Diogo was already gaining significant influence and property in the east of Malacca in an area that Ataíde considered "his" territory. Pinto wrote in *Peregrinação* that Ataíde was outraged by Diogo's refusal of his loan offer: "Diogo used to be nothing but a servant of Gonçalo Coutinho[102] and doesn't deserve to be Ambassador to China."[103] Xavier excommunicated Ataíde from the Church;[104] he was then arrested and removed from the post of captain. All of his property

97 Ibid., 184.
98 Ibid., 185.
99 Ibid., 185–188. Xavier died of pleurisy.
100 May 1554, between Goa and Cochin, Letter from Belchior Nunes Barreto to Fr. Ignatius de Loyola in Rome. Historiographical Institute, *Jesuit Letters Concerning Japan*, vol. 2, 25.
101 Schurhammer & Wicki, *Epistolae S*, tomus II, Epistola 136, 513–516.
102 See note 57 above.
103 Ibid.
104 July 21, 1552, Straits of Singapore, Letter from Francis Xavier to Fr. Gaspar Barzaeus in Goa. Historiographical Institute, *Jesuit Letters Concerning Japan*, vol. 1, 285–289.

was confiscated by the order of the Viceroy of Portuguese India, who regarded him as responsible for Xavier's tragic death.[105]

4.3 *The Liberation of Prisoners in Guangzhou*

Xavier's diplomatic mission was unsuccessful, but Jesuit priests and brothers who arrived in East Asia later continued negotiations regarding the liberation of Portuguese prisoners in Guangzhou. Mendes Pinto's letter, written during his time as a Jesuit, gives evidence of the release of at least three Portuguese from the prison in Guangzhou in 1555 as a result of Belchior Barreto's negotiations. Barreto's letter describes the negotiations. As there has been no translation of this part previously, I will quote a longer passage here.

> After our arrival in China, I have been to Canton twice, and on each occasion, I stayed there for one month. The first time I went to check the possibility of liberating those captives, including three honored Portuguese and some Chinese Christians who had been kept as prisoners in the jail at Canton. Their cells are very strong. By the orders of the mandarins one of the prisoners was brought in front of me. I found it heart-breaking to see him. He appeared barefoot, without a cap, with both hands entrapped in a board, with his neck in a plank on which his crime was carved, and with his feet bound by shackles of iron. It was said that the others were held in the same condition. Those working at this prison told us that these captives had been sentenced to death. The reason why these Portuguese and others were held captive in China was the following: during a war they had lost their ships and were either caught for having committed murder or a theft. As the Portuguese are paying customs at present they cannot be considered as robbers (pirates). I had brought raw ambergris with me that the King of China has sought for over six years. He had promised to pay a reward to whoever brought him some, because it was written in their books that ambergris would grant a long life upon an old person who ate them in a certain way. On the second occasion, I went to liberate the same prisoners, I brought 1,500 pardaos to give them to Chaem, a principal governor. Three men from the Portuguese community here have donated money for the rescue of these captives. The money has now

105 Pinto, *Tōyō Henreki-ki*, vol. 3, 230; Rui Manuel Loureiro,"A conquista espritual do Império do Meio," in *Fidalgos Missionários e Mandarins* (Lisbon: Fundação Oriente, 2000), 482.

> been deposited in Canton so that it can be given to Chaem for the liberation of these prisoners. [106]

It is clear from this account that Barreto went twice to negotiate the liberation of the Portuguese prisoners. The first time, he carried ambergris with him but failed in his attempt. The second time, however, he carried 1,500 pardaos (equivalent to 1,000 taels), which might have been demanded the first time. He then successfully bailed out the Portuguese prisoners. It is true that trade with foreign ships that could provide ambergris was welcomed during the Ming dynasty. Barreto obviously knew about this.[107] It is also clear, as he mentions, that "the Portuguese had paid customs" to the Guangzhou authorities.

It seems reasonable to assume that the liberated prisoners were Mateus de Brito, the aforementioned fourth king, and Amaro Pereira.[108] After his liberation Pereira wrote in detail about the Chinese legal system, which he had experienced himself and heard about as a captive. As stated above, Galiote Pereira had already been liberated.[109] It thus seems possible that Lançarote Pereira and Fernão Borges, two of the three "kings," were not released or had already died at that time. Yet Alonso Ramirez, who wrote a letter from Lampacau in 1555, and Fernão López were possibly released along with two other prisoners who were referenced in the letter from the Society of Jesus. The Portuguese in Lampacau had gathered 1,500 pardaos for their liberation by 1555.

Diogo was among the Portuguese in Lampacau at this time.[110] Diogo had arrived at Lampacau from Sunda together with eight Japanese.[111] At Shangchuan Island he had encountered Xavier. Diogo sailed from Sunda directly to China to sell pepper he had brought from Sumatra. This means he avoided traveling through Malacca and ignored the presence of the appointed Captain of Malacca. Diogo thus escaped paying customs at Malacca. It is interesting to mention the existence of eight Japanese sailors among Diogo's crew. This

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106 November 23, 1555, Macao (Lampacau), Letter from Fr. Belchior Nunes Barreto to the Jesuits in India. *Cartas da Índia*, f. 36.

107 Shigeki Iwai,"Jūroku Seiki Chūgoku ni okeru Kōeki Chitsujo no Mosaku" [Search for Orders of Trade in Sixteenth-Century China], in *Chūgoku Kinsei Shakai no Chitsujo Keisei* [The Formation of Order in Modern Chinese Society] (Kyoto: Institute for Humanities Research, Kyoto University, 2004), 123.

108 For the copy of the letter of Amaro Pereira, see Biblioteca da Ajuda, *Jesuítas na Ásia*, 49-IV-49. Gomez also thinks that Amaro Pereira was the prisoner who was released with Brito. Gomez, *Macau um Municipio da História*, 47.

109 Boxer, *South China in the 16th Century*, lv.

110 January 12, 1556, Malacca, Letter from Luís Fróis to the Jesuits in Goa. Biblioteca da Ajuda, *Jesuítas na Ásia*, 49-IV-49, ff. 253v–255v (= Letter of Fróis).

111 Letter of Fróis.

shows that the Wokou has to be considered an umbrella term for an ethnically diverse group.

Barreto's negotiations might have been a response to Diogo's demand. One might think that Diogo had been the main contributor to the bailout, but his name does not appear in Barreto's letter. A Jesuit in Goa, Luís Fróis, states that other influential maritime merchants, António Pereira and Francisco Toscano, were staying in Lampacau at that time.[112] As Barreto stated that the bail was covered by money that was lent and donations from many Portuguese, they also might have contributed.

Fróis's letter thus includes some information that supplements Barreto's letter. For example, Luís de Almeida, a merchant on the Malacca–China coast trades and later a Jesuit in Japan, is mentioned as having accompanied Barreto to Guangzhou for negotiations. The letter states that Barreto sought the assistance of de Almeida because of the deep trust the Ming dynasty authority had in him. It furthermore shows that Mateus de Brito and two other prisoners were released at the same time. During his second stay in Guangzhou, the Ming dynasty authority invited Barreto for a discussion with Chinese intellectuals. He was asked questions on topics such as the constitution of the world and the afterlife. As Fróis states, the Chinese ridiculed him when they heard his answers.[113] Fróis furthermore explains why the prisoners had not yet been executed. The supreme commander (*haidao-fushi*) of Guangzhou had told Barreto that they were still awaiting the final decision of the king from the court.[114] Therefore they planned to punish the Portuguese prisoners after the arrival of a judicial officer.[115] As Barreto says in his letter, the bail was to be provided to the judicial officer. Even foreigners who infringed the law were thus not punished in a haphazard manner but were formally dealt with under the judicial system of the Ming dynasty.

In another letter to the Father General of the Society of Jesus about this matter, Barreto states that there had been six prisoners.[116] As mentioned, Pinto had become a Jesuit brother at that time (1554–58) owing to the influence of Xavier. It may be true that Pinto participated in the negotiations as a member of Barreto's group and that he had a chance to hear what had happened in Shuangyu. It is also possible that he relied on his old acquaintance Galiote

112 Ibid.

113 Ibid.

114 Ibid.

115 This is thought to be an officer of the Chaem (都察院) or the Chumbin (巡撫).

116 November 27, 1555, Macao (Lampacau), Letter from Fr. Belchior Nunes Barreto to Fr. Ignatius de Loyola. *Cartas da Índia*, f. 36.

Pereira as a source, because descriptions in Pinto's *Peregrinação* also appear in Cruz's *Tratado das cousas da China*.

4.4 *Diogo Pereira in Macao*

Xavier's 1552 letter cited above indicates that Diogo had a real brother (possibly a younger brother) named Guilherme. He should be differentiated from Diogo's right-hand men, Lançarote and Galiote, who called themselves "relatives of Diogo." Guilherme's trips to Japan included traveling from Lampacau to Hirado in 1556, from Lampacau to Bungo in 1558, and from Macao to Bungo in 1559.[117] Diogo Pereira's group definitely held a central role in the East Asia Portuguese trade in the 1550s. Jesuit documents reveal that Diogo stayed at the port of Lampacau during the winter of 1555.[118] He also held bases at Goa and Kochi in India and Macao, and he was probably also active in the India–Malacca–Chinese coast sailing route.

In 1562, some years after the Portuguese had been expelled from Shuangyu and relocated their trading base first on Shangchuan and then Lampacau, and finally in Macao, Diogo reappeared.[119] At that time he was serving as the new ambassador to China, dispatched by the King of Portugal and appointed by Coutinho, the Viceroy of Portuguese India, in 1562. Diogo arrived at Macao on August 24, 1562. There he stayed at his brother's house and negotiated with Ming dynasty officials in Guangzhou for a visit to the court in Beijing. However, an official visit to the emperor was not allowed.[120]

In the same year he was elected Capitão da Terra (captain of the land) of Macao from among 800 Portuguese living in Macao and Asian inhabitants who had converted to Christianity.[121] Francisco Pérez, who was a Jesuit brother staying there, described the brothers Diogo and Guilherme in his letter as "rulers of Macao."[122] Capitão da Terra refers to the elected leader among the people in Macao during the absence of the Capitão-mór. The latter was appointed by the king every year to govern the Portuguese inhabitants in Macao and to sail to Japan. The position of Capitão da Terra was not conferred by the King of Portugal but decided by an election, a form of self-government in Macao.

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117 Okamoto, *16 Seiki Nichi-Ō Kōtsū-shi no Kenkyū*, 506. According to Boxer, Guilherme was the second wealthiest person in Portuguese India after the Viceroy of India. Boxer, *Fidalgos in the Far East*, 33.

118 Biblioteca da Ajuda, *Jesuítas na Ásia*, 49-IV-49, ff. 276v–279r.

119 Gomez, *Macau um Municipio da história*, 48–49.

120 Ibid.

121 Ibid.

122 January 1564, China, Letter from Francisco Pérez to the Fr. Provincial of India. Biblioteca da Ajuda, *Jesuítas na Ásia*, 49-IV-50, ff. 590r–591v.

According to Gomez, a Macao history researcher, this office worked against the king's and his viceroy's authority, and it was therefore requested that it should be abolished. It is thought, however, that the position continued in Macao until 1623, when the captain was directly dispatched from the government office of the Viceroy of Portuguese India. Diogo Pereira is thus considered to have been one of the foremost leaders in the Portuguese society of Macao until his death in 1587.[123]

From this fact we have to assume that Diogo's influence on Portuguese society to the east of Malacca was very strong. Though many people in his group were captured and died in the large raid on Shungyu in 1548–49, his group maintained its power on the Chinese coasts in the 1550s. Diogo himself finally became a substantive ruler of Malacca. His large properties and influence through gathering private merchants under his command probably caused the conflicts with public authorities, in the first place with the Captain of Malacca and the Viceroy of Portuguese India. It seems that leaders of private trading groups, such as those led by Diogo Pereira, also achieved leading political and social positions within the Portuguese society of Macao. This structure of self-government by merchants became a major characteristic of Macao society during the era of trade with Japan.

Francisco Xavier began his missionary work in Asia at the request of the Portuguese king, but he accompanied mainly private maritime merchants who operated to the east of Malacca. Xavier may have recognized that he could not rely on officials in the China Sea because he could not use Portuguese ships to travel from Malacca to Japan. In consequence, it was not Portuguese India's authorities but private maritime merchants who substantially supported his mission in Japan. It is therefore possible that Xavier advised the King of the Portugal to enlarge, with royal authorization, Diogo's influence on the Malacca–Chinese coast trading networks, not only in material aspects but also to balance Portuguese India authority and to control other private maritime merchants.

From the 1550s, when Jesuit missionary activity in Japan and trade between China and Japan, namely Namban trade, officially began, the Jesuits and private maritime merchants established a close relationship. Without an analysis of the presence and activities of private maritime merchants, we cannot fully understand the process by which the Jesuits came to depend on trade networks for their missionary work. In Japan, their work became inextricably linked to the Namban trade for about 100 years.

123 Gomez, *Macau um Municipio da história*, 48–49.

CHAPTER 2

The Structure and Content of Namban Trade

The purpose of this chapter is to understand the structure of Namban trade through the analysis of Spanish records that inform us about import and export goods, places of production, trade prices, and the selling prices of the official trade that was undertaken by the ships of the Capitão-mór, assigned by the king. Numerical data about trade has not been well provided, with the exception of research by Takase Kōichirō (高瀬弘一郎),[1] who extracted information about the import volume of raw silk from documents relating to the Jesuits and other organizations.[2]

Thanks to Takase's research, Jesuit missionary reports have been shown to provide excellent and reliable historical information about Portuguese trade in East Asia. For example, in 1559 the Jesuits of Japan concluded a contract to load fifty picos of raw silk into the ships of the Capitão-mór every year, such that Namban trade would give them a financial basis for their missionary work. Other materials, such as gold, were also sent from Macao, accruing good profits, all of which were used as the operating foundation of their missionary activities. Furthermore, we can assume that the Namban trade and the Jesuits were closely linked based on the fact that the Jesuits rendered a fund consignment service from a local lord in western Japan (*saigoku daimyō* 西国大名) and intervened in raw silk package deals. Their missionary report gives us some details of the trade. Missionaries were sensitive to information about merchant ships on which their livelihood depended, but they did not keep many records of the contents and volumes of loaded goods. Therefore it is difficult to reconstruct a complete picture of the Namban trade from this information.

Iwao Seiichi (岩生成一), who systematically studied red-seal ship trades, comments about the detailed records of imported and exported goods: "there

1 Kōichirō Takase, "Macao Nagasaki Kan Bōeki no Sō Torihiki-daka, Kiito Torihiki-ryō, Kiito Kakaku" [Total Turnover, the Raw Silk Trade Volume and Prices of the Trade between Macao and Nagasaki], in *Kirishitan Jidai no Bōeki to Gaikō* [Trade and Diplomacy in the Kirishitan Period] (Tokyo: Yagi Shoten, 2002), 3–50.

2 A concrete example of the trade in Macao is given by a Florentine merchant, Francesco Carletti, *Ragionamenti di Francesco Carletti sopra le cose da lui vedute ne' suoi viaggi si dell' Indie Occidentali, e Orientali come d'altri Paesi*. English translation; Francesco Carletti, *My Voyage around the World*, trans. Herbert Weinstock (London: Methuen, 1965).

are quite few materials both in Japan and other countries and even if we have them, they are in fragments." He mainly used Dutch sources for his study.[3] The most fruitful source material concerning external trade in the early modern period is from the VOC, which handled organized trade activities and kept detailed correspondence between individuals and local factories. Nagazumi Yoko (永積洋子),[4] Kato Eiichi (加藤榮一),[5] and Ishida Chihiro (石田千尋)[6] all introduced detailed evidence about the goods that were traded in their research. They also investigated the diplomatic policy of the Tokugawa Shogunate in the first half of the 17th century and, importantly for this chapter, imported and exported goods.[7]

1 Overview of the Documents

Although the documents analyzed in this chapter were reprinted in Spanish,[8] and translated into English some years ago (Blair & Robertson: *The Philippine*

3 Seiichi Iwao, *Shuin-sen Bōeki-shi no Kenkyū* [Study of the History of the Red-seal Ship Trade] (Tokyo: Kōbundō, 1958), 292–306.

4 Yōko Nagazumi (ed.), *Hirado Oranda Shōkan no Nikki* [Diaries Kept by the Dutch Factory at Hirado], 4 vols (Tokyo: Iwanami Shoten, 1969–1970).

5 Eiichi Katō, "'Hirado'Jidai Zenhan-ki no Oranda-sen: Nihon Bōeki no Jittai" [Dutch Ships in the First Half of the "Hirado" Era: The Actual Situation of the Japanese Trade], *Tabako to Shio no Hakubutsukan Kenkyū Kiyō* [Bulletin of the Tobacco & Salt Museum] 2 (1987); Katō, "Rengō Oranda Higashi Indo Gaisha no Senryaku Kyoten toshite no Hirado Shōkan" [The Dutch Factory at Hirado as a Strategic Base for the East India Company of the United Kingdom of the Netherlands], in Takeo Tanaka (ed.) *Nihon Zen-Kindai no Kokka to Taigai Kankei* [The State and the External Relations of Japan in the Pre-Modern Period] (Tokyo: Yoshikawa Kōbunkan, 1987).

6 Chihiro Ishida, *Nichi-Ran Bōeki no Shiteki Kenkyū* [Historical Study of the Trade between Japan and the Netherlands] (Tokyo: Yoshikawa Kōbunkan, 2004); Ishida, *Nichi-Ran Bōeki no Kōzo to Tenkai* [Structure and the Development of the Trade between Japan and the Netherlands] (Tokyo: Yoshikawa Kōbunkan, 2009).

7 For recent studies on the first half of the 17th century, see Yasuko Suzuki, *Kinsei Nichi-Ran Bōeki-shi no Kenkyū* [Study of the History of the Trade between Japan and the Netherlands in the Early Modern Period] (Kyoto: Shibunkaku Shuppan, 2004); Keisuke Yao, *Kinsei Oranda Bōeki to Sakoku* [The Dutch Trade and National Seclusion in Early Modern Japan] (Tokyo: Yoshikawa Kōbunkan, 1998); etc.

8 Francisco Colin, *Labor Evangélica: Ministerios apostolicos de los obreros de la Compañia de Iesus, fundación, y progressos de su provincia en las islas Filipinas*, tomo III, ed. Pablo Pastells (Barcelona: Imprenta y Litografía de Henrich y Compañía, 1900–1902; first published Madrid, 1663), 219–221.

Islands; Boxer: *The Great Ship from Amacon*),[9] a full analysis of the information they contain remained to be done.[10]

Since this information enables us to create a detailed picture of Namban trade I have revisited these sources in order to highlight and describe the trade's dynamics. The original text is housed in the General Archive of the Indies, Seville, Spain.[11] As already mentioned, the available reprints contain glaring mistakes and lack explanatory notes. These problems have led to erroneous conclusions and an incorrect impression of the information the sources hold.

The date of the original writing is not known, but it is often assumed to be around 1600. The document might be based on an old catalog of the General Archive of the Indies, in which this date is given.[12] The author may have been Spanish: he indicated that Spain was his home country and wrote about

9 Emma Helen Blair & James Alexander Robertson, *The Philippine Islands 1493–1898*, vol. 19 (Manila, 1973; second edition), 303–319; Charles Ralph Boxer, *The Great Ship from Amacon: Annals of Macao and the Old Japan Trade 1555–1640* (Lisbon: Centro de Estudos Históricos Ultramarinos, 1959), 179–184.

10 The research paper by Kobata Atsushi (小葉田淳) regarding the relative values of gold and silver was the first in Japanese to cite a part of the English translation. In addition, Okamoto Yoshitomo (岡本良知) translated and introduced elements of the trade with Japan in his *Memorandum of Trading Goods with Japan in Macau by Obscure Spanish*. However, Okamoto uses Spanish reprints and English translations as his original sources, and they contain glaring mistakes (Kobata points to the fact that precise translations had not been established) and almost no comments or explanatory notes about special terms. Kōichirō Takase also cites parts of the Spanish reprint and English translation according to Okamoto's translation that referred to them. Okada Akio (岡田章雄) cites the English translation in his research paper about trade in the early modern period.

11 The manuscript used for existing reprints and translations is Document 31 in Box 46 of Patronato (hereinafter Document A) in the General Archive of the Indies. Apart from this document, there exists a manuscript beginning in the middle of the document; this is Document 3 in Box 263–2 of Patronato (hereinafter Document B). The remaining part of Document B begins in the middle of a list of goods brought from China to Goa and continues to the end of the document. While Document A must also be a manuscript, considering points such as smooth writing and no date or signature, Document B seems to have been created not from the same original text as Document A, but from Document A itself, considering the mistakes included in it. The beginning of Document B does not make sense; it seems it was once a complete version, whose first half has been lost for some unknown reason. Given the mistranscriptions, the writer of Document B was obviously not familiar with the place names and products of Asia.

12 Yet the reason for this date lies in the thirty-one documents that are included in Box 46 of Patronato, most of which were written in the later part of the 16th century. The content of this box is ordered chronologically and documents with unknown date are bundled at the end. Box 46 is one of sixteen boxes containing documents from 1518 to 1619 named "Patronato S2/SS12 discovery. The Maluku Islands and spices." Box 45, previously Box 46, contains documents dating from 1525 to 1537 and Box 47 from 1605 to 1619 follows. Document

the Portuguese from a third-person perspective. The Captaincy General of the Philippines seemed to stand in the background of the document. Assuming it was a report on trade conducted by the Portuguese between Japan and Macao, we can try to identify an approximate date for it. The Captaincy General of the Philippines in Manila was established in 1571, when Spain undertook to govern the Philippine islands and to trade in the East China Sea.[13]

1.1 *Spanish Interest in the Japan Trade*

Some Spanish individuals, including Augustinians and Franciscans, were on board Vicente Landeiro's ship that sailed from Macao to Hirado in 1584. Matsura Shigenobu (松浦鎮信), the territorial lord of Hirado, entrusted them with a letter asking the Spanish government in the Philippines for commercial transactions and amity. A galleon ship from Macao to New Spain (Mexico) drifted down to Amakusa (天草) in 1587, and a Fragata ship arrived in Satsuma in a similar way.[14] Toyotomi Hideyoshi (豊臣秀吉) sent letters to the Spanish government in the Philippines, demanding they submit to him, in 1591 and 1593; but official relations were not established owing to the unstable situation in Japan. For example, Dasmariñas was killed in a riot by Chinese sailors during his expedition to Ternate Island. Hideyoshi confiscated loaded goods from the *San Felipe*, a galleon drifting down to the Urado (浦戸) Port, Tosa (土佐), from Manila to Mexico in 1596. During this period mendicant orders came to Japan from Manila and started missionary work.[15] In addition, a Japanese merchant ship traded in Manila.[16]

A in Box 46 is therefore from the latter part of the 16th century, but this fact is not enough to conclude it was written in 1600.

13 Regarding the Spanish government and multi-ethnic society of the Philippines, see Tremml-Werner's recent work. Birgit Tremml-Werner, *Spain, China, and Japan in Manila, 1571–1644: Local Comparisons and Global Connections* (Amsterdam: Amsterdam University Press, 2015).

14 Yoshitomo Okamoto, *16 Seiki Nichi-Ō Kōtsū-shi no Kenkyū* [Study of the History of Interaction between Japan and Europe in the Sixteenth Century] (Tokyo: Hara Shobō, 1974; first published Tokyo: Rokkō Shobō, 1942), 480–481, 494.

15 The Franciscans started their mission in Japan in 1593, then the friars of Dominicans and Augustinians in 1602.

16 Antonio de Morga, *Philippine Shotō-shi* [*Sucesos de las Islas Filipinas*], trans. Yanai Kenji & Kanki Keizō, Dai-Kōkai Jidai Sōsho [Series of the Age of the Discovery], series I, vol. 7 (Tokyo: Iwanami Shoten, 1966), 392; Morga, *History of Philippine Islands* (Scotts Valley, CA: Createspace Independent Publishing Platform, 2015); Juan Gil Fernandez, *Hidalgo to Samurai: Jūroku-Jūnana Seiki no Hispania to Nippon* [*Hidalgos y samurais: España y Japón en los siglos XVI y XVII*], trans. Hirayama Atsuko (Tokyo: Hosei University Press, 2000); Juan Gil Fernandez, *Hidalgos y samurais: España y Japón en los siglos XVI y XVII* (Madrid: Alianza Editorial, 2007).

I also focus on a historical source (Salazar's note) held in the National Historical Archive of Spain (Archivo Histórico Nacional).[17] The information provided in this source prompted Spain to take an interest in Japan in the late 1580s. Japanese historians have long known about this source, but it has not been analyzed in sufficient depth.[18] The source contains information that a Japanese visitor to Manila was communicating with the Spanish governor-general of the Philippines.[19]

This communication occurred in 1587, a time when Luzon and other islands of the Philippines were under the occupation of the Spaniards. In that year, a group of Japanese merchants arrived in Luzon. The merchants met Domingo de Salazar, who, as Bishop of Manila, was the leading Catholic prelate of the area. The source is a compilation of information on Japan that the bishop gleaned from the merchants. Enclosed in the source is a document from the merchants themselves. The document describes the various regions in Japan, featuring a particularly detailed account of Iwami (石見), the location of a silver mine. This account includes the following statement: "Here lies plenty of silver. The Portuguese visit here" (Ay mucha plata. Aqui van los portugueses). Iwami boasted many valuable natural harbors, including Okidomari (沖泊) in Yunotsu(温泉津). Outside Yunotsu it had Hamada, one of Japan's foremost commercial ports.

The source also includes a list of sixty-seven Japanese domains in exquisite handwriting by a Japanese person. Besides the Iwami domain, the list includes a detailed account of the Aki domain and of the Mori family, who ruled the domain. The pages containing this geographic information were bundled together with a map of Japan drawn on a single sheet. The map was drawn according to a cartographic style that historians call the Gyoki-zu (行基図) style (it is known among historians of cartography that a Buddhist

17 AHN, Coleccion Diversos 26, no. 9, Documentos de Indias, 267bis, Informacion original recibida por Fr. Domingo Salazar, Obispo de Filipinas acerca del Japon (1587), fecha 1587, julio, 4. Incluido la mapa de Japón.

18 Hiroshi Nakamura, a Japanese historian of cartography, introduced the source to the community in 1939 in the French language. At the time, Nakamura was unable to accurately decipher the Spanish-language account of Iwami. Hiroshi Nakamura, "Les Cartes du Japon qui servaient de modèle aux cartographies européeans au debut des relations de l'Occident avec le Japan,"*Monumenta Nipponica* 2, no. 2 (1939).

19 A manuscript copy of the same document that does not contain the maps and local descriptions in Toyo Bunko in Tokyo. MS-14 Japon-Filipinas. Copia de la peticion de los Japoneses- ... a D. fray Domingo de Salazar...This copy is transcribed and analyzed as below. S.J. Johannes Laures, "Nihon to Philippine Shotō tono Shoki no Kōtsū ni kansuru Ichi-komonjo" [A Document Relates the First Contact between Japan and Philippines], in *Kirishitan Kenkū*, no. 5 (Tokyo: Yoshikawa Kōbunkan, 1959).

FIGURE 2.1
Domingo de Salazar's note

priest named Gyoki provided the first template for this style). The map was most likely drawn by a Japanese person. By collating the map with the list of sixty-seven domains, one can get a rough idea of the layout of the independent jurisdictions (known as *bunkoku*). Notably, however, the map omits Japan's northernmost island Hokkaido, which was then known as Ezochi. Among the Portuguese maps of the time, which represented the cutting edge of European cartography, there is a map produced in 1561 featuring a landmass that bears a striking resemblance to Hokkaido/Ezochi. Although Japanese cartographers of the late 16th century may have been aware of Hokkaido/Ezochi's existence, they omitted it from their maps of Japan. The source provides evidence that Spaniards in Manila had accessed accurate information about Japan's geography and Jesuit activity in Japan as early as 1587.

Thus the Spanish in Manila seemed to be fully aware of the existence of Japan by the end of the 16th century.[20] Tokugawa Ieyasu (徳川家康) seized power after the death of Hideyoshi after the Battle of Sekigahara (1600). He strove for internal unification and attempted to bring calm to the country's foreign affairs. He also focused his attention on trade with New Spain (Mexico), and in 1598 he asked Jerónimo de Jesús, a Franciscan, to encourage Spanish ships to sail from Manila to Uraga (浦賀), a port in his territory. In 1601 he sent a letter to the Governor-General of Manila to ask for amity and commerce. A ship from Manila bound for Edo region in 1602 entered port at Bungo (豊後 Oita) owing to bad weather conditions, and in 1608 trading ships came to the Uraga port.[21] A large volume of raw silk was brought from Manila to Nagasaki (長崎) in 1605, greatly affecting the Macao merchants' raw silk trade.[22]

Based on these considerations, we can assume the document was written after 1584 when Matsura asked about trading and before 1602 when the official trade started. In other words, it was during a period when the Captaincy General of the Philippines was seriously investigating trading possibilities with Japan and the Spanish in Manila, having already resolved the situation regarding Portuguese trade in around 1602.

Boxer reasons that the author of this document may have been Pedro de Baeza, a Spaniard who stayed in Macao for six years.[23] As the document says

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20 According to Gil Fernandez, *Hidalgo to Samurai*, 24–26, the people of Manila feared Hideyoshi's plan to invade Manila as a real threat.

21 Kōichirō Takase, "17 Seiki Shotō ni okeru Waga-Kuni no Spain Bōeki" [Trade between Japan and Spain in the Early Seventeenth Century], in *Kirishitan Jidai no Bōeki to Gaikō* [Trade and Diplomacy in the Kirishitan Period] (Tokyo: Yagi Shoten, 2002), 88–122.

22 Ibid., 100–101.

23 Boxer, *The Great Ship from Amacon*, 179; Boxer, *Christian Century in Japan 1549–1650* (Berkeley & Los Angeles: University of California Press, 1951), 425–427.

"I didn't remember the net price nor selling price" concerning the cargo of tin, and "I loaded on the ship from China to Japan," it is certain the author actually joined traders with Japan on a Macao trading ship. With regard to the whole description, it is also certain the author stayed in Macao and saw the mutual trade in Guangzhou (広州) with his own eyes. Boxer does not give any other grounds for these conclusions, except to point to the possibility that Pedro de Baeza had the necessary experience to be in this position. Another memorandum written by Baeza (1609) to which Boxer refers states that the "Philippines don't produce gold."[24] But this contradicts the detailed reference to gold production in the Philippines at the end of the same document. According to Boyajian, Baeza was from a converted Jewish family that formed a network on the route from the new continent to Manila.[25] As the author's name is not on the document, we can only make suppositions. It is certain, however, that the author was Spanish, familiar with Portuguese trade in Asia, and that he had experience of sailing to Japan.

As mentioned earlier, the first reprint of this document was contained in *Labor Evangelica* (1663). The mistakes included in that edition prove that the later English translation used this reprint as an original text, and that it was neither a new translation nor a reprint from the original book.[26] Therefore, I have decided to analyze the content in light of the correct translation as opposed to the transliteration of the original book.

2 The Commodities

The contents of the "Memorandum of Trading Goods of Portuguese Ships" (hereinafter Memorandum) can be categorized into five broad types: "Loaded goods in ships from China to Japan," "Loaded goods in ships from China back to India," "Loaded goods in ships from Goa to China," "Detailed memo of goods in Guangzhou," and "Trading goods of Portuguese and their production area." The first three categories contain mainly goods that were transported on the main sailing routes, such as China to Japan, China to India, and Goa (India) to China. They mostly do not include goods bought and sold in port markets in Southeast Asia. We can suppose therefore that the records regarding port markets in

24 Boxer, *Christian Century in Japan 1549–1650*, 425–427.

25 James Boyajian, *Portuguese Trade in Asia under the Habsburg 1580–1640* (Baltimore: The Johns Hopkins University Press, 1993).

26 To give an example, there are common errors as *çangalas* (*canga* in the original), *De Far* (*Defar* in the original, corruption of the name of the city *Dofar*), *Sumatra* (*Somaria* in the original).

Southeast Asia and their production were inserted as part of the fifth category, "Trading goods of Portuguese and their production area." Existing research about Namban trade has covered trade between Japan and Macao and has not focused on markets in Guangzhou and the hinterland. These descriptions prove that Macao was a main distribution point. Chinese products brought to Japan were mainly traded in markets in Guangzhou. Products destined for Japan were traded in Guangzhou in April and May and those for Goa in September and October.[27]

2.1 *Chinese Commodities for the Japanese Market*

Chinese products destined for Japan make up the largest and most detailed category of goods, with raw silk and silk textiles being the lead products. Historians have not yet focused on twisted yarn in raw silk, but according to the imported volumes there was not a big difference between 500–600 picos of white yarn and 400–500 picos of twisted yarn. One pico is equivalent to approximately 60 kg. However, the profit ranged from 70 percent to 185 percent according to quality. The *Memorandum of the Procurador in Japan* (see Chapter 6), possibly written by Tçuzu Rodrigues S.J., states that "It is not bad to trade 5 to 6 or 10 boxes of rolls of cloth and twisted yarn. They must be thick, high quality, and crimson. That is because they absorb [exchange] silver well and are sold well to raise stable profits." Twisted yarn was, as we can see, the best-selling good. The total volume of imported white yarn and twisted yarn was about 1,000 picos. This record refers to the trade at the end of the 16th century, indicating there was a big difference from the more than 2,500 picos of imported raw silk taken to Japan by Portuguese ships in 1600.[28]

As the total volume of imported raw silk, white yarn, and twisted yarn taken to Japan by Dutch ships from the factory in Patani was 6,205 catty (equivalent to 62 picos),[29] Portuguese ships clearly had a monopoly in the Chinese raw silk market at the time. Though the VOC started to trade with Japan in 1609, the volume of imported goods was quite small in the beginning compared with the amount that Portuguese ships imported.

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27 Kazuo Enoki, *Min-matsu no Macao* [Macao in the Late Ming Era], vol. 5 of *Enoki Kazuo Chosaku-shū* [Works of Enoki Kazuo] (Tokyo: Kyūko Shoin, 1993), 186.

28 Takase, "Macao Nagasaki Kan Bōeki no Sō Torihiki-daka," 23.

29 Kazuhiro Yukutake, "Ieyasu Seiken no Taigai Seisaku to Oranda-sen Bōeki: 'Hirado Shōkan Shoki' no Nichi-Ran Bōeki Jittai" [Foreign Policy of Ieyasu and the Dutch Ship Trade: The Actual Situation of the Trade between Japan and the Netherlands in the Early Phase of the "Period of the Dutch Factory at Hirado"], *Tōkyō Daigaku Shiryō Hensan-jo Kenkyū Kiyō* [Research Annual of the Historiographical Institute, University of Tokyo] 17 (2007): 94.

Apparently because the trading volume of Portuguese ships was so large, Dutch imports were excepted from the *pancada* (wholesale price). There was no need to control the prices.

According to the records, Portuguese ships imported 1,700–2,100 rolls of silk textiles. Only 558 rolls of silk textiles were imported by Dutch ships in 1615, so the difference in volume is obvious.[30] Three thousand rolls of cotton textiles were imported, a significantly larger volume than silk. This shows that not only luxury goods but also many everyday goods were part of the Namban trade. The same situation pertained with ceramics, which will be analyzed later. However, compared with cotton, silk brought a greater level of profit, with a selling price per roll that was five times higher.

Together with raw silk from China, gold ingots (*insukin* 印子金) were a leading product. At the beginning of the "Detailed memo of goods in Guangzhou," gold is mentioned in the following way: "One tael of high quality gold is equivalent to seven taels of silver" (see Table 2.1). According to the study by Kobata Atsushi (小葉田淳), the exchange rate between gold and silver in China from 1573 to 1620 had been considered as "one gold is equivalent to seven or eight silver."[31] Kobata argues against this rate, quoting an English translation of this Memorandum. He notes that the exchange rate between gold and silver in Japan in the early 17th century could not be proved to be one to eight. The Memorandum therefore was either mistranslated or was referring to a rate in another time period. According to Kobata's research, the exchange rate between gold and silver in Japan in the early 17th century was one to twelve or thirteen. But this has to remain as speculation. As mentioned earlier, there is no evidence to identify the year of the Memorandum. Editors of English translations sometimes state that Volume 19 contains material dating from 1620 to 1621 together with account documents from the early 17th century and material that cannot be dated.

Judging from records concerning the market price in Guangzhou of gold (superior), it becomes clear that Kobata did not mistranslate the Memorandum. The rate was 6.6 taels to 8.3 taels for selling in Japan and that of gold (standard) was 5.4 taels to 7.8 taels. Profits from the exchange of standard quality gold were in the region of 44 percent and therefore more than that for superior quality gold. It may be noted that 3,000–4,000 taels are equivalent to 112.5–130 kg in weight. Obata states in his paper that the exchange rate

30 Ibid.

31 Atsushi Kobata, "Nihon no Kin-gin Gaikoku Bōeki ni kansuru Kenkyū" [A Study on the Foreign Trade of Gold and Silver of Japan], *Shigaku Zasshi* [Journal of the Historical Society] 44–10 (1933): 1402.

between gold and silver in 1585 was one to 8.32, which was quite similar to the selling price mentioned in this Memorandum. Based on this information it is possible to suppose that the author of this document wrote his record based on his trade experience in Japan and Macao around 1585, according to the later order of the Captaincy General of the Philippines.

As I will argue in Chapter 6, it is generally known that the Jesuits in Japan consigned raw silk to Macao merchant ships destined for Japan in order to gain profits for their missionary work. The *procurador* of Macao, that is, the person in charge of the economic matters of the Jesuits also in Japan, fixed the rule that "all other than goods (except necessary cotton) must be invested into gold. [...] we have to make our best effort to invest into gold with 4,000 taels at a minimum every year."[32] A Jesuit Father Visitador for the East Indies, Alessandro Valignano, established this rule when he visited China and Japan in the 1580s. The rule was further revised in 1611–12 by Pasio, and again in 1618 by Vieira.[33] It is not known when this part was established, but it is clear the Jesuits invested 4,000 taels of silver to purchase gold in China and exchange it in Japan every year.

Ceramics ranging in quality from everyday commodities to luxury goods made up a total of 20,000 pieces. Selling prices in Japan were about two to three times the purchase prices and differed significantly according to the product's quality. There was a twelve- to fifteen-fold difference between ten pieces of commodity ceramics at 0.1 tael and ten pieces of luxury ceramics at 1.2–1.5 taels.

Plants growing wild in China, such as rhubarb, liquorice, and *Smilax glabra* (or tufuling, a component of Chinese herbal medicine), had quite a high profit ratio that could reach 400 percent. *Smilax glabra* was traded at especially high prices, so the Capitão-mór was allowed to treat it preferentially in Macao.[34] Concerning sugar, the demand for brown sugar was higher than that for white among the Japanese; its profit ratio could reach 900 percent. This was because sugar was used not primarily as food but as medicine, and there was great demand for it.

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32 "The regulation of the Procurador of Japan residing in China. The visitor Francesco Pasio gave this regulation here when he came to Japan." Kōichirō Takase, *Iesus-kai to Nippon* [The Society of Jesus and Japan], trans. and notes, vol. 1 (Tokyo: Iwanami Shoten, 1981), 608.

33 Kōichirō Takase, "Kirishitan Kyōkai no Zaimu Tantō Padre" [Father Procurador of the Kirishitan Church], in *Kirishitan Jidai no Kenkyū* [Study on the Kirishitan Period] (Tokyo: Iwanami Shoten, 1977); Takase, "Kirishitan Kyōkai no Macao Chūzai Zaimu Tantō Padre" [Father Procurador of the Kirishitan Church in Macao], in *Kirishitan Jidai Taigai Kankei no Kenkyū* [Study on the External Relations in the Kirishitan Period] (Tokyo: Yoshikawa Kōbunkan, 1994).

34 See Chapter 5.

TABLE 2.1 Market prices in Guangzhou

Product	Price in Guangzhou	Notes
Gold (superior)	silver 7 taels/tael	
Musk	8 taels/cate	
Raw silk	80 tael/pico	
Twisted yarn made in Nanjing	130 taels/pico	
Damask roll (standard)	7 taels/roll	Total length 14 vara
Damask roll (superior)	12–15 taels/roll	Total length 16 vara
Taffeta roll made in Nanjing	2.5–3 taels/roll	Total length 12 côvado
Silk fabric roll	1.3 taels/roll	Total length 10 vara
Cotton yarn	8 taels/pico	
Shawl with luxury silk	3.5–4 taels/piece	
Net type shawl for women	0.4–0.5 taels/piece	
Cinnabar	40 taels/pico	
Copper	7–8 taels/pico	
Brass	7–8 taels/pico	
Quicksilver	40 taels/pico	
Wire	8 mace/pico	
Iron	2 taels/pico	
Refined iron	2.5 taels/pico	
Cinnabar sand (superior)	7 taels/cate	
Flake white	2.5–3 taels/pico	
Ceramics (superior)	1.2 taels/10 pieces	
High grade plate	1.5 taels/10 pieces	
High grade large plate	0.3 taels/piece	
Ceramics (standard)	0.15 taels/10 pieces	
Wheat	0.4 taels/pico	
Wheat flour	0.8 taels/pico	1.2 taels/pico (Macao)
Cow		4 taels/head
Pig	1.5 taels/pico	2–3 taels/head
Hen	2 taels/pico	
Salted fish	2 taels/pico	
Fresh fish	1 condrin/cate	
(white) Sugar standard	1.5–2 taels/pico	
(white) Sugar superior	2.5–3 taels/pico	
Kapur	10 taels/pico	
Cinnamon	3 taels/pico	
Rhubarb	2–3 taels/pico	
Liquorice	2.5 taels/pico	
Smilax glabra	0.8–1 taels/pico	

2.2 *Chinese Commodities for the Indian Market*

The imported volume of white yarn for India was 1,000 picos, greater than the volume for Japan. The profit ratio was 150 percent, thus 60 percent higher than the rate for Japan. Twisted yarn was not contained in the list and the number of rolls of damask and taffeta bought was 10,000–12,000. This was equivalent to five times the number of silk fabric rolls for Japan.[35] While goods described as "most of them are consumed by the local inhabitants" were silk textiles, gold, brass, and musk, one that was clearly mentioned as an exported good to Portugal was kapur (*dryobalanops aromatica*). Other goods destined for Europe passed through India, but they were likely consumed in India as well.

According to the Memorandum, places of collection were not limited to China but included Manila. As it is difficult to believe that high-quality silk fabric was mass-produced in Manila at this time, it seems that Chinese merchants from Zhangzhou (漳州) brought it to Manila. In other words, the Portuguese utilized Manila as a place in which to obtain Chinese goods more freely than in Guangzhou. While trade between Manila and Macao was prohibited under the union of Spain and Portugal by Felipe II (Philip II), restatements of these bans indicate they were not actually complied with. Especially around 1585, when this Memorandum was written, the ban had not yet been issued and merchants in Macao traveled to Manila on their own ships in order to trade.[36] Silk brought from there to India was supposed to be exported to Europe.

On this sailing route, gold was brought at three to four picos (weight 180–240 kg), which was a much higher rate than in Japan. It could achieve a selling price in Goa up to 1.8–1.9 times higher than in Japan. The exchange ratio between gold and silver was one to thirteen. Exchanging gold into silver in India was more profitable than in Japan. Looking at other goods, sugar for instance had an import volume that was thirty times higher than in Japan. Crude drugs and minerals were also taken there in large amounts. This was proportional to the

35 Sixty-two rolls of damask were imported to Japan by a Dutch ship in 1615; thus even if the damask is not recorded in this Memorandum, it seems that damask was sometimes imported to Japan.

36 Lucio de Sousa, *Early European Presence in China, Japan, the Philippines and South East Asia 1555–1590* (Macao: Macau Foundation, 2010); Kōichirō Takase, *Monsoon Monjo to Nippon: Jūnana Seiki Portugal Kōbunsho-shū* [Monsoon Documents and Japan: Collection of Portuguese Archives in the Seventeenth Century] (Tokyo: Yagi Shoten, 2006), 70. The original source that Takase uses here is: António Bocarro, *O livro das plantas de todas as fortalezas, cidades e povoações do estado da India Oriental*, ed. Isabel Cid, vols. 1–2 (Lisbon: Casa da Moeda, 1992), 167–168.

demand. The exception was quicksilver, used for plating gold and copper,[37] which was more often imported and had a higher selling price in Japan. At that time the amalgam method for refining silver was used in silver mines but was not otherwise widely known.

2.3 *Commodities from India to China*

The types of loaded goods from Goa to India were comparatively limited. As the profit from gold exchange was greater than in Japan, a considerable quantity of silver was brought from India to China. How much is not clear, however, because the loaded volume was not recorded. Furthermore, daily commodities produced in Europe occupied a considerable proportion of the total. It was said that daily commodities such as wine and olive oil brought from afar were sometimes sold below cost. These goods were considered as not for onward selling but as gifts or for personal consumption by the Portuguese and Spanish.

So far I have analyzed trade between China and India and compared it with trade between China and Japan. As a result the trade between China and India has been proved to have been larger in scale and in profit ratio. The quantities of the major products, such as raw silk, rolls of cloth, and gold, exceeded those to Japan. India also paid more in silver. The exchange rate of gold to silver was one to 8.3 in Japan but one to more than ten in India. Profits from the gold trade in India were therefore greater even if the trade quantity remained the same. A report about forts and cities in Portuguese India by António Bocarro illustrates this point:[38]

> The route from Goa to China, except the route to the (Portuguese) Kingdom, was the richest and most valuable in the (Portuguese India) Territory. The first *nau*[39] was called the "silver *nau*". [...] Today, people make an effort and try to load even 300–400 candim (ca. 68–91 tons) in one galleon.[40]

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37 According to a commonly accepted theory, the amalgam method was introduced in the 17th century when contacts between Manila had been established. Akio Okada, "Kinsei Shoki ni okeru Shuyō naru Yunyū Busshi ni tsuite" [Major Imports in the Early Stage of the Early Modern Period], in *Nichi-Ō Kōshō to Namban Bōeki* [Negotiations between Japan and Europe and the Namban Trade], Okada Akio Chosaku-shū [Works of Okada Akio], vol. 3 (Kyoto: Shibunkaku Shuppan, 1983), 10–18.

38 Bocarro, *O livro das plantas de todas as fortalezas, cidades, e povoações do Estado da Índia Oriental*.

39 Carrack.

40 Takase, *Monsoon Monjo to Nippon*, 167–168.

India was not the main silver production area at this time.[41] It is possible that the silver mentioned was brought instead from the Americas to Europe and then taken on to India. Trade between China and India was declining when the VOC appeared in the China seas, coming from the Indian Ocean area to Southeast Asia in the 17th century. The Dutch fought several battles with their Portuguese and Spanish rivals.[42] While the "silver ships" between China and India were declining in number, those on other routes were increasing. In other words, since the 1570s the galleon trade between Acapulco and Manila had developed, and coincidentally the silver trade via India in Asia weakened. Evidence for this relationship is hard to find, so it is difficult to calculate the exact impact the opening of the Manila–New World route had on Portuguese trade within Asia. We should consider that the Portuguese in Macao monopolized the silver trade with Japan, where large quantities were produced. Compared with the Spanish, who lacked further ports, the Portuguese used their networks of local port cities in Asia to collect products that were needed in China.

2.4 *Products from Various Regions across Asia*

Most of the commodities transported from China to Japan were produced in China. Though products made in South Asia and Southeast Asia were not on the list, products such as agalloch, sandal wood, and Tonkin raw silk from Cochinchina, agalloch and aloes wood from Cambay, tin and pepper traded in Manila, kapur from Borneo, clove from the Maluku Islands, and raw silk and silk fabric from Manila were commonly traded goods and were carried by red-seal ships from various places.[43] Macao merchant ships also were keen to bring them to Japan.

I have summarized the products from Siam that we can define most precisely in Table 2.3. I will compare them with the load of Portuguese, red-seal and Dutch ships. While the Portuguese records are from the late 16th century, the records of red-seal and Dutch ships are from the late 17th century.

Commonly traded goods were sappan wood, lead, areca nut products, and turmeric products. Silver, musket, and benzoin were added to these items for Portuguese ships during the 16th century. Deer skin, shark skin, agalloch, and tin were listed for red-seal ships and Dutch ships in the 17th century. Among others, deer skin and shark skin seem to have been as important as sappan wood. It is unclear why they were not listed in the trade records of the

41 Om Prakash, *Precious Metals and Commerce* (London: Routledge, 1994).

42 Takase, *Monsoon Monjo to Nippon*, 167–168.

43 Iwao, *Shuin-sen Bōeki-shi no Kenkyū*, 288–289.

TABLE 2.2 List of production places and products in Asia

Place of Production	Products
Malacca	Clove, nutmeg, mace, tin, turtle shell, pearl
Ceylon	Cinnamon, diamonds, precious stones
Bengal	Cotton cloth, sugar, precious stones, rice
Mozambique	Ivory, sappan wood
Hormuz	Arabian horses, brass, silver larin coin, dates, camel fabric, rose water, Venetian gold coin
Pegu	Rack (red dye from coccid)
Siam	Silver, musket, benzoin, turmeric oil, coconut oil, sappan wood, lead, rice
Cochinchina	Agalloch, aloes wood, silver, lead, pepper, raw silk
Champa	Agalloch, aloes wood (superior to that from Cochinchina), black wood for chopsticks
Cambay	Frankincense made in Dhufar
Timor	Sandalwood
Borneo	Kapur, furniture made of kapur
Maluku Islands	Some kinds of clove
Banda	Nutmeg, mace, feathers from rare herons
Japan	Silver, tuna, sword, haft
Sunda	Various goods
Manila	Cotton fabric, silk fabric made in China (damask, taffeta, twisted yarn, sleaved raw silk), dish, gold

Portuguese ships. Nagazumi Yoko explains concerning deer skins that "they might be imported in a large scale from the Philippines from the end of the 16th century until the beginning of the 17th century. Later they were imported mainly from Siam and Taiwan."[44] Antonio Morga, who was a colonial official in the Philippines, wrote *Sucesos de las Islas Filipinas* (*Events in the Philippine Isles*), in which he gathered information about trade and related subjects that he garnered during his stay in the Philippines from 1595 to 1603. He wrote:

> These ships [from Japan] go back to Japan in the season of the southwest wind in June and July. They bring raw silks from China, gold, deer skin,

44 Yōko Nagazumi, *Shuin-sen* [Red-seal Ship] (Tokyo: Yoshikawa Kōbunkan, 2001), 108.

TABLE 2.3 Comparison of products from Siam

Source	Period	Products
Memorandum of Trading Goods by Portuguese Ships	Assumed 1585–1600	Silver, musket, benzoin, turmeric oil, coconut oil, sappan wood, lead, rice
List of import/export goods of red-seal ships according to regions	1603–33	Sappan wood, deer skin, shark skin, buffalo horn, lead, tin, kapur, dragon's blood, calico, striped cotton cloth, ivory, cane, coral pearl, agalloch
List of Siam products imported to Japan market by Dutch ships	1634	Deer skin, shark skin, sappan wood, extra quality agalloch, lead, tin, Cambodian walnut, yellow salve, dried areca nut, rattans, ivory, brown sugar, black lacquer

> sappan wood for dye, honey, bees wax, coconut liquor, wine from Castilla, zibet, pot for tea, glass, cloth from Manila and rare goods from Spain back home.[45]

In other words, the Japanese and Portuguese did not import deer skin from Siam but from Manila at the end of the 16th century. We can suppose this was the reason these skins were not loaded on many Portuguese ships. Morga also lists products brought by the Chinese from Zhangzhou, Fuzhou (福州), and Guangzhou, as shown in Table 2.4[46]

This table shows that items brought by the Chinese to Manila were similar to those brought by the Portuguese from China to India. We learn from this that almost every item was sent to Europe and that the goods traded by Macao and Chinese merchants in Zhangzhou, Fuzhou, and Guangzhou were almost the same. Furthermore, we should pay attention to the fact that many of these products were not only from China but also from Southeast Asia and the wider region. It is also clear that the Spanish bought ginseng from the Chinese not for trade in Europe but in Japan.

45 Morga, *Philippine Shotō-shi*, 392.
46 Ibid., 388.

TABLE 2.4 Commodities brought by the Chinese to Manila

Category	Products
Fabric	Raw silk, various colored pure silk, velvet, damask, silk fabric, satin, taffeta, grogram, picot, linen cloth, white cotton cloth, kanga (black cotton cloth), mantle
Luxury grocery items	Musk, benzoin
Furniture and craftwork	Pottery, ivory, canopy, bed cover, veil for canopy, table cloth, cushion, carpet, harness, hand mirror, small box, desk, bed, tab le, chair, bench, thread, string
Natural/mineral	Pearl, ruby, sapphire, crystal, copper, iron, tin, lead, niter, gunpowder
Foods	Pepper, sugaring (orange, peach, ginseng), pear, nutmeg, fruits in general, salted pork, dried meat, chicken, various kinds of spices
Animals (for domestic use/ornamental)	Buffalo, heron, horse, donkey, mule, ornamental birds

2.5 *Japanese Commodities for the Chinese Market*

Import and export items and prices were on the list of trades between China and India, as well as between Japan and China. A list of goods and prices from China was also provided in detail, but there is no list of goods and prices for the trade from Japan to China. "Trade goods and places of production of the Portuguese" just mentions the production of silver, tuna, swords, and haft.

An English sailor Ralph Fitch, who traveled from the Indian Ocean to the Chinese Sea between 1585 and 1591, recorded that "when the Portuguese sail from Macao to Japan, they import a lot of raw silk, gold, musk and porcelain but export only silver."[47] This description fits the Memorandum and shows that there was no main product except silver, which was paid by Japanese. On the other side, various products were imported from China to Japan. Furthermore, the correspondence between the descriptions in the Memorandum and Fitch's record may show that the trade situation described in the Memorandum was after all true for the period.

47 Iwao, *Shuin-sen Bōeki-shi no Kenkyū*, 377.

Morga, whom I have already quoted, writes about Japanese and Portuguese ships sailing from Japan to Manila as follows:

> Every year Japanese and Portuguese merchants sail from the Nagasaki port from Japan and travel to this island riding on the northern winds in the end of October and around March. They anchor in Manila by following the same procedure. Their main goods are wheat of a very good quality which is much needed in Manila. They also import high-priced dried meat, beautiful colored silk textile, fold screens with a flamed decor and oil painting with gold leaves, various kinds of blades, armors, javelins, swords and other weapons with beautiful crafts, writing desks, boxes, small lacquered wood boxes and put patterns, good looking accessories at a moderate price, fresh pairs with very excellent quality, barrels and tubs of good quality salted tuna, larks in cages called Shinbarol with a very good voice and more. [...] Most of them are consumed within the island and some are goods destined for New Spain. The payment is made with real silver coins. However, as silver is produced in Japan, they don't need it as much as the Chinese. They even usually bring a lot of silver plates themselves to sell at a comparatively low price.[48]

We can see from this description that in addition to silver goods brought from Japan to Manila the products were mostly food, craftwork, and swords. The main product exported from Japan was silver, and no other products could expect to achieve such high profits. Furthermore, this proves that Japanese ships and Portuguese ships competed against each other as they brought similar products from Japan to Manila in the same period (1595–1603).

3 Customs and Freight Rate

The Memorandum touches on matters of customs, freight rate and the consideration for the Capitão-mór in various places. Now I will further analyze this after taking a look at the recent research from Takase Kōichirō on the matter.[49] Takase quotes many authorities from different periods concerning the customs and freight rate of Portuguese ships' trade between Japan and Macao and also the reward to the Capitão-mór that took place from time to time.

48 Morga, *Philippine Shotō-shi*, 391–392.

49 Takase, *Monsoon Monjo to Nippon*, 70–80.

In the latter half of the 16th century, when private merchant ships came from Macao to Japan every year, the Capitão-mór could not monopolize trade in Japan. Private merchants came to Japan with their own ships, at least until around 1610.[50] I assume that private merchant ships from Macao ceased to go to Japan because of the obligation to receive the red-seal ships that was issued by the Tokugawa Shogunate and also the *Madre de Deus* incident in 1610, when the Capitão-mór ship of André Pessoa was attacked by the governor's army of Nagasaki and Arima Harunobu (有馬晴信).[51] Pessoa finally blew up himself and his ship in Nagasaki's bay. Following this incident, the Capitão-mór trade changed its structure and began to use a group of several smaller ships (galliots) in order to reduce the risk of using a single large ship (*nau*). Private merchant ships mostly vanished because their owners officially joined the trade with Japan by offering their ships to the Capitão-mór. This process is an important turning point in the history of the Namban trade, which will be addressed later.

3.1 *Capitão-mór Income and Freight Charges*

After 1556, the authorization of trade with Japan began to be invested by the Portuguese king in only one person according to his military achievement or if he paid money for it (the Capitão-mór system).[52] The benefit of this authorization was not the income from goods but the collection of "freight charge," a certain ratio of prices of goods, from the Society of Jesus, the Santa Casa da Misericórdia, for example, and organizations in Macao.[53] The chief

50 Kōichirō Takase, "Kirishitan Jidai ni okeru 'Kyōshō'" ["Religious-Merchants" in the Kirishitan Period], in *Kirishitan Jidai Taigai Kankei no Kenkyū*.

51 The bases for my assumption are (1) there is no record of private ships that went to Japan after 1610 in the Portuguese documents; (2) the private ship of a wealthy merchant that entered the port of Nagasaki in 1609 received something like a red-seal certificate (see Chapter 6); and (3) in 1613, when the Capitão-mór from Macao arrived in Japan for the first time after the incident he went to the Edo court where he received a red-seal certificate to cross the sea. But this is just a hypothesis at this time.

52 Okamoto Yoshitomo thinks the Capitão-mór system for navigation to Japan was regulated, both in name and reality, after 1556 with Dom Francisco Mascarenhas. Before that date, according to him, private ships reached Japan several times a year. Okamoto, *16 Seiki Nichi-Ō Kōtsū-shi no Kenkyū*, 280–281.

53 Takase, *Monsoon Monjo to Nippon*, 77. The original source that Takase uses here is: Unknown author, 1582. Livro das cidaded, e fortalezas que a coroa de Portugal tem nas partes da India, e das capitanias, e mais cargos que nelas há, e da importância delles. This book is transcribed by Francisco Paulo Mendes da Luz and published by Centro de Estudos Historicos Ultramarinos in 1960.

merchant (*feitor do povo*) was entrusted with selling these goods in Japan and calculating the profits.

According to Takase Kōichirō, 2,000 picos of raw silk were loaded into the ship of the Capitão-mór destined for Japan every year, and the cargo owners had to pay 10 percent of the net price of any loaded goods as freight to the Capitão-mór.[54] Manuel Dias, a Jesuit, records that they had to pay for 2,000 picos of raw silk loaded even if the actual amount loaded was less.[55]

The Memorandum states this more precisely, and we can conclude the basic incomes of the Capitão-mór as the following: (1) the freight charge of raw silk, which was 10 percent of the net price; (2) 500 taels from cargo owners with other goods; and (3) the equivalent of sales of sixty picos of excellent quality raw silk sold in a package deal. Calculating the basic income of the Capitão-mór from one passage of the Memorandum, it amounted to 16,000 ((80 taels per 1 pico of raw silk × 0.1) × 2,000) + 9,000 (150 taels × 60 picos) + 5,000 (estimating ten owners of other goods) equal to a total of 30,000 taels. However, this is not correct, as the net and selling prices of raw silk differed from time to time, and the number of owners of other goods cannot be identified. Furthermore, *Smilax glabra* was monopolized by the Capitão-mór and its sales profits were also expected to make up part of his income.[56]

António Bocarro states in his record, written in about 1635, that 10 percent of the total sales from trade were posted into the safe at Macao and that less than a tenth of this was paid to the Capitão-mór as his consideration.[57] The change in the privileged consideration system shown in this record seems to be related to the considerable changes in the trading system in Japan. As Chapter 4 will show, the city of Macao owed a huge debt to the Japanese in the 1630s and thus suspended the Capitão-mór system after 1634.[58] The rigging of the ship and the acquisition of staff in 1635 were funded by the public property (royal treasury) saved in Macao, and the experienced Capitão-mór was elected to be sent to Japan under paid employment. The city of Macao tried to improve the debt situation by reducing the necessary costs to a minimum. We have to consider

54 Ibid., 72–73.

55 Álvarez Taladriz, "Un documento de 1610 sobre el contrato de armação de la nao de trato entre Macao y Nagasaki," *Tenri Daigaku Gakuhō* [Bulletin of Tenri University] 11, no. 1 (1959): 6. The original source transcribed here is: A report written by Manuel Dias dated April, 18th, 1610 in ARSI, Jap. Sin. 14-II, fl. 341–341v.

56 Takase, *Monsoon Monjo to Nippon*, 70.

57 Ibid., 72.

58 Boxer, *The Great Ship from Amacon*, 140–141. The Capitão-mór of this year was Lopo Sarmento de Carvalho. He, too, was a converted Jewish merchant.

therefore that both the meaning and the income of the Capitão-mór in terms of Japanese trade saw significant change after 1635.

3.2 *Customs*

Malacca, Ceylon, and Goa were mentioned in the Memorandum as the places where Portuguese ships paid customs on the Asian trade route. Of this, 7.5 percent of the total amount of goods was paid in Malacca, but there was no trade there. Does this mean that trading ships of the Capitão-mór only paid customs duties and left after having supplied their ships and waited for the right wind? This was indeed the order of the Viceroy of Portuguese India. What really happened is shown in the following statement:

> We paid 8 percent of the total goods as customs at the custom office when we arrived at Malacca. On our departure, we don't pay anything. However, to prevent the Capitão-mór [in Malacca] from damaging travels to China for spices, we cannot bring any spices or other goods from there [Malacca] to China under the edict of the past Viceroy. We had several discussions with the Capitão-mór [in Malacca]. Those [who authorized the voyage from China to Japan] bought the aforementioned allowance for spice travel from them [the Capitão-mór of Malacca] to bring [spices] to China. They are the main products with large values there [China].[59]

This source dates from 1582, close, if I am correct in my dating, to the time described in the Memorandum. It is clear that the rights pertaining to the spice trade lay basically with the captains in Malacca. But the Capitão-mór traveling from India to China and engaged in trade between Japan and Malacca bought the rights. They brought spices directly from Malacca to China because spices (mostly pepper) were sold at a high price in China.

In other words, the line in the Memorandum that states "in Malacca, no item is sold nor discharged" was repeating the official rule. Yet in reality, the buying and selling of trading rights among the captains (*capitão*) broke this rule. The Memorandum contains further information about payment of 8.5 percent of the loaded goods at arrival and departure in Goa, the payment of

59 Record about the cities and the fortresses in India possessed by the Portuguese court, about the Capitão-mór and other offices in these cities and fortresses and the expenditure for them (1582). Cited from Takase, *Monsoon Monjo to Nippon*, 76–77. For the original text in Portuguese, see Francisco Paulo Mendes da Luz (ed.), "Livro das cidades, e fortalezas, que a Coroa de Portugal tem nas partes da Índia, e das capitanias, e mais cargos que nelas ha, e da importância delles," *Studia* 6 (1960): 351–363.

2,000–3,000 cruzados by forcibly taking under tow ships that sailed in the sea around Ceylon, and so on.

The Memorandum does not state that customs were collected in Macao as the king's profit. The aforementioned record by Manuel Dias from 1610 states that there was no customs system to profit the Portuguese king, but that the city authorities of Macao collected 2–4 percent of the loaded goods from ships that sailed into Macao as customs duties.[60] This was called *cardeirão* and was collected as common property to maintain the city. However, Bocarro recorded for 1635 that the customs duties that became the profit of the Portuguese king were 10 percent of the total trade profit.[61] We should consider therefore that some changes to the customs system in Macao were made between 1610 and 1635. This seems to be related to the changed relations between Macao and Portuguese India in the 1620s, which I will discuss in more depth in Chapters 4 and 5.

4 Groundage in Macao Port and Taxes Due to the Chinese Authorities

From 1620 onwards, customs duties pertaining to the Portuguese India trade were collected in Macao. In fact, the Portuguese paid "groundage" to the Guangzhou authority after they entered their contract of settlement.

The Memorandum says the amount of port dues depended only on the capacity of a ship regardless of whether it was loaded or not. We already know the Portuguese paid land taxes to the Chinese authority,[62] but other taxes have not been researched until now.[63] However, determining who had a right to collect taxes relating to the port services will help to define to whom the land belonged.

In 1556 Dominican friar Gaspar da Cruz stayed around Guangzhou. He recorded that the Chinese authority measured the total length of ships that

60 Takase, *Monsoon Monjo to Nippon*, 73; Taladriz, "Un documento de 1610 sobre el contrato de armação de la nao de trato entre Macao y Nagasaki," 7.

61 Takase, *Monsoon Monjo to Nippon*, 71–72.

62 According to a commonly accepted theory, the land taxes in Macao were 500 taels per year, but this was actually the amount after 1740. It is said that the original amount of the land taxes was 1,000 taels, and 600 taels after 1691, then 500 taels after about 1740. Jin'ichi Yano, *Shina Kindai Gaikoku Kankei Kenkyū* [Study on the External Relations of China] (Tokyo: Kōbundō, 1928), 367–377.

63 Yano, *Shina Gaikoku Kankei Kenkyū*, 376–377.

sailed into Guangzhou and collected groundage from them.[64] Concerning these port dues, the story of Omura Sumitada (大村純忠) is a well-known example. He entrusted the collection of anchorage fees to the Jesuits when he donated Nagasaki to them in 1580. The groundage at Nagasaki was 1,000 ducats per ship.[65] This case demonstrates the general rule that the groundage was paid to the landowner.

From the Memorandum we know that "even if inhabitant in Macao," in other words if one were also a Portuguese trader living in Macao, one had to pay the groundage. This payment was apparently made to the Chinese authority. Linschoten, a Dutchman staying in Portuguese India, observed in detail how these dues were collected by the Chinese authority from the Portuguese:

> Portuguese live together with local Chinese in Macao city and its islands. They do business with people in Guangzhou. But all products from Guangzhou are brought [to Macao] by local Chinese. Portuguese are not allowed to visit Guangzhou. For this reason ships can come travel from India to Macao. When ships come from India, Mandarins [authorities] and officials in Macao measure the width and length of the ships. They issue a bill and collect the groundage. Once the groundage is paid, they can load goods as they wished and no more tax payment nor confiscation of goods will happen. Portuguese are allowed to elect one Portuguese functioning as a representative. He is sent to Guangzhou to buy what they want.[66]

Linschoten stayed in Portuguese India from 1583 to 1588. After his return he published an account of his own experience and the information he had gained about the Dutch foray into Asia. His stay was close in time to the possible date when the Memorandum was written, and the works share some points. In other words, it is clear the Portuguese paid not only land taxes but also groundage to the Chinese authority after their settlement in Macao. As

64 Gaspar da Cruz, *Chūgoku-shi* [*Tractado das cousas da China*], trans. Hino Hiroshi (Tokyo: Kōdan-sha, 2002; first published Tokyo: Shin Jinbutsu Ōrai-sha, 1996); Charles Ralph Boxer (ed.), *South China in the 16th Century* (Bangkok: Orchid Press, 2004; first published 1953).

65 Kōichirō Takase, "Kirishitan Kyōkai no Keizai Kiban wo meguru Naibu no Rongi" [Internal Discussion about the Economic Base of the Kirishitan Church], in *Kirishitan Jidai no Kenkyū*, 423–426.

66 Jan Huyghen van Linschoten, *Tōhō Annai-ki* [*Itinerario/Discours of Voyages into ye East & West Indies*], trans. and notes Iwao Seiichi et al. (Tokyo: Iwanami Shoten, 1968), 241.

the latter amount was 3,000–4,000 taels per ship with a load of 300 tons, its relative importance compared with the 500 taels of land tax is clear.

Navarrete, a Dominican who stayed temporarily in Macao in the middle of the 17th century, wrote about the groundage as follows:

> Macao has so far paid the land tax for building houses and churches and the groundage for ships to Chinese authority. When a ship arrives, the Chinese authority comes from its Metropolis (Guangzhou) to measure the ship's capacity and collect a tax responding to the quantities of its load. When the ship departs, they measure its size again and collect customs. The method of measuring changes every year.[67]

Land tax, groundage, and customs upon arrival and departure were paid to the Chinese authority in Macao. This method of collecting taxes was similar to the customs system used by the Portuguese in Goa. Yet it becomes obvious that the Chinese authorities allowed the Portuguese to settle and live in Macao. The Chinese overlooked the Portuguese settlements while imposing large land taxes and groundage on them. Navarrete explains the differences between Macao and Manila as follows:

> Macao has flourished from trades with Manila and Japan and become very rich. However, Macao cannot compare with Manila and I cannot find any similarities between these two cities. I have found many different points in many ways between these two cities. These differences are similar to those between Madrid and Vallecas [they are similar to London and Hammersmith],[68] and while people in Manila are free, people in Macao are slaves [of China].[69]

In this description the main characteristics of Macao are captured from within the framework of European colonialism. Macao's differences are illustrated through a comparison with Manila in Spain and the view of the people in Macao as Chinese slaves.

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67 Dominick Navarrete [Domingo Fernández Navarrete], *An Account of the Empire of China, Historical, Political, Moral and Religious*, Chapter XIII (London, 1703), 261.

68 Vallecas is a small neighborhood in the suburbs of Madrid. Hammersmith is now a district in the western part of London. It was formerly a small village in the suburbs of London.

69 Navarrete, *An Account of the Empire of China*.

Another kind of tax problem occurred in the 1620s. Macao sustained serious damage from a military attack by the VOC fleet in 1622. To remedy this situation, the resident administration officer in charge of military defense and control of the citizens, the Captain General (Capitão-geral), was sent from the viceroy's office of Portuguese India to Macao. The first Governor, Dom Francisco Mascarenhas, began to consolidate the military functions and the administrative structure. He further improved the economy during his term of office. As part of this effort he tried to build a fort and install a cannon factory to strengthen the military. The construction of this fort irritated the Ming authorities that oversaw the Portuguese settlement in Macao. The Haitao-fushi (海道副使) of Guangdong province arrived in Macao in May 1625 to investigate the matter. He indicated that 22,000 taels as tribute divided into two portions per year was to be collected under "the order of the Tutan (都堂, governor),"[70] for a permit to build a fort. Trading was to be allowed between Macao and Guangzhou after payment was confirmed. This was repeated every time a payment was made.[71] Further regulations stated that the Portuguese would not be allowed to have four ocean defense ships anchored at the same time in Macao. The amount of rice that was brought from Guangzhou to Macao every month was to be halved.[72] At this time China was undergoing political change from the Ming to the Qing dynasty. The Ming seemed to demand from the Portuguese as much tribute as they possibly could.

The Portuguese government in Goa deemed Macao to be a part of its domain and the Chinese authorities deemed Macao to be a place where the Portuguese were allowed to stay after offering their tribute and obedience. We can say, therefore, that at this time Macao was probably already acting according to a "two systems in one country" agenda.

70 Governor of a province. Under this office, there were *Buzhengshi* (布政使, Provincial Treasurer), *Anchashi* (按察使, Provincial Judge), Haitao-fushi (海道副使, Provincial Commander) and *BeiwoTuchihhui* (備倭都指揮, Commander of the Coast Guard).

71 Biblioteca Pública e Arquivo Distrital de Évora, Códice CXVI 2–5, f. 190r.

72 Ibid., ff. 188r–189v.

TABLE 2.5 Price list of the commodity in the Portuguese intra-Asian trade of the 16th century

Origin	Commodity	Quantity	Price in Goa
China⇒Japan route			
China	raw silk	500～600 picos	
China/Manila	twisted thread (fine)	400～500 picos	
China/Manila	twsited thread average	included above	
China/Manila	darc thread	included above	
China/Manila	silk textile embroidered	1700～2100 piece	
China	gold（average）	3000～4000 taeis	
China	gold（fine）	included above	
China	musk(average)	2 picos	
China	musk(fine)	included above	
China	white ceruse	500 picos	
China/Manila	cotton thread	200～300 picos	
China/Manila	black cotton textile	3000 pieces	
China/Manila	black mixed cotton textile with silk	included above	
China/Manila	white cotton textile	included above	

Price in Canton	Price in Macao	Price in Japan	Profit ratio	Note
80taeis/pico		140〜150 taeis/ pico	75%〜87%	
130〜140 taeis/ pico		370〜400 taeis/pico	185%	ones of the best quality is from Nanking
55〜60 taeis/ pico		100 taeis/pico	70〜82%	
40 taeis/pico		94 taeis/pico	135%	1cattie≒1/104picos
1.1〜1.4 taeis/ piece		2.5〜3 taeis/ piece	114〜127%	
5.4 taeis silver/ taeis		7.8 taeis/taeis	44%	
6.6〜7 taeis silver/taeis		8.3 taeis/taeis	26%	
8taeis/cattie		14〜15 taeis/ cattie	75〜88%	
		26 taeis/cattie	225%	depend on the chance
2.7 taeis/pico				6〜7 conderin/ salsera in Portugal
8 taeis/pico	7taeis/picos	16〜18 taeis/ pico	128〜157%	
0.28 taeis/piece		0.5〜0.54 taeis/ piece	78〜92%	
1.3 taeis/pico				
0.12 taeis/piece		0.23〜0.24 taeis/ piece	92〜100%	

TABLE 2.5 Price list of the commodity in the Portuguese intra-Asian trade of the 16th century (*cont.*)

Origin	Commodity	Quantity	Price in Goa
China/Manila	colored cotton textile	included above	
China	quicksilver	150～ 200 picos/300 picos	
Siam	lead	2000 picos	
China	China root	500～600 picos	
China	ceramic and porcelin(fine)	20000 pieces	
China	ceramic and porcelin(average)	included above	
China	ceramic and porcelin(inferior)	included above	
China	rhubarb	100 picos	
China	liquorice	150 picos	
China	white sugar	60～70 picos	
China	brown sugar	150～200 picos	
China⇒Goa route			
China	raw silk and twisted thread	1000 picos	200 cruzados/ picos
China/Manila	silk damasc (fine)	10000～ 12000 pieces	wide range
China/Manila	silk damasc (excellent)	included above	wide range

Price in Canton	Price in Macao	Price in Japan	Profit ratio	Note
0.085 taeis/ piece		0.16〜 0.17 taeis/ piece	88〜100%	
40 taeis/pico	43 taeis/ picos	90〜92 taeis/ pico	125〜130%	
	3 taeis/picos	6.4 taeis/pico	113%	
0.8〜1 taeis/ pico	1〜1.2 taeis/ picos	4〜5 taeis/ pico	400%	
1.2〜1.5 taeis/10 pieces		wholesale pricex2〜3	100〜200%	1 big and high quality piece@15 maces
1.5 maces/10 pieces				
1real/10 pieces				
2.5 taeis/pico		5 taeis	100%	
2.5 taeis/1pico	3 taeis/picos	9〜10 taeis/ pico	260~300%	
1.5〜2 taeis/1pico	1.5 taeis/ picos	3~4.5 taeis/ pico	100〜125%	Japanese prefer brown sugar
	0.4〜 0.6 taeis/ picos	4〜6 taeis/ pico	900%	
80 taeis/pico			150%	1cruzado÷1tael
5 taeis/piece				consumed in India, ones have 16varas as width@12 〜15taeis/piece
6〜7 taeis/piece				consumed in India

TABLE 2.5 Price list of the commodity in the Portuguese intra-Asian trade of the 16th century (*cont.*)

Origin	Commodity	Quantity	Price in Goa
China/Manila	taffeta(fine)	included above	wide range
China/Manila	taffeta(excellent)	included above	wide range
China	gold	3〜4 picos	wholesale price x 1.8〜1.9
China	brass	500〜600 picos	wholesale pricex2
China	musk	6〜7 picos	more than wholesale price x 2
China	quicksilver	100 picos	wholesale pricex1.7〜1.8
China	cinnabar	500 picos	wholesale price x1.7〜1.8
China	white sugar	2000〜 3000 picos	wholesale pricex 2〜3
China	China root	1000〜 2000 picos	wholesale price x2〜3
Manila	brass	2000 picos	wholesale price x 2
China	camphor	200 picos	wholesale price x 2〜3
China	ceramic	large quantity	wholesale price x 1.2
China	gold colored furniture		3000〜 4000cruzados
China	silk thread for embroidery		187〜208 taeis/ picos
China	embroidered beddings		
Goa⇒China route			
India	silver		

	Price in Canton	Price in Macao	Price in Japan	Profit ratio	Note
	2.5〜3 taeis/ piece				width of 12covado
	5.4〜6.6 taeis silver/1 tael gold			80〜90%	consumed in India
	7〜8 taeis/pico			100%	consumed in India
	8taeis/cattie			100%	
	40 taeis/pico			70〜80%	
	40 taeis/pico			70〜80%	
	1.5〜2 taeis/1pico	1.5 taeis/pico		100〜200%	
	1〜1.2 taeis/pico			100〜200%	
	8maces/pico	5.6〜7 taeis/ pico		100%	consumed in Bengal
	10 taeis/pico				to be sent to Portugal
					coins or embroidery pieces

TABLE 2.5 Price list of the commodity in the Portuguese intra-Asian trade of the 16th century (*cont.*)

Origin	Commodity	Quantity	Price in Goa
India	ivory	2000～ 3000 taeis	
Spain	velvet		6～7cruzados/ covado
Spain	scarlet		5～8cruzados/ covado
Spain	wine(average)	150～200 pipas	40～50 cruzados/pipa
Spain	wine(fine)	included above	95cruzados/pipa
Spain	olive oil	6 pipas	8～10reals/jar
Spain	vinegar with caper	some barrels	
Prices in Canton market			
China	gold （fine）		
China	musk		
China	raw silk		
China	twisted thread made in Nanjin		
China	damask（fine）		
China	damask(average)		
China	taffeta(fine)		
China	silk textile(average)		
China	cotton thread		
China	silk shawl		
China	shawl braded of silk thread		
China	cinnabar		
China	copper		
China	brass		

Price in Canton	Price in Macao	Price in Japan	Profit ratio	Note
50taeis/pico				
	7〜8taeis/palmo		240%	1covado＝66cm, 1palmo=22cm
	80〜90 cruzados (max)		80%〜100%	1pipa(barrel)÷800ℓ
				not to sell in Macao
			20%	12reals/jar in Manila
silver7taeis/taeis				
8taeis/cattie				
80taeis/pico				8taeis in the original
130taeis/pico				
7taeis/piece				width of 14 varas
12〜15taeis/piece				width of 16varas
2.5〜3taeis/piece				width of 12 covados
1.3maces/piece				width of 10varas
8taeis/pico				
3.5〜4taeis/piece				
4〜5maces/piece				
40taeis/pico				
7〜8taeis/pico				
7〜8taeis/pico				

TABLE 2.5 Price list of the commodity in the Portuguese intra-Asian trade of the 16th century (*cont.*)

Origin	Commodity	Quantity	Price in Goa
China	quicksilver		
China	wire		
China	iron		
China	refined iron		
China	cinnabar (fine)		
China	porcelin (fine)		
China	plate (fine)		
China	big plate (fine)		
China	porcelin (average)		
China	porcelin (inferior)		
China	wheat		
China	flour powder		
China	cow		
China	pig		
China	hen		
China	salted fish		
China	fresh fish		
China	white sugar (average)		
China	white sugar (fine)		
China	camphor		
China	cinnamon		
China	rhubarb		
China	liquorice		
China	China root		

Price in Canton	Price in Macao	Price in Japan	Profit ratio	Note
40taeis/pico				
8maces/pico				
2taeis/pico				
2.5taeis/1pico 70maces/cattie				
1.2taeis/10 pieces				
1.5taeis/10 pieces				
3maces/piece				
1.5maces/10 pieces				
less than 1real/10 pieces				
4maces/pico				
0.8taeis/pico	1.2taeis/pico			
	4taeis/each			
1.5taeis/each	2〜3taeis/ each			
2taeis/1pico				
2taeis/1pico				
1conderin/1cattie				
1.5〜2taeis/pico				
2.5taeis/pico				
10taeis/pico				
3taeis/pico				
2〜3taeis/pico				
2.5taeis/pico				
0.8〜1taeis/pico				

CHAPTER 3

The Namban Trade and Nagasaki Merchants: Structure of Investment and Capital Injection

1 Hakata and Nagasaki

In 1570, as merchants from all over Japan began to gather in Nagasaki (長崎), the port opened to Namban ships. Many local names in Nagasaki, deriving from names in Hakata (博多), still indicate that the number of immigrants from Hakata was especially large. Takeno Yoko (武野要子),[1] as well as Okuno Takeshi (奥野武),[2] describe in detail in their research the territorial networks and family relations that linked these two cities.

In this chapter, I will focus on the trading methods of Suetsugu Heizō (末次平蔵),[3] one of the many merchants in Nagasaki originally from Hakata, which had been the most important port open to foreign ships throughout the medieval era. Heizō was a prominent member of society, serving as a governor and a red-seal ship trader. Research on Suetsugu Heizō has been undertaken from several perspectives, most notably those of the red-seal ship trade,[4] commercial history based on family relations,[5] and research about *nagegane* (投銀,

1 Yōko Takeno, "Sakoku to Hakata Shōnin: Hakata Bōeki Shōnin Kenkyū Josetsu" [National Seclusion and Merchants of Hakata: A Research Introduction of the Merchants of Hakata], in Mataji Miyamoto (ed.) *Han Shakai no Kenkyū* [Study of the Clan Society] (Tokyo: Minerva Shobō, 1960). This article discusses the rise and fall of merchants of Hakata, concentrating on their relationship with Hideyoshi and their participation in the Nagasaki trade. Takeno, *Hakata no Gōshō* [Wealthy Merchants of Hakata] (Fukuoka: Ashi Shobō, 1980).

2 Takeshi Okuno, "Nagasaki to Hakata Shōnin" [Nagasaki and Merchants of Hakata], *Nagasaki Dansō* 50 (1971). He examines the connection between the Suetsugu Family of Nagasaki, founded by Suetsugu Kozen (末次興膳), and the merchants of Hakata, especially from a view of the family relations and the commercial activities.

3 The importance of Suetsugu family is also mentioned in Geoffrey Gunn, *World Trade Systems of the East and West: Nagasaki and the Asian Bullion Trade Networks* (Leiden & Boston: Brill, 2017), 85–86.

4 Yōko Nagazumi, *Shuin-sen* [Red-seal Ship] (Tokyo: Yoshikawa Kōbunkan, 2001); Motojirō Kawashima, *Shuin-sen Bōeki-shi* [History of the Red-seal Ship Trade] (Osaka: Kōjin-sha, 1921).

5 Yukinobu Koyama, "Shoki Nagasaki Shijō ni okeru Shōnin Shihon: Suetsugu Heizō to Hakata Shōnin no Rendō wo Chūshin ni" [Merchant Capitals in the Early Nagasaki Market: Especially on the Linkage between Suetsugu Heizō and the Merchants of Hakata], *Chūō Daigaku Daigakuin Kenkyū Nempō: Bungaku Kenkyū-ka* [Bulletin of Graduate Studies: Graduate School of Letters, Chuo University] 21 (1991). He examines the role of Suetsugu Heizō as director and mediator of *nagegane*.

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loan agreements used in Nagasaki trade, referring to usury and cessation of liability after a maritime accident). It is less well known that Heizō was actually a Namban trader who traded in particular with merchants in Macao.[6] Suetsugu Heizō was a hereditary name that was used for four generations, from the early 17th century until 1676. As the first and second generations were deeply involved in trade with Macao, which ceased in 1639, we cannot investigate their true character only in relation to the red-seal ship trade and the trade with the VOC.

According to *Ikoku Tokai Gomen no Koto* (異国渡海御免之事, the note of the license to sail to foreign countries),[7] the first Heizō Masanao (政直) was the only merchant who was allowed two red-seal ships every year. Masanao was well known for the aggressive tactics he employed in order to succeed the governor of Nagasaki. He reported to the Tokugawa Shogunate that Murayama Tōan (村山東安), the governor at the time, was suspected of supporting Christians and that he had favored Toyotomi Hideyori (豊臣秀頼), a son of Hideyoshi, during the war of the Toyotomi against the Tokugawa (the battles in Osaka in 1614 and 1615). The second Shigesada was known by the name Heizaemon (平左衛門) before he took the hereditary name of Heizō. The second Heizō in this chapter refers to him (Shigesada), if not otherwise specified. In reference to the second Heizō, a letter dated October 31, 1630, from Nijenrode, who was a governor of the VOC trading post, said that "the son who had become a wanderer after repudiation by his father becomes the successor of his father."[8]

Some parts of the *nagegane shomon* (bond) contained in the Suetsugu Documents (末次文書)[9] and Shimai Documents (島井文書)[10] in Hakata, they are clearly related to Heizō. These documents have been used for research into

6 Kōichirō Takase, *Kirishitan Jidai no Bōeki to Gaikō* [Trade and Diplomacy in the Kirishitan Period] (Tokyo: Yagi Shoten, 2002).

7 "5 ships from Nagasaki, 2 ships of Suetsugu Heizō, 1 ship of Funamoto Yaheiji, 1 ship of Araki Sotaro, 1 ship of Itoya Zuiemon, 3 ships from Kyoto, 1 ship of Chaya Shiro, 1 ship of Suminokura and 1 ship of Fushimiya."

8 Oskar Nachod, *Jūnana Seiki Nichi-Ran Kōshō-shi* [*Die Beziehungen der Niederländischen Ostindischen Kompagnie zu Japan im siebzehnten Jahrhundert*], trans. Tominaga Makita (Tenri (Nara): Yōtoku-sha, 1956), 495.

9 Apograph, Historiographical Institute, University of Tokyo collection, 3071–91–65. Documents passed down to the Suetsugu Family. There are three bonds of *nagegane* written in Japanese, three in Chinese, and six in European languages.

10 Apograph, Historiographical Institute, University of Tokyo collection, 3071–91–8. The Shimai family belonged to one of the great merchant families of Hakata, and Shimai Soshitsu (島井宗室), known as tea master, came from this family. Among the bonds of debt of the Shimai Documents, nine are bonds of *nagegane* written in Japanese and two are in Portuguese. The original text is conserved in the Fukuoka City Museum.

the relations between Heizō and merchants in Hakata.[11] There is in fact more information to be found in Portuguese documents relating to Macao regarding Heizō's investment in Portuguese ships. Previously these documents received little attention from scholars. In this chapter, I will identify the system of investment in red-seal ships and foreign ships called *nagegane* as well as the role of Heizō and his relationship with merchants in Macao through an analysis of this material.

2 Some Problems Concerning *Nagegane*

2.1 *Defining* Nagegane

The questioning of the meaning of *nagegane* began with the introduction of the existence of the bonds by Kawashima Motojirō (川島元次郎).[12] Shiba Kentarō (柴謙太郎),[13] Boxer,[14] Okamoto Yoshitomo (岡本良知),[15] Iwao Seiichi (岩生成一),[16] Takase Kōichirō,[17] Yamawaki Teijirō (山脇悌二郎),[18] Nagazumi Yoko

11 Koyama, "Shoki Nagasaki Shijō ni okeru Shōnin Shihon."

12 Kawashima, *Shuin-sen Bōeki-shi*.

13 Kentarō Shiba, "Nagegane towa Nani? Kaijō Kashitsuke ka, Commenda Tōshi ka?" [What Is *Nagegane*? Maritime Loan or *Commenda* Investment?], *Keizai-shi Kenkyū* [Study of Economic History], parts 1–3 (1933): 45–47; Shiba, "Nichi- Ō-bun Nagegane Shōmon no Kōsatsu" [Analysis of Bonds of Nagegane Written in Japanese and in European Language], *Keizai-shi Kenkyū* [Study of Economic History] 17, parts 1 & 2 (1937).

14 Charles Ralph Boxer, "Notes on the Portuguese Trade in Japan during the Kwanei Period (1624–1643)," *Shigaku* 12, no. 2 (1933); Boxer, *The Great Ship from Amacon: Annals of Macao and the Old Japan Trade 1555–1640* (Lisbon: Centro de Estudos Históricos Ultramarinos, 1959); etc.

15 Yoshitomo Okamoto, "Nagegane ni kansuru Tokushu no Shiryō" [Unique Documents on *Nagegane*], *Shakai Keizai Shigaku* [Socio-Economic History] 5, part 6 (1935): 40–51.

16 Seiichi Iwao, *Shin-ban: Shuin-sen Bōeki-shi no Kenkyū* [Study of the History of the Red-seal Ship Trade: New Edition] (Tokyo: Iwanami Shoten, 1985), 380.

17 Takase, *Kirishitan Jidai no Bōeki to Gaikō*; Takase, "Iesus-kai no Zaisei to Nagegane" [Finance of the Society of Jesus in Japan and *Nagegane*], *Shigaku* 43, parts 1 & 2 (1970); Takase, *Kirishitan Jidai Taigai Kankei no Kenkyū* [Study on the External Relations in the Kirishitan Period] (Tokyo: Yoshikawa Kōbunkan, 1994); Takase, "Jūroku-Jūnana Seiki Kyokutō ni okeru Iesus-kaishi no Keizai Katsudō to Kiristo-kyō Shisō" [Economic Activities and Christian Thoughts of Jesuits in the Far East in the Sixteenth and Seventeenth Century], *Journal of the Faculty of Distribution and Logistics Systems, Ryutsu Keizai University*, 2, part 2 (1998).

18 Teijirō Yamawaki, *Kinsei Nicchū Bōeki-shi no Kenkyū* [Study of the History of the Trade between Japan and China in the Early Modern Period] (Tokyo: Yoshikawa Kōbunkan, 1960).

(永積洋子),[19] and Nakamura Tadashi (中村質)[20] have further discussed many topics and consulted various materials on this topic. The term's origin and definition are nevertheless still unclear. From an insurance and financial perspective, Matsutake Hideo (松竹秀雄) encyclopedically organized the certification documents and related materials from preceding studies.[21]

The *nagegane* motif appears frequently in literature of the Genroku (元禄) period (1688–1704). In novels by Ihara Saikaku (井原西鶴),[22] for example, it always refers to the massive investment of a large amount of money in *Tang* (唐) or foreign ships. In his *Koshoku Ichidai Otoko* (好色一代男), dissipation in the Maruyama Yūkaku (丸山遊郭, prostitute quarters of Nagasaki) was labeled *nagegane*, as speculative 'investment' (for example, paying for a prostitute's services) was considered to be reckless, like gambling. All stages of *nagegane* appearing in Saikaku's work were located in Nagasaki. In other words,

19 Yōko Nagazumi, "Oranda Bōeki no Nagegane to Kariire-kin" [Nagegane and Debts in the Dutch Trade], *Nippon Rekishi* 351 (1977), 77–93.

20 Tadashi Nakamura, *Kinsei Nagasaki Bōeki-shi no Kenkyū* [Study of the History of the Trade at Nagasaki in the Early Modern Period] (Tokyo: Yoshikawa Kōbunkan, 1988).

21 Hideo Matsutake, *Nagegane* (*Bōken Taishaku*) *to Kaiji Kin'yū* [*Nagegane* (Adventure Lent) and Maritime Finance] (Tokyo: Seizandō Shoten, 1988).

22 From Saikaku Ihara, *Ihara Saikaku Zenshū* [Complete Works of Ihara Saikaku], trans. and notes Teruoka Yasutaka (Tokyo: Shōgakukan, 1976–1977). "To turn from Japan to risky speculations in the China trade, sending one's money clean out of sight [*nagegane* in the original text], needs boldness and imagination. But at least a Chinese merchant is an honest man, and keeps squarely to his promise: the insides of his rolls of silk are the same as outsides, his medical herbs are not weighted with worthless ballast, his wood is wood, his silver is silver, and none of it changes as the years go by" (Saikaku Ihara, "A Subterfuge behind a Literary Screen," in *The Japanese Family Storehouse, or The Millionaires' Gospel*, Book 4, trans. G.W. Sargent (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1959), 85–86); "Chief among the merchants gathering here [Nagasaki] from all Japan are the sharp witted dealers from Kyōto, Ōsaka, Edo and Sakai, men who think in terms of loss as well as gain, ready to send their money [*nagegane* in the original text] chasing after clouds in a foreign ship, but seldom losing in the long run"(Saikaku Ihara, "Making a Clock in Slow Motion," in *The Japanese Family Storehouse, or The Millionaires' Gospel*, Book 5, trans. G.W. Sargent (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1959), 106); "At this point a merchant friend of his came to him and said: 'I am going on a buying trip to Nagasaki.' 'That gives me an idea,' Yonosuke said. 'I shall follow you there. You will be doing me a favour by taking along this box of gold coins [*nagegane* in the original text] for me.' 'What are you going to use it for? To buy foreign goods?' 'No, native.' 'In the Maruyama gay quarters, perhaps? Well, well'"(Saikaku Ihara, "Dolls from the Capital," in *The Life of an Amorous Man*, Book 8, trans. Hamada Kenji (Boston, Rutland, VT & Tokyo: Tuttle Publishing, 2001), 225); "Long ago, he invested to Chinese merchants with *nagegane* and got a break. Then gradually he rose to wealth. In this age hard to make money, he was called Hachigoro of early retirement..."(*Twenty Cases of Unfilial Children*).

nagegane meant an investment in ships sailing abroad, and the stage on which it took place was always Nagasaki.

The word *nagegane* appears in a Japanese document written in 1676 regarding Kageyama Kyūdayū (陰山九太夫), a servant of the fourth Suetsugu Heizō Shigetomo (茂朝), and Shimoda Mizaemon (下田弥三衛門), a translator of Chinese, who participated in illegal trade by employing a Chinese pilot to send a ship to Cambodia. Furthermore, this record shows that the fourth Heizō Shigetomo performed *nagegane* without knowing that it was illegal. Investment in foreign ships was limited mainly to Tang ships (唐船, Chinese ships) after the official trade partners of Japan were limited to China and the Netherlands. The rule to "end sending silver to foreign countries"[23] in 1669 prohibited further agreements of any kind. We should consider, however, that agreements remained in force as long as Chinese houses served as managing centers for *nagegane* and Chinese lived in the city.[24]

The term *nagegane* was not used in certification documents in the Shimai Documents and Suetsugu Documents. However, chronological records from Hakata and Sakai during the Edo period do use the word *nagegane*.[25] But these are later editions, and although usage of the term *nagegane* can be confirmed for the Empō (延宝) period (1673–81) in the case of the fourth Heizō Shigetomo, it is still unclear concerning the Kan'ei period. The terms used in such contracts were *kotozutegin* (言伝銀, a silver entrusted contract targeting the purchase of goods) and *kaijōgin* (海上銀, a high-rate contract defining the limited liability of the lessee in the event of a maritime accident). The Shogunate prohibited both in 1638.[26]

The term *nagegane* (投銀/*tōgin*) itself has been considered to mean silver investment. However, considering that tou (投) in Chinese implies "entrust" and the term appeared in Chinese ship trades in Nagasaki more frequently in the later 17th century, I suspect that *nagegane* may originally have been similar to the character of *kotozute* (entrusting silver). In any case, *kotozutegin* and *kaijōgin* should be considered separately. As far as we can distinguish them, I will refer to them separately. As most of the contents of bonds called *nagegane*

23 Copy of the *okakitsuke* from Kambun 7 to Empo 8 (自寛文七年至延宝八年御書附写), in Nakamura, *Kinsei Nagasaki Bōeki-shi no Kenkyū*, 196–197.

24 Ibid., 259.

25 For Hakata, see Genko Tsuda (津田元顧), "Sekijō-shi" [Description of Hakata], in the Appendix of Chikusi Shidan-kai (ed.) *Chikushi Shidan*, Mori Bunko Collection (Fukuoka: Chikusi Shidan-kai, 1921), 126, 137, 156, 194–198. For Sakai, see Shigan Takashi (高志芝巌), *Tō-chū Zen-Sakai Shō-shi* [Detailed Description of All Sakai, with Headnotes], revised and enlarged by Takashi Yōkō [高志養浩], notes Kawano Fumikichi, vol. 2 (Tokyo: Kōbundō, 1985), 111–113.

26 Nakamura, *Kinsei Nagasaki Bōeki-shi no Kenkyū*, 171.

shomon in previous research were actually *kaijōgin* bonds, I summarize the character of *kaijōgin* briefly as follows:[27]

1. *Kaijōgin* determined the exemption of the repayment obligation if a ship did not return safely. The certification document clearly states: "A case of sailing on the sea shall not exist" (海上之儀は存せず候).[28]
2. Compared with a typical financial loan, the interest was quite high. The leading character represented by the term *kaijō* (sailing on the sea) was the lessor who was taking the risk. The high interest rate was supposed to represent the incidental premium risk.
3. There were examples where multiple individuals provided loans as investments in the same ship.
4. A range of interests were involved, including red-seal ships, Chinese ships, and Namban ships.[29]
5. When the Portuguese or Chinese borrowed silver directly, a bond was made in the respective foreign language (Portuguese, Chinese). A bond between Japanese and foreigners often required a guarantee.
6. There are examples where a person borrowed silver with a normal loan and further loaned it as a lessor to the crew of a ship sailing abroad with *kaijō*.
7. *Kakohi* (かこひ) was an agreement in which the lessee had to repay the normal interest plus an extra 10 percent of the principal if the voyage was not carried out until the following year or later.
8. Another feature, called *toiyahou* (といや包)[30] or *metari* (めたり),[31] certified a statement that the amount of silver was correct.

2.2 *Agreements with the Chinese*

Agreements with the Chinese after the Kan'ei period (1624–45) did not continue as investments in red-seal ships or Portuguese ships, and the changes at this time appeared in certification documents. According to the organization of

27 *Kaijōgin* seems to derive from the maritime loan, largely developed in the European Mediterranean world. I will refer to this matter in Chapter 4, in relation to the Macao society.

28 Motojirō Kawashima, who cited this bond for the first time, defined the word "A case of sailing on the sea shall not exist," as "for the danger on the sea is not clear, the lessor takes the risk." In addition, he thinks that the term *kaijōgin* is an abbreviation which includes a sense "A case of sailing on the sea shall not exist" Kawashima, *Shuin-sen Bōeki-shi*, 161.

29 The interest rate for Japanese ships was 35–50%, for Portuguese ships around 30%, and for Chinese ships 110% maximum.

30 *Toiyahou* is wrapped silver distributed by shipping wholesalers, who also conducted an exchange and currency business. Such an inscription shows that the amount has been verified.

31 The silver in this period was currency by weight, thus there were some differences in weight in each type of silver. *Metari* means the silver is heavier than the standard.

source material by Matsutake Hideo, we can count sixteen cases of agreements (not limited to bonds), including Suetsugu Documents.[32] While the loans to merchants in Macao and loans between Japanese were almost always performed in Hakata, comparatively more loans to Chinese were made in Sakai (堺). As Matsutake has already summarized the agreements' contents, I will examine the changes that took place among the Chinese who engaged in trade with Japan, as we can recognize them from five bond examples in the Suetsugu Documents (Table 3.1).[33] I will begin by examining individual cases.

The first case is an agreement made in 1620 in which the lessor was Suetsugu Hikobee (末次彦兵衛), Sōtoku's (宗徳) son-in-law, who was a merchant in Hakata and was called Nakano Hikobee (中野彦兵衛). The Chinese Wu Yishan (呉一山) in Hikichicho (引地町) in Nagasaki wrote a bond as a surety, and the lessee (借銀人) was also Chinese, Jin Yuqiao (金迂喬). Previous research has indicated that Wu Yishan was the guarantor (認銀人) of this agreement.[34] It is, however, not obvious that Wu Yishan supported Jin Yuqiao, because Wu Yishan loaned him money and wrote the bond on his own. It is natural to conclude that Wu Yishan borrowed money from Suetsugu in order to then lend it to Jin Yuqiao, who traveled on board Funamoto Yashichiro (船本弥七郎)'s ship. I assume that such a double loan system operated when the person who finally managed the money had low credit. In this agreement the interest was 35 percent and a *kaijō* was clearly written. This interest rate was relatively low in terms of *kaijō* for red-seal ships, and was quite low compared with later investment in Chinese ships.

Jin may have been one of Funamoto Yashichiro's crew members in Quangnam (広南, south of Vietnam). Yashichiro was a trader who received his red-seal license more than twice and mainly sailed to Cambodia and south of Vietnam, to the Tōan area ruled by the Nguyen family. Most of the red-seal traders employed a captain when they sent their ships abroad. But Yashichiro was both the owner and captain, and thus he traded at the destination himself. He became the center of Japanese society especially in Hoi An, a trading port in the Quangnam area that was governed by the Nguyen family, and he was well received at the Nguyen court.[35]

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32 The research of types of bonds, not limited to Chinese, is detailed in Matsutake, *Nagegane* (*Bōken Taishaku*) *to Kaiji Kin'yū*.

33 Apograph, Suetsugu Documents, Historiographical Institute, University of Tokyo collection, 3071–91–65. Amang the Suetsugu Documents, there are bonds for Chinese, as Bangquan (浜泉) and Higo Shikan (肥後四官), written in Japanese.

34 Matsutake, *Nagegane* (*Bōken Taishaku*) *to Kaiji Kin'yū*, 102.

35 Kawashima, *Shuin-sen Bōeki-shi*, 577–594. Sometimes Funamoto Yashichiro (船本弥七郎) appears in documents as "Bernardo," with his Christian name.

TABLE 3.1 Chinese bonds from the Suetsugu Documents

	1	2	3	4	5
Date	01.29.1620	02.03.1620	01. Lucky day. 1626	09.14.1638	02.21.1641
Lessor on bond (A)	Nakano Hikobee (中野彦兵衛)	Nakano Hikobee	Nakano Hikobee	Nakano Hikobee	Yoshitoku Hikozaburo (吉徳彦三郎)
Investor (B)	Oga Kurohyoe (大賀九郎兵衛) (100 taels)	Oga Zengoro (大賀善五郎) (100 taels)	Oga Kurohyoe (100 taels) Oga Zengoro (50 taels)		Oga Kurohyoe (100 taels) Shiraishi Yoemon (白石與右衛門) (50 taels) Beniya Hikobee (紅谷彦兵衛) (50 taels)
Lessee on bond (C)	Wu Yishan (呉一山)	Zheng Xinkuan (鄭心寛)	Huang Sanguan (黄三官)	Wang Meizhi Sanguan (汪美之三官)	Yao Nanfu (姚南甫), Yao Junfu (姚君甫)
Actual lessee (D)	Jin Yuqiao (金迂喬)	Zheng Xinkuan	Huang Sanguan	Wang Meizhi Sanguan	Yao Nanfu, Yao Junfu

TABLE 3.1 Chinese bonds from the Suetsugu Documents (*cont.*)

	1	2	3	4	5
Destination	Quangnam (広南)	Pak-Kang, Taiwan (台湾北港)	Pak-Kang, Taiwan	Nanjing (南京)	Unknown
Silver amount	200 taels	150 taels	300 taels	50 taels	180 taels
Interest	35%	40%	35%	80%	50%
Ship	Funemoto Yashichiro (船本弥七郎)'s ship	Nakamachi Nikan (中町二官)' s ship	Hirano Tojiro (平野騰次郎)'s ship	Wang Mei zhi San -guan's ship	Unclear
Kaijō	Funamoto's ship	Nikan's ship	No mention	No mention	No mention
Special notes		Guarantor: Zhong ding		Partially repaid by Hu Ruihuan (胡瑞寰) eight years later	White thread *kotozutegin*

In the second case, the guarantor was a medical doctor, Nikan (二官), in Nakamachi (中町) in Nagasaki. The lessee was a Chinese man named Zheng Xinkuan (鄭心寛). In this case Zheng was traveling to Pek Kang (北港) in Taiwan (台湾) on Nikan's ship from Nagasaki. As the envelope of the bonds states that the medical doctor Nikan lived in Nakamachi, it is obvious that the owner of the ship and the guarantor were the same person. In other words, the Chinese medical doctor living in Nagasaki managed trades between Taiwan and Nagasaki. According to the envelope, which states "Nikan accepted it" (二官、之を請け), Nikan's role was not only ship's owner but also guarantor. The Chinese merchant Li Dan (李旦) lived in Hirado (平戸) and was engaged in trading between Japan and Taiwan at this time.[36] Nikan in Nakamachi could possibly be a person involved in this trade. This was a bottomry agreement (*kaijōgin*), as the envelope states "*kaijō* of Nikan ship."

In the third case, Huang Sanguan (黄三官), a lessee, was a crewman on a ship owned by Hirano Tōjirō (平野藤二郎) that was bound for Pak Kang in Taiwan. No guarantor's name has been found. The Hirano family was descended from the Sueyoshi (末吉) family, a great merchant family in Osaka. Hirano Tōjirō was the second Masasada (正貞) at this time and was appointed governor of Osaka,[37] the Shogunate's territory, for helping the Tokugawa during their fight against the Toyotomi in 1614 and 1615.[38] Tōjirō further received the red-seal license for trading abroad and often sent his ships to Vietnam.

In this year ships were traveling to Taiwan under special circumstances. As mentioned earlier, trade between Japan and Taiwan had been managed by Li Dan in Hirado.[39] After his death in 1625, the Shogunate granted a red-seal license for Taiwan to the governor of Nagasaki, the Suetsugu family, and the Hirano family in Osaka.[40] In 1626, Hirano's ship sailed to Taiwan as did Suetsugu's ship. Augustin Li Yiguan (李一官), Li Dan's son and presumably a pirate, controlled the ship traffic near Taiwan and possibly hindered Suetsugu's and Hirano's ships from purchasing raw silk and deer skin in Taiwan as they had planned to do. The captains of the two ships, Nakamura Shirobee (中村四郎兵衛) and Hamada Yahyōe (浜田弥兵衛), respectively, asked the Dutch, who had a base there, to lend them smaller ships so they could travel to China to purchase their goods directly. The Dutch refused this request. Heizō Masanao,

36 Iwao, *Shin-ban*, 362.

37 Tōjirō (藤次郎) was a hereditary name of the head of Hirano family in Osaka.

38 Nagazumi, *Shuin-sen*, 176.

39 Li Dan had a wide range of networks between Taiwan and Japan, and Zheng Zhilong (鄭芝龍) belonged to his group. After Li Dan's death Zheng's presence came to dominate the group.

40 Nagazumi, *Shuin-sen*.

who was reported by Hamada on his return to Nagasaki the following year, appealed to the officials of the Shogunate and was able to have the head of the Dutch factory officially informed that he and his compatriots would be expelled if they did not treat Japanese sailing to Taiwan better.[41]

Nagazumi Yoko explains the Shogunate's quick response by pointing to the fact that some officials had invested in Suetsugu's ships.[42] Although the bond itself has been lost, we know about a weapon smith in Sakai, Jizaemon (治左衛門), who invested 100 taels with 35 percent interest in the Chinese Kui Wo (愧我) on Hirano's ship in the same year.[43] If we further presume that the owner was Hirano in Osaka, the investment here was raised in Sakai as well as in Hakata.

In Japanese commercial practice, if the debt was not cleared, the bonds would remain in the hands of the lender.[44] In other words, since Hirano's ship failed to trade in Taiwan that year, Huang Sanguan and Kui Wo seem not to have paid back their entrusted silver. Furthermore, as Hirano and Suetsugu tried to continue staffing the base for Taiwan–Japan trade, which was organized by Li Dan before his death, this might demonstrate that indeed many Chinese served on board these ships as crewmen. It was actually from the Shogunate's perspective that Li Yiguan was characterized as a pirate. It is fairer to say that he inherited the trade network his father had built.

These three agreements financed loans to Japanese red-seal ships or to Chinese living in Nagasaki who were on board these ships. Their interest rates, from 35 to 45 percent, did not differ much from those of the loan agreements among the Japanese or with the Portuguese ships. The interest on capital injection agreements with Chinese ship owners in the late Kan'ei period (ca. 1634–43) was quite high, with an average of 80 percent.[45] These agreements had an average interest rate, as did the *kaijōgin*, which seems to relate to the fact that the lessees were crewmen of red-seal ships. This means the interest rate was not, as previous research has argued,[46] affected by the strength and the quality of the ships but was decided by the creditworthiness of the lessees or guarantees.

In 1635 the Japanese were prohibited from traveling abroad. This influenced the substance of agreements with the Chinese. In case no. 4, the lessee was

41 Ibid., 176–181; Nachod, *Jūnana Seiki Nichi-Ran Kōshō-shi*, 125–128.
42 Nagazumi, *Shuin-sen*, 176–181.
43 Nakamura, *Kinsei Nagasaki Bōeki-shi no Kenkyū*, 180–212.
44 Ibid., 186.
45 Matsutake, *Nagegane* (*Bōken Taishaku*) *to Kaiji Kin'yū*, 118–119.
46 Yamawaki, *Kinsei Nicchū Bōeki-shi no Kenkyū*.

Wang Meizhi Sanguan (汪美之三官), who was an owner of a Chinese ship from Nanjing (南京). As 50 taels of lent money corresponded to 40 taels in interest, this equated to an interest rate of 80 percent, which was quite high. The year of the contract was 1638, when the Japanese had already been prohibited from sailing abroad. The Shogunate discussed breaking off official relations with merchants in Macao, and consequently the number of Chinese ships coming to Nagasaki began to increase.[47] It was common among Chinese ships for loans to carry an 80 percent interest rate. Almost all lessees were no longer crew members but ship owners.[48] The lessees did not live in Japan and it was therefore more difficult to collect the loan, which might explain the high interest rate. The annex of this bond states that the Chinese Hu Ruihuan (胡瑞寰) partially repaid 30 taels in 1648, eight years later, but there was no further payment of the money.

The last case was an agreement made in 1641, when only Dutch and Chinese ships could come to Nagasaki, as Japan had broken off relations with Macao. The merchant Yoshitoku Hikozaburō (吉徳彦三郎) from Honkōzenmachi (本興善町) in Nagasaki invested 180 taels at 50 percent interest in two Chinese brothers named Yao Nanfu (姚南甫) and Yao Junfu (姚君甫).[49] This interest rate was lower than the one for Wang Meizhi but higher than those in the first three cases. This discrepancy can be explained by the official ban on the Portuguese trade, which had previously brought many Chinese products (especially raw silk) to Japan. The Dutch factory did not accept Japanese investments. The Japanese were therefore limited in their investment targets to the Chinese. The contract interest rate for Wang Meizhi in 1658 was 80 percent and the one for the Yao brothers was only 50 percent. This could be explained by the fact that as the trade volume with Chinese ships increased and negotiations with them became more common, transactions on credit became possible.

Furthermore, it is possible that this agreement was not a *kaijōgin*. The evidence for this lies in the envelope of the certificate document. On the envelope the amount is given as 145 taels of silver, which differed from the actual volume of 180 taels. It has been supposed that "the envelope for another bond slipped into it for some reason,"[50] but we cannot say it had nothing to do with the bond as there is a description of Yiguan (一官) and Erguan (二官), which

47 Teijirō Yamawaki, *Nagasaki no Tōjin Bōeki* [Trade by Chinese Merchants in Nagasaki] (Tokyo: Yoshikawa Kōbunkan, 1964), 25–28; Iwao, *Shin-ban*, 380.

48 Matsutake, *Nagegane* (*Bōken Taishaku*) *to Kaiji Kin'yū*, 118–120.

49 Details about Yoshitoku Hikozaburō are unknown, but from the fact that his bond is included in the Suetsugu Documents, he seems to have been a member of the Suetsugu family.

50 Matsutake, *Nagegane* (*Bōken Taishaku*) *to Kaiji Kin'yū*, 118–120.

appears to be the Yao brothers. As the lessor sometimes negotiated repayment by decreasing the value of the principal in the case of a payment delay,[51] we might conclude that this bond was also followed up. If the bond and envelope were for the same agreement, this agreement seems to have been *kotozutegin* and not *kaijōgin* as the envelope included the direction to purchase 100 kins of raw silk. From this case, *kotozutegin* was not only so-called "entrusted silver": it further contained a combination of purchased goods and gained profit. In this case, a trader could achieve some profit after he had purchased the required goods with the money received and after he had repaid the interest.

The common element among these five cases is that even if the lessor on the bond was the Suetsugu family in Hakata, there were also other merchants who deposited silver, especially merchants who were related to the rich merchant family of Ōga (大賀) in Hakata. In other words, the role of the Suetsugu family can be said to have been as a kind of organizer for investment trusts. As has been made clear in this section, the bonds for investment agreements in the Shimai Documents of a rich merchant in Hakata focus on people involved in red-seal ships, while the bonds in the Suetsugu Documents contain many agreements with Chinese and Portuguese. The Suetsugu family in Hakata obviously faced a different situation from the Shimai family and did not hesitate to conclude agreements with foreigners. The agreements with merchants in Macao mentioned in the Suetsugu Documents that I examine in the next section will help to clarify this point. Two of the aforementioned five cases of bonds in Chinese in the 1620s were proved to be *kaijōgin*. The others did not include the word *kaijō*. As the case from 1641 may have been a *kotozutegin*, we can say that these agreements with the Chinese did not clearly define the risk of losses at sea, which makes them different from the cases involving red-seal ships.

3 The Role of Suetsugu Heizō as seen in Portuguese Certification Documents

Koyama Yukinobu (小山幸伸) has researched Heizō's role by analyzing some of the bonds left in Japanese side. He concentrates on the relationship between the investment group of merchants in Hakata formed by local and familial connections and the Suetsugu family in Nagasaki.[52] In this section I will examine his work on investment trades from many perspectives by analyzing a broader

51 Boxer, "Notes on the Portuguese Trade in Japan during the Kwanei Period (1624–1643)," 16–17.

52 Koyama, "Shoki Nagasaki Shijō ni okeru Shōnin Shihon."

range of European sources. Bonds in Portuguese in particular have not been discussed in terms of their contents and the accuracy of their translation since Shiba Kentarō published them. His translation includes some mistakes, which makes it necessary to examine the original documents.

3.1 *Paredes's* Kaijogin *Loan Bonds*

A Portuguese named Rodrigo Sanchez Paredes borrowed 7,500 taels at 30 percent interest from Suetsugu Sōtoku with the special condition of *kakoi* (かゝこい) at 10 percent (Table 3.2, col. 1) on November 5, 1627.[53] From the bond in this case, we can see that Heizō deposited silver from Sōtoku and paid him back the principal and the interest. Such *kaijōgin* agreements in Portuguese have been interpreted as *respondência* agreements in previous research.

Respondência is defined as including "high interests and ceasing of the payment obligation in the case of an incident at sea."[54] The word *respondência* in this bond is used as "equivalent to interest" corresponding to the "principal." In other bonds, we can see that the sentence "to borrow silver by *respondência* (*tomar a responder*)" is followed by a concrete interest rate and a definition of how to share the risk (*risco*). Some bonds do not state clearly that they are *respondência* agreements (e.g., Table 3.2, col. 5) but a share of the risk was usually referred to. Given these conditions, I conclude that *respondência* first meant "high interest," and that the risk-taking of a lessor at sea (*declarar o risco*) was stipulated in order to justify the high interest rate.

Takase defines *respondência* as corresponding to *kaijōgin*. They certainly share common elements, such as high interest rates and a clear notification that the lessor is taking a risk. While Takase is not necessarily wrong, I argue that while the first character of *kaijōgin* was the clear notification of the lessor's risk, to which a high risk and the expression "premium for risk" are attached, *respondência* itself corresponds to high risk (namely, a premium for risk). In other words, this is a chicken-or-egg problem: clearly stating "lessor's risk taking" in a different section shows that these two factors in these bonds were supposed to be considered separately.

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53 According to the list of inhabitants of Macao in 1625 (Biblioteca Pública e Arquivo Distrital de Évora, Códice CXVI 2–5, ff. 226r–232v), Paredes was Portuguese and was from the parish of Santo António of Macao. *Kakoi* is a special condition added for a delay of more than one year in the return voyage. *Suetsugu Tsurumatsu-shi Shozō Monjo* (Documents Possessed by Mr. Suetsugu Tsurumatsu), Historiographical Institute, University of Tokyo collection, 4171–91–36.

54 Takase, "Kirishitan Kyōkai no Keizai Kiban wo meguru Naibu no Rongi," 313.

TABLE 3.2 Loan relationships with the Portuguese in Suetsugu Documents and Shimai Documents (agreements with Macao city and with individuals)

	1	2	3	4	5	6	7	8
Date	11.05.1627	07.20.1631	11.16.1632	10.16.1633	11.06.1637	10.06.1638	10.16.1638	10.18.1638
Debtor	R.S. Paredes	M. Pereira	A. Lobo	F. Carvalho	T. Tavares A. Mancio	P.F. Carvalho	L.F. Marinho P. Crasto	João Pereira
Holder	Individual	Individual	City Macao	Individual	Individual	City Macao	Individual	City Macao
Silver amount (taels)	7,500	500	3,000	5,000	4,000	4,000	3,000	15,000
Interest	30%	unknown	33%	unknown	38%	25%	28%	25%
Creditor			Luís Tavares					
Obligee	Suetsugu Sotoku (末継宗徳)	Shimai Gombei (島井権平)	Nakano Hikobee (中野彦兵衛), Takagi Goroemon (高木五郎右衛門)	Shimai Gombei	Nakano Hikobee, Ito Kozaemon (伊藤小左衛門)	Suetsugu Sotoku	Nakano Hikobee, Oga Doku (大賀道句)	Nakano Hikobee, Takashima Shirohyoe (高島四郎兵衛), Suetsugu Sotoku, Takagi Goroemon, Oga Doku, Nakano Heikichi (中野平吉)
Source	Suetsugu Documents	Shimai Documents	Suetsugu Documents	Shimai Documents	Suetsugu Documents	Suetsugu Documents	Suetsugu Documents	Suetsugu Documents

So-called maritime loans or adventure loan agreements are similar to *kaijōgin*.[55] These kinds of agreements were used for long-distance maritime trade in Portugal, Spain, and Italy during this period. A clear notification of the lessor's risk-taking was an essential condition of the bond, but an expression equivalent to premium risk was not necessarily stated. A high interest rate was obviously attached to the bond. Strictly speaking, *kaijōgin* was not equivalent to *respondência* in terms of a high interest rate, but the expression "borrow silver by *respondência*" in Portuguese seems to stand for "high interest" with the condition that the lessor takes the risk. Therefore, the results are substantially the same.

Similar maritime investment agreements in Portugal and among Portuguese commercial networks abroad in the 16th and the 17th centuries have never been used to analyze the character of *respondência*.[56] Considering that the term "maritime loan" was used not only by the Japanese but also by the Portuguese in India and Macao during this period, such research is much needed. As in this chapter the focus is on Japan, I will explain these maritime loans in Europe briefly in Chapter 4 to avoid confusion here. However, regarding this sort of agreement, what has been referred to as *respondência* until now should properly be called a sea loan or adventure loan (*empréstimo a risco*), which describes a similar type of agreement in Portugal.

All bonds defined how risks were to be dealt with. Furthermore, the Japanese section of some of the bonds' envelopes state that all of the loan is of *kaijo* [*subete kaijō nari* (惣海上也)], showing that the risks were shared among all ships in the fleet. Even if an individual was a lessee, the payment obligation would remain, even if only one ship returned (it would not be annulled unless all ships failed to return). One envelope, for example, clearly states that the payment obligation will not lapse if all "*hiyashi* (ひやし)-*viagem*," meaning the "fleet" in this case, do not encounter a maritime incident, and a third of the principal and interest will be paid if one ship returns to Nagasaki ("惣ひやし、但一度に出舩ノ海上、自然ひやし一艘ノ時、三分一取申筈ノ定").

Returning to Paredes's bond, there is a mention in Portuguese that "esta prata vai a entregar a Cidade por via de Feizodono" (this silver will be deposited through (Suetsugu) Heizō and the city will receive it).[57] Actually the silver

55 *Cambio marítimo*, *préstamo a la gruesa*, *empréstimo a risco* are the typical names of this kind of loan.

56 There have been studies that have tried to compare this type of agreement with *commenda* investments, characterized by capital intensity, or with *foenus nauticum* of Ancient Rome, but comparisons with the maritime loans that flourished in Lisbon and Seville in the 16th and 17th centuries have not been attempted.

57 Shiba, "Nichi- Ō-bun Nagegane Shōmon no Kōsatsu," part 1, 8–9.

was originally deposited with Heizō by Suetsugu Sōtoku and loaned to Paredes. It is obvious that the city mentioned, Cidade, is Macao and that Heizō acted as an agent for the lending process as well as for the repayment.

In this *kaijōgin* agreement between Sōtoku and Paredes, we can clearly see that Heizō was an intermediary. Sōtoku and his group probably collected silver from other merchants in the manner shown by the aforementioned agreements among Japanese and Chinese. We can further conclude that the Suetsugu family in Hakata gathered investments together and formed an organization similar to a modern investment trust company by sharing their work with Heizo in Nagasaki. The article dated October 5, 1634, in the *Diaries Kept by the Heads of the Dutch Factory in Japan* recorded that Heizō brokered 2,000 taels of investment in a Portuguese ship by Matsukura Katsuie (松倉勝家), the lord of Shimabara (島原).[58] Heizō therefore invested in Portuguese ships not only on behalf of merchants but also if requested to do so by local lords.

3.2 *Investment Association of Merchants in Hakata Based on Family Relationships*

Apart from the case of Paredes, Nakano (Suetsugu) Hikobee also collected silver in agreements, as indicated in Table 3.2. Hikobee was Suetsugu Sōtoku's son-in-law and succeeded him as head of the Suetsugu family. Further investors were Itō Kozaemon (伊藤小左衛門), who was yet another son-in-law of Sōtoku,[59] Ōga Dōku (大賀道句), who was the husband of Sōtoku's granddaughter,[60] Takagi Gorōemon (高木五郎衛門), a relative of Takagi Ichisaburō (高木市三郎), another son-in-law of Sōtoku, and others. This investment association in Hakata was therefore based on the family ties centered on the Suetsugu family. I imagine the reason why Ōga and Itō, two rich merchants from Hakata, were also listed here was that, as the amount of investment made in Macao's merchants was very large, the investors should be limited to those who were very rich. But it is possible that through the Suetsugu family merchants of average wealth could make smaller investments in Portuguese ships on a scale equal to the red-seal ships. The first Heizō, a younger brother of Suetsugu Sōtoku, and

58 Historiographical Institute, University of Tokyo (ed.), *Oranda Shōkan-chō Nikki* [Diaries Kept by the Heads of the Dutch Factory in Japan], Part of Translation, vol. 1, part 2 (Tokyo: University of Tokyo Press, 1976), 37–38.

59 The first Itō Kozaemon. The second Itō Kozaemon became a purveyor of the Kuroda clan (黒田藩) and built up a huge fortune, but he was executed by decapitation for smuggling with Korea in Kambun 7 (1667).

60 He was a purveyor of the Kuroda clan and a red-seal ship trader. He was also called Oga Kurozaemon (大賀九郎左衛門). He was elected to the townspeople of Dejima (出島), Nagasaki.

his son, the second Heizō, had to manage the investments that consolidated this association in Nagasaki. As the first Masanao was still alive in 1627 when Paredes's agreement was formed, we can assume that an agreement based on the familial relationship served as the foundation of such organized financial affairs. Paredes was one of the merchants in Macao who were on friendly terms with the Suetsugu family in Nagasaki. The reliability of their business relationship is demonstrated by a letter from Paredes to the second Heizō dated March 20, 1638. According to the envelope, this letter was forwarded from Heizō to Sōtoku.[61]

The content of this private letter from the Portuguese Paredes to Heizō is interesting. Paredes writes that he could not take part in the voyage to Japan in 1638 because of his internment by the authorities in Guangzhou (広州) in China at the time.[62] Because of this, he asked Heizō to make arrangements with Suetsugu Sōtoku since he could not pay his debt to him that year. The Sōtoku–Heizō (broker)–Paredes arrangment was the same as Paredes's bond shown above. It is unclear when exactly the agreement between Sōtoku and Paredes was entered into, but judging from the custom that unpaid bonds remained in place it is possible that these two agreements were one and the same, and that the payment had been suspended for ten years since 1627 when the agreement had been first established.

In the entry of November 10, 1634, in the *Diaries Kept by the Heads of the Dutch Factory in Japan* it is recorded that the debt of contracted silver between Japanese and merchants in Macao was sometimes suspended for as much as twelve years. Delays of payment of over ten years were not rare. The interest payable on the bond was due annually and the debt equivalent to the interest could become substantial, exceeding by far the principal, if the payment was not made for over ten years. It remains a mystery why Paredes, a merchant whom Heizō trusted, could not completely settle the agreement in 1627. As Heizō was succeeded by the second Shigesada between 1627 and 1638, the Heizō involved in the agreement and the Heizō addressed in the letter were actually father and son and not the same person. The relationship between Heizō and Paredes continued for two generations.

Paredes's letter shows that he was engaged in Namban trade as Heizō's agent. It is clear that Heizō ordered Paredes to purchase velvet and *rinzu*

61 Suetsugu Documents, Historiographical Institute, University of Tokyo collection, 3071–91–65.

62 He probably went to Macao to deal with the construction of the fortress of Macao, especially to explain the situation to Haitao-fushi and to donate cannons. Beatriz Basto da Silva, *Cronologia da história de Macau*, vol. 1 (Macao: Direcção dos Serviços de Educação, 1992), 108.

(綸子, silk satin damask), at least in the year preceding the letter, that is in 1637. Because Heizō's participation in the Namban trade with entrusted silver is an extremely important matter, I will examine this case in more detail.

4 Suetsugu Heizō's Role in the Namban Trade

The entry of December 15, 1634, in the *Diaries Kept by the Heads of the Dutch Factory in Japan,* records that Matusura in Hirado tried to force the Dutch to receive silver investments but was firmly refused. An accountant for the Matsura (松浦) family, Ryūzaki Shichirōemon (龍崎七郎右衛門), tried again to convince the Dutch to accept the silver, "because the Portuguese used to accept it."[63] According to Ryūzaki, Japanese merchants deposited significant amounts of silver, or *kotozutegin*, with merchants in Macao.

According to a study by Iwao Seiichi, investments in red-seal ships and Portuguese galliots required fares according to the different trades and goods that were being purchased.[64] This shows that some rich merchants received preferential treatment in terms of fees and charges.

The entry for November 1638 in the *Diaries Kept by the Heads of the Dutch Factory in Japan* states that the Dutch factory tried to repay all the silver previously borrowed from Heizō,[65] but that Heizō's messenger told them to keep it for a while because the repayment date had been missed as the galliots had already set sail. The Dutch factory resolved the matter by keeping only 50,000 taels of the borrowed amount. In other words, while Heizō insisted the Dutch factory should keep the silver in order to increase his interest, owing to the delayed repayment timing, the factory returned part of the silver but decided to keep a part of it in order to favor an increase on Heizō's return. At the same time, Heizō lent a significant amount to the Dutch when he invested in galliots from Macao.

Through the *Diaries Kept by the Heads of the Dutch Factory in Japan*, Heizō's investment in Namban ships have become clear. Plenty of Portuguese sources further help to identify how Heizō entrusted silver to merchants in Macao. Two letters from Heizō to the authorities in Macao (from 1634 and 1635) show

63 Historiographical Institute, University of Tokyo (ed.), *Diaries Kept by the Head of the Dutch Factory in Japan* (Original Text), vol. 1 (Tokyo: University of Tokyo Press 1974), 199.

64 Seiichi Iwao, *Shuin-sen Bōeki-shi no Kenkyū* [Study of the History of the Red-seal Ship Trade] (Tokyo: Kōbundō, 1958), 287.

65 Historiographical Institute, University of Tokyo (ed.), *Diaries Kept by the Head of the Dutch Factory in Japan* (Original Text) vol. 3 (Tokyo: University of Tokyo Press, 1978), 333–334.

his involvement most clearly. These letters mostly concerned the possibility of breaking off relations with Macao. This unstable situation was caused by the Christians who had visited Japan. Various problems arose as soon as a letter from Santos, a Japanese priest living in Macao, to the Japanese in Nagasaki was discovered.[66] Separately from these reports about the domestic situation and the relationship with Macao, Heizō included further detailed references to silver he had sent and entrusted to Macao to purchase raw silk.

4.1 *Heizō's 1634 Letter*

It is evident from a letter sent by Heizō to the city of Macao in 1634 that Heizō had sent 10,000 taels to Macao through Agostinho Lobo in the previous year or earlier.[67] According to the same letter, he received raw silk worth the equivalent of half of the money in 1634. He also sent 10,000 taels in 1634 to purchase high-quality raw silk using separate ships. Lobo was in charge of the Capitão-mór in 1624 and 1625 and was among the rich merchants in Macao. He was a rare case as he had been to Japan as a Feitor do Povo (a commercial representative of the city of Macao) while he was in charge of the Capitão-mór. Heizō deeply trusted him, as is obvious in his letters, and Lobo was without doubt an important merchant.

4.2 *From Silver to Purchasing Stocks*

The most important word that appears in Heizō's letter in 1634 is "*baque*." Takase defines this as "meaning the quota of raw silk to the members of *armação* (joint investment association) in Macao and the raw silk quota in *itowappu* (糸割符, thread tally union) system."[68] Takase interprets *baque* in this case as meaning that the "raw silks purchased by money from Heizō were from the *itowappu* system and treated as Heizō's quota" when he analyzes the letter quoted above.[69] This conclusion, however, cannot be reached in this context. Although Takase is correct to understand *baque* as meaning a quota of *itowappu*, it was originally conceived as shares of stocks within the association (*armação*), which jointly invested in raw silk in Namban ships departing from Macao. In mentioning clearly that the silver would be used to purchase high-quality raw silk and to appoint the agents who would purchase it, *baque*

66 See Chapter 7.

67 Biblioteca de la Real Academia de la História, Madrid, 9–7239 (2), ff. 433–434v.

68 Kōichirō Takase, "Macao-Nagasaki-kan ni okeru Itaku Bōeki ni tsuite: Sakoku Izen no Itowappu to no Kanren ni oite" [Entrusted Trade between Macao and Nagasaki: In Relation to Itowappu System before the National Seclusion], *Shigaku* 49, part 4 (1980).

69 Takase, *Kirishitan Jidai no Bōeki to* Gaikō, 64.

in this case means the share Heizō could gain by his participation in the joint investment association in Macao.

As the export of raw silk thread, with the exception of *itowappu*, had been strictly prohibited by the articles of the *Toshiyorihosho* (年寄奉書, documents issued by close associates of the Shogun), the orders given to the magistrate of Nagasaki in 1633, it is unlikely that Heizō, even though he actually ruled in Nagasaki, was an exception and was allowed to deal outside of itowappu. A safer and more stable approach would have been for Heizō to receive an allocated ration from the Feitor, who was responsible for the account settlement of *armação*, according to his ratio of *baque*. Heizō was part of the joint investment association and had sold his package as *itowappu* in Nagasaki in the same way as other raw silk.

The city council of Macao resolved that the "Feitor and any other persons who sail to Japan shall not receive any capitals to purchase raw silk out of *pancada* from policymakers and Japanese merchants in Japan."[70] This indicates that while they had received capital with which to purchase raw silk out of *pancada* (*itowappu*) from Japanese policymakers and merchants, this was now prohibited. In other words, the reason Heizō participated in the joint investment association in Macao in 1634 is that he seems to have changed his methods owing to the ban on raw silk trade with entrusted silver outside of itowappu because of the aforementioned revision of foreign regulations in 1633, according to which obtaining raw silks by means other than *itowappu* was strictly prohibited. Takase insists that Heizō continued to invest his capital "illegally" in entrusted trades in trading ships from Macao and that he tried to obtain raw silks outside of itowappu.[71] Judging from his letter it seems more reasonable to think that Heizō did not continue to trade illegally when the new situation arose between Japan and Macao. Rather, after 1634 he obtained raw silk through the *itowappu* system in order to earn profits legally by using the investment association system in Macao.

While Macao civilians had to pay boat fares and other charges to the Capitão-mór and Macao city to receive their shares from the *armação* association for loading raw silk,[72] they did not collect charges from Heizō and others. According to the Matsuras' accountant, mentioned earlier, they maintained

70 Arquivo do Leal Senado (ed.), *Arquivos de Macau*, vol. 3 (Macao: Imprensa Nacional de Macau, 1930–1931), 131–132.

71 Takase, *Kirishitan Jidai no Bōeki to Gaikō*, 65.

72 Kōichirō Takase, *Monsoon Monjo to Nippon: Jūnana Seiki Portugal Kōbunsho-shū* [Monsoon Documents and Japan: Collection of Portuguese Archives in the Seventeenth Century] (Tokyo: Yagi Shoten, 2006), 74. The original source which Takase uses here is: Ao artigo 21, acerca da mercancia, ARSI, Fondo Gesuitico 721, f. 3.

friendly relations. In other words, it is possible that Heizō forced merchants from Macao to increase the interest they paid to him in return for providing greater convenience for their activities in Nagasaki.

4.3 *Heizō's 1635 Letter*

The letter from Heizō to Macao written in 1635 notes that 7,000 taels of *soma* and 3,000 taels of *chōgin* (丁銀, fine silver coin) were deposited with the Feitor.[73] It seems that *soma* silver (a high grade of silver, therefore preferred by merchants) was unavailable, as the postscript mentions 8,560 taels of *chōgin* and 3,000 taels of *chōgin*, equivalent to 7,000 taels of *soma*. As we find no references to *baque* in this letter, it is not known if it refers to a purchase of shares in the *armação*. However, Heizō asked Macao to send a Feitor familiar with Japanese practices; the Feitor, the *armação* representative, he may have also purchased raw silks using the *armação*'s shares. Takase explains that Heizō's reference to the Feitor indicates a smooth business operation and one that was to his advantage since Paredes, Heizō's agent, was the Feitor. But whether Heizō requested Paredes's dispatch is unclear from the letter. He may be referring to the Feitor's ability to increase sales and allocate raw silk to the *armação*, which Heizō had joined.[74]

Furthermore, both letters refer to the "hedging of risks." This means that the raw silk and the silver that paid for it were Heizō's risk. In other words, this investment had the characteristics of a maritime loan, but *respondência* (premium for risk) is not clearly mentioned. It was generally the case in Macao that the purchase of raw silk did not call for any interest charges. This strengthens my contention that main features of *kaijōgin* do not necessarily correspond with the *respondência*.

The two letters of 1634 and 1635 mention the names of agents who continued to be on friendly terms with Heizō, such as Paredes, Rocha,[75] and

73 Biblioteca de la Real Academia de la História, Legajo 9–7239 (2), ff. 409r–409v; Biblioteca da Ajuda, *Jesuítas na Ásia*, 49-V-11, ff. 599v–601r. This letter is translated by C.R. Boxer in his book *The Great Ship from Amacon*, 326–330. Heizō ordered the purchase of "chali raw silk" of finest quality in 1634 and 1635. In the research by Boxer and Takase using these letters, "chali raw silk" is said to be unknown, but according to the entry of "chale" in *Glossário luso-asiático* of Dalgado, it is "a type of high-quality texture (especially wool) produced in Kashmir." According to the document indicated in the same entry, it "is superior to Chinese raw silk," thus it was not the raw silk of China and may be a rare raw silk produced in the Kashmir region. Sebastião Rodolfo Dalgado, *Glossário luso-asiático* (Coimbra: Imprensa da Universidade, 1919–1921).

74 The Feitor of 1635 was Manuel de Gouveia Botelho.

75 According to the list of Macao inhabitants in 1625, Bartolomeu da Rocha, a Portuguese from Portugal, belonged to the parish of Santo António. He hosted the Franciscans who

Aranha (Capitão-mór in 1629).[76] Parades was related to Heizō through *kaijōgin* agreements;[77] he came to Japan as an ambassador who was pleading to restart trade in 1640 after the break with Macao. Paredes may have been chosen because of his extensive experience in Japan as well as for his close relationship with the Japanese authorities, including Heizō, the governor of Nagasaki. Rocha and Paredes were not only agents of Heizō but also members of the city council. Rocha was a representative of the faithful of St. Francis Church in Macao and owned a huge mansion. Paredes was an equally successful merchant. The Jesuit sources show that Rocha had traveled as a merchant between Macao and Japan in around 1615.[78] It is thus clear that Heizō employed the most powerful merchants in Macao as his agents.

4.4 *The 1632 Investment Agreement*

According to the letter of 1634 we know that Heizō sent 10,000 taels to Macao through Lobo, who was Feitor and a Macao merchant. While Takase thought Lobo was Heizō's agent,[79] Feitor normally refers to a representative of the investment association in Macao (*armaçāo*). The Feitor had full commercial responsibility to arrange package deals for raw silk, traveling to Japan with a status second only to the Capitão-mór in Nagasaki. After returning to Macao they allocated their profits according to the ratio of each citizen's share. Lobo came to Japan as Feitor in 1632.[80] In 1633 the Feitor was Francisco Rodrigues, so it was Lobo who kept Heizō's silver in 1632. Based on the entry dated June 25, 1632, in the Documents of Macao City Council, it is clear that Lobo, who came to Japan in 1632, had a special responsibility:

> Because this city has such a high debt, it is impossible to reduce the debt and there are no other remedies [...], thus the order was given. The Feitor who would sail to Japan was ordered to borrow a maximum of 50,000 taels under *respondência* from Japanese subjects for the payment of the

arrived in Macao from Manila in 1633, and he belonged to the faithful of the church of St. Francis in that period. Basto da Silva, *Cronologia da história de Macau*, 106.

76 Oliveira Aranha was the Capitão-mór of navigation to Japan in 1629.

77 Paredes was from Tomar in central Portugal. He participated in the navigation to Japan as Feitor at least two times. He married Maria Cordeiro, a half-Chinese and half-Portuguese girl, in Macao and had at least three children. Benjamin Pires Videira, *A Embaixada Mártir* (Macao: Instituto de Macau, 1988), 54–55.

78 Kōichirō Takase, "Kirishitan Jidai ni okeru 'Kyōshō'" ["Religious-Merchants" in the Kirishitan Period], in *Kirishitan Jidai Taigai Kankei no Kenkyū* [Study on the External Relations in the Kirishitan Period] (Tokyo: Yoshikawa Kōbunkan, 1994), 501.

79 Takase, *Kirishitan Jidai no Bōeki to Gaikō*, 61.

80 According to the list of inhabitants of Macao in 1625, he did not belong to any of the local parishes and was Portuguese from Portugal.

> debt based on the profit after the market situation has been confirmed. On this condition he is ordered to collect a maximum of 50,000 taels from the Japanese as a *respondência* agreement.[81]

In other words, the Macao city council resolved to collect a large amount of investment from the Japanese, up to a maximum of 50,000 taels, and Lobo was contracted to arrange it. As mentioned before, Lobo was a Capitão-mór in 1624 and 1625, and it was not often that he traveled to Japan as a working-level official Feitor. In fact, the person who borrowed silver in Japan should have been a person who was well respected in Macao city and trusted in Japan as well.

As we can see from the third case in Table 3.2, Lobo loaned silver under a *kaijō* agreement on September 12, 1632. The merchants Nakano Hikobee and Takagi Gorōemon took out the loan with him, and Luís Tavares,[82] a Portuguese interpreter in the Nagasaki magistrate's office, stood surety for the loan.[83] Judging from the resolution mentioned above, it is possible that the agreement was not with Lobo as an individual but as a representative of Macao. Furthermore, Lobo recorded on the bond that "this silver was borrowed for the Macao city. Therefore, payment was held with strict accuracy," which makes clear that the main loan body for the agreement was the city of Macao. The article of April 11, 1633, of the Documents of Macao City Council states the total amount Lobo borrowed:

> Civilians in Macao in this year demanded to pay and spend 28,300 taels from 66,000 taels the Feitor A. Lobo borrowed under *kaijō* loan and 120,000 taels the previous Feitor, Francisco Rodrigues o Velho, borrowed to discharge attached property (in Japan).[84]

In other words, the total amount Lobo scraped together in silver through *kaijō* loans in Japan amounted to 66,000 taels. Thus the 3,000 taels lent by Nakano and Takagi were just the tip of the iceberg.

As Heizō sent 10,000 taels to Macao through Lobo not in 1633 but in 1632, Heizō's silver also contained a part of the 66,000 taels. As Heizō writes in his letters that raw silk equivalent to half of the total 10,000 taels arrived in Japan, it is possible that the remaining 5,000 taels came from the *kaijō* loan agreement under the name of the city of Macao.

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81 Arquivo do Leal Senado, *Arquivos de Macau*, 115–116.

82 Tavares was a Portuguese interpreter (Namban tsuji 南蛮通詞) of the magistrate's office at Nagasaki. He was born to a Portuguese father and a Japanese mother.

83 Apograph, Suetsugu Documents, Historiographical Institute, University of Tokyo collection, 3071–91–65.

84 Arquivo do Leal Senado, *Arquivos de Macau*, 123.



FIGURE 3.1 Agostinho Lobo's contract with Nakano Hikobee in 1633

4.5 *Nagasaki Merchants' Investments*

In the agreements between the Japanese and Portuguese in Macao shown in Table 3.2, all the investors were merchants from Hakata. There is to date no record in the Japanese sources proving that merchants from Nagasaki and Macao directly entered into *kaijōgin* agreements before 1627.[85] This is why agreements between merchants in Hakata and Sakai have been the focus of examination so far, and why sources showing investments made by merchants from Nagasaki have been missed. The following source in Portuguese gives the content of a claim in 1626 against the city of Macao by a group based in Nagasaki, with their names listed jointly to recover debts.

> [Because the payment from Darrias has been delayed through the prohibition of *respondência* by the city of Macao] we suffered great losses. We ask you, the authority of Macao, to agree that he will come to Japan to reimburse and to complete his obligation. [...] Nagasaki, April 3, 1624.
>
> Ito Kozaemon (伊藤小左衛門) (stylized signature), Takagiya San'emon (高木や三衛門) (stylized signature), Itoya Sokaku (ゐとや宗覚) (stamp), Hirado Martinho (平戸まるちいによ) (stamp), Kusuriya Miguel (薬屋みげる) (stylized signature), Oga Soku (大賀宗九) (stylized signature), Arimaya Yasu[...] (有馬屋安[...]) (stylized signature).[86]

Okamoto Yoshitomo was the first to publish this complaint.[87] Yet he found the signatures indecipherable, and later research was still unable to interpret them. This source was thus treated as "one of the sources regarding *nagegane*." As I have tried to decipher the signatures for this chapter, we can now see that not only people who were involved with the Suetsugu family in Hakata, such as Itō Kozaemon and Ōga Sōku,[88] but also powerful merchants from Nagasaki as well as red-seal ship traders such as Itoya Zuiemon (糸屋随右衛門) (Sōkaku) and Kusuriya Miguel, further relatives of the Takagi family, and *machidoshiyori* (町年寄, town leaders) in Nagasaki entered their names as debtors. Investors in Hakata and Sakai are prominent in Japanese sources regarding *nagegane*

85 The Dutch observed that the Nagasaki merchants assaulted Macao merchants who were trying to collect the debt.

86 Appeal by the merchants of Hakata to the city council of Macao, dated April 3, 1626. Biblioteca Pública e Arquivo Distrital de Évora, Códice CXVI 2–5, ff. 274r–274v.

87 Okamoto, "Nagegane ni kansuru Tokushu no Shiryō," 92.

88 Ito Kozaemon was a wealthy Hakata merchant and a red-seal ship trader. He invested silver in a bond written in Portuguese, found in the Suestugu Documents. Takeno, *Hakata no Gōshō*, 144–154. Like Ito Kozaemon, Oga Soku was a wealthy Hakata merchant and built up a huge fortune as a purveyor of the Kuroda clan. Takeno, *Hakata no Gōshō*, 118–128.

to foreign ships. This source, however, proves that merchants in Nagasaki participated in loans to Macao merchants as well, even though no debt bonds exist.



FIGURE 3.2 Protest by Japanese merchants against Darrias's bankruptcy

4.6 *The Vassals of the Shogun Ban Investment*

I have already stated that ships belonging to Suetsugu and Hirano that sailed to Taiwan in 1626 were funded by the retainers of the Shogun. *Daimyō* also invested in foreign ships at this time, as we saw from the investment of Matsura Takanobu (松浦隆信), the lord of Hirado, in Dutch ships in 1634.[89] Matsura Takanobu invested 3,000 taels in Dutch ships and asked that his responsibilities and liability for the loan be stated clearly. The clear notification of the lessor's risk is equivalent to a *kaijōgin*. The Dutch factory was forced to accept in order to maintain their good relationship with the lord of Hirado, where they had settled. In 1635 Matsura Takanobu also offered to invest 5,000 taels in the Dutch factory.[90] The factory had declined other investment offers,[91] but could not refuse the request from Matsura as the factory was in his domain at Hirado. However, when Matsura Shigenobu (松浦鎮信), Matsura Takanobu's heir, offered to invest 2,000 taels in the Dutch factory in the same year, they firmly refused.[92] These facts show that some local lords and vassals of the Shogun intended to profit through their investment in mercantile ventures. The same holds true of Portuguese ships. A report dated September 20, 1633, from the Captain General of Macao to the Governor of Portuguese India, reads as follows: "The Shogun strictly prohibited his vassals to invest silver under *respondência.* If they do so, regardless of how much profit they might accumulate, these profits will be expropriated."[93]

Another letter to the Captain General of Macao from the Governor of Portuguese India dated May 4, 1634, states similarly that the "Shogun ordered to have his order acknowledged."[94] This suggests that by 1633 at the latest the Shogun's vassals were prohibited from making maritime loan agreements. Some articles for foreign trade were defined in the *Toshiyorihosho,* the so-called first *sakoku* order (or national isolation edict), by the magistrate of Nagasaki in 1633. An article regarding investment was not included, however. As we have no reason to doubt the credibility of the aforementioned sources, it seems that the Shogun's vassals were separately banned from investing in foreign ships. In view

89 Historiographical Institute, University of Tokyo (ed.), *Diaries Kept by the Head of the Dutch Factory in Japan* (Original Text) vol. 1 (Tokyo: University of Tokyo Press, 1973), 199.

90 Ibid., 305–306.

91 Historiographical Institute, University of Tokyo (ed.), *Diaries Kept by the Head of the Dutch Factory in Japan* (Original Text) vol. 2 (Tokyo: University of Tokyo Press, 1975),6.

92 Historiographical Institute, University of Tokyo (ed.), *Diaries Kept by the Head of the Dutch Factory in Japan* (Original Text) vol. 1 (Tokyo: University of Tokyo Press, 1973), 242.

93 Historical Archive of Goa / Directorate of Archives and Archaeology, *Livro das Monções*, Livro no. 19-D, f. 1020v.

94 Ibid., f. 1031r.

of the fact that Heizō assisted Matsukura, the local lord of Shimabara, in 1634, in investing in Dutch ships, and that the accountant of the Matsura family of Hirado offered to invest in the Dutch factory, it seems that local lords (*daimyō*) were excluded from the restriction or only loosely restricted. As already stated, a general prohibition on *kotozutegin* and *kaijōgin* extending to merchants was promulgated in 1638, and it is possible that the prohibition of investment in foreign ships by the vassals of the Shogun was issued earlier. Because Suetsugu Heizō was the governor of Nagasaki and a vassal of the Shogun, I imagine he was afraid to infringe the law after 1634. Instead, rather than making direct investments, he increased his dependence on agents by changing to investment methods that did not attract high interest rates by participating in the association in Macao.

I think the reason that Heizō began to invest in raw silk associations in Macao was that there was no other way to find his way into Portuguese ships. This was because of the uncertainty about the future of the Dutch factory and the dangerous situation for red-seal traders when overseas travels were limited to ships with *hōsho* (奉書船) in the previous year, and there was a total prohibition on overseas travel by the Japanese the following year.

By referring to one of the fifteen articles to the magistrate of Nagasaki issued by the Bakufu, dated February 21, 1639, telling to "stop investing *kaijōgin* and *kotozutegin* into ships from Macao" ("天川船へ海上銀並言伝銀停止之事"), Iwao Seiichi argues that "Portuguese ships at that time lacking trade capital were tided over for a while by investments from Japanese merchants, but their capital source was cut off."[95] However, it is clear from Portuguese sources that for a period after 1634 the receipt of silver from Japan continued not as the capital for the trade, but to obtain a favor of the governor. We should conclude therefore that the purpose of this article was not to cut off trade capital from Portuguese ships. Instead the Shogunate was concerned about useless investments and damage to Japanese merchants after the break with Macao.

95 Kōichirō Takase, "Macao-Nagasaki-kan ni okeru Itaku Bōeki ni tsuite: Sakoku Izen no Itowappu to no Kanren ni oite" [Entrusted Trade between Macao and Nagasaki: In Relation to Itowappu System before the National Seclusion], in *Kirishitan Jidai no Bōeki to Gaikō* [Trade and Diplomacy in the Kirishitan Period] (Tokyo: Yagi Shoten, 2002), 66.

CHAPTER 4

Macao and the Namban Trade: The "Maritime Loan" Debt Problem

1 Macao Society, 1620s to the 1630s

1.1 *The End of Macao's Self-Government*

As I have shown in Chapter 1, in the 16th century Macao was a place where only a marginal existence was possible—a place where merchants of unknown origin, in one sense bandits, were autonomous, and an area controlled by Portuguese India and at the same time subservient to China. However, the advance of other European powers in the 17th century affected this autonomy.

After the Dutch fleet attacked Macao with twelve ships in 1622,[1] and the city was destroyed,[2] the government of the Viceroy of India in Goa decided to dispatch a Captain General (Capitão-geral) to Macao. Behind this decision lay the battles that Spanish and Portuguese forces were waging against the Dutch in the Asian ocean in the early 17th century. The spice trade around Malacca was damaged by these battles, while silver from the New World used in the Chinese trade had started to flow into Asia via the Pacific Ocean galleon route at the end of the 16th century. When the quantity of silver, which until this time had traveled via India, started to diminish in Portuguese India, Goa began to focus upon becoming a center for Macao's silver trade with Japan. The dispatch of the Captain General was a turning point in the Goa government's recognition of the importance of Macao, as Portuguese India started to interfere with Macao's autonomy.

The first Captain General, Francisco Mascarenhas, took up his new position in Macao in 1623. But influential merchants rebelled against his assignment, resulting in conflict. Mascarenhas planned to strengthen the military force by building forts and equipping cannon factories, with the Dutch fleet as his target. He also planned to reduce the political and economic influence

1 The Dutch ships first appeared around Macao in 1599, then came to navigate the sea near Macao almost every year. The sixteen Dutchmen who landed in Macao on two small boats in 1601 were captured. These men, after being forced to convert to Catholicism, were released the following year.

2 Charles Ralph Boxer, *A derrota dos holandeses em Macau no anno de 1622* (Macao: Escola Tipografia de Orfanato, 1938).

 | DOI: 10.1163/9789004463875_007

of the powerful merchants in Macao. As he strengthened his military capability against the Dutch, his building of forts came to the attention of the Ming authorities. Macao had not been fortified until this point because it recognized the Chinese authority in Guangzhou (広州). The Ming authorities demanded that the chief citizens in Macao should send an emissary to explain why the forts were necessary. João Rodrigues Tçuzu, an interpreter who was active in the Society of Jesus in Japan, and others were elected as emissaries.[3] Even in this period, the Ming authorities emphasized that while the city of Macao had been given special dispensation to allow foreigners to reside there for trade, this did not imply permission to build fortifications.

Mascarenhas tried to decrease the power of merchants in Macao by strictly prohibiting them from receiving silver on high interest sea loans (*respondência*) from Japanese merchants, which was their capital basis. It is clear from the following material that Japanese merchants pressed them to continue their investments. From the document concerning a Macao merchant Darrias quoted in chapter 3, it is obvious that Nagasaki merchants were also involved in investments to Portuguese. There I explained that the prohibition by Mascarenhas caused a delay in the debt repayment to the Macao merchant Darrias, and the text can be interpreted as the Japanese expressing their dissatisfaction to the authority in Macao. Mascarenhas initiated many reforms, according to the *Mascarenhas Documents*,[4] in the possession of Arquivo Distrital de Évora. These include various records from Macao in the same period, and they include Darrias's letters and the source material mentioned above. As the sources concerning the history of Macao in the period during which the trade with Japan took place, from the 16th century to the first half of the 17th century, are quite limited, except for the Jesuit missionary records, the *Mascarenhas Documents* are a valuable source of information about Macao in the 1620s.[5]

Although Mascarenhas was not able to achieve the centralization of power that the Goa government wanted due to the influence of powerful merchants and pressure from the Ming dynasty and Japan,[6] the power of the Captain General gradually increased during the terms of his successors Filipe Lobo (in office 1626–30) and Jerónimo da Silveira (in office 1630). This was not, however, because the influence of the powerful merchants had decreased, but seemingly because their attitude to the existing Macao society had changed

3 See Chapter 5.

4 Biblioteca Pública e Arquivo Distrital de Évora, Códice CXVI 2–5.

5 A part of the *Mascarenhas Documents* was recently transcribed and published. Elsa Penalva & Miguel Lourenço (eds.), *Fontes para a história de Macau no século XVII* (Lisbon: Centro Científico e Cultural de Macau, 2009).

6 Charles Ralph Boxer, *Fidalgos in the Far East 1550–1770* (Hong Kong: Oxford University Press, 1968), 93–108.

following Mascarenhas's implementation of strict measures and later his compromises with local merchants.

1.2 *The 1625 Census*

The *Mascarenhas Documents* contain a list of inhabitants of Macao in 1625.[7] In this list, Portuguese from Portugal, Portuguese creoles who were called *homen da terra*, and foreigners were separately recorded; all of them were male. The total number of Portuguese from Portugal was 437 and the number of Portuguese creoles was 403. Though their wives, children, and sisters, and many more Chinese, Indian, and East Asians, may have been present, the actual numbers are unknown. In the records concerning foreigners, their origins, such as Spain, Majorca, or Galicia, are clearly stated. However, most of them, though of mixed race, are recorded with Portuguese names,[8] which makes it difficult to establish their precise origins.

The names in the list are categorized by the parishes to which they belonged, for example "independent," "belonging to the Santo António church parish," or "belonging to the São Lourenço church parish." All individual creoles recorded belonged to one of these two parishes. However, since about 150 of the Portuguese from Portugal were "independent," it appears they only stayed in Macao temporarily for business, or perhaps they were "cristãos-novos" or conversos.

One of the creoles was Vicente Rodrigues,[9] a rich Jesuit agent and shipowner. Those engaged in the Namban trade were a mixed group, with Portuguese from Portugal, Portuguese creoles born and raised in Macao, people from other areas of Europe, and their servants or slaves, as well as people from various regions of Southeast Asia, India, and Africa.

Tristão Tavares and António Mancio, who borrowed silver from Nakano Hikobee (中野彦兵衛) and others in Hakata (Chapter 3, Table 3.2), can be proved by this list to have been "*homen da terra*," or Portuguese creoles living in Macao.[10] Tristão Tavares was a brother of Luís Tavares, an interpreter in the Nagasaki magistrate's office (長崎奉行所). Luís Tavares appears in Chapter 3 as

7 Biblioteca Pública e Arquivo Distrital de Évora, Códice CXVI 2–5, ff. 226r–232v.

8 Non-Portuguese persons, if they were servants or freedmen of the Portuguese, were permitted to assume their master's surname.

9 He was a son-in-law of Pedro Martins Gaio who came to Nagasaki on a junk ship in 1609. Kōichirō Takase, "Kirishitan Jidai ni okeru 'Kyōshō'" ["Religious-Merchants" in the Kirishitan Period], in *Kirishitan Jidai Taigai Kankei no Kenkyū* [Study on the External Relations in the Kirishitan Period] (Tokyo: Yoshikawa Kōbunkan, 1994). He was a fellow lodger of the Society of Jesus in Japan, thus presumably his mother was Japanese.

10 See Chapter 5 (Biblioteca Pública e Arquivo Distrital de Évora, Códice CXVI 2–5, ff. 226r–232v).

an attorney for the contract between Augustino Lobo and Hakata merchants. Possibly they were born to a Japanese mother and a Portuguese father.

Livro das Plantas de todas as fortalezas, cidades e povoaçoens do Estado da Índia *Oriental* written by António Bocarro in 1635 mentions that there were about 850 *casados* (Portuguese who married and lived in Macao with their families). Those born in Macao to a Portuguese father and an Asian Christian mother made up a group of approximately the same size. Bachelors, or Portuguese men with a wife in another city of Portuguese India, numbered around 150.[11] They owned one to six slaves each, with Cafres (Kaffirs) from Mozambique being the most expensive.

1.3 *Trade between Manila and Macao*

The relationship between Spanish Manila, as a supplier of silver from the New World, and Macao was very important for the latter during the era of trade with Japan. The Avis dynasty, the second Portuguese monarchy that oversaw the Age of Exploration, had no heir to the throne when the young Portuguese king, Dom Sebastião, was defeated at the Battle of Alcácer Quibir by the Moroccan army in 1578 and died.[12] The throne was given to the Habsburgs, to Philip II of Spain (Philip I of Portugal) in 1580.[13] For the next sixty years, Portugal and Spain shared the same king, but Philip II did not subsume Portugal into Spain, deciding that any interests in Portuguese India belonged to Portugal. Macao was informed of this decision in 1582 by Alonso Sánchez, a Jesuit sent as a messenger by Gonzalo Ronquillo de Peñalosa, the General Governor of the Philippines. Sánchez visited Guangzhou from Macao under the pretext of reporting to the Ming dynasty and asked for permission for the Spanish in Manila to trade directly with China, but his request was denied.

Philip II did not have a clear policy about the foreign territories of Spain and Portugal at the beginning of his rule in Portugal. Because of this, tension arose between Macao and Manila concerning their respective trade with China. Because the Spanish could not secure a commercial base directly in China,[14]

11 Beatriz Basto da Silva, *Cronologia da história de Macau*, vol. 1 (Macao: Direcção dos Serviços de Educação, 1992), 107.

12 Cardinal Henrique, an uncle of Dom Sebastião, governed the kingdom of Portugal as regent for two years, from 1578 to 1580. Al Ksar el Kibir (Alcácer Quibir) is located in the northern part of Morocco, about 100 km from Tangier.

13 Jean-Frédéric Schaub, *Portugal na monarquia hispânica (1580–1640)* (Lisbon: Livros Horizonte, 2001).

14 Zhiliang Wu（吳志良）, *Segredos da sobrevivência: História política de Macau* (Macao: Associação de Educação de Adultos de Macau, 1999), 84–87.

they divided their roles in such a way that the merchants of Macao sailed to Manila with Chinese products and were paid in New World silver.[15]

However, on January 22, 1587, when the Spanish mendicant orders joined the missionaries in Asia, Philip II banned trade between Macao and Manila.[16] This was because the relationship between Macao, where the Jesuits had a significant influence, and Manila, where the bases of other religious orders were built, was worsening. The Viceroy of India in Goa declared that all orders apart from the Jesuits were prohibited from engaging in proselytism in China and Japan.[17] It is obvious, however, that these bans did not have a significant effect on trade, as similar bans were issued in 1598 and 1601.[18]

The reason that trade between Macao and Manila continued even though it was banned several times seems to be that their commercial links did not overlap and they were able to be mutually profitable.[19] Macao was the location where raw silk and textiles traded in the Guangzhou market were gathered, and merchants in Fujian (福建) took large amounts of raw silks there. But there was always more demand for silk in Manila, which gained financially from the New World silver that arrived by galleon. At the same time, Manila was the only place where Macao merchants had been able to obtain silver that was not from Japan since the 17th century. Because this trade was operated by private trading ships, the actual situation is virtually unknown today.

In the 17th century, the Dutch, the common enemy of the Portuguese and the Spanish, began to appear on the Asian ocean and to target the commercial routes controlled by their rivals. As mentioned earlier, because of the significant damage caused by the Dutch fleet's attack on Macao in 1622, the establishment of a defense function and the augmentation of military power were immediately required.[20] This problem was resolved by Macao, which had

15 Benjamin Pires Videira, *A viagem de comércio Macau-Manila nos séculos XVI a XIX* (Macao: Museu Marítimo de Macau, 1995), 5–30.

16 Ibid., 11.

17 Leonor Diaz de Seabra, "Power, Society and Trade: The Historic Relationship between Macao and the Philippines from the 16th to 18th Centuries," *Revista de Cultura: International Edition* 7 (2003), 48.

18 Pires Videira, *A viagem de comércio Macau-Manila nos séculos XVI a XIX*, 11–13; Basto da Silva, *Cronologia da História de Macau*, 69.

19 Diaz de Seabra, "Power, Society and Trade," 48–50.

20 António Bocarro, 1635. *Magnum opus: Livro das plantas de todas as fortalezas, cidades e provoações do Estado da Índia Oriental.* Biblioteca Pública e Arquivo Distrital de Évora, BPE CXV 2–1. "Description of the City of the Name of God in China, by António Bocarro, Chronicler-in-Chief of the State of India, 1635," in Charles Ralph Boxer (ed.), *Seventeenth Century Macau in Contemporary Documents and Illustrations* (Lisbon: Imprensa Nacional, 1942; reprint Hong Kong: Heinemann Asia, 1984).

no official relations with Manila, asking the latter for its support. The *Cartas Ânnuas do Colégio de Macau* (the annual report of the Colégio of Macao) states the following:

> [After the Dutch had left] the city of Macao was afraid that the enemy would launch a similar attack and that they might come to retaliate with even more forces. The Capitão-mór asks for equipment to guard the people, including cannons in order to revenge and to regain his lost trust. There had not been enough equipment. As the ocean route for supply from India was more dangerous and troubled by the monsoon, it was believed that purchasing from Manila would be preferable. The city of Macao resolved to send people to ask for their support. [...] Therefore they thought that it was necessary to entrust a padre of our society with the role to deal with it.[21]

Thus a Jesuit was elected to enter negotiations to procure weapons from Manila for Macao. Further sections of the *Cartas* Ânnuas *do Colégio de Macau* also describe a Jesuit taking charge of negotiations between Macao and Manila.[22] It is therefore possible that Jesuits were frequently employed in diplomatic negotiations between Macao and Manila because an official relationship did not exist.

The Captain General Francisco Mascarenhas recommended that trade should be allowed between Macao and Manila, with the aim of strengthening Macao's military power. He negotiated with the government of the Viceroy of Portuguese India,[23] but the official approval arrived as late as November 1629,[24] because the viceroy's government initially refused. Trade was prohibited again in 1633 because Juan Cerezo de Salamanca, the Governor of Manila, appealed to the Viceroy of India about Macao merchants behaving aggressively in their trade relationships with Manila.[25]

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21 Archivum Romanum Societatis Iesu, Jap-sin 114, ff. 321–330. In this book I referred following document collections. João Paulo Oliveira e Costa (ed.), *Cartas Ânnas do Colégio de Macau* (*1594–1627*), trans. Ana Fernandes Pinto (Macao: Comissão Territorial de Macau para as Comemorações dos Descobrimentos Portugueses, Fundação Macau, 1999), 243–259.

22 Oliveira e Costa, *Cartas Ânnas do Colégio de Macau* (*1594–1627*), 253–256.

23 Boxer, *Seventeenth Century Macau in Contemporary Documents and Illustrations*, 110; *A carta de Dom Francisco Mascarenhas* (Biblioteca Pública e Arquivo Distrital de Évora, Códice CXVI 2–5, f. 35).

24 Boxer, *Seventeenth Century Macau in Contemporary Documents and Illustrations*, 117.

25 Ibid., 135.

When the prohibition was lifted again, in order to rebuild trade, Ramos, who was assigned to Macao and put in charge of the Japan–Manila voyage and of controlling the royal treasury,[26] applied to the Viceroy of India in a letter dated February 11, 1636, for permission to dispatch two official trading ships every year from Macao to Manila:

> I report to your Highness about the decrease of the trading ships from Manila and what I heard about other various decreasing revenues. [...] By various reasons, Manila should purchase [Chinese] products through Macao. At first the neighbors of Manila [Castellan] craved for trades with people in Zhangzhou because they bring plenty of products for a proper price. As Castellans have started to pay for their purchase with silver on credit, which gives both parties financial merits, the law cases in this trade have currently increased. [...] I would ask your Highness to send two ships loaded with goods of good quality from here [Macao] to avoid people in Manila to receive so many goods from Zhangzhou. If you do so, it will bring us a lot of profit. All products can be purchased from here [Macao] at more proper prices than if they are purchased from Zhangzhou. More products would also be sent from Manila to Spain. Then it can bring down lawsuits and complaints.[27]

This document emphasizes that the troubles that arose between the Chinese and the Spanish regarding purchases on credit could be smoothed out, and that this could provide profits for both Manila and Macao if the business through which the Portuguese in Macao supplied Chinese products to Manila was stabilized. Since officially trade between Manila and Macao was not permitted, as mentioned earlier (though private trading continued), almost no income was brought by this route to the financial administration in Macao. It seems that Ramos thought Macao could obtain enough income to restructure its finances if such a trade was officially allowed, and charges and customs were collected.

As stated above, I have examined the changes in and important factors for the society of Macao from the 1620s to the 1630s. This is necessary for any investigation of the Namban trade in the 17th century. In the next section I will turn to the problem of debts to the Japanese, mentioned in Chapter 3, and how these were dealt with in Macao.

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26 Administrador da Fazenda Real e as Viagens de Manila e Japão.

27 Arquivo Nacional Torre do Tombo, *Livro das Monções ou Documentos Remetidos da Índia*, Livro 38, ff. 196–199v.

2 Loaned Silver in the 1630s

2.1 *Export of Japanese Copper*

The reorganization of the trade structure was planned under the direction of the fourth Captain General, Manuel da Câmara de Noronha (in office 1631–36), during the 1630s, at a time when Japanese trade was in danger of coming to an end. Macao greatly feared that the Japanese might switch to trading with the Dutch sooner or later, as payments were increasingly delayed. As their first step towards reorganization, in order to gain profits from the trade under the name of Macao city, they planned to borrow silver from merchants in Nagasaki at zero interest. With this silver it would be possible to purchase copper produced in Japan for sale in China or Southeast Asia. The profit would then be used for repayment of the Japanese debt.[28] This plan was proposed by Sebastião Soares Pais, who was dispatched from Goa to Macao in 1634 in order to oversee the transactions. It is clear, therefore, that trade in Macao was not under the control of Portuguese India until this time.

The "Note of the Trade Balance with Japan" from 1635 confirms that seven merchants in Nagasaki lent silver that year.[29] The capital value of this borrowed silver was about 3,900 taels, which was used to purchase a total of 2,292 picos 4 cates (equivalent to about 138 tons) of copper. Botelho,[30] who was the Feitor (commercial representative) in that year, is listed as the recipient. The "Note" further states that this borrowed silver was repaid to the merchants in Nagasaki. The important point here is the idea to try to export copper, not silver, from Japan for sale overseas.[31] In other words, this source shows that copper started to have value as a commodity in a period when only silver was being exported from Japan.

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28 Regulation by the Viceroy of India Pedro da Silva, given to the administrator of the Royal Treasury and Japan–Manila voyage Romão de Lemos, dated April 22, 1637. Arquivo Nacional Torre do Tombo, *Livro das Monções ou Documentos Remetidos da Índia*, Livro 40, ff. 305–306.

29 From the account report of other places, included in the same document, presumably this document was written by the administrator Romão de Lemos, successor of Manuel Ramos. Arquivo Nacional Torre do Tombo, *Livro das Monções ou Documentos Remetidos da Índia*, Livro 61, ff. 476–477v.

30 According to the list of inhabitants of Macao in 1625, he belonged to the parish of Santo António and was Portuguese from Portugal.

31 Seiichi Iwao, *Sakoku* [National Seclusion] (Tokyo: Chūō Kōron-sha, 1966), 438–439. The demand for copper was rapidly increasing in Portuguese India in the 17th century for the casting of cannons and other weapons to use against the Dutch. Ana Maria Ramalho Proserpio Leitão, *Do trato português no Japão*, dissertação de mestrado da Faculdade de Universidade Clássica de Lisboa, 1994, 35.

The Capitão-mór system for trade with Japan also changed as a result of Pais's restructuring. The old system consisted of selling the sailing rights to a single Capitão-mor, who received the right to collect charges according to the commodities loaded for shipping to Japan. This usually consisted of raw silk, funded with his own capital and that of an investment organization in Macao as well as further entrusted goods.[32] Pais planned to abandon the Capitão-mór system for voyages to Japan and to fund ships with public money from Macao. Under the new arrangement, the Capitão-mór was engaged and paid by the city of Macao, thus becoming a kind of employee, and though he was still in control of the fleet now, he no longer benefitted from the huge trading profits, which henceforth were to be considered as treasury income. The liabilities to the Japanese would then be paid from this fund. Apart from new arrangements concerning the Capitão-mór, further changes were introduced in relation to the Feitor and captains, whose powers were now downgraded.[33] The first trading venture under the new system was carried out in 1635: "The trade voyage to Japan was successful and generated revenues of 114,000 taels, even when excluding *Smilax glabra* [*pau da china*] and others, [...] 2,450 [picos] of copper arrived by these ships."[34]

The income earned in 1635 for the treasury through the trade with Japan was approximately 114,000 taels and 2,450 picos of copper in total, to which 150 picos of copper were added to 2,292 picos of copper bought using silver borrowed from the Japanese at zero interest. The Capitão-mór was allowed to monopolize the trade in *smilax glabra*, a material used in Chinese medicine that was traded at high prices,[35] which was exempt from customs as miscellaneous income.

The average total sales from the trade with Japan in the 1630s was around 2 million taels.[36] After the Capitão-mór system had been abolished, the total trade with Japan in 1635 amounted to 1,140,000 taels because 10 percent of the

32 Charles Ralph Boxer, *The Great Ship from Amacon: Annals of Macao and the Old Japan Trade 1555–1640* (Lisbon: Centro de Estudos Históricos Ultramarinos, 1959), 17–19.

33 Boxer, *The Great Ship from Amacon*, 60–72.

34 Letter of the Captain General of Macao Manuel da Câmara de Noronha to the Viceroy of India Miguel de Noronha, dated 18 December 1635. Arquivo Nacional Torre do Tombo, *Livro das Monções ou Documentos Remetidos da Índia*, Livro 35, ff. 316–317v.

35 Kōichirō Takase, *Monsoon Monjo to Nippon: Jūnana Seiki Portugal Kōbunsho-shū* [Monsoon Documents and Japan: Collection of Portuguese Archives in the Seventeenth Century] (Tokyo: Yagi Shoten, 2006), 70. António Bocarro, *O livro das plantas de todas as fortalezas, cidades e povoações do estado da India Oriental*, ed. Isabel Cid (Lisbon: Casa da Moeda, 1992), 167–168.

36 Ibid., 75.

total balance became treasury income. The letter from the Viceroy of India to the King of Portugal, dated March 8, 1636, states that in addition to this income from voyages to Japan, the earnings from voyages to Manila had been 70,000 pardaos.[37] One pardao was equivalent to 300 réis,[38] and 1 tael to 400 réis. The customs income from the voyages to Manila can be calculated as 52,500 taels, with the assumption that a pardao had three-quarters of the value of 1 tael. Because this is also deemed as equivalent to 10 percent customs for the total trade sales, we can say that the actual trade sales with Manila amounted to 525,000 taels. The total income for Macao city was thus more than 1.6 million taels in 1635.

With regard to the trade in copper, 1 pico was equivalent to about 60 kg. The volume of copper brought from Japan to Macao in that year was possibly about 147 tons in total. The volume of copper the VOC shipped from Japan to Taiwan was 100 last, equivalent to 125 tons.[39] From the total amount of copper shipped to Macao, we can glimpse the city's monopoly of Japanese products at that time.

2.2 *Repayment of Japanese Debt*

Manuel Ramos, who managed Macao's trade with Japan through the treasury in 1635, reported in a letter to the Viceroy of India, dated December 11, 1635:

> The liabilities of individual citizens were paid with 70,000 taels in this year and 52,000 taels of debt still remain. The debt in the name of Macao was paid with 60,000 taels and 90,000 taels of debt still remain.[40]

In other words, 130,000 taels of debt were paid back to Japanese merchants in 1635, but 52,000 taels of individual debt and 90,000 taels of Macao city's debt still remained. This amount corresponds with the number given in the records of the head of the Dutch factory in 1634: that the "debt amount of whole Macao to Japanese reaches 150,000 taels."[41] Ramos wrote in another report

37 Arquivo Nacional Torre do Tombo, *Livro das Monções ou Documentos Remetidos da Índia*, Livro 33, ff. 250r–250v.

38 Kōichirō Takase, "Kirishitan Kyōkai no Keizai Katsudou ni okeru Sōkin" [Remittance in the Economic Activities of the Kirishitan Church], in *Kirishitan Jidai Taigai Kankei no Kenkyū*; Sebastião Rodolfo Dalgado, *Glossário luso-asiático*, vol. 1 (Coimbra: Imprensa da Universidade, 1919), 176.

39 Historiographical Institute, University of Tokyo (ed.), *Diaries Kept by the Head of the Dutch Factory in Japan* (Original Text) vol. 1 (Tokyo: University of Tokyo Press, 1974), 273.

40 Letter from Manuel Ramos to the Viceroy of India Miguel de Noronha, dated December 11, 1635. Arquivo Nacional Torre do Tombo, *Livro das Monções ou Documentos Remetidos da Índia*, Livro 35, ff. 285–286v.

41 Historiographical Institute, University of Tokyo (ed.), *Diaries Kept by the Head of the Dutch Factory in Japan* (Original Text) vol. 1 (Tokyo: University of Tokyo Press, 1974), 194.

on February 11, 1636, that "even though 50,000 taels have been paid this year, 100,000 taels of debt still remain."[42] The total amount of Portuguese liabilities to the Japanese in 1636 thus amounted to 150,000 taels.

The treasury's income from Macao ships trading with Japan represented 10 percent of total sales from the Japan trade, more than 200,000 taels on average for the three years from 1636 to 1638.[43] There were at least two reasons for this. The first is the significant rise in the price of raw silk in Japan. After the ban on overseas travel for the Japanese, the Chinese could import raw silk without their former red-seal ship competitors. But the amount they imported was not large enough. Ramos predicted that high revenues could be expected that year in a letter to the Viceroy of India dated February 11, 1636:

> Three ships for Japan have been prepared.[44] People agree that all these ships are going to Japan because a high revenue is expected. It is because the price normally rises high, and accordingly the revenue, when fewer than three ships sail. Furthermore, excluding this point, it is certain that Japanese didn't send any ships to Cambodia, Siam, Champa, Tonkin, and Cochinchina and we can expect that trading voyages to Japan at this time should be good.[45]

Ramos indicated that the Japanese market became profitable for Macao because of the ban on Japanese traveling overseas. He furthermore recognized that the price of raw silk would rise if the absolute quantities of imported raw silk decreased and the number of galliot ships was reduced to three.

The second reason was a rumor that was spreading in Japan that the trade with Macao ships would end. The price rose because the purchase of raw silk increased.[46] The Dutch factory recorded in 1636 that galliots "transported 2,350 boxes of silver, respectively 1,000 taels" from Nagasaki to Macao.[47] Some commentators think the trade was unstable because the public was aware of the discussions in the Shogunate in the 1630s about breaking with Macao, and because of the high debt level. However, the trade between Japan and Macao achieved its highest profits at this time.

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42 Arquivo Nacional Torre do Tombo, *Livro das Monções ou Documentos Remetidos da Índia*, Livro 38, ff. 196–199v.

43 Leitão, *Do trato português no Japão*, 53–54.

44 Actually, the fleet of 1636, whose captain was Gonçalo da Silveira, arrived in the port of Nagasaki with four ships

45 Arquivo Nacional Torre do Tombo, *Livro das Monções ou Documentos Remetidos da Índia*, Livro 38, ff. 196–199v.

46 Boxer, *The Great Ship from Amacon*, 146.

47 Historiographical Institute, University of Tokyo (ed.), *Diaries Kept by the Head of the Dutch Factory in Japan* (Original Text) vol. 2 (Tokyo: University of Tokyo Press, 1974), 130–131.

2.3 *The Ban on Maritime Loan Agreements*

Maritime loan agreements in Japan were severely restricted following the reforms instituted by Ramos, who succeeded Pais in the office that controlled the Japan voyage. The ban on maritime loans and the prohibition on receiving entrusted silver by the Viceroy of India in 1610,[48] and then by the Captain General in the 1620s, show that these maritime loan agreements had never been officially recommended in Macao. However, they did not end entirely because Japanese and Macao merchants continued to insist on them. Ramos wrote the following in his letter to the Viceroy of India, dated December 11, 1635:

> The certain information has reached my ears that many people will bring new amounts of silver entrusted by the political elite in Nagasaki to the next voyage. If the treasury does not conduct this sale and profits are not used to pay the bankrupts, they will try to bring more silver. [...] Therefore, your Highness Viceroy, you should expose your justice and punish them.[49]

Only one new maritime loan agreement from 1634 to 1635 was confirmed in the Documents of Macao City Council. Baltazar Vasconcelos entered into an agreement with a Japanese individual in 1635, but the silver he brought with him was confiscated. Among the "political elite in Nagasaki" mentioned by Ramos, Suetsugu Heizō (末次平蔵) entrusted 10,000 taels of silver to his agent merchant in Macao in the same year (see Chapter 3), although it is not clear if this was a maritime loan. Ramos realized that increasing debt from loans by the Japanese might lead to relations with Japan being broken off. Ramos's letter continues as follows.

> They need to repay the Japanese in any possible way even with the highest interest. This will generate an effect to avoid the end of this trade. It is because the powerful men want their silver to be paid back and to obtain large profits through their silver. If they can obtain it, this will help us a lot to rebuild our relationship with them.[50]

In other words, it was thought in Macao that they needed to satisfy the governor of Nagasaki and the powerful merchants, all big investors, in order to

48 Instruction of the Viceroy of India Rui Lourenço de Távora, dated 27 April 1610. Biblioteca da Ajuda, *Jesuítas na Ásia*, 49-V-3, f. 28.

49 Arquivo Nacional Torre do Tombo, *Livro das Monções ou Documentos Remetidos da Índia*, Livro 35, ff. 281–282.

50 Ibid., ff. 285–286v.

continue to trade with Japan. One reason for this was that Macao recognized that Suetsugu Heizō, a person of influence, had been forced to give up his red-seal ship trade because of the ban on overseas travel and as a result had developed a greater interest in the Namban trade. That is to say, Macao saw opportunities for itself after the Shogunate government started to change its foreign policy from 1633 onwards.

3 Types of Debt

3.1 *Analysis of Macao City Council Documents*

The Documents of Macao City Council are a valuable source of information regarding Macao, especially as few sources have survived because of fire, damage from excess humidity, and the banishment of the Jesuits from China in the 18th century.[51] I have identified documents relating to Japan from 1630 to 1640 that are currently located in Macao City Council,[52] most of which relate to *respondência* (maritime loans). I will briefly explain the content of the city council's debates regarding this problem, basing my comments on the material.

As mentioned earlier, almost all sources concerning Japan are directly or indirectly related to the *respondência* problem. Those that are directly related to it can be arranged as follows: (1) the agreement of *respondência*, (2) the ban on (punishment for) *respondência*, (3) treatment of debtors (excluding punishments), (4) future policies and views on debts, and (5) silver provided for repayment for the legation in 1640.

Many cases of punishment took place between 1635 to and 1636, most of which were likely implemented according to Ramos' prohibition of *respondência*. We can occasionally find records about *respondência* with names of identifiable individuals listed for category 1, corresponding to the bonds, which were

51 Sebastião José de Carvalho e Melo, Marquis of Pombal, who became the Prime Minister of Portugal in 1755, as a part of his social and economic reform, decided to expel the Jesuits, who wielded significant political influence with the great noble families, from the mainland and overseas territories of Portugal. Thus the Society of Jesus was expelled from Macao as well. It is said that the documents conserved by the Jesuits in St. Paul's College became scattered and were lost as a result.

52 First appearance in my article: Mihoko Oka, "Nihon Kankei Macao Shiryō ni miru Kan'ei Jūichi-nen no Paulo dos Santos Jiken" [The Affair of Paulo dos Santos in Kan'ei 11: From the Macao Sources Concerning Japan], *Tōkyō Daigaku Shiryō Hensan-jo Kenkyū Kiyō* [Research Annual of the Historiographical Institute, University of Tokyo], 15 (2005): 75–94. Note that I have substantially revised the comments in this article in writing this present volume.

preserved in the Shimai Documents and Suetsugu Documents referred to in Chapter 3 of this book; I also examined these in the preceding chapter. Boxer is partly aware of these but he does not examine the two documents together.[53] Analysis of and inquiry into records in Japan and materials in Macao can complement the missing parts of the bonds preserved in Japan. I will examine this information in the following section.

3.2 *Debts from Individual Agreements*

Of the six Portuguese bonds contained in the Suetsugu Documents,[54] there is one in which the Capitão-mór was the debtor, three in which the Feitor was the debtor, and a further two in which unspecified Macao merchants were the debtors. Regarding these bonds, I have argued that high-ranking officers in Macao city were voluntarily involved in *respondência* trades,[55] but analysis of the Documents of Macao City Council indicates that these agreements by the Feitor or Capitão-mór were not individual but official agreements, connected to a resolution of the city council. I conclude that the Feitor or Capitão-mór in every year in which he appears as debtor appeared as the representative of the city. In Chapter 3, I mentioned the possibility that a part of the 66,000 taels that Feitor Agostinho Lobo borrowed in Japan in 1632 was a loan from merchants in Nagasaki, including Heizō.

The bonds appearing here only required formal items such as date, creditor, debtor, amount, interest rate, ship's name, risk of loss, and whether or not there was an intermediary (an agent).[56] The background to these contracts cannot be completely identified using the bonds. There is supplemental information in the minutes of the Documents of Macao City Council about no. 3 (Agostinho Lobo, 1632),[57] no. 4 (Francisco Carvalho, 1633),[58] no. 5 (Tristão

53 Charles Ralph Boxer, "Notes on the Portuguese Trade in Japan during the Kwanei Period (1624–1643)," *Shigaku* 12, no. 2 (1933): 18.

54 Apograph, Suetsugu Documents, Historiographical Institute, University of Tokyo collection, 3071–91–65; *Suetsugu Tsurumatsu-shi Shozō Monjo* (Documents Possessed by Mr. Suetsugu Tsurumatsu), Historiographical Institute, University of Tokyo collection, 4171–91–36.

55 Mihoko Oka, "A Great Merchant in Nagasaki in 17th Century: Suetsugu Heizō II and the System of Respondência," *Bulletin of Portuguese/Japanese Studies* 2 (2001): 37–56.

56 For the bonds remaining in Japan, see Kentarō Shiba, "Nichi- Ō-bun *Nagegane* Shōmon no Kōsatsu," parts 1 & 2 (1937).

57 According to the list of inhabitants of Macao in 1625, he did not belong to any of the local parishes and was Portuguese from Portugal.

58 According to the list of inhabitants of Macao in 1625, he belonged to the parish of São Lourenço and was Portuguese from Portugal.

Tavares/António Mancio, 1637),[59] and no. 6 (Fernandes Carvalho, 1638),[60] from the agreement records of Macao merchants in Suetsugu Documents/Shimai Documents shown in Chapter 3, Table 3.2. For example, the minutes dated November 16, 1636, state the following:

> When Francisco Carvalho Velho, who owned about 20,000 taels to the Japanese, ordered their repayment by officers of this city, he asked some people to pay for him and they accepted. Because repayment should be performed within three years, it seems that all debt will be paid at the end of the voyage planned for the next year, 1637. Carvalho currently offers people who had paid for him to receive 14,300 taels he owns at present.[61]

Carvalho wrote a letter to Shimai Gombei (島井権平) dated October 16, 1633, that includes the following information:[62]

1. He borrowed 700 taels from Shimai Gombei in the past.
2. He could not repay him in that year but he himself or his son-in-law, Sebastião de Almeida,[63] would visit Japan in order to repay him within three years.
3. Pêro Rodrigues, António Carvalho, and António Neretti sat with him and signed as witnesses.

Carvalho's debt to Japanese merchants amounted to 20,000 taels in 1636, according to the records of the Documents of Macao City Council. The total amount of silver listed in the document that appears in the Shimai Documents was 700 taels. Even if interest is added to this amount, it represents only the tip

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59 According to the list of 1625, both were Portuguese Creoles who were called *homen da terra*. António Mancio belonged to the parish of São Lourenço. See Chapter 3.

60 Feitor of that year. According to the list of inhabitants of Macao in 1625, he did not belong to any of the local parishes and was Portuguese from Portugal.

61 Act of the city council of Macao, composed by Gaspar Coelho, dated 13 November 1636. Arquivo do Leal Senado (ed.), *Arquivos de Macau*, vol. III (Macao: Imprensa Nacional de Macau, 1930–1931), 143.

62 According to the list of inhabitants of Macao in 1625, Carvalho belonged to the parish of São Lourenço and was Portuguese from Portugal. The letter is cited in many articles, so I do not present the whole text here. Apograph, *Shimai Documents*, Historiographical Institute, University of Tokyo collection, 3071–91–8. Hideo Matsutake, *Umi no Nagasaki-gaku* [Nagasakiology of the Sea] (Nagasaki: Kusano Shoten, 1990), 68–69; Nagasaki City (ed.), *Nagasaki Shi-shi: Tsūkō Bōeki-hen Seiyō Shokoku-bu* [History of Nagasaki City: Part of the Relationship and the Trade with Western Countries] (Osaka: Seibundō Shuppan, 1981); Shiba, "Nichi- Ō-bun *Nagegane* Shōmon no Kōsatsu," part 1, 30–34. The original document is now conserved in the Fukuoka City Museum.

63 It is confirmed that he was judge of the City of Macao in 1631.

of the iceberg of Carvalho's total debt. He obviously borrowed from other Japanese as well. The three people who recorded their names as witnesses were Portuguese interpreters in the magistrate's office at Nagasaki.[64] One of them, Antonio Nerette, may have been a son of Orazio Neretti (in Portuguese documents known as Horácio Nerette, possibly the son of a Japanese or Korean woman), a Florentine who came to Japan as a Capitão-mór in 1600 and was ambassador of the Viceroy of India in 1612.[65] As António Carvalho remained as an interpreter in the magistrate's office in Nagasaki after the break with Macao, which will be discussed in Chapter 8, he may have been Japanese.

In regard to Portuguese interpreters at the magistrate's office in Nagasaki at the time, the name of Luís Tavares was confirmed around the period 1633–37 and it is possible, judging from his handwriting, that he translated the letter of Suetsugu Heizō, the governor of Nagasaki, which is mentioned in Chapter 3. Although the offspring of foreigners were prohibited from staying in Japan after 1636, punishable by death, Luís Tavares, an interpreter in the magistrate's office, remained in Nagasaki until the following year. Luís had a brother named Tristão and he oversaw the head secretary of the Macao city council. The mother of these two may have been Japanese.

Tristão Tavares is listed in the bond of Suetsugu Documents (Chapter 3, Table 3.2) as a debtor and was noted in the context of debts of *respondência* in the minutes of the Documents of Macao City Council:

> To save this city and its people, the public announcement to Tristão Tavares ordering him to repay his debt within twenty-four hours at this conference hall sticks out. In the case of not complying within twenty-four hours, all of his property will be investigated and his houses will be totally destroyed.[66]

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64 Biblioteca de la Real Academia de la História, Legajo 9–7239 (2), f. 421. Among these three, the records about António Carvalho are the best preserved. Carvalho is said to have been an apostate Japanese. He is described as Nishi Kichibee（西吉兵衛, Dutch interpreter), but it is difficult to confirm this identification. I am in the process of collecting materials concerning the Portuguese interpreters in Nagasaki with the intention of writing an article on this topic in the future. Léon Pagès, *Nihon Kirishitan Shūmon-shi* [*Histoire de la Religion Chrétienne au Japon*], trans. Yoshida Kogorō, vol. 3 (Tokyo: Iwanami Shoten, 1940), 343; Takashi Miyanaga, *Nihon Yōgaku-shi: Po-Ra-Ran-Ei-Doku-Futsu-Ro-go no Juyō* [History of Western Studies in Japan: Acceptance of Portuguese, Latin, Dutch, English, German, French and Russian Languages] (Tokyo: Sanshū-sha, 2004), 51.

65 Noble merchant from Florence. After the *Madre de Deus* incident, he was sent to Japan as an ambassador with a petition by the Viceroy of India Rui Lourenço de Távora in 1612.

66 Act of the city council of Macao, composed by Simão Vaz de Paiva, dated 13 November 1639. Arquivo do Leal Senado (ed.), *Arquivos de Macau*, vol. II (Macao: Imprensa Nacional de Macau, 1930), 125.

This document was issued twelve days after the resolution made by the Macao city council on November 1, 1639, which stated that "all citizens in Macao who owe to Japanese have to contribute all amounts to the Macao city council."[67] Tavares was the chief secretary in the Macao city council from 1631 to 1634 and one of the representative merchants in Macao. It is clear from Chapter 3, Table 3.2, that he joined the trade voyage to Japan in 1637 (at least) and that he borrowed 5,000 taels invested by Ito Kozaemon and Nakano Hikobee, two Nagasaki merchants, at 38 percent interest. Thus, he continued to receive investments from Japanese merchants even as he owed huge debts.

As members of the council were powerful merchants in Macao city, it was important for the city that they entered into new *respondência* contracts. In a letter to the Viceroy of India from the Captain General dated September 12, 1633, the following problem was addressed:

> Debts to Japanese are increasing over time and important persons in the council are involved too. Elder people in particular have amassed debts like a lord and they also involve other people.[68]

It was decided in Macao that an envoy would be sent to plead for the reopening of trade after the Shogunate government broke off relations with Macao in 1639. Because there was an expectation among Macao merchants that "if debts are fully paid off, trades will be restarted upon the request of Japanese merchants," various plans were discussed in the council to come up with silver for repayment, the first of which involved the confiscation and sale of Tavares's properties.

3.3 *Group Agreement on Debt*

By comparing the *respondência* agreements of Carvalho and Tavares in the Suetsugu Documents and Shimai Documents with the records of the Documents of Macao City Council, the two men can be identified as private trades. However, as mentioned in Chapter 3, there was one case where an official agreement was concluded with Agostinho Lobo, the Feitor in 1639, as the responsible person. The city of Macao also "officially" concluded a *respondência* agreement in 1638 in Japan:

> It was decided that silver would be borrowed from Japan by a *respondência* agreement at significant values by Pedro Fernandes Carvalho, the

67 Arquivo do Leal Senado, *Arquivos de Macau*, vol. II, 123–125.

68 Historical Archive of Goa/Directorate of Archives and Archaeology, *Livro das Monções de Goa*, Livro no. 19-D, f. 1002v.

> Feitor do Povo in this year. The silver is for the purchase of *baque*.[69] Inhabitants of Macao failed to purchase raw silks from China in this year and the business didn't go well. Because of the small amount of raw silk we were able to ship, the Japanese were offended. This will give a large damage to our future trades. As the Feitor's account book shows, the Feitor brought about 97,000 taels from Japan. The silver was handed over without impropriety and in front of a *procurador* who was scheduled to be replaced in 1639. The Feitor was given less than 13,000 taels. These 13,000 taels were deposited by the Feitor as a security deposit to fulfill the 25 percent interest agreed in Japan. Macao city was ordered to keep the rest of the amount for *pancada* raw silks. Officers in Macao decided the total amount of this raw silk. The rest will be used for further profits. It will also be used for repayment of the debt of this city and the *respondência* agreement of this year.[70]

Macao ordered Carvalho, the Feitor, to borrow silver from Japanese merchants according to the terms of the *respondência* agreement again in 1638. In that year Macao was the contract partner. The silver brought to Macao was worth 97,000 taels in total. According to this document, the interest on *respondência* agreement had to be kept at 25 percent for one year.

The Suetsugu Documents contain an agreement bond in Carvalho's name from 1638 showing that Carvalho borrowed 4,000 taels of silver from Suetsugu Sotoku in Hakata. Although Sotoku was one of the major investors, in this case he took only a small part of 97,000 taels in total. As with the "official" agreement made by Lobo in 1632, many other Japanese merchants may have joined in this investment. As shown in Chapter 3, Table 3.2, there are two other bonds from 1638 in the Suetsugu Documents. One tells us that Leonardo Ferreira Marinho and Pedro de Crasto (Castro) borrowed 3,000 taels of silver through a joint investment by Nakano Hikobee and Oga Doku (大賀道句).[71] The second states that João Pereira, the Capitão-mór of that year, borrowed 15,000 taels through a joint investment by Nakano Hikobee and six other merchants in Hakata.

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69 Quota to the members of the Armação.

70 Act of the city council of Macao, composed by Simão Vaz de Paiva, dated December 22, 1638. Arquivo do Leal Senado, *Arquivos de Macau*, vol. 11, 65.

71 According to the list of inhabitants of Macao in 1625, he did not belong to any of the local parishes and was Portuguese from Portugal.

Judging from the context of the bond, Marinho's and Crasto's contracts were individual agreements. In the case of Pereira it may have been a Macao *respondência* agreement, which was decided on in the council. With interest of 25 percent, it was a major contract.[72]

Furthermore, there is a record dated September 17, 1638, that tells us about a person named Hiranoya Zenbee (平野屋善兵衛) who borrowed 500 taels from Shibuya Kyubee (渋谷九兵衛) in Hakata at 25 percent interest with the purpose of investing in a ship from Macao.[73] The term *shitadekashi* (したでかし) in the bond refers to a recognized form of agreement in Japan whereby the lender lends money only on condition that the debtor (in this case the city of Macao) takes responsibility for payment. *Shitade* (したで) is *cidade*, which means city or town in Portuguese. Another record states that Xu Feihu (許斐護) in Hakata, a Chinese merchant, lent 500 taels to João Pereira. Thus loans to Macao were not unusual.[74]

Boxer states: "[in 1639] the debts of Macao city itself to Japan were 200,000 taels and other debts of 140,000 taels for individuals going to Japan."[75] He recognizes that there were two types of *respondência* agreements: one type was with Macao city and the other was an individual agreement. But Boxer does not examine the latter. However, as mentioned above, the officer controlling trade with Japan said that "the debts of individuals from Macao had been paid with 70,000 taels to Japanese in this year, 52,000 taels of debts still remaining. The debts of Macao city were paid back to Japanese with 60,000 taels and 90,000 taels of debts still remain." I assume that these two kinds of debts should be clearly differentiated. According to Boxer, the remaining debts owed by Macao merchants to the Japanese seem to have been between 500,000 and 700,000 taels.

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72 As for the contract between Paredes and Suetsugu Heizō, to which I referred in Chapter 3, Shiba ("Nichi- Ō-bun *Nagegane* Shōmon no Kōsatsu," part 1, 8–11) and Matsutake (*Umi no Nagasaki-gaku*, 60–61) think the city of Macao was the debtor. However, as we have seen in Chapter 3, Shiba's translation includes some mistakes, and in another related document Paredes, as a private person, asked Suetsugu Heizō to mediate with Sotoku. Therefore, it is obvious the contract was a private one in this case.

73 Tadashi Nakamura, *Kinsei Nagasaki Bōeki-shi no Kenkyū* [Study of the History of the Trade at Nagasaki in the Early Modern Period] (Tokyo: Yoshikawa Kōbunkan, 1988), 191; Hideo Matsutake, *Nagegane* (*Bōken Taishaku*) *to Kaiji Kin'yū* [*Nagegane* (Adventure Lent) and Maritime Finance] (Tokyo: Seizandō Shoten, 1988), 38.

74 Print photograph, Historiographical Institute, University of Tokyo collection.

75 Boxer, "Notes on the Portuguese Trade in Japan during the Kwanei Period (1624–1643)," 27.

4 The Link between Individual Agreements and Bankruptcy

4.1 *Individual Agreements in the 1620s*

As mentioned above, the official borrowing of contracted silver by Macao was an exceptional method that was used to resolve individual debts. My impression is that the basic form of the *respondência* agreement was shaped among individuals.

Borrowing silver at a high interest rate from Japanese merchants was prohibited by the Goa government after 1610.[76] Okamoto Yoshitomo considers this an attempt to prevent damage to the official trade profits and to block Japanese merchants from intervening in trade.[77] It seems the capital for the Namban trade actually started to depend on investments by Japanese merchants.

The first Captain General, Francisco Mascarenhas, reported to the royal court of Portugal in December 1624 that he had banned Macao merchants from entering into *respondência* agreements but that they had not obeyed:

> Domingos Carvalho, the Feitor for the voyage, brought this silver by *respondência*. [...] I inform you that he cannot take any offices in Macao because of this. [...] they all signed a document to protest against me. They ask me through two secretaries to resign my office of Captain General.[78]

This case shows that ten powerful merchants rebelled against the newly arrived Captain General who had been dispatched from Goa in response to Domingos Carvalho being punished for entering into a *respondência* in Japan.[79] Their names were included in the inhabitant list of 1625, each at the top of the list in their respective parishes. Thus they were obviously important merchants in Macao: Domingos Carvalho was a contract partner and initiator of this event; Abreu, Paredes, and Rocha belonged to Santo António Church; and there were other Portuguese who did not belong to any of the local churches. Powerful merchants who engaged in trade with Japan who had important offices, including Paredes and Rocha, whose names were mentioned as Heizō's agents in Chapter 3, and Carvalho, who was the Feitor in 1638, were all listed as among the rebels. Furthermore, as also shown in Chapter 3, not only did the prohibition of the *respondência* agreement have no effect on Macao merchants,

76 Biblioteca da Ajuda, *Jesuítas na Ásia*, Códice 49-V-3, f. 28; Códice 49-V-5, ff. 84–85.

77 Yoshitomo Okamoto, "Nagegane ni kansuru Tokushu no Shiryō" [Unique Documents on *Nagegane*], *Shakai Keizai Shigaku* [Socio-Economic History] 5, part 6 (1935): 87–88.

78 Letter of Dom Francisco Mascarenhas to King Filipe III of Portugal, dated 28 December 1624. Biblioteca Pública e Arquivo Distrital de Évora, Códice CXVI 2–5, f. 238.

79 According to the list of inhabitants of Macao in 1625, he belonged to the parish of Santo António and was Portuguese from Portugal.

they were not punished for their opposition to the Captain General. This was because Paredes had entered into a *respondência* agreement as an individual with Suetsugu Sotoku.[80]

I have already mentioned that Japanese merchants, including merchants in Nagasaki, such as Itoya Zuiemon and Kusuriya Miguel, red-seal ship traders, submitted a written complaint about a Portuguese merchant named Darrias because he did not repay them their silver, reasoning that *respondência* agreements had been prohibited in Macao.[81] Since the ban on *respondência* agreements was in fact ignored by the merchants in Macao, the real reason may not have been the ban but the fact that Darrias could not pay the silver back to the Japanese.

4.2 *Business Dealings between Macao and Chinese Merchants*

There was yet another factor besides the official prohibition in the lawsuit against Darrias. His identity, and the reason he delayed repayment of the contract silver, becomes clear from a report by Manuel Ramos (who controlled voyages to Japan) to the Viceroy of India, dated October 25, 1635—nine years after the written complaint:

> Here [in Macao] lives a man named Fernão Darrias de Moraes. He is really poor and has no honor. He went to Japan some years ago, brought some silver, and gave it to a Chinese. This Chinese used the silver for business in Guangzhou but he broke his words. In the end the Captain General, the honorable Mascarenhas, cautioned Darrias. He then voluntarily went in a prison and disposed of all of his properties. Currently he has accepted to take a post in Guangzhou as a representative of Macao city with normal salary.[82]

This letter informs us about Darrias, who deposited the silver he had borrowed from a Japanese merchant with a Chinese agent. The letter says that Darrias could not repay the Japanese merchant because the Chinese participant had failed to uphold his part of the obligation. Mascarenhas, the Captain General, punished Darrias because of written complaints that were submitted by merchants from Nagasaki. The above-mentioned document indicates that the case against Darrias was settled by the disposal of all his properties to allow for

80 See Chapter 3.

81 Biblioteca Pública e Arquivo Distrital de Évora, Códice CXVI 2–5, ff. 274r–274v.

82 Letter of Manuel Ramos to the Viceroy of India Miguel de Noronha, dated October 25, 1635. Arquivo Nacional Torre do Tombo, *Livro das Monções ou Documentos Remetidos da Índia*, Livro 35, ff. 259–260v.

payment. Furthermore, Darrias seems to have gone to Guangzhou in the service of Macao.

That Darrias was punished because of a written complaint from Japanese merchants about his plan to purchase raw silk by entrusting the Japanese merchant with silver he had brought to Macao to a Chinese agent is important information. The aforementioned material explains that Darrias could not provide the silver to repay the Japanese merchant because of the contract troubles arising between Darrias and the Chinese agent.

The usual theory about trade between Macao and China is that a representative of Macao visited Guangzhou every year when the market was open and purchased goods en bloc.[83] However, Chinese agents operated in Macao from the earliest stage of the settlement. When Macao further developed as a city, many more Chinese immigrated to the city. While the Portuguese population, including those of mixed parentage, numbered about 1,000 in around 1640, the number of Chinese living in Macao was about 40,000.[84] The price of goods purchased in Guangzhou reached several hundred thousand taels.[85] This amount was so large that it cannot be the case that Macao merchants operated this official trade alone. Sources yielding information about their relationship with the Chinese in the early 17th century are quite limited. The troubles between Darrias and the Chinese agent indicate that Macao merchants also had direct business with Chinese agents outside the market at Guangzhou.

Contrary to the Darrias case, Jerónimo Rodrigues, the rector of Colégio de São Paulo of the Jesuits in Macao, observed a case of a Chinese merchant who invested with the Portuguese:

> Chinese merchants, in cases where they are trustworthy, sell on credit with a large value to the Portuguese in June when ships depart from here [Macao] to Japan. In other words, they give 1,000 cruzados to those who can pay 500 cruzados promptly and the other 500 cruzados when the

83 Kazuo Enoki, *Min-matsu no Macao* [Macao in the Late Ming Era], vol. 5 of *Enoki Kazuo Chosaku-shū* [Works of Enoki Kazuo] (Tokyo: Kyūko Shoin, 1993), 190. According to the record by the Florentine merchant Carletti, cited in the article of Enoki, in the market season, four or five trade representatives were chosen in Macao and went to Guangzhou. They were permitted to purchase goods at shops in Guangzhou during the day, but they had to stay overnight on board their ship at sea. Francesco Carletti, *My Voyage around the World*, trans. by Herbert Weinstock (London: Methuen, 1965).

84 Basto da Silva, *Cronologia da história de Macau*.

85 The total amount of sales from the trade with Japan in the 17th century was usually more than one million taels per year; therefore, if we estimate the average profit margins to be 200–300%, the gross purchase would be several hundred thousand taels.

> ship returns. [...] As most of the properties we [the Society of Jesus] send to Japan are bought on credit, we will have to suffer the debts for many years once the ship is lost.[86]

This document also shows that apart from the extensive trading at Guangzhou, individual trade also occurred between Macao merchants and the Chinese. The quotation above is part of a statement related to the "*Madre de Deus* incident," in which the galleon ship *Nossa Senhora da Graça* under the command of Capitão-mór André Pessoa was destroyed in the bay of Nagasaki when it came under attack by the forces of a Japanese lord, Arima Harunobu (有馬晴信), in January 1610. The source goes on to say that Jesuit debts increased because the commodities they had sent from Macao to Japan were bought on credit. Business on credit was common between the Chinese and Portuguese in Macao, but prices increased in the case of business on credit with the Chinese because the ocean had become unsafe due to attacks by Dutch ships. This statement was written in 1617. At the same time, the Jesuits extended their debts with *respondência* agreements.[87]

Furthermore, the instructions that the Viceroy of India gave to Manuel Ramos show the actual condition of purchase on credit from the Chinese. Ramos had arrived to Macao as an administrator of the Japan and Manila trade.

> Even if we miss the season of the monsoon, in Macao there are not enough goods to load three ships for Japan. [...] The Chinese always carry concealed goods equivalent to the load of one ship. [...] The official profits thus reach 40,000 taels for one voyage to Japan.[88]

In other words, alongside the goods the Portuguese bought at the market in Guangzhou, the Chinese unofficially shipped further goods to Macao equivalent to a third of the amount of goods that were taken to Japan at any one time; the expected gross sales were 400,000 taels (the official profit being calculated as 10 percent of gross sales). Because these goods were sold on credit, according to the same document, the Portuguese owed the Chinese large amounts of money.

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86 Letter from Jerónimo Rodrigues to the Superior General of the Society of Jesus, from Macao, dated January 5, 1617. Kōichirō Takase (trans. and notes), *Iesus-kai to Nippon* [The Society of Jesus and Japan], vol. 1 (Tokyo: Iwanami Shoten, 1981), 457–458.

87 See Chapter 6.

88 Historical Archive of Goa / Directorate of Archives and Archaeology, *Livro das Monções de Goa*, Livro no. 19-D, f. 104or.

The Portuguese bought goods from Chinese using silver loaned by Japanese traders and financiers—*kotozutegin* (言伝銀, entrusted silver) and *kaijogin* (海上銀, *respondência* agreement)—to build up important capital for the Namban trade at Macao in the early part of the 17th century. These facts demonstrate that this trade ran on virtual capital, in other words credit sales and loaned silver. The document cited above tells us about the Chinese who came to Macao for the purpose of illegal trading, using the monsoon as their excuse. This points to the possibility that goods traded in Macao were not only from Guangzhou. These Chinese could have been merchants from Zhangzhou (漳州) or Fuzhou (福州) who sailed to Manila before the monsoon in March.[89] But this cannot yet be proven.

4.3 *Spanish Silver from Manila*

It is clear from the previous section that in addition to the official market that was held once a year in Guangzhou, individual trade with particular Chinese merchants was conducted in Macao. As we have seen, individual trade was common between Manila and Macao, even though trade and friendly relations were officially prohibited. The minutes of the Macao city council from 1631 show that *respondência* agreements regarding trade between Macao and Manila existed in the same manner as with Japan.

According to the record of investigation into *respondência* written by Sebastião de Almeida,[90] a judge, no one, regardless of social status, who brought *respondência* silver from Japan or Manila was allowed to visit Japan or Manila again.[91] This statement illustrates that silver was consistently carried from Manila or Japan using *respondência* agreements, although the trade was prohibited by 1631.

Galleons shipped large quantities of silver from the New World to Manila. Manuel Ramos reported to the Viceroy of India that "Castilians have started to pay people in Zhangzhou in advance with silver. Lawsuits related to these

89 Antonio de Morga, *Philippine Shotō-shi* [*Sucesos de las Islas Filipinas*], trans. Yanai Kenji & Kanki Keizō, Dai-Kōkai Jidai Sōsho [Series of the Age of the Discovery], series I, vol. 7 (Tokyo: Iwanami Shoten, 1966), 387. Morga, *History of Philippine Islands* (Scotts Valley, CA: Createspace Independent Publishing Platform, 2015).

90 He was a son-in-law of Carvalho, who left a letter on debt in the Shimai Documents and was 20,000 taels in debt to the Japanese. In the Shimai Documents, Almeida's name appears as a joint surety.

91 Act of the city council of Macao, composed by Tristão Tavares, dated 7 June 1631. Arquivo do Leal Senado (ed.), *Arquivos de Macau*, vol. I (Macao: Imprensa Nacional de Macau, 1929), 303–304.

transactions are rapidly increasing at present."[92] This makes it clear that investments or payments in advance were made frequently to the Chinese.

A report from Macao's city authority to the Viceroy of India from around 1633 (the exact date is unknown) states that high-ranking officers in the government-general in Manila often made *respondência* deals with the Chinese.

> Chinese who had traded in Manila last year couldn't sail to Manila at the appropriate time because of the strict control by the authorities of the Ming dynasty. Only one ship sailed [from Zhangzhou] during the monsoon as usual and another one in September. However, the governor and officers had not been satisfied with the result of *respondência* agreements brought by these ships. From last year onwards they seized the goods of Chinese in Manila. As we, the ship from Macao, also sailed in the same September to sell goods (and sales prices had declined), we suffered significant damages.[93]

This demonstrates that *respondência* agreements were made in Manila as they were made in Japan. Manila was rich in silver. The Chinese were the usual investment targets of the investors, especially governors and ministerial level officers. Similar investments to those with Chinese merchants might have been made from Manila in Macao merchants selling Chinese products in Macao.

In 1631 a ship that had sailed from Macao to Nagasaki was seized along with all its crew members, including the Capitão-mór, because of the large debt it owed to Japanese merchants. The Macao city council resolved in 1633 that it would finance the repayments demanded by Japan with *respondência* silver from Manila:

> The Macao city council orders that payment to the Japanese should be made with silver that had recently arrived and been examined. The silver belonged to Castilians who live in this city at present. The payment of 28,300 taels of circulated silver to Japanese will be done with their silver. We will not sail to Manila this year.[94]

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92 Arquivo Nacional Torre do Tombo, *Livro das Monções ou Documentos Remetidos da Índia*, Livro 38, ff. 196–199v.

93 Historical Archive of Goa/Directorate of Archives and Archaeology, *Livro das Monções de Goa*, Livro no. 19-D, f. 1061r.

94 Act of the city council of Macao, composed by Tristão Tavares, dated 7 November 1633. Arquivo do Leal Senado, *Arquivos de Macau*, vol. II, 229–230.

In other words, it may be proved that more than 28,300 taels of silver were invested in *respondência* from Manila to Macao. Boxer's research touches on Macao *respondência* silver from Manila, but he does not examine it further.[95] Since Spain and its colonies in America at the time were investing heavily in trade using silver from *respondência*, the development of *respondência* is also an important research topic for Asia during the Age of Exploration.

5 *Respondência* Agreements and the World Market for Silver

Previous Japanese research has regarded *nagegane*, as discussed in Chapter 3, as a "special" form of finance that arose in Japan at the time. This perspective owes much to its focus on Japanese history, but if we look at history more widely, it becomes clear that *nagegane* was part of a global trend.

Fernand Braudel calls the seventy years from 1557 the "Genoese's century."[96] As is widely known, governments in Spain and Portugal depended on finance from Genoese bankers for domestic and foreign trade.[97] It seems that Genoese investment in foreign trade initiated an investment boom for trade networks in Seville and Lisbon and connected these cities with Asia, the Atlantic Ocean, and the Pacific Ocean.[98]

The research often compares *nagegane* with the *foenus nauticum*, a maritime loan finance scheme from the Roman era, and *commenda* agreements (mainly in Genoa),[99] which were a maritime trade trust used in various cities engaged in the Mediterranean trade in Italy throughout the ages. Many different names for *commenda* agreements existed in the various areas that were involved in the Mediterranean trade but they were basically the same. A number of investors deposited loads or capital with a ship and divided their profits among investors according to their deposit ratios. Those who conducted the sea voyage received a quarter of the profits on their return.

This type of trade investment flourished in Genoa, especially during the 12th century. Merchants who were not wealthy enough to have their own ships

95 Boxer, *The Great Ship from Amacon*.

96 Fernand Braudel, *Busshitsu Bummei, Keizai, Shihon Shugi: Jūgo-Jūnana Seiki / III-1: Sekai Jikan 1* [*Civilisation matérielle, économie et capitalisme, XV^e et XVIII^e siècles 3: Le temps du monde*], trans. Murakami Mitsuhiko (Tokyo: Misuzu Shobō, 1995), 198.

97 Ruth Pike, *Enterprise and Adventures: The Genoese in Seville and the Opening of the World* (Ithaca: Cornell University Press, 1966).

98 Ibid.

99 Studies on the *commenda* agreements in Venice are well summarized in Yōko Kamenaga, *Chūsei Genova Shōnin no "Ie"* [The "Family" of the Medieval Genoese Merchants] (Tokyo: Tōsui Shobō, 2001). The *commenda* agreement was called *colleganza* in Venice.

could still participate in the long-distance trade in the Mediterranean and earn profits.[100] It is usually considered that *commenda* agreements declined with the appearance of powerful investors who took over long-distance trades in Genoa after the 13th century. But *commenda* agreements, so-called *sociedad*/*sociedade* and *compañia*/*companhia*, were joint investment arrangements that blossomed during the second half of the 15th century in the Iberian Peninsula owing to the rise in foreign trade. It is also known from the research of Pike and others that capitalists in Genoa and the *converso* merchant groups, who had their eyes on Spanish and Portuguese foreign business, were behind this.[101]

Shiba Kentaro (柴謙太郎) argues from his examination of existing bonds in Japan that there is a similarity between the *commenda* and *nagegane*,[102] and that a joint investment association existed among merchants in Hakata. As I pointed out in Chapter 3, what has been collectively investigated as *nagegane*, meaning forms of investment and capital injection in Nagasaki during the early modern period, should be examined separately, and this includes their historical development. In addition to the complications highlighted by Shiba and others, who did not examine "*companhia*/*armação*", which was a joint investment organization in Macao, it seems that difficulties arise because the problem is fixed to the question of whether or not *kaijogin* (*respondência*) was a *commenda* (joint investment association).

With Japan as the example, the basic format of investments is that individuals or groups comprising a number of people (*commenda*/*companhia*) entrusted their commercial goods to a ship. They clarified the risk of loss of these commercial goods (maritime loan) to the consignor and promised high interest rates according to the risk of loss, that is, the risk premium (*respondência*). Therefore, while *commenda* is a type of "investment form," *respondência* refers to a conditional function of risks for investment agreements. They were different types of agreements, which could be combined, and it is easy to see that considering them jointly causes confusion.

The problem is that previous studies have totally missed the point that *companhia* and *respondência* were the investment forms most often used for financing trade routes on the ocean on which the forces of Spain and Portugal were advancing at the time. *Companhia* were created in Macao in the 16th century when it was closely connected with Nagasaki. Similar organizations

100 Kamenaga, *Chūsei Genova Shōnin no "Ie,"* 20–21.

101 Ruth Pike, *Linajudos and Conversos in Seville: Greed and Prejudice in 16th and 17th Century in Spain*, American University Studies Series, 9 (New York: Peter Lang, 2000).

102 Shiba, "Nagegane towa Nani? Kaijō Kashitsuke ka, Commenda Tōshi ka?" Teijiro Yamawaki (山脇悌二郎) opposes him, arguing that "*nagegane* is not similar to the *commenda* agreement but was a special loan agreement." Yamawaki, *Kinsei Nicchū Bōeki-shi no Kenkyū*.

to *companhia* were formed in Hakata and Nagasaki, with recognition from the Japanese side. This was especially the case with trade involving raw silk, as this was the main commodity bound for Nagasaki.

5.1 Companhia *and* Respondência *in Spain and Portugal*

It is not necessary to say much about the development of long-distance trade that occurred after Columbus's arrival in America and thanks to the advance of Spain in the Americas after the 16th century. The Casa de Contratación de Indias, which was built in 1503 in Seville, served as a window for this trade and was a control post for customs and all voyages.[103] We can occasionally find sources related to the formation of *respondência* and *companhia* in this context. The main focus of the research has been the voyage of Columbus, a Genoese, to the West Indies, Spain's move abroad and its subsequent trade activities, and the impact of the financing of Genoese capitalists who had moved to Seville.

Respondência was one of the business regulations used by the first Genoese merchants in Seville. The loan interest rate for those engaged in sea travel ranged from 50 to 60 percent in the early 16th century.[104] According to Pike, separately from *respondência*, Genoese merchants in Seville at this time were engaged in sending products made in Europe (commodities such as food and clothes) to the West Indies (especially to La Española and Cuba) as "entrusted trade." The development of the New World continued, and self-sufficiency in food supply became possible. African slaves were sent to the New World to provide what was considered the necessary manpower for further development. Mainly sugar at first, and then silver, were exported to Europe. The trading arrangement between Spain and the New World was theoretically a Crown monopoly, but there were cases where even the sailing rights that were assigned to the Genoese increased as a means of payment according to the compensation for royal debts to Genoese capitalists. The Genoese did not themselves sail to the New World as captains, but the captains of vessels were empowered to bring products back. They formed partnerships called *compañia* and promised their partners they would pay a quarter of profits upon their arrival. This was similar to the *commenda* in regard to the captain's quota.

It was not only Genoese merchants who dominated the Spanish economy during the 16th century and who used these agreements. Many others drew on

103 Antonio Acosta Rodríguez, Adolfo González Rodríguez & Enriqueta Vila Vilar (eds.), *La Casa de la Contratación y la navegación entre España y las Indias* (Seville: Secretariado de Publicaciones de la Universidad de Sevilla, Centro de Estudios Hispanoamericanos del Centro Superior de Investigaciones Científicas y Fundación El Monte, 2004).

104 Pike, *Enterprise and Adventures*, 50.

them (especially *conversos*) for their trade with the New World.[105] Considering the risk of maritime accidents during long-distance trade, such contracts were a necessity.

The content of such agreements and in particular the *respondência* and *companhia* agreements that are specific to Portugal are apparent in documents from the Casa de Contratación de Indias,[106] and from the *notario* (Spanish) in Seville,[107] where they are preserved in good condition. Documents from the *notaio* (Italian), which form the heart of the State Historical Archieve sources, are important not only for the study of Genoese history but also for an exploration of the historical changes in maritime finance agreements.

In Lisbon there exists no source collection similar to those in Seville or Genoa giving details of *respondência* and *compañia* agreements. Facilities for foreign trade, including the Casa da Índia, were located near the coast and were destroyed during the major earthquake and tsunami in 1755, with most of the documents related to commerce and the colony being lost.[108] Details about maritime finance during the Age of Exploration in Portugal and the specific places and people engaged in these matters are therefore still unknown. This means the bonds concluded between Nagasaki and Macao and preserved in the Suetsugu Documents and Shimai Documents are rare and valuable.

In 1488, just before the Portuguese began to advance into the Indian ocean, Pedro de Santarém, a Portuguese Jew, wrote a commentary that was printed in 1552 in Venice. He wrote in detail about *respondência*,[109] demonstrating that investments in long-distance trade had already become popular in the late 15th century in Portugal.

According to his book, the *respondência* was an agreement type that became popular after the middle of the 14th century, mainly in Lisbon, Venice, Genoa, Ancona, and Naples. After the development of ocean sailing to Africa and following conflicts with Islamic powers on the coast of North Africa in the 15th century, the use of *respondência* further increased.[110]

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105 Pike, *Linajudos and Conversos in Seville*.

106 Archivo General de Indias, Seville.

107 Archivo de Protocolos Notariales de Sevilla, Seville.

108 The so-called Monsoon Documents, that is, Livro das Monções ou Documentos Remetidos da Índia, which give a glimpse of the activities of the Portuguese in Asia, particularly around Goa, were conserved in Goa and escaped destruction in the earthquake.

109 Petrus Santerna, *Tractatus perutilis et quotidianus de assecurationibus et sponsionibus mercatorum* (Venetiis: apud Baltassarem Constantinum ad signum divi Georgii, 1552).

110 Among the notarized documents in Genoa, documents on the *cambium maritium* (maritime loan) remarkably increased in the second half of the 17th century. I have not found any notarized documents on maritime loans in Genoa before the first half of the 17th century.

Vera Cruz Pinto has studied the historical changes in *respondência* in Portugal.[111] According to his summary, *sociedade* or *companhia* were a type of investment used in Lisbon in the 15th century when trade was conducted with the African coast. Several merchants entrusted their money to one ship. At the same time, "risk premium," meaning maritime insurance with high interest rates, was attached to these investments. Payments were made upon return. Most of the investors in these contracts in 15th-century Lisbon were foreigners, such as Genoese, Flemish, British, and southern Germans.[112]

When trade with Asia began in the 16th century, the position of an Escrivão de Seguros, meaning a person engaged in organizing records of or arbitrating *respondência*, was established in Casa da Índia, specifically in 1529. In around 1570 this position was consolidated into the Casa dos Seguros. In Lisbon, the *respondência* was treated as "maritime insurance" because the Church had prohibited *usura* (loan at high interest/usury) by canon law.[113] High interest loans among Catholics were prohibited but were concluded under the term maritime insurance. However, as Santarém insists, this ban did not apply to Jews. Foreigners and Jewish Portuguese in Lisbon therefore utilized *respondência*, possibly already at the beginning of the Age of Exploration.

According to Vera Cruz Pinto's structuring, investment associations of *companhia* and *respondência* with the creditor taking the risk appeared at the same time. This was similar to the investments in silver in the trade between Macao and Nagasaki, in which considerable profit allocations were guaranteed upon return instead of investing in risky trips. As *respondência* increased in Nagasaki trades in the early 17th century, this method of finance may have been transmitted to Japan via Macao merchants.

Respondência, with the characteristic that the owner of the loaded goods would take the risk, was the main method for transferring silver in the Atlantic rim trades, the galleon trade between America and Manila, and the Portuguese trade in Asia.[114] Therefore, *respondência* investment from Manila to Macao and Macao merchants' borrowing of silver from the Japanese were all part of the same phenomenon, which appeared at the same time all over the world.

It is interesting to note that the Japanese independently developed an investment structure for *respondência* at Hakata and Nagasaki, even though

111 Eduardo Vera Cruz Pinto, "Os seguros marítimos nas rotas portuguesas do ultramar: Uma perspectiva histórico-jurídica (séculos XV-XVI)," *Revista da Faculdade de Direito da Universidade de Lisboa* 39, no. 1 (1998): 269.

112 Ibid.

113 It was often called *emprestar ao risco* (a risk-bearing investment) or *emprestar ao aposto*.

114 In Spanish, the *respondência* was called *préstamo a la gruesa* (adventure loan), *préstamo marítimo* (maritime loan), or *cambio marítimo* (maritime loan).

they learned from Macao merchants that the Spanish in Manila were conducting direct trade with Chinese by *respondência*. Cases of local Asian merchants joining in such Mediterranean-type *respondência* with European merchants in India and Southeast Asia are unclear. As mentioned above, trust was a necessary condition for *respondência*. Obviously some basic conditions had to be met to establish trust between foreigners and local people in East Asia.

5.2 *Maritime Loans from Macao Merchants*

In my examination of *respondência* I have already cited and referred to the research into maritime loans/*respondência* by Takase Kōichirō. Takase introduces and translates documents about maritime loans from an early stage, even though his own study is not directly related to maritime loans. But there are sources he does not consider related to *respondência*. His study focuses on the activities of the family of Pedro Martins Gaio and Vicente Rodrigues, Macao merchants who, as agents, supported the trade with the Jesuits in Japan.[115] The activities of this family are especially conspicuous because of their deep relationship with the so-called *Madre de Deus* incident between 1609 and 1610, which was a significant turning point for Portuguese trade in Japan.

Vicente was a merchant of mixed parentage who was born in Nagasaki to a Portuguese father and a Japanese mother. He was born in Japan and became a Jesuit missionary assistant (Dojuku) until adolescence,[116] but later withdrew from the Society of Jesus. Following his marriage, as a son-in-law of Gaio he was active as the captain of a private ship, with his base in Macao. These characteristics closely resemble those of the captain of the ship that Francesco Carletti, a Florentine merchant, used to move between Japan and Macao between 1598 and 1599.[117] This captain may have been Vicente.

Vicente loaned money to Cunha, the Capitão-mór, to fund voyages to Japan in 1614: "300 taels of principal silver with 50 percent interest to it, in total 450 taels of seda silver."[118] Takase translates *respondência* in this part of the silver bill as benefits. His interpretation does not conflict with my point, explained in Chapter 3, that *respondência* originally meant high interest as a risk premium, which could not be separated from the creditor taking the risk. Vicente did not clearly state on his bill that he was "taking the risk," but judging from the high interest rate he obviously meant *respondência*. The Gaio family thus became

115 Takase, "Kirishitan Jidai ni okeru 'Kyōshō,'" 471–508.

116 Ibid., 472.

117 Carletti, *My Voyage around the World*, 136.

118 Takase, "Kirishitan Jidai ni okeru 'Kyōshō,'" 501. *Seda* means silk in Portuguese, and this kind of silver of high quality was employed especially for the purchase of silk from China.

wealthy merchants not only because they were Jesuit agents but also because of the maritime loans they offered at high interest rates.

Takase demonstrates that the Gaio family traded on the route connecting Kochi, Malacca, and Macao. They had trade relations (*respondência*) with Manila.[119] Takase points out that this trade route fell into "the area of Jesuit activities." The Kochi–Malacca–Macao route was, however, rather an area whose typical trading networks were dominated by converted Jews (also known as *conversos* or *cristãos novos*). The same document does not explicitly say that the Gaio family were converted Jews, yet it states that the family "wants to trade [...] the property of old Christians and of all of the Jews in this area [Macao]." Naming Jews as their trading partners may explain this family's own origin. Moreover, the reference to *respondência* with Manila was not limited to the usual "trade relation" and could have referred to *respondência* agreements as well. Documents with references to *nagegane* and maritime loans are mainly dated from after the 1620s. But if these documents point to maritime loans they are an interesting example of maritime loans practiced by merchants in Macao during the 1610s.[120]

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Previously it was not sufficiently noted how important silver from Japan and the New World was for the economic region of East Asia in terms of *respondência*. But this phenomenon should be examined not only within the context of Japan's foreign trade in the 17th century but also as capital flow in a dynamic space that connected the East Asian seas with the world at large in the 16th and 17th centuries.

The government in Goa initiated reforms by which the revenue from trade with Japan in 1635 helped temporarily to decrease debts. However, this did not serve to repay all debts to the Japanese nor did it amount to a fundamental restructuring of the financial situation of Macao. The city of Macao asked the government in Goa to cover its costs for maintaining the city, for purchasing goods at the markets in Guangzhou, and for the payment of debts in Japan. But the government in Goa refused this petition, citing the fact that Macao operated autonomously and independently through its merchants and had done so since the 16th century.[121] The Viceroy of India consulted five high-ranking

119 Ibid., 473–476; Archivum Romanum Societatis Iesu, Jap-sin 15-I, ff. 6–7v.

120 The first example of a *respondência* agreement by the Society of Jesus in Japan was in 1612. Such agreements between Macao merchants in that period were rare.

121 Panduronga S.S. Pissurlencar & Vithal Trimbak Gune (eds.), *Assentos do Conselho de Estado da Índia*, vol. 2, Publicações do Arquivo Histórico do Estado da Índia, 4 (Bastora & Goa: Tipografia Rangel, 1954).

officers in Portuguese India,[122] and four of them opposed the economic support plan for Macao. This shows that the government in Goa regarded Macao not so much as an important base for Portuguese India but more as an assembly of merchants that located in one port in China. This perception of Macao continued until the middle of the 17th century.

122 The four officers who opposed providing support for Macao were Filipe Mascarenhas (governor of Ceylon), Lourenço Melo de Carvalho, José Pinto Pereira (*vedor da fazenda geral*; overseer of the Treasury), and António Mascarenhas. The opinions of these four officers appear in Arquivo Nacional Torre do Tombo, *Livro das Monções ou Documentos Remetidos da Índia*, Livro 41, ff. 81–90v. The only officer who agreed to the support plan was Gonçalo Pinto da Fonseca (Arquivo Nacional Torre do Tombo, *Livro das Monções ou Documentos Remetidos da Índia*, Livro 41, ff. 81–82v).

CHAPTER 5

Religion and Power in Macao

1 The Role of St. Paul's College during the Namban Trade Period

Before reflecting in the following chapters on the close connection between religion and trade as one of the reasons for the decline in the Namban trade, this chapter will discuss how religious power played out in the city of Macao.

In about 1557 Portuguese settlers began to live in Macao with the approval of the Guangzhou (広州) authorities, and powerful captains started to build an autonomous city. During the early years the Pereira brothers, Diogo and Guilherme, as mentioned in Chapter 1, boasted that they were the most powerful players in Macao society. In essence, Portuguese society in Macao was a continuation of the community that had been led by the captains in Shuangyu (双嶼) and Lampacau (浪白澳). The Capitão-mór, to whom the right to sail to Japan was given, was Macao's representative in the government of Portuguese India. With a few exceptions, the Capitão-mór did not live in Macao. As he was replaced every year, the right to control the city and environment was entrusted to the most powerful members of the Macao community.

In 1560 an interrogation office for heretics (part of the Inquisition) opened in Goa. Both heretics and *conversos* were questioned there. The number of powerful converso merchants living in Malacca and Macao had been increasing:[1] in 1562, around 800 people lived in Macao;[2] by about 1569, between 5,000 and 6,000 "Christians" were reported to be living there.[3] This meant that during the 1560s, beginning with immigrants from India, the number of people related to the Portuguese, including their male servants from Africa and Asia, as well as Christian converts from China, rapidly increased. The background to this development was not only the migration of *conversos* but also the Jesuits' move to Macao and the beginning of their proselytism there in the 1560s.

1 Lucio De Sousa, *Early European Presence in China, the Philippines and South-East Asia, 1555–1590: The Life of Bartolomeu Landeiro* (Macao: Macau Foundation, 2010).

2 Beatriz Basto da Silva, *Cronologia da História de Macau*, vol. 1 (Macao: Direcção dos Serviços de Educação, 1992), 44.

3 Ibid., 49.

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During their voyage to Japan the Jesuits stayed with the Portuguese at several ports on the Chinese coast, including the Shangchuan Islands (上川島) and Lampacau, owing to seasonal winds. From 1557 onwards the Portuguese started to settle in Macao and after the installation of a small-scale residence (*casa*) in 1563 they began to reside there permanently.[4] The facility further developed into St. Paul's College, which continued to be a center for the Jesuits in East and Southeast Asia, as well as an institution for higher learning in scholarly subjects and the arts.[5]

As we saw in Chapter 1, Jesuit missionaries were faced with negotiating the release of Portuguese prisoners in Guangzhou. From the beginning many men in Macao asked to join the Society as missionaries. In this chapter, I will focus on the activities of St. Paul's College. By consulting several administrative sources from the first half of the 17th century in Macao, such as the Arquivos de Macao,[6] the Mascarenhas Documents,[7] the Livros das Monções,[8] and the chronicle of St. Paul's College,[9] I will investigate the relationship that developed between the Jesuits and the Portuguese in Macao when the Namban trade flourished.[10] Concerning various internal problems at St. Paul's College, I will rely on many aspects of the research undertaken by Takase Kōichirō.[11] But as he does not directly consider the relationship with the wider society in Macao, this chapter does not overlap with his work.

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4 Ibid.

5 Mihoko Oka, "Kirishitan Jidai no Macao ni okeru Sei-Paulo Colegio no Yakuwari" [The Role of St. Paul's College of Macau in the Kirishitan Period], *The Kirisutokyo-shigaku* [The Journal of History of Christianity] 56 (2002); João Paulo Oliveira e Costa (ed.), *Cartas Ânnuas do Colégio de Macau* (*1594–1627*), trans. Ana Fernandes Pinto (Macao: Comissão Territorial de Macau para as Comemorações dos Descobrimentos Portugueses, Fundação Macau, 1999); Kōichirō Takase, *Kirishitan Jidai no Bunka to Shosō* [Culture and Other Various Aspects of the Kirishitan Period] (Tokyo: Yagi Shoten, 2001), 546.

6 Arquivo do Leal Senado (ed.), *Arquivos de Macau*, vols. I-III (Macao: Imprensa Nacional de Macau, 1929–1931); see Chapter 4 of present volume.

7 Biblioteca Pública e Arquivo Distrital de Évora, Códice CXVI 2–5; see Chapter 4 of present volume.

8 Arquivo Nacional Torre do Tombo, *Livro das Monções ou Documentos Remetidos da Índia.*

9 Oliveira e Costa, *Cartas Ânnuas do Colégio de Macau* (*1594–1627*).

10 As for the history of the relationship between the society of Macao and the Jesuits, the following reference is very substantial, both for the historical sources and for its analysis. Manuel Teixeira, *Macau e a sua diocese* (Macao: Escola Tipográfica do Orfanato Salesiano, 1940–2000).

11 Takase, *Kirishitan Jidai no Bunka to Shosō*.

2 Bishop Carneiro and Macao Society in the 16th Century

When studying the relationship between Macao society and the Church in the 16th century, Belchior Carneiro should not be overlooked.[12] During the fifteen years from 1568 until his death in 1583, he was enormously influential in building the foundations of Macao society. Macao belonged to the Nicea–Ethiopia diocese at this time,[13] and Carneiro as its bishop resided in Macao. Soon after he arrived in Macao he began to build the Misericórdia foundation (in 1569). The goal of this institution was to help the poor and to implement Christian ethics. One of its functions was to collect money from the rich and give it to the poor.[14]

Banking facilities were developed as the Portuguese population spread around the world during the Age of Exploration. It was possible, for example, to deposit money at the Misericórdia at Rio de Janeiro and cash in the bill in Goa. Exchange transactions became global. The director of the Misericórdia, the so-called Provedor, also managed any possessions left by the deceased in his diocese. If an inheritor was designated, the money was transmitted through the Misericórdia system. If no heir was named, it was converted into alms for social aid.[15] In 1615 capital for a voyage to Japan was loaned by the Misericórdia in Macao.[16]

Furthermore, in 1579, under Bishop Carneiro an official contract was made for the Jesuits to keep the missionary work in Japan and to have a right to load raw silk of 50 picos per annum in the ships going to Japan from Macao taking

12 Belchior Carneiro was born in Coimbra in 1516. He came to Macao in 1568 and died there in 1583.

13 The independence of the diocese of Macao was approved in 1579.

14 Isabel dos Guimarães Sá, *Quando o rico se faz pobre: Misericórdias, caridade e poder no Império Português: 1500–1800* (Lisbon: Comissão Nacional para as Comemorações dos Descobrimentos Portugueses, 1997); José Caetano Soares, *Macau e a assistência: panorama médico-social* (Lisbon: Agência Geral das Colónias, 1950).

15 The history of the Misericórdia in Portugal started with the initiative of Queen Leonor, widow of King João II. The original purpose of the Misericórdia was charitable works to help the poor and the sick, but on the back of their abundant capital strength, not only in mainland Portugal but also in the State of India, the Misericórdia came to play a role as financial institution. Joaquim Veríssimo Serrão, *A Misericórdia de Lisboa: Quinhentos anos de história* (Lisbon: Livros Horizonte, 1998); Ivo Carneiro de Sousa, "Da fundação e da originalidade das Misericórdias portuguesas (1498–1500)," *Oceanos: Misericórdias, Cinco Séculos*, 35 (1998): 25–39.

16 Oliveira e Costa, *Cartas Ânnuas do Colégio de Macau* (*1594–1627*), 140–141; Archivum Romanum Societatis Iesu, JAP/SIN46, ff. 359–363.

part in the whole purchase union (*companhia de armação*).[17] Jesuit silk threads were sold on a large scale in Japan together with raw silk via the investment guild's merchants based in Macao. The profits were used for the maintenance of the Church. It is not clear exactly when the investment guild was established at Macao, but we know that Carneiro was instrumental in proposing its establishment.[18] He rescinded the raw silk monopoly held by the great merchants and enabled merchants with smaller capital to join the trade. He may have intended to maintain the system in the style of a *companhia*.[19]

The reasons why the Jesuits joined the investment guild for raw silk in order to acquire funds for their missionary activities are not unconnected to the arrival of Alessandro Valignano, the inspector for the jurisdiction in East India, in Macao in 1577. The missionary system Valignano that operated in Japan was notable for its *accomodatio* (adaption) policy.

As I will explain in Chapter 6, his basic plan was to ensure resources for missionary work. From the beginning the Jesuits, as investors, joined the raw silk investment guild Carneiro had built. According to the contract of 1579, their rights were settled on an annual basis.

In 1583, Carneiro proposed to create an executive unit for the administration of Macao. The Bishops served as its directors. In 1584 the Viceroy of India, Duarte de Menezes, described this as a legislative assembly that had two judges, three counselors, and one public prosecutor as members. The chairperson was a Capitão da Terra elected by the bishop or the citizens.[20] Important matters were decided at meetings of the powerful Portuguese inhabitants. Jesuit bishops had proposed the executive institution, and the fact that a bishop held the post of chairperson explains how the Jesuits gained its strong influence in the social structure of Macao.[21]

Macao was acknowledged as an administrative unit inside Portuguese India when Portugal was incorporated into Spain under Philip II in 1580. In 1583 the Viceroy of India raised Macao's status from a settlement to a city. Until that time Macao had been simply a trading port for the Portuguese and people from other ethnic groups, all of whom lived there together.

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17 The total amount of raw silk for the *armação* in all Macao was 1,600 picos (2,000 picos, later).

18 Álvarez Taladriz, "Un documento de 1610 sobre el contrato de armação de la nao de trato entre Macao y Nagasaki," *Tenri Daigaku Gakuhō* [Bulletin of Tenri University] 11, no. 1 (1959): 103–122.

19 See Chapter 4.

20 Basto da Silva, *Cronologia da História de Macau*, 59.

21 See Chapter 4.

The Jesuits played a crucial role in developing and controlling Macao. I mentioned in Chapter 1 how their missionary work in Japan was supported from the outset with capital from maritime Portuguese merchants. Regardless of whether the financial support promised by the King of Portugal arrived or not, the Jesuits depended on Macao as the basis for trade between Japan and Macao.

3 The Treasury of St. Paul's College

St. Paul's College was funded by Alessandro Valignano in 1594, using the Jesuit residence that was already in existence as its base. The college served the Society for a long time, with its scientific, spiritual, and economic aspects playing a central role in the proselytism that took place in East Asia. The college was known as the College of Madre de Deus as it shared the site with the church of the same name.[22] To understand the role of St. Paul's College in Macao society, one has to consider its special functions, which are not usually connected with a religious institution.

In Chapter 4 I described the large-scale trade reform concerning Japan between 1623 and 1630. The following letter to the King of Portugal from Romão de Lemos, who administrated the Japan voyage trade, relates to this reform:

> Concerning the profit from the 1637 Japan voyage, the Feitor João Barreto submitted 80,000 taels of distributed silver to me. I deposited it again in the safe at St. Paul's and kept the rest for payment. The rest was also stored at St. Paul's when the account settlement was finished. [...] After I had deposited the silver in the safe at St. Paul's, I went to the secretary for the voyage and in his presence gave one key back to the Father Visitador of the Society of Jesus. As you know from the certificate, he did not accept the other keys even when he was appealed to. That is why I was left with the other two keys. The Captain General took one and now I have one in my possession. As I have already informed your majesty, my key and the silver under the name of the city of Macao is 1,600,000

22 Portuguese voyagers departing from Macao would attend Mass in this church to pray for the safety of their voyage. Gonçalo Couceiro, *A Igreja de S. Paulo – Fortaleza do Monte* (Macao: Gabinete de Comunicação Social do Governo de Macau, 1990); Takase, *Kirishitan Jidai no Bunka to Shosō*, 163–165. The church and the College of Madre de Deus were destroyed by fire several times. The actual façade which still remains is a new edifice after 1602. The other parts of the edifice were burnt down in 1835.

> taels. Therefore the earnings from the [finance corporation for] voyage to Japan are approximately 160,000 taels. After having paid the necessary expenses for this voyage, the Feitor João Barreto gave me the rest of 84,500 taels. I have already deposited this money also in the safe.[23]

This account relates to trade with Japan around 1637 and touches on many topics. When rumors spread about a possible break in trade with Japan, the raw silk on board ships from Macao was sold at a higher price. That is why merchants from Macao made a large profit from the trade.[24] The total amount is estimated as 1,600,000 taels, of which 10 percent was paid as tax to the royal treasury. In the same report a large amount of the annual *respondência* in silver from Japanese merchants is also mentioned.[25]

The author of the letter, Lemos, took office at the royal treasury and the government position for controlling maritime trade from his predecessor Ramos. This office was created in 1634. As pointed out in Chapter 4, during this time Macao was facing several problems. As the base for trade with Japan and Manila, it had to deal with the obstacles that Christianity faced in Japan, competition with the Dutch, large debts, and rivalries with Chinese merchants in Manila. The trade there was organized in the same way as in Macao, by self-government. From the mid-1620s onwards the Goa government tried to assert its authority over Macao, and in 1635 the Capitão-mór system was abolished.

The source quoted above confirms that in 1637 the total income from the trade with Japan was 160,000 taels. After subtracting expenditure costs, a net profit of about 80,000 taels remained. This profit was stored at the treasury of St. Paul's. The place name refers to the college (including the church and religious house facilities), as well as the fortifications and the hills on which both buildings were situated. The Father Visitador from the Society of Jesus was entrusted with the keys to the treasury. St. Paul's was not primarily a fort but rather the control office for the Jesuits and a college. In a further report to the Viceroy of India with the same date, Lemos wrote in detail about the installation of the treasury:

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23 Letter of Romão de Lemos to King Filipe III of Portugal, from Macao, dated 4 January 1638. Arquivo Nacional Torre do Tombo, *Livro das Monções ou Documentos Remetidos da Índia*, Livro 41, ff. 167v–169.

24 Historiographical Institute, University of Tokyo (ed.), *Diaries Kept by the Heads of the Dutch Factory in Japan* (Original Text), vol. 1 (Tokyo: University of Tokyo Press, 1974), 209.

25 Mihoko Oka, "A Great Merchant in Nagasaki in 17th Century: Suetsugu Heizō II and the System of Respondência," *Bulletin of Portuguese/Japanese Studies* 2 (2001): 37–56.

> To accomplish and complete your Excellency's regulation and order, I asked the Jesuit Fathers, with the mediation of the Captain General his Excellency Domingos da Câmara de Noronha, whether they could give me a *casa* for installing a safe to deposit the receipts and expenditure as well as the earnings from the voyages to Japan. Without your Excellency's order, on what grounds could I have made such a request. I further believe they would not have agreed to store such an amount of silver at their religious house. This is all for safety.[26]

To summarize the contents of the report:

1. Before 1637 a treasury for the public finance of the city of Macao already existed. A building for controlling the receipts and expenditures was constructed inside St. Paul's College.
2. The office for sea travel and the Society of Jesus negotiated terms for the use of the building, with the Captain General acting as intermediary.
3. Because of concerns for its safety, the treasury control office of Macao was placed inside St. Paul's.

In other words, already by 1637 St. Paul's was the site where public expenditure was controlled.

In 1640, on the occasion of sending a delegation to Japan with an appeal to reopen trade, a council decided on the amount of reimbursement it would offer Japan. Again the treasury at St. Paul's College was used to deposit the silver.[27]

Instructions from the first supreme commander of Macao, dated May 25, 1625, indicate from what date the treasury for public earnings existed inside St. Paul's.

> All the earnings and customs from the voyages are stored in the safe with three keyholes. The supreme commander possesses one of these keys. In the case of his absence, the Capitão da Terra (Captain of the Land) and the Capitão-mór for sea travels to Japan take it instead. Another key is kept by the eldest council member. The last one is controlled by the Feitor who manages the total amount of profits from the sea travels. In case one of these men is not present, some other government official, such as a council member with approval from the presiding judge, or the

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26 Letter of Romão de Lemos to the Viceroy of India Pedro da Silva, from Macao, dated 4 January 1638. Arquivo Nacional Torre do Tombo, *Livro das Monções ou Documentos Remetidos da Índia*, Livro 43, ff. 232–239.

27 Act of the city council of Macao, composed by Simão Vaz de Paiva, dated 4 January 1640. Arquivo do Leal Senado, *Arquivos de Macau*, vol. II, 127.

> presiding judge with approval from a *procurador* and *escrivão* (secretary), keeps it. The safe is installed inside the college of the Society of Jesus.[28]

According to these instructions, in 1625 Macao's earnings and customs payments (the public income) were deposited at the treasury located in the college of the Society of Jesus. Three keys were needed to unlock the safe. The keys were held by the Captain General, the eldest member of the council, and the Feitor in charge of managing the account books of the Japan voyage. Lemos also mentioned the need for three keys when he wrote about the treasury and its storage facility. The safe installed in 1625 was thus the same one that was used in 1637 for earnings from voyages.

However, in 1637 the Captain General, the administrator for the voyage to Manila and Japan, and the Jesuit Father Visitador managed the three keys. The highest-ranking person in charge of the Jesuits at Macao was usually the Rector of the college. When the Father Visitador was present, all Jesuits in Japan and Macao had to obey his supreme authority. In 1637 the Visitador Manuel Dias refused to manage the key, leaving the Captain General with two and the administrator for voyages with one.

The following is a summary of the information presented so far in chronological order:

1. In 1625, the Captain General D. Mascarenhas directed St. Paul's College to install a safe on its grounds for storing the earnings and customs from the voyages to Japan.
2. In 1625, the keys to the safe were held by the Captain General, the eldest member of the council, and the Feitor.
3. In 1637, on instructions from the Viceroy of India, a building (*casa*) to store the treasury was built in the grounds of St. Paul's College, with the expectation that this would be very safe.
4. In 1637, the three keys to the safe were held by the Captain General, the administrator for the voyages to Manila and Japan, and the director of the college.
5. In 1640, reimbursement silver from Japan was stored in a building (*casa*) of the college after it had been collected at Macao.

In 1625, the earnings from the Japan voyage and customs were kept safe at St. Paul's College. These particulars illustrate how the customs system at Macao changed after Mascarenhas took office. As explained in Chapter 2, before that time funds for the maintenance of the city, a minimum customs payment

28 Instruction of Dom Francisco Mascarenhas, dated 25 May 1625. Biblioteca Pública e Arquivo Distrital de Évora, Códice CXVI 2–5, ff. 47–48v.

called *caldeirão*, had been collected from the inhabitants. Mascarenhas instituted a system that collected customs as revenue for the king.

Thus from 1625 to 1637 the keepers of the three keys changed from the senior members of the council and a representative of the citizens and the merchants, to a government official from Portuguese India and the Jesuits. In other words, the influence of Portuguese India on the governmental structure of Macao became stronger during the ten-year period after 1625.

As mentioned at the beginning of Chapter 4, the reason for the local uprising against Mascarenhas was not resistance to vague control by Portuguese India. Since the middle of the 16th century the merchants who resided in Macao had built a self-governing society that maintained a balance with the Ming authorities. It was their dissatisfaction with the change in customs collection methods, which were now collected by the King of Portugal and clearly represented a hierarchical change, that led to their discontent.

The Jesuits were in a difficult position as its members stood between the local Portuguese society and the power of Portuguese India. It is possible to think that placing the vault in which customs payments were stored at St. Paul's College, the Jesuits' institution, demonstrates their influence on both parties. In 1635 the administrator for the voyages to Japan and Manila, Ramos, wrote to the Viceroy of India to report that the Jesuits actively served the king and to praise their meritorious service.[29] From 1625 onwards customs payments and public properties were deposited in the safe at St. Paul's College, and a room for receipts and expenditures was installed there. This can be regarded as an embodiment of the special character of Macao, the Namban trade city, with its complex entanglement of politics, economics, and religion.

4 St. Paul's Fort

The installation of a vault at St. Paul's College for safeguarding Macao's funds was related to its safety. This was also guaranteed by some specific geographical conditions.

On November 9, 1594, the Jesuit Visitador for East India, Alessandro Valignano S.J. wrote the following about the appearance of the college: "Our college is encircled by mountains making a very strong earthen wall. The college is well closed." Thus from the beginning the college was carefully constructed

29 Letter of Manuel Ramos to the Viceroy of India Miguel de Noronha, dated 25 October 1635. Arquivo Nacional Torre do Tombo, *Livro das Monções ou Documentos Remetidos da Índia*, Livro 35, ff. 259–260.

in isolation from its surroundings. The following letter by Duarte de Sande further indicates how a particular architectural style was used to form a solid facility. As director of the newly established college, Sande wrote on January 16, 1596: "The construction works of a wall facing a path approaching the main entrance of the college has been completed. In this way the *casa* and the entry hall are closed in a good manner."[30]

Thus the college was not easy to enter from outside. It was purposely built on the top of small hill in order to create an environment that was closed off from its surroundings. At this time one could look out over the harbor from the hills on which the college stood. The whole place became the St. Paul's fort from 1617, on the Fortaleza do Monte, when the surroundings of the college were turned into a strongly protected area. When the Dutch fleet attacked it in 1622, the whole place became a military base protected by cannons.[31]

The Fortaleza do Monte neighbored the college and served until 1749 as a residence for the successive supreme commanders, since Mascarenhas stayed there after he took office in 1623.[32] In this regard St. Paul's College was also the political center of Macao. The following source tells us what the Dutch thought of the Fortaleza do Monte as a center when they planned to invade Macao:

> According to Gregório de Moraes, an Edo statesman called him back to his government office. He told him that the Dutch reported that in front of St. Paul's fortification at Macao is a hill. This is without doubt the Nossa Senhora da Guia. When Moraes confirmed its name, he read the plans of the enemy [the Dutch]. Even God does not allow, they must have a plan to make war to the city [Macao] and take the harbor. They tried to know where the highest spot in Macao on attacking to the city.[33]

30 Archivum Romanum Societatis Iesu, JAP/SIN52, ff. 118–123; Oliveira e Costa, *Cartas Ânnuas do Colégio de Macau* (*1594–1627*), 69.

31 Annual report of the college of Macao by João Fróis, dated 4 November 1622, Archivum Romanum Societatis Iesu, JAP/SIN114, ff. 321–330; Oliveira e Costa, *Cartas Ânnuas do Colégio de Macau* (*1594–1627*), 253–254.

32 As for the conflict between Mascarenhas and the influential citizens of Macao, there are many related documents in the Biblioteca Pública e Arquivo Distrital de Évora, Códice CXVI 2–5. According to Jorge (Jorge Graça, *Fortificações de Macau: Concepção e história* (Macao: Instituto Cultural de Macau, 1984), 41–42), rectangular stockades were constructed in the four sides of the fortress: one was assigned to the residence of the captain general, and the others to the barrack.

33 Letter of Manuel Ramos to the Viceroy of India Miguel de Noronha, dated 11 November 1635. Arquivo Nacional Torre do Tombo, *Livro das Monções ou Documentos Remetidos da Índia*, Livro 35, ff. 285–286v.

Moraes was a Portuguese–Japanese interpreter residing in Japan,[34] who was interrogated by Edo government executives after they were provided with information by the representative of the Dutch in Japan (when the Shogunate was discussing breaking off relations with Macao, the VOC's Hirado factory passed on information). The Dutch thought that it was necessary at first to capture the Guia Hills located to the east and then take the St. Paul's fort. Yet the Edo shogunate wanted the Dutch to invade Macao as well, as this was also a base for trade with China. It is well known that the Shogunate hinted that the Dutch should invade Manila.[35] They also investigated Macao as an object for attack, as is made clear by the records of the Dutch trading firm.[36]

The private property of the city of Macao was deposited at St. Paul's College because it was surrounded by a strong fort and was also geographically in the political center of Macao. But as much as the place fitted this purpose well, the close connection between the Jesuits and the city's trade, and the fact that the Jesuits were entrusted to guard the trade earnings of Macao generally, are more obvious reasons why the depository was installed at St. Paul's College.

5 The Economic Foundation of the College

5.1 *Almsgiving*

St. Paul's College was established at Macao with the goal to "train priests necessary for proselytizing Japan," as Valignano firmly insisted. At first there was severe opposition to this plan from within the Indian jurisdiction district. To summarize the research by Takase Kōichirō,[37] the opponents raised four points:

34 To be precise, a title of "jurubaça" is added to him. Originally, "jurubaça" means "creole" in Malay. Then gradually, as a usage of word, the role as interpreter became more emphasized. Usually, the word of "lingua" is used to signify the normal interpreter, therefore "jurubaça" means a son between the Portuguese and the native of the land in many cases.

35 Hirofumi Yamamoto, *Kan'ei Jidai* [Kan'ei Era] (Tokyo: Yoshikawa Kōbunkan, 1989), 95.

36 The strategy of VOC in Japan at the period is presented well by Adam Clulow. Adam Clulow, *The Company and the Shogun: The Dutch Encounter with Tokugawa Japan*, Columbia Studies in International and Global History (New York: Columbia University Press, 2014); Historiographical Institute, University of Tokyo (ed.), *Diaries Kept by the Heads of the Dutch Factory in Japan* (Original Text), vol. 1 (Tokyo: University of Tokyo Press, 1974), 216–218.235–236. Ibid, vol.2 (1974), 148. In 1635–1636, the cabinet officials of the Shogunate consulted several times with the head of the Dutch factory, thus it is obvious that the Shogunate considered seriously the possibility to attack Macao.

37 Takase, *Kirishitan Jidai no Bunka to Shosō*, 165–178.

1. Doubts about the qualities of the Japanese who were being trained as priests.
2. The deficiency of the economic base for operating the college.
3. The inconvenience of supplementing personnel from Japan and India for education.
4. The inappropriateness of Macao's society for religious education.

Valignano responded as follows:[38]

1. To promote proselytization in Japan, Japanese priests are necessary and indispensable.
2. To train them religiously it is necessary to distance them from Japanese society.
3. The required economic basis could be secured by revenue from rents and almsgiving.

The Superior General of the Jesuits supported Valignano's advocacy, which led to approval for founding the college. Even the first college director, Duarte de Sande, who had opposed its founding in the first place, was finally delighted that a financial basis for operating the school could be secured.

> We in the harbor city (Macao) could, through various means, buy and support a rent worth 600 cruzados a year. These are assets for the district of Japan from several houses and shops. By decision of the council profits from these shall be used on founding the college. (To summarize a part: constructing the college on a mountain side without any flat sides was a very difficult operation). Construction was completed during the first half of the year without using even 1 real from the property of Japan province or that of the Jesuits, because the costs were covered by part of the 1,500 cruzados our old friend Pedro Quintero bestowed on us for the construction.[39]

The capital for managing the college was covered by revenue from rent and almsgiving as Valignano had expected. The expenses for construction were covered by the inheritance of 1,500 cruzados donated by the merchant Pedro Quintero.[40]

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38 Ibid., 179–184.

39 Annual report of the college of Macao by Duarte de Sande, dated 28 October 1594, Archivum Romanum Societatis Iesu, JAP/SIN 52, ff. 40v–46; Oliveira e Costa, *Cartas Ânnuas do Colégio de Macau (1594–1627)*, 58.

40 Pedro Quintero from Andalsia, who came to Asia as a crew member of the fleet of Ruy López Villalobos (1543), was local merchant of Macao from the early days of the city. Juan Ruiz-de-Medina, *Documentos del Japón, 1558–1562* (Roma: Instituto Histórico de la Compañía de Jesús, 1995), 235.

The management and professional duties of the college were separated from the Jesuits' *casa*, which had previously existed.[41] The *casa* had emphasized the religious education of the Portuguese residing in Macao, whereas the college's focus was on the education of priests. It was decided that the *casa* would mostly have almsgiving as a basis for its administration, and the college revenues from rents. Yet in 1597, only three years after this separated management had been established, it was abolished. *Casa* (residential part of the monastery) and college were united as was their dependence on one financial source.

Taking a Christian viewpoint, the income was to be mainly secured by donations from followers. It was seen to be difficult to keep the value of rent revenue constant. Therefore, almsgiving was an ideal source for income. How this was achieved can be illustrated with one example.

> We are entirely relieved as we could get support for our needs. The people are concerned about our college. They are looking to console their consciences. They trust on our conciliation of their disharmony and we become friends. If there is financial advantage or a miracle, the love and devotion of this city for our Society grows.[42]

The Jesuits provided not only spiritual guidance but also the role of "summary court" to reconcile conflict among Macao's inhabitants. As they were well attuned to worldly profits, almsgiving would increase if the profits rose.

I will give a more detailed example of how the Jesuits served this function in the next section. The college aimed to have financial as well as political reasons for its close connection with the inhabitants of Macao and their authorities. The first college director, Sande, wrote:

> When a Jesuit priest performs a scientific lecture in front of the bishop, friars of the Dominicans, Augustinians, and Franciscans, the Capitão-mór as head commissioner of the peace and other powerful members of the city gather and show their support of those with extensive doctrinal knowledge.[43]

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41 Takase, *Kirishitan Jidai no Bunka to Shosō*, 235–248.

42 Annual report of the college of Macao by Manuel Dias minor, dated 8 January 1617, Biblioteca da Ajuda, *Jesuítas na Ásia*, 49-V-5, ff. 183–186v; Oliveira e Costa, *Cartas Ânnuas do Colégio de Macau* (*1594–1627*), 162.

43 Annual report of the college of Macao by Duarte de Sande, dated 16 January 1596, Archivum Romanum Societatis Iesu, JAP/SIN 52, ff. 118–123; Oliveira e Costa, *Cartas Ânnuas do Colégio de Macau* (*1594–1627*), 71.

Sande thus recorded how the wealthy inhabitants of Macao admired the high scholarly level of the Jesuits and gave them alms for this reason.

The college was an educational institution for the Jesuits but also open to the public. At public lectures, the college director Manuel Dias wrote, many alms were collected.

> On the afternoon of Lent Friday and Sunday, this college received many very enthusiastic audience and the sermon lectures were continued. The Father Visitador preached on Sunday afternoon to many listeners, especially creoles, who believed in the Sacraments of the Church. Because of mercy of God, we gained many donations. Also a priest [of the Society] appealed much deficiency for the Misericórdia in various churches of this city, also lack of money for hospitals and to furnish other needs of the city. In one instance five or six people spent 400 pardaos as alms. The director of the Misericórdia came to the priest to express his gratitude.[44]

Not only did the priests of the college gain support and alms from powerful Macao merchants through their lectures, but wealthy merchants of mixed ethnicity also gave alms.

Many such examples can be found in the college's written reports.[45] The Jesuits' financial strength also facilitated donations for the Misericórdia, and they engaged themselves in the maintenance of Macao's social infrastructure, for example hospitals.

5.2 *Revenue from the Trade with Japan*

It is well known that the Jesuits widely participated in the Namban trade in Japan. Goods for trading were provided in Macao, so naturally the Jesuits there were deeply involved in trade. Despite Valignano's assertion that the college was funded by alms and revenues from rents and not from trade earnings, this was not truly the case. Alms were not sufficient to maintain the management of the college and income from real estate was insecure. By about 1610 it became difficult to maintain the college using these sources, as João Rodrigues recorded as he undertook missionary work in Japan and lived in Macao.

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44 Annual report of the college of Macao by Manuel Dias, dated 1598, Archivum Romanum Societatis Iesu, JAP/SIN52, ff. 267–269v; Oliveira e Costa, *Cartas Ânnuas do Colégio de Macau* (*1594–1627*), 81.

45 Archivum Romanum Societatis Iesu, JAP/SIN46, ff. 318–322; Oliveira e Costa, *Cartas Ânnuas do Colégio de Macau* (*1594–1627*), 97.

> In this miserable situation, when we could hardly feed the members of our Society, without the conditions in Japan improving, no carrack arriving from India, without a stable income from the rents for the college, we had to use some money meant for the foundation. For the same reasons the endurance of the priests in China is also compelled. The *procurador* of Japan is running around with them [the priests in Japan] but they don't have any means to help them and they have lost everything there [in Japan]. No one is lending them money.[46]

This report is related to the incident of the galleon *Nossa Senhora da Graça*, which took place at Nagasaki in 1610.[47] The Jesuits lost the goods entrusted to that ship, which led to a shortage of maintenance costs for the diocese of Japan. As Rodrigues mentioned, there were no plots of land from which to earn money, and with no ships from India the miserable situation worsened. Thus, the financial basis of the Jesuits at Macao depended on trade not only with Japan but with India as well.

5.3 *The Red-Seal License for Namban Ships*

Apart from the trouble of the *Nossa Senhora da Graça* incident caused by the Capitão-mór André Pessoa, Rodrigues also mentions that the Shogun, who was keen to trade with Macao, may have sent a red-sealed letter of patent through Japanese bishops or priests.

From 1604 onwards the Shogunate issued red-seal licenses or patents (*shuinjō*) to ocean-going ships. The authority of the Shogun guaranteed the security of the Japanese traveling overseas and was also intended to restrict voyages from Japan. In 1609 a red-seal license was issued for a Dutch ship, as well as merchant ships from Macao.[48]

The problem that arose is to be found in the detail concerning the issuance of a patent for a Macao merchant ship that was "passed through Jesuit bishops or priests." According to Takase's research, in 1609 the ship *Graça* entered the port of Nagasaki. Just before this, a junk of Vicente Rodrigues,[49] a member of the wealthiest family in Macao, the Gaio family, entered the port of Nagasaki.

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46 Annual report of the college of Macao by Tçuzu Rodrigues, dated 1 November 1611, Biblioteca de la Real Academia de la História, Jesuitas, Legajo 21, ff. 311–313; Oliveira e Costa, *Cartas Ânnuas do Colégio de Macau* (*1594–1627*), 133–135.

47 This incident has been considered as a turning point which the Tokugawa regime begun to discuss the prohibition of Christianity. See Chapters 4 and 6.

48 Red-seal certificate for the foreign trade.

49 Vicente Rodrigues was creole and was fellow of the Society of Jesus in Japan before he became merchant. Therefore, presumably his mother was Japanese.

Vicente received from the magistrate of Nagasaki a patent of the Shogun that was passed on to him through Vieira, the Nagasaki *procurador*.[50] Vicente took on this ship together with his father-in-law Pedro Martins Gaio as a representative Jesuit merchant. It is not clear since when Macao merchant ships had been trading under red-seal patents. We know, however, that in 1609 a license was given to merchants who were not Capitão-mórs and that Jesuits participated in this trade.

At St. Paul's College at Macao, the priest responsible for administering the Macao–Japan trade was called the Japan *procurador*.[51] One might consider that to base the finances of the college on trade was precarious. Yet the missionary work of the Jesuits in the Diocese of Japan (including Macao) was from the beginning closely connected with trade, and as Valignano pointed out it was unrealistic to think that the college might be run only with religiously approved sources such as alms and rent revenue. To maintain missionary work in Japan and Macao, cooperation with merchants was indispensable for the Jesuits. These were two sides of the same coin in terms of their activities in Macao society.

6 The Role of the College in Macao

The role of the college in Macao can be split into religious and worldly functions. Representative of the former is the spiritual guidance that was given through hearing confessions and providing religious education; of the latter there are political and economic aspects such as mediation and diplomacy. Both indicate the direct connection to Macao. An example of how these two aspects interacted can be observed in the fact that alms were collected following public sermons.

6.1 *Education and Hearing Confessions*

Education at the college was not limited to the training of priests and brothers but was also open to younger people from the city. The founding of the college was thus widely welcomed by the Portuguese residents. The first college director Sande expressed this as follows:

50 Kōichirō Takase, "Kirishitan Jidai ni okeru 'Kyōshō'" ["Religious-Merchants" in the Kirishitan Period], in *Kirishitan Jidai Taigai Kankei no Kenkyū* [Study on the External Relations in the Kirishitan Period] (Tokyo: Yoshikawa Kōbunkan, 1994), 475.

51 Takase, *Kirishitan Jidai no Bunka to Shosō*, 348–356.

> The people of Macao are very happy and content to see the younger people gaining honor and actual profit by studying at the new college. They couldn't previously receive such an education here. For this reason they fell into ignorance and lassitude. But now their children can continuously study what they like by attending school.[52]

The following document is about the education of children who were born to Portuguese men and Asian women, the *homen da terra* (natural of Macao). In addition, the Portuguese who had traveled to Macao from Portugal were also attending lectures.

> Not only the *homens da terra* also the Portuguese are learning the doctrines. They are effectively using their time spent at the college repeatedly learning the doctrines, and above all, after attending these lectures, repent their whole life.[53]

In the following report, a Jesuit tells how Macao as a commercial city could easily develop bad habits. Yet thanks to the guidance from the college, Macao was a morally outstanding city in the domain of Portuguese India.

> In this city men and women alike imitate devotion and many people conduct a religious life. For example, for merchants, respecting truth and faith [loyalty] is not a small virtue. In this city all people are the same. The work of a merchant is to corrupt men. Yet God has bestowed his blessing on this city. Also men who had lived a corrupted life in India and other places changed their lives for the better no sooner they arrived here. They calmly follow our and other people's good examples and listen carefully to the sermons and doctrines.[54]

The Jesuit is claiming here that because of the thorough religious education of the college, even though it is a commercial city, Macao is morally outstanding. Even if we bear in mind that this claim is an exaggeration, we can deduce from

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52 Annual report of the college of Macao by Duarte de Sande, dated 16 January 1596, Archivum Romanum Societatis Iesu, JAP/SIN52, ff. 118–123; Oliveira e Costa, *Cartas Ânnuas do Colégio de Macau* (*1594–1627*), 70.

53 Annual report of the college of Macao by Manuel Dias minor, dated 8 January 1617, Biblioteca da Ajuda, *Jesuítas na Ásia*, 49-V-5, ff. 183–186v; Oliveira e Costa, *Cartas Ânnuas do Colégio de Macau* (*1594–1627*), 161.

54 Annual report of the college of Macao by Jerónimo Rodrigues, dated 14 November 1627, Archivum Romanum Societatis Iesu, JAP/SIN46, ff. 326–331; Oliveira e Costa, *Cartas Ânnuas do Colégio de Macau* (*1594–1627*), 262.

it the college's deep intellectual influence on Macao's society. Especially a confession in a church of St. Paul had the right to issue a complete indulgence.[55] Confessions there were much appreciated, which gave plenty of opportunities to get in contact with believers. This social influence was the basis that allowed the Jesuits also to play a worldly part in Macao society.

6.2 *Mediation and Diplomacy*

The college report of 1596 that follows shows how priests from the college served as mediators in a problem that concerned some features of Macao's self-governmental organization.

> Last year, when the ship for Japan should have departed, a severe discrepancy of opinion occurred between the city of Macao and the Capitão-mór. [...] Because the conditions for sea trade became very rough owing to their quarrel and because it could not be controlled even through the considerations of Bishop Leonardo [de Sá], the bishop asked the college director, a Dominican friar, for help. So they consulted with clerks from the town hall and the Capitão and finally reached a conclusion that satisfied everybody.[56]

The quarrel described here concerned Macao's *raison d'être*, trade with Japan. Troubles had arisen between the Capitão-mór and others (those in charge of the investment guild). In the section that is not quoted, there is a description of the discord that arose between the Feitor, whom the city had elected as representative for the *companhia de armação*, and the Capitão-mór. When the Capitão-mór tried to discharge the Feitor, the people who had chosen him armed themselves and planned to attack the Capitão-mór. The Capitão-mór at this time was Manuel de Miranda.[57] The Viceroy of India had instructed Miranda that the townspeople should not load raw silk onto the Capitão-mór's ship, which was not from the *companhia*.

Despite this, an equivalent of raw silk from the citizens of Macao that had not been distributed by the *companhia* was traded in the same year (thus the Capitão-mór did not earn his commission of 10 percent). This is why trouble arose between the Capitão-mór and the citizens of Macao.

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55 Biblioteca da Ajuda, *Jesuítas na Ásia*, 49-V-5, ff. 183–186v; Oliveira e Costa, *Cartas Ânnuas do Colégio de Macau* (*1594–1627*), 159.

56 Annual report of the college of Macao by Duarte de Sande, dated 16 January 1596, Archivum Romanum Societatis Iesu, JAP/SIN52, ff. 118–123; Oliveira e Costa, *Cartas Ânnuas do Colégio de Macau* (*1594–1627*), 73–74.

57 Charles R. Boxer, *The Great Ship from Amacon: Annals of Macao and the Old Japan Trade 1555–1640* (Lisbon: Centro de Estudos Históricos Ultramarinos, 1959).

In 1596, the time of this record, the Capitão-mór served as representative of the trading fleet. During his term he received his authority as the most powerful person in Macao from the government office in Goa. However, in Macao there already existed a hierarchy among the residential Portuguese and their families. As the Capitão-mór was coming from Portugal or India, confrontations between the two sides frequently arose. Such a social structure with an opposition between the authority of Portuguese India and powerful merchants was seen from the beginning. The power of the Church was the only common authority and its influence on society was immense.

The next annual report shows how the Jesuits from the college not only mediated in Macao's local government but also on diplomatic missions in other regions. This report was written in 1622, immediately after Macao suffered a cannon attack from the Dutch fleet.[58]

> [After the Dutch had left] the city of Macao fears that the enemy might return for revenge with an even greater force for a similar attack. Beginning with cannons, the Capitão-mór wishes further means for protecting the people in case of revenge and to lift the sinking faith. These are lacking. He thinks a supply from Manila is preferable because from India one would have to use a dangerous sea passage and also risk the monsoon. The city of Macao decided to send someone who would ask for assistance. As these transactions are extremely important it is of great concern whether the process goes well or not. For this purpose they think it necessary to entrust several of our [Jesuit] priests with their dealings.[59]

Unlike Manila at the same time, Macao had just received a permission of residence from Ming dynasty authorities but almost no military facilities. Macao thus dispatched Jesuits to Manila with whom the city did not have official relations even though they both were under the authority of the Habsburg Empire. Jesuits had been sent as negotiators, as they were supposedly neutral. Having influence on both territories as they did, they were expected to make advantageous progress in negotiations with the Manila government.

Jesuits were often dispatched on missions to China and regions of Southeast Asia, both for courtesy visits and to establish diplomatic relations. After bombardment by the Dutch fleet in 1622, the Portuguese Indian state acknowledged

58 Charles R. Boxer, *A derrota dos holandeses em Macau no anno de 1622* (Macao: Escola Tipografia de Orfanato, 1938).

59 Annual report of the college of Macao by João Fróis, dated 4 November 1622, Archivum Romanum Societatis Iesu, JAP/SIN114, ff. 321–330; Oliveira e Costa, *Cartas Ânnuas do Colégio de Macau (1594–1627)*, 256–257.

the importance of Macao and sent Mascarenhas there as first supreme commander (see Chapter 4 for further details).

Mascarenhas planned to fortify Macao without having received approval from the Ming authorities. This was a provocation to the Ming authorities, which firmly requested him to pay a large amount of money as indemnity—or to suffer expulsion from Macao.[60] In 1625 the merchants of Macao requested a meeting with the governor of Guangdong (Guangdong Dudu) to open negotiations. However, as they did show the Ming authorities due respect at their meeting by observing customary Chinese protocol (whereby an embassy from a region subordinate to China had to make three kneelings followed by nine lowtows), their request was denied. The citizens of Macao selected João Rodrigues (Tçuzu) for the negotiations because he was well versed in Chinese and Chinese customs.[61] Rodrigues had been banished from Japan since 1610 and had been enrolled at St. Paul's College. Having lived at Macao for fifteen years by that time, it is likely he excelled not only in Japanese but in Chinese as well. It is also likely that there was nobody else at Macao, notwithstanding its size, who accepted to show allegiance and conformity to Chinese customs when observed by local authorities.

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I have investigated the Jesuits' social influence in the commercial city of Macao and the functions of their base, St. Paul's College, after the installation of a safe there as a foothold for their social influence. It has become clear that the Jesuits in Macao not only fulfilled important spiritual functions in guiding inhabitants in religious matters, but they were also important in worldly terms, in the fields of politics and diplomacy.

Without any doubt, the Fortaleza do Monte came to be the political center of Macao from the 1620s onwards, and its influence on the neighboring college was significant. Even before then the Jesuits had a very strong influence on the society of Macao in spiritual as well as worldly matters. This is clear from the college's annual reports. The circumstances in which the Society's influence took shape can be explained by the role it played as a kind of cushion between the rivalries in Macao's unstable local society and the power structure of Portuguese India.

The commercial city of Macao shared its fate from the beginning with the Jesuits. St. Paul's College was not only a religious institution but also fulfilled an important function in Namban trade.

60 See Chapter 2.

61 Biblioteca Pública e Arquivo Distrital de Évora, Códice CXVI 2–5, f. 190r.

CHAPTER 6

The Jesuits and Trade after the Prohibition of Christianity in Japan

1 Valignano and the Mercantile Community in Macao

In 1579, the Jesuits signed a contract with the mercantile community in Macao. This guaranteed the right to space for 50 picos (3 tons) of raw silk in the hold of the ship that sailed to Japan every year. The financial benefits that accrued from this trade were indispensable for the Jesuits' missionary work in Japan.

The trade in which the Jesuits were involved, which had been conducted through private connections between Jesuits and representative merchants in Macao, became more official in 1579, when Alessandro Valignano, an Italian priest who had arrived in Japan that same year as Visitador in the East Indies, dispatched directly from the Society's Father General, negotiated a formal contract.

Other religious bodies criticized this trading involvement, in particular mendicant orders that intended to embark upon their own missionary work in Japan, but also Portuguese aristocrats and Protestants, and even the Vatican. Even within the Society, there was frequent disagreement about involvement in commercial activity.[1] A well-known example is the conflict that took place between Francisco Cabral, a Portuguese priest who directed missionary work in Japan between 1570 and 1581, and Valignano. Drawing on his experience in Asia, Valignano undertook many reforms to the Jesuits' commercial trading activities, recognizing the importance of a stable financial infrastructure for the Japan mission's continued operation. One of these reforms, which he regarded as fundamental, was involvement in the *companhia de armação* trading union in Macao. Cabral, on the other hand, stressed that the Jesuits in Japan should depend on donations and rents (earnings from real estate). Because of their opposing points of view, and fundamentally different characters, Cabral and Valignano could not reach an agreement on this matter.

1 Kōichirō Takase, "Kirishitan Kyōkai no Keizai Kiban wo meguru Naibu no Rongi" [Internal Discussion about the Economic Base of the Kirishitan Church], in *Kirishitan Jidai no Kenkyū* [Study on the Kirishitan Period] (Tokyo: Iwanami Shoten, 1977), 333–452.

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Criticism of participation in trade had always existed, and it continued to grow. Yet trade was entrusted to the representative merchants in Macao even after Christianity was prohibited in Japan. This arrangement continued until formal relations between Japan and Macao ceased.[2] In 1614, all missionaries were ordered to leave Japan. Jesuit involvement in trade considerably declined from this point, and we do not know how it was conducted. Takase Kōichirō makes it clear that from the latter half of the 1590s until this time annual earnings from trade were between 12,000 and 16,000 cruzados.[3] But Takase makes no reference to trade involvement by the Jesuits after the persecution of Christians in Japan began.

As income from trading activity was necessary in order to maintain the Jesuits in Japan and Macao, Valignano instituted the position of *procurador*. In charge of economic affairs, *procuradors* were established in Nagasaki, Macao, Malacca, Goa, Lisbon, and Madrid,[4] with those directly concerned with Japanese trade being in Nagasaki and Macao. The position of *procurador* at Nagasaki can be traced back to at least 1563, with the earliest mentioned by Takase being Miguel Vaz. However, there is no proof that he was the first.[5]

The next known *procurador* at Nagasaki to assume office was João de Crasto (or Castro), who was nominated by Valignano. He served for ten years from 1583. The office of *procurador* at Macao was established at around the same time.[6] As Visitador Valignano was invested with the authority to impose regulations clarifying the Macao *procurador*'s duties because of the important role he played in maintaining Japanese missionary work. According to Takase, this took place in around 1580. Part of the Regulations relate to the college in Macao. Valignano also created three or four entries in the Regulations for the *procurador* at Nagasaki. Francesco Pasio, the Visitador in 1611–12, added entries 35–37 and made corrections to other sections. In addition, he corrected and added entries concerning the *procurador* office at Macao. In 1618, the Father Visitador Francisco Vieira made further substantial additions.

2 Kōichirō Takase, "Kirishitan Kyōkai no Bōeki Shūnyū-gaku" [The Amount of the Trade Revenue of the Kirishitan Church], in *Kirishitan Jidai no Kenkyū*, 604–610.

3 Ibid., 610.

4 Kōichirō Takase, "Kirishitan Kyōkai no Zaimu Tantō Padre" [Father Procurador of the Kirishitan Church] in *Kirishitan Jidai no Kenkyū*, 515.

5 Ibid., 515–516. It is possible that Luís de Almeida managed the trade through his old friends before that year.

6 Father André Pinto assumed the office in 1578. Kōichirō Takase, "Kirishitan Kyōkai no Macao Chūzai Zaimu Tantō Padre" [Father Procurador of the Kirishitan Church in Macao], in *Kirishitan Jidai Taigai Kankei no Kenkyū* [Study on the External Relations in the Kirishitan Period] (Tokyo: Yoshikawa Kōbunkan, 1994), 370–380.

Takase translated the Regulations for the *procurador* at Nagasaki and the *procurador* for Japan residing at Macao into Japanese,[7] and has studied them in detail.[8] The Regulations, including the revisions that Pasio and Vieira made, reveal the Jesuits' commercial connections with Japan up to 1618. Yet it is unclear what happened to the *procurador*'s office for Japan following the prohibition of Christianity and the expulsion of missionaries. In the part of the Regulations for the *procurador*'s office at Macao that Vieira revised in 1618, there is only one entry that alludes to maintaining the St. Paulo College of Macao in light of the persecution in Japan: "the maintenance method for the college as stated in paragraph 24 is impossible to complete during the period while many priests and brothers escaped from their persecution in Japan and are staying here."[9]

The main sources for this chapter date from 1629 and relate to the *procurador* for Japan. They are not widely known in Japan but are of great interest. As well as informing us about the Jesuits' trading activities before Christianity was prohibited, they tell us about the situation after the ban.

Valignano's Regulations and the revisions made to them were passed on in the form of a superior's will to his dependents. They describe the *procurador*'s office and relevant regulations, resembling a kind of internal report. The actual conditions of missionaries active in trading with Japan become clear through first-hand accounts. The document was intended to be passed on to succeeding *procurador*s, and I will term it here the Memorandum for the Japan *procurador* (hereafter the Memorandum).

2 Summary of the Memorandum for the Japan *Procurador*

Ana Proserpio Leitão included details about this manuscript in her Master's thesis for Lisbon University in 1994.[10] This extremely valuable information aims to reconstruct the trade between Japan and Macao in the frame of

7 Kōichirō Takase, "Nihon no Procurador no Kisoku" [The Regulation of the Procurador of Japan], in *Iesus-kai to Nippon* [The Society of Jesus and Japan], vol. 1 (Tokyo: Iwanami Shoten, 1981), 593–642; Takase."Shina ni Chūzaisuru Nihon no Procurador no Kisoku" [The Regulation of the Procurador of Japan Residing in China], in *Iesus-kai to Nippon*, vol. 1, 593–642.

8 Takase, "Kirishitan Kyōkai no Zaimu Tantō Padre"; Takase, "Kirishitan Kyōkai no Macao Chūzai Zaimu Tantō Padre."

9 Takase, "Shina ni Chūzaisuru Nihon no Procurador no Kisoku," 617–618.

10 Ana Maria Ramalho Proserpio Leitão, *Do trato português no Japão*, dissertação de mestrado da Faculdade de Universidade Clássica de Lisboa, 1994.

Portuguese India. However, she regards the Memorandum as a supplement to Valignano's Regulations, without noting their very different characters.

The Memorandum, as well as the two Regulations mentioned earlier, are included in the collection of Jesuítas na Ásia, volume 49-V-8, which mainly records missionary work in China and Vietnam, including only a few accounts from Japan. The documents contained in Jesuítas na *Ásia* were stored in the archive of St. Paul's College at Macao, having been included in a case that was sent to the Colegio Mayor de San Ildefonso at Manila in 1761, as well as to the Jesuit institutions in Lisbon, when the Jesuits had to close their bases in the Portuguese overseas territories under the regime of Sebastião José de Carvalho e Melo, the Marquis of Pombal.[11] I have investigated the manuscripts held by the Royal Academy of History at Madrid,[12] the National Historical Archive of Spain,[13] and the National Library of Spain,[14] where large quantities of the documents sent from Macao were restored, but I could not find the originals. The Memorandum faithfully reflects the situation surrounding proselytization in Japan in 1629, although differently from Valignano's Regulations. Therefore, it offers valuable information that allows us to think about the missionary work of the Jesuits and their economic problems in more detail.

3 Analysis of the Memorandum

3.1 *Author and Composition*

Who wrote the Memorandum, and what was the intended aim? On the manuscript, there is no indication of either of these points. It seems that the author was not known when the Jesuítas na Ásia collection was formed in the mid-18th century.[15] Yet the character of the writer is clearly expressed, and the Memorandum also includes information about the background to its composition.

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11 Archivo Histórico Nacional Madrid, Legajo Jesuitas 891–1, ff. 428–430v; Josef Franz Schütte, *Archivo documental español: "El archivo del Japón" vicisitudes del archivo jesuítico del extremo oriente y descripción del fondo existente en la Real Academia de la Historia de Madrid*, tomo XX (Madrid: Real Academia de la História, 1964), 76–77.

12 Biblioteca de la Real Academia de la História, Legajo 9–7236, 9–7236 (2), 9–7239, 9–7239 (2), 9–7239 (3), 9–7240 and 9–7331.

13 Archivo Histórico Nacional Madrid, Legajo Jesuitas 270, 271, 272.

14 Biblioteca Nacional Madrid, tomo 17620, 17621. Cf. Josef Franz Schütte, "Documentos del Archivo del Japón en la Biblioteca Nacional Madrilène," *Missionalia Hispanica* 27, no. 79 (1970): 59–88.

15 On the composition of this manuscript, see the following references: Josef Franz Schütte, "Descoberta de originais do Arquivo de Macau, base da colecção *Jesuítas na Ásia*," *Brotéria* 72, no. 1 (1961): 88–90; Schütte, "Vicissitudes do Arquivo do Japão enviado de Macau para

On three or four occasions, the author states: "Confirming the order by my superior, I enlarged and explained in detail some subjects to understand better." In other words, the Memorandum was written on the order of the author's superior, who was staying at Macao, as advice for the *procurador* who would succeed to the office.

In several passages, it is clear that the author served as *procurador* for a long time, and that the text was based on his experience. In Entry 3, for example, he explains how much easier it was to be a Christian mentor than a *procurador*, which was more troublesome. In the sixth and eighth entry, he states that he served as *procurador* at Macao and Nagasaki. Even more decisive is Entry 30, in which he writes: "It had already happened to me two years ago when the cargo from Japan did not arrive correctly." He was thus the *procurador* at Macao in 1627. We may conclude that the only person fitting all these conditions is João Rodrigues 'Tçuzu'.

Rodrigues is also known as author of the *História da Igreja do Japão* and *Arte de Lingoa de Japan*. Among the Jesuits, he was renowned for his knowledge of Japan's culture and the Japanese language, and even Tokugawa Ieyasu (徳川家康), the first Tokugawa shogun, liked him. It is also worth considering the long period during which he served as *procurador*—from 1598 until 1610 at Nagasaki, in that year transferring to Macao, where he was the Japan *procurador* from around 1622 until 1627, when he decided to resign. Yet even after this, he was frequently summoned for consultation on financial problems that concerned the Jesuits' Japan province.[16] In 1628, Rodrigues traveled to Beijing as translator for the Macao military during discussions with the Qin military, being dispatched on the order of the Ming court. It is possible to believe that he did not write the Memorandum during his stay in Macao, because it was included in reports from the Jesuits' Chinese province.

Rodrigues had the tendency to critically evaluate his fellow Jesuits,[17] and severely criticized them in his Memorandum. But all his criticism was factual.

Manila no ano de 1761," *Brotéria* 74, no. 2 (1962): 187–193; Schütte, "Macao ni atta Iesus-kai-shi no Tōyō Komonjo no Sai-Hakken ni tsuite" [On the Rediscovery of the Oriental Manuscripts of Jesuits, Which Were in Macao]," *Kirishitan Bunka Kenkyū-kai Kaihō* [Bulletin of Association for the Study of Kirishitan Culture] 4 (1961): 1–2; Schütte, *Archivo documental español*; Schütte, "Joseph Montanha-shi no 'Aparatos', narabini Ōritsu Portugal-shi Gakushi-in no Hatsugi ni yoru Iesus-kai Kyokutō Monjo-kan Shahon" [The "Aparatos" of Fr. José Montanha, and the Manuscripts from the Archive of the Society of Jesus in the Far-East by the initiative of the Academia Real da História Portuguesa], trans. Matsuda Kiichi, *Kirishitan Kenkyū* [Journal of Kirishitan Studies] 9 (1964): 274–336.

16 Michael Cooper, *Rodrigues, o Intérprete: Um Jesuíta no Japão e na China do século XVI*, trans. Tadeu Soares (Lisbon: Quetzal Editores, 2003), 366. [Michael Cooper, *Rodrigues the Interpreter: An Early Jesuit in Japan and China* (New York & Tokyo: Weatherhill, 1974).]

17 Ibid., 336.

Most correspondence of the Jesuits was sent to Europe in order to promote their activities, and tended to abbreviate or omit inconvenient material. The Memorandum, on the other hand, is a confidential work, as Entry 34 states: "to be read only by a few persons." It is therefore perfectly feasible that Rodrigues spoke his mind, and presented the Jesuits' real situation in Japan.

3.2 *Criticism of Past* Procuradores

Large parts of the Memorandum criticize past *procuradores*, including descriptions of their faults. In this section, I will examine these descriptions and investigate the extent to which Rodrigues thought their mismanagement damaged the financial situation in the Jesuits' Japan province. In the first entry, he mentions that in the past many priests did not possess the disposition that was appropriate for a *procurador*; a natural talent for the position was absolutely necessary. The faults that Rodrigues specifically describes are summarized below. It is clear that he based the Memorandum on the faults of past *procuradores*.

Example of Faults of Previous *Procuradores*:

- Because of forgetting to estimate a market price, bidding was lost (Ent. 2).
- Misreading of commercial value inflicted a heavy loss. For the same reason, the *procurador* was deceived by the Chinese (Ent. 2).
- Exchange of cheap cloth and raw silk without knowing the commodities' true value (Ent. 2).
- Losses made because trade was entrusted to men without substantial capital (Ent. 4).
- Owing to the *respondência*'s borrowing, the guild's debts increased (Ent. 5).
- Loss owing to loading textiles instead of taking money to make a quick profit (Ent. 6).
- Heavy loss made by not selling raw silk that was meant for sale in Nagasaki (Ent. 8).
- Loss made after trying to sell goods to Kyoto for a low price (Ent. 9).
- Loss made because the *procurador* leaked financial secrets to others (Ent. 11).
- Loss of 10,000 taels because a contract was not carefully studied and written down (Ent. 13).
- Silver was lent to someone who did not pay it back (Ent. 15).
- The entrusted silver received was not noted in the account book or in the protocol, leading to a loss of trust in the guild (Ent. 16).
- Because receipts and the expenditure of silver were not correctly noted in the account book, profits declined (Ent. 17).
- Loss made after being deceived by a number of Japanese who were pretending to be honest (Ent. 20).

- Lacking sincerity led to a loss of trust. As a result, a small amount of silver was not lent (Ent. 25).
- Loss made after not understanding the contract terms with Macao concerning goods and prices (Ent. 27).
- The risk of subordination to local lords or the Shogun after having received their help (Ent. 28).
- Wasting property on local lords or the Shogun after they showed kindness (Ent. 28).
- Rushing to send inventories and reports to Macao and thereby making mistakes (Ent. 30).
- Making a great loss because the extravagances of the *procurador*'s superior (the Provincial) could not be stopped (Ent. 31).
- Loss of silver and serious mistakes by the *procurador* in relation to the Shogunate's trust (Ent. 35).
- Causing losses after supplying padres with goods before receiving their financial report relating to the preceding fiscal year (Appendix Ent. 4).

Even after a quick glance at these entries, it becomes obvious how carefully Rodrigues observed the work of several *procuradores* and how well he understood the general picture of Jesuit trade with Japan. The document most closely resembles merchant family regulations. The examples of mismanagement derive mostly from "lacking knowledge of the market and estimation," "carelessness in regard to the contact with Japanese," and "carelessness with regard to the account." One can easily pick up here Rodrigues's self-confidence after his long experience as *procurador*. The time during which he participated in the financial affairs of the Jesuits comprised most of his life, until his death in 1633 or 1634.

Rodrigues writes that the mistakes of past *procuradores* brought about the Jesuits' debts. Soon after he took office, having succeeded Sebastião Vieira as *procurador* in Macao, the adjusted account for the Japan province in 1624 showed a profit of 12,612 taels and a debt of 12,566 taels.[18]

Takase makes it clear that from around 1607 the Japan province of the Jesuits produced a deficit, which it could not recover until trading ended.[19] The finances began to slip into the red during Rodrigues's term as *procurador* at Nagasaki, but until that time the assets were fluctuating. Rodrigues's successors were also perceived to be as not without fault. Sebastião Vieira, who followed him as *procurador* at Nagasaki (1609–12), had a bad reputation, and

18 Kōichirō Takase, "Kirishitan Kyōkai no Shisan to Fusai" [The Asset and Debt of the Kirishitan Church], in *Kirishitan Jidai no Kenkyū*, 253.

19 Ibid., 257.

it was reported that he caused many problems for proselytization in Japan.[20] Although his successor, Carlo Spinola, had an outstanding ability for understanding economic problems, he also created considerable debts for the Jesuits through the accumulation of loans that used *respondência* contracts.[21] Rodrigues's criticism was mainly directed at these two men. The next section will deal in more detail with the *procurador*'s office and maritime loans.

As previously mentioned, Rodrigues is not above criticizing others in the Memorandum. He also seems to be perpetually reflecting on his own term as *procurador*. One of his characteristics was that he was on friendly terms with the rulers of his time through the good offices of an agent who handled trading. Rodrigues was entrusted with silver by Toyotomi Hideyoshi and Tokugawa Ieyasu and bought goods from Macao through an agent.[22] Entry 35 states that one should not be entrusted with silver by rulers, and the fact that this is emphasized in the third addition seems to indicate that this instruction is based on bitter experience. Rodrigues laid "extreme importance" in Entries 35 and 36 on "not having Japanese as assistants." These two entries possibly note the main lessons he learned.

3.3 *A Comparison with Valignano's Regulations*

The Memorandum has a different style to the Regulations, yet they are related. A short comparison will follow.

At the beginning of the Memorandum, Rodrigues states: "Father Valignano wrote in the same way several instructions for the Japan *procurador*. These should be read." He declares that the basic duties of the *procurador* were fixed by the Regulations that Valignano had written for the Japan and Macao *procuradores*. Yet, based on his own thoughts and experiences, Rodrigues demonstrates that in the almost forty years since Valignano's Regulations were written, the situation for missionary work in Japan had completely changed. In practical terms, it would be inconvenient to attempt to comply with the Regulations exactly.

Rodrigues gives completely contrary descriptions to those in Valignano's Regulations regarding being entrusted with silver by political authorities, lending silver, and having *armação* contracts with Macao. Concerning the first

20 Takase, "Kirishitan Kyōkai no Zaimu Tantō Padre," 518–519.

21 Kōichirō Takase, "Kirishitan Kyōkai no Shikin Chōtatsu" [The Financing of the Kirishitan Church], in *Kirishitan Jidai no Kenkyū*, 296–313.

22 Kōichirō Takase, "Kirishitan Senkyō-shi no Keizai Katsudō: Tokuni Bōeki no Assen ni tsuite" [Economic Activities of the Kirishitan Missionaries: Especially on the Mediation of the Trade], in *Kirishitan Jidai no Kenkyū*, 562–563.

TABLE 6.1 Comparison between the Regulations and the Memorandum

Subject	Valignano's Regulations	Rodrigues' Memorandum
Relation to the superior	To follow one's superiors apart from the duties of the *procurador* (J4; M13)	Sometimes the superior (mainly Provincials or Vice-Provincials) and the *procurador* are opposed to each other (31)
Agent merchants	Business should be entrusted to a faithful and believing merchant (J5)	Business should be entrusted to a wealthy lay merchant (4)
Entrusted silver from political leaders	Entrustment is to be noted correctly in the account book including the purchased goods (J12); in the case of taking silver, the superior has to be notified (J16)	Entrusted silver should not be taken from political leaders (35)
Daily records for shipping to Macao	Before the ship leaves, a list of goods to be purchased in the following year should be written and signed by the superior (J18)	Sometimes, superiors are signing without understanding the account book (33)
Management of the keys of the safe	The superior and the *procurador* each hold one key (J19); the *procurador* alone holds the keys (P)	Sometimes Japanese fellow lodgers or Japanese brothers had been entrusted with the keys. In these cases, the contents were secretly stolen (12; S7)
Loans	Concerning loans of money and goods, the superior's instructions are to be followed (J20)	Silver and other important goods are not to be lent (15; S2)
Portuguese and Japanese merchants	Without orders from the superior, neither Portuguese nor Japanese shall open a lawsuit (J22)	Be careful not to hurt the feelings of Portuguese and Japanese merchants (24)

TABLE 6.1 Comparison between the Regulations and the Memorandum (*cont.*)

Subject	Valignano's Regulations	Rodrigues' Memorandum
***Armação* contracts**	A contract with the city of Macao for raw silk worth 50 picos per year is to be kept (J31, 32)	Contracts with the city of Macao shall be annulled as quickly as possible (26)
Dealing with Chinese	Not to be involved in direct dealings with the Chinese (M3)	Worthless goods have been purchased from the Chinese for high prices (2)
Gold investments	Except for the raw silk covered by *armação* contracts, gold is to be bought and shipped (M8)	Gold has not been purchased. There has been a loss through buying textiles, which make small profits (6)

J = Japan *procurador*/ M = Macao *procurador*/ P = Pasio's revision
S = Supplement of the Memorandum

point, about receiving silver from rulers, Valignano writes that "if one's superior allows it, it is rightful to receive it." Pasio states in his revisions of around 1612 that it was "originally forbidden." In Pasio's time, being entrusted with silver was already regarded as dangerous. Rodrigues writes from his own experience that one should not take such silver, even if, for example, the ban on Christianity is lifted or the persecutions stop. Regarding the loan of silver, Valignano gives his permission if "the superior orders it," but Rodrigues suggests its prohibition. He writes in his Memorandum that "before Valignano decided on this Regulation it was sternly forbidden." Approving silver loans was therefore Valignano's decision, and it had, according to Rodrigues, many negative effects.

Rodrigues further proposes a change to the content of the *armação* contract (concerning the Jesuits' annual sale of 50 picos of raw silk in Japan) that Valignano had entered into at Macao. This *armação* contract was the foundation for the Jesuits' trade profits. Rodrigues did not propose in his negotiations with Macao that this contract should be humbly abandoned, but emphasized that this right should naturally have been given and that the amount of raw silk should be increased from 50 to 100 picos. Rodrigues refers specifically to Valignano's Regulations, and agrees on the point about purchasing gold. Valignano

reasoned in favor of the gold trade by saying that it "can be traded with as it is not bulky, not openly noticed, and does not lead to tumult."[23]

Rodrigues affirms Valignano's opinion by stating that the gold trade "can be trusted, is safe, is an article with small risks, is absorbing a large amount of silver, goes publicly unnoticed and helps without doubt to increase profits. A hundred gold bars can be brought secretly in a small chamber or two jars without specifying the address." Especially after the prohibition of Christianity, the Japan *procurador* sent large amounts of gold to Japan to exchange it for silver (Entry 8).

3.4 *The Galleon* Nossa Senhora da Graça

The income from the Japanese trade undertaken by the Jesuits was founded on the sale of raw silk. Rodrigues's words in Entry 6 deserve attention: "As André Pessoa's case in this year, as other cases in other years, the profits gained from gold are those that remained for us. There is much meaning in this, as understanding people will understand." The year referred to is the year of the galleon *Nossa Senhora da Graça*. As mentioned in Chapter 4, André Pessoa was the Capitão-mór on the ship *Nossa Senhora da Graça* (hereafter *Graça*) when it was attacked by the forces of Arima Harunobu in 1610. When it sank beyond the bay of Nagasaki, a large amount of raw silk belonging to the Jesuits was lost. The economic impact on the Jesuits' trade with Japan was substantial.[24] Yet Rodrigues noted that he could avoid problems even in a year like that thanks to his dealings in gold.

On the gold business undertaken by the Jesuits, Takase's research is detailed; it will be abbreviated here.[25] Wealthy Macao citizens entrusted gold to the Jesuits, to be traded at Nagasaki. Such gold should have been on board the *Graça* and would have shared the fate of the silk. But when most of the *Graça*'s cargo had been loaded in the bay of Nagasaki, priests from the city unloaded the gold and hurriedly changed it into silver.

After they had done this, they did not load the silver onto the *Graça* to send it to Macao, as they were supposed to do, but decided to pass it directly to the owners of the gold. Then, after engaging with troops from Arima, the *Graça* sank. Although the gold and the silver that had been exchanged for the merchants in Macao had not actually been loaded, the Jesuits used the maritime

23 Takase, "Nihon no Procurador no Kisoku"; Takase, "Shina ni Chūzaisuru Nihon no Procurador no Kisoku," 602.

24 Kōichirō Takase, "Kirishitan Jidai ni okeru 'Kyōshō'" ["Religious-Merchants" in the Kirishitan Period], in *Kirishitan Jidai Taigai Kankei no Kenkyū*, 473.

25 Takase, "Kirishitan Kyōkai no Shikin Chōtatsu," 282–290.

loss as a reason for disclaiming responsibility: in the case of a shipwreck the owner of the business had limited liability.

They asserted the silver had been lost and they didn't have any reimbursement obligations. Later, the merchants of Macao,[26] who had entrusted the Jesuits with their gold, learned that silver of equivalent value had not been lost. They demanded reimbursement from the Jesuits and took legal action. Entry 6, quoted earlier, alludes to the fact that the Jesuits did not return the profits from the gold to its owners. The suggestive wording indicates that the Jesuits did not consider this case should be made public.

In the same year that André Pessoa entered the port of Nagasaki, a junk belonging to another Portuguese trader arrived from Macao loaded with between 200 and 225 picos of raw silk (equivalent to 12 tons) and around a hundred cases of brocade. This ship was operated by Vicente Rodrigues, son-in-law of the wealthy merchant Pedro Martins Gaio, who made a huge fortune as agent merchant for the Jesuits. Normally, this ship's cargo would have competed with the *Graça*'s, and would only have achieved low prices from its Japanese trade. But because the *Graça* and all its cargo had sunk, extremely high prices were realized.[27] Entry 8 of the Memorandum states that "from the year of the arrival of the ships belonged to André Pessoa and by Pêro Martins Gaio, we still have stocked textiles in our storerooms. These had already taken damage and cannot be priced." Goods belonging to the Jesuits had not been shipped on board Vicente Rodrigues's ship,[28] as textiles had been carried by the *Graça* to Nagasaki. These textiles were not sold and turned out to be useless. From this, we know that not all goods belonging to the Jesuits sank together with the *Graça*. Those textiles and other goods that had been unloaded were not immediately sold at Nagasaki, but were leftovers and thus a loss for the Jesuits.

During the period from July 29, 1609, when the *Graça* arrived in the port of Nagasaki, until Arima's forces attacked the ship and it was sunk on January 6 of the following year, a substantial traffic in goods had therefore taken place. As was the custom, "at first trade with goods other than raw silk is to be carried out and the raw silk traded all together after that."[29] One has to conclude that

26 Among these Macao merchants, there was João Batista Nassi, who seems to have been a kinsman of the Nassi family. Members of the Nassi family escaping from the persecution in the Iberian Peninsula emigrated to the Ottoman Empire, achieving success and exerting power there. Takase, "Kirishitan Jidai ni okeru 'Kyōshō."

27 Takase, "Kirishitan Jidai ni okeru 'Kyōshō,'" 491.

28 Ibid., 484–487.

29 Kōichirō Takase, "Sakoku Izen no Itowappu to Pancada-Pancado Torihiki" [The *Itowappu* System and Pancado-Pancada Trade before the National Seclusion], in *Kirishitan Jidai no Bōeki to Gaikō* [Trade and Diplomacy in the Kirishitan Period] (Tokyo: Yagi Shoten, 2002), 164.

textiles and other goods were unloaded and sold at the market, and that the consideration in silver for these goods was on board.

In addition, the raw silk was still on the *Graça*. It remained there for six months, sunk in the ocean, because the merchants of Macao had not accepted the price offered by the Japanese and the business had been difficult to establish.[30] Nakamura Tadashi makes it clear that small amounts of the raw silk were sold on board the ship without unloading the whole cargo.[31] It is therefore necessary to cast doubts on the general understanding that the *Graça* sank "with all of its cargo."[32]

The Memorandum notes in Entry 27 that despite the guarantee to unload the raw silk belonging to the Jesuits immediately on arrival at Nagasaki, one *procurador* (Sebastião Vieira) did not do this, and therefore caused the Society to suffer a substantial loss. This description clearly points to the raw silk that was being shipped on the *Graça*. Vieira had the right to unload this silk, unlike the raw silk belonging to the merchants of Macao, but it remained on board and was lost.

In principle, Rodrigues was following Valignano's Regulations in his clarifications, but he made recommendations according to the prevailing conditions and his experience as *procurador*. These recommendations were biased towards the duties of the *procurador* at Nagasaki, because he had spent a long time in that position.

3.5 *Warnings during the Ban on Christianity*

In the Memorandum, there frequently appears the expression "faced with reduced circumstances" (*fissocu* = *hissoku* 逼塞 in modern usage). This is defined, in the *Vocabulário da Língua do Japão*,[33] as having the meaning of being "hidden and locked up, secluded and not appearing in public, and as a verb."[34] To express the secret pursuit of the Jesuits' missionary work while Christianity

30 Tadashi Nakamura, *Kinsei Nagasaki Bōeki-shi no Kenkyū* [Study of the History of the Trade at Nagasaki in the Early Modern Period] (Tokyo: Yoshikawa Kōbunkan, 1988), 106; Takashi Gonoi, "1610 Nen Nagasaki-oki ni okeru *Madre de Deus* Gō Yakiuchi ni Kansuru Hōkokusho" [Report about the Ship *Madre de Deus*, Set on Fire off the Coast of Nagasaki in 1610], *Kirishitan Kenkyū* [Journal of Kirishitan Studies] 16 (1976): 301–364.

31 Nakamura, *Kinsei Nagasaki Bōeki-shi no Kenkyū*, 106.

32 Tatsuichirō Akizuki & Kan Yamada (supervision), *Nagasaki Jiten: Rekishi-hen* [Encyclopedia of Nagasaki: Part of History] (Nagasaki: Nagasaki Bunken-sha, 1982), 57–58.

33 Mitsunobu Ōtsuka (ed.), *Évora-bon Nichi-Po Jisho*, Vocabulario da lingoa de Iapam: Évora Edition (Osaka: Seibundō Shuppan, 1998; originally published 1603).

34 The original text in Portuguese is "Estar escondido, ou encerrado, ou retraido não saindo a publico. vt. Fissocusuru."

was banned and persecutions were taking place, the Japanese word *fissocu* is used. This general expression was used among priests to describe their situation. Rodrigues raised matters of concern for the Japan *procurador* that were highlighted because of the *fissocu* situation. His main points are summarized here:

1. Trustworthy Japanese and Portuguese agent merchants at Nagasaki are required. Maintain one house for trading with them. Neither the merchant nor the Jesuit shall go there when it is not necessary (Entry 4).
2. Priests are not allowed to meet each other, and they should never gather at the residence [*casa*] of the *procurador*. If a priest under *fissocu* comes to the *procurador*'s house, he is not to be supplied with food and lodging (Entry 29, Supplement 6).
3. In case it is difficult to secretly contact the superior, the *procurador* should rely on his own judgment if it is necessary (Entry 34).

It is obvious from these three points that the preservation and security of the *procurador*'s function was essential even when Christianity was prohibited in Japan.

According to our current knowledge, Manuel Borges served as the final *procurador* in Nagasaki.[35] Takase writes that Borges's term of office ran at least until 1626, adding that "it is still not clear for how long Borges fulfilled his duties as *procurador* and who followed him." Borges was born in 1586 in Évora in the region of Alentejo in Portugal. He traveled to Japan in 1612 as a missionary, and succeeded Cristóvão Ferreira in 1622 as Japan *procurador*. He was called to Macao as *procurador* but eventually remained in Japan to continue his missionary work. In the end, he was arrested in Bungo (today's Oita) together with a Japanese fellow lodger named Sukezaemon and many guards. He was escorted to the Omura prison near Nagasaki.[36] On August 16, 1633, he was martyred.[37] By coincidence, the leader of proselytization in Japan, Cristóvão Ferreira, was captured in the same year at Nagasaki and denounced in October. When Ferreira was in prison at Nagasaki and about a month before his renunciation, he wrote a letter dated September 6, 1633 to Andre Palmeiro,

35 Takase, "Kirishitan Kyōkai no Zaimu Tantō Padre," 520.

36 Takashi Gonoi, *Nihon Kirishitan-shi no Kenkyū* [Study of the History of the Kirishitan in Japan] (Tokyo: Yoshikawa Kōbunkan, 2002), 314; Gonoi, "Kinsei ka ni okeru Ōmura-han to Kirishitan Senkyō-shi: Ōmura-han no Gun'eki wo Chūshin tosite" [The Omura Clan under the Ban on Christianity and the Christian Missionaries: Especially on the Military Service of the Omura Clan], *Nagasaki Dansō*, 71 (1986).

37 Gonoi, *Nihon Kirishitan-shi no Kenkyū*, 356–357.

the Visitador priest residing at Macao. He wrote about the proselytization and martyrdom taking place in Japan in 1632 and 1633 in great detail:

> For two months, eleven missionaries, eight Jesuits, two Dominicans, and one Augustinian have been interned in this prison. [...] From September last year to January this year more than twenty-three clergymen died, faced martyrdom or were captured. [...] In this prison are altogether eleven men affiliated with the Society of Jesus. [...] Five from the Omura prison have already suffered their martyrdom.[38]

At the beginning of this letter, Ferreira writes that he impatiently awaits the time of his own martyrdom. Since the persecutions had begun, it was one of Ferreira's duties to send a list of martyrs' names to Macao as part of his annual report.[39] The ability to collect information about martyrdoms and to send it from inside the prison provides evidence of a network of organized followers among the merchants of Macao and the Japanese who were supporting the missionaries. Ferreira did not write specifically about Borges's martyrdom, which had taken place the month before this letter was composed, but he might have been one of the mentioned "five from the Omura prison."

There is no confirmatory evidence that Borges was the Japan *procurador* until his death. Yet, with regard to the first of the three points that Rodrigues noted when he considered the circumstances around the prohibition of Christianity, there was no need for the *procurador* to reside at Nagasaki when the inquiry of Christians became more severe, if business could be entrusted to the agent merchants. The *procurador*'s role was to guarantee trading profits in order to maintain the Japan province, even if living at Nagasaki became impossible. Rodrigues's second point indicates the importance of avoiding being conspicuous to ensure the *procurador*'s safety. The third point is further confirmation that for their safety the superior and the *procurador* need not act together. Until 1633, Ferreira was the leading missionary in Japan and Borges was active as *procurador*. In this way they functioned as the two pillars that maintained the Japan province. Without either of them, the proselytism undertaken by the Jesuits in Japan would have come to an end.

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38 Letter of Cristóvão Ferreira to the visitor André Palmeiro, from Nagasaki, dated September 6, 1633. Biblioteca Nacional de Portugal, Códice MSS. 7640, f. 71rv.

39 Hubert Cieslik, "Cristóvão Ferreira no Kenkyū" [Study on Cristóvão Ferreira], *Kirishitan Kenkyū* [Journal of Kirishitan Studies] 26 (1986): 89–93.

3.6 *Information on the Market in Japan*

Rodrigues also describes in the Memorandum his knowledge of Japan and the Japanese people; this was based on his direct experience but also depends on hearsay. The situation in around 1629 was not necessarily the same as he had experienced, yet the Memorandum is a valuable source for the beginning of the 17th century.

3.7 *Raw Silk Prices and* Pancada

"The leading price at Nagasaki is the best price for selling raw silk. Trying to suddenly increase the price by holding back will lead to losses" (Entry 8).

In 1604, the *itowappu* system was established. Most of the raw silk from Macao merchant ships arrived to be sold together (as *pancada*). The Jesuits' raw silk was an exception and not subject to *itowappu*. The "leading price at Nagasaki" is therefore the *pancada* price. Rodrigues points out that higher profits might be achieved if the Society's raw silk was also sold for the *pancada* price. He was obviously involved in deciding the *pancada* price,[40] so could adjust it to his own benefit. His understanding was that "even if the first price rises it will rise only slightly. But if the price falls it will fall on a large scale." In the next entry, he adds that "a good merchant has to know how to make little loss if he wants to gain profit." In case not everything was sold at *pancada*, the price could be decided without moving too far away from the market price. It is commonly thought that selling raw silk apart from *pancada* was a privilege of the Jesuits.[41] Rodrigues knew from his own experience that it was safer to sell together with other Portuguese, for this meant that the customer would be a large company.

He also points out (Entry 9) that trying to sell goods not in Nagasaki but in Japan's capital Kyoto would lead to leftovers. When other religious orders attacked the Jesuits for being inseparable from trade, Rodrigues's defense was that the Society "gives the raw silk to the *procurador* who, after sailing with their ships, sends it to Christian merchants at Kyoto or at Sakai-central commercial city close to Osaka. They sell it at their custom without the Jesuits being involved."[42]

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40 Kōichirō Takase, "Kyōkai Shiryō wo tōshite Mita Itowappu" [The *Itowappu* System Seen through Ecclesiastical Documents], in *Kirishitan Jidai no Bōeki to Gaikō*, 127–128.

41 Valentim Carvalho, "Valentim Carvalho Bembaku-sho (Apologia do Japão; Refutation),"trans. and notes Kōichirō Takase, in *Iesus-kai to Nippon*, vol. 2 (Tokyo: Iwanami Shoten, 1988), 457–458.

42 Kōichirō Takase (trans. and notes), "Nihon ni oite Ikyōto-tachi no Kaishū ni Jūji shite iru Iesus-kaishi-tachi ni taishite 1617 Nen 1 Gatsu Roma ni oite Francisco-kai no Ichi Shūdōshi ga Hirometa Chūshō Bunsho e no Kaitō" [Reply to the Slander Document Spread by a

Even if it was an exaggeration to say that Jesuits were not involved, it is highly likely that raw silk was sent to agents at Kyoto and Sakai. This can be deduced from Rodrigues's description of large leftovers of textiles at Kyoto. Sending the Jesuits' raw silk to the region around Kyoto was therefore a custom. Rodrigues was dissatisfied with this method, and regarded sales at Nagasaki to be ideal.

Rodrigues also opposed the idea of setting up a shop at Nagasaki when the *procurador* of the Jesuits asked for his opinion (Entry 23). It is interesting to speculate whether this proposal had been around for a while or had come to the fore in order to prepare for a potential relaxation of the ban on Christianity. Yet in any case it was Rodrigues's policy to leave everything related to trade to his agents. His view was that the Jesuits should avoid becoming deeply involved in first-hand trade operations.

3.8 *Textiles*

"Our textiles from the year of André Pessoa and Pêro Martins still exist. They have been damaged and cannot be priced" (Entry 8).

Arguments about handling textiles other than raw silk in the trade with Japan had repeatedly been made inside the Jesuits. At the province council held at Macao in 1620, it was decided that goods feasible for trade, apart from raw silk, were gold, musk, and ambergris. Textiles were bulky, and to judge them required experience and good sense.[43] In Entry 2 of the Memorandum, Rodrigues gives examples of Macao merchants being tricked by the Chinese in the silk damask trade.

At this time, the amount of brocade grew to the same as that of raw silk.[44] From 1609 until 1629, when Rodrigues wrote the Memorandum, unsold textiles were left to decay in the warehouse. Textiles were a risky commodity not only with regard to their purchase at Macao but also in terms of their trading in Japan.

3.9 *Silver Screening*

"There is a secret in minting silver in Japan. Not knowing the screening method will lead to great loss" (Entries 14 and 19).

Franciscan Friar in January 1617 in Rome against the Jesuits who Engaged in the Conversion of Infidels in Japan], in *Iesus-kai to Nippon*, vol. 2, 352.

43 Kōichirō Takase, "Kirishitan Kyōkai no Bōeki Katsudō: Tokuni Kiito Igai no Shōhin ni tsuite" [Trade Activities of the Kirishitan Church: Especially Products Other than the Raw Silk], in *Kirishitan Jidai Taigai Kankei no Kenkyū*, 245–256.

44 Ibid.

Rodrigues recommended listening to the advice of those who understood the screening method. He further recommended being careful when purchasing refined silver by cupellation (*haibukigin*) and silver coins (*chogin*). According to Valentim Carvalho's Refutation, "In one year the king sent silver refined by cupellation. Its purity is higher than the regular seda silver and earnings are up to 4 to 5 percent.[45] At Guangzhou this silver is used to purchase raw silk and other commodities."[46] In short, cupellation silver was more highly valued at Guangzhou for purchasing raw silk because of its high purity. Seda silver was regarded as "regular silver" because *chogin* were overwhelmingly flowing out of Japan.[47] According to Kobata Atsushi, the value ratio for seda silver and *chogin* silver was 88 to 100 and that for cupellation silver to *chogin* silver was 84 to 100. The ratio for soma silver, which was regarded as the best, was 81 to 100.[48] Cupellation silver therefore had 1.04 times the value of seda silver. Carvalho was right. Possibly the *chogin* silver coins circulating in Japan were recoined at Macao, being made into higher purity seda silver before being used for purchasing in Guangzhou. It is not yet clear exactly where the silver was recoined.

In the same passage, Rodrigues writes: "even if we acquire it and I describe it here, everyone reading this without experience would have difficulties understanding it." At least he seems to have known about the screening method, but if other Jesuits wished to acquire the technique, they would have to befriend a minting specialist.

3.10 *Rodrigues's View of the Japanese People*

At every turn in the Memorandum, Rodrigues mentions his distrust of the Japanese, as the following examples will make obvious: "Japanese people are greedy and secretly steal silver" (Entry 18); "People in Nagasaki especially are greedy in getting profit though they never show it on their face" (Entry 20); "one should not make a Japanese Irmão [Brother] an assistant of the *procurador*" (Entry 36, Supplement 7).

In particular, he repeats that one should not trust Japanese colleagues, fellow lodgers, or their servants. This is "extremely important," he adds at the end.

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45 "Seda" means "silk" in Portuguese. On increasing the productivity of silver in Japan, a large quantity of silver was employed to buy Chinese commodities that the Portuguese used to bring, especially Chinese silks. Japanese started using the word "sedagin" to indicate high-quality silver.

46 Carvalho, "Valentim Carvalho Bembaku-sho," 500.

47 Atsushi Kobata, *Kin-gin Bōeki-shi no Kenkyū* [A Study on the Trade of Gold and Silver] (Tokyo: Hosei University Press, 1976), 36–54.

48 Ibid., 39–40.

Carlo Spinola, who succeeded Rodrigues as *procurador* at Nagasaki when the latter left for Japan in 1610, further demonstrated what the Jesuits from Europe felt about the Japanese Irmãos and their fellows. In the Memorandum, the criticism of the Japanese is based on Rodrigues's personal experience, but it was not unusual for contemporary missionaries to warn against those Japanese who attended the Jesuits' meetings. Records indicate that Japanese members bore unfavorable testimony at the magistrate's office with regard to the *Graça*. Inside the Jesuits, discrimination according to race and the discontent that resulted from this clearly existed.[49]

Rodrigues was fluent in Japanese and on friendly terms with rulers such as Hideyoshi and Ieyasu. He also had a deep knowledge of Japanese culture. Therefore, his severe criticism of the Japanese was probably not unrelated to his forced release from the *procurador*'s office and his transfer to Macao in 1610. As earlier scholarship demonstrates, the main reason for this was his dispute with the prefectural Governor of Nagasaki, Murayama Toan.[50] At first, Rodrigues was close to Toan, even saying that he "was advised in everything about my work from him."[51] Yet, having gained an impression that he had been betrayed, he left Japan behind.

4 Japanese Silver and the *Procurador*

In the Memorandum, there are many interesting passages regarding the relationship of the Jesuits with silver loaned from Japanese dealers to the *procurador* and *respondência* contracts. I will investigate them in this section.

4.1 *The Jesuits and Entrusted Silver*

Entrusted silver by Japanese and *respondência* contracts were part of the silver investment business in which the Jesuits were deeply involved. The main difference between these two financial methods was that the former was a simple

49 Takase, "Kirishitan Jidai ni okeru 'Kyōshō,'" 482.

50 Arcadio Schwade, "João Rodrigues Tsuihō no Shinsō" [The Truth on the Expel of João Rodrigues], *Jochi shigaku* [Historical Studies] 12 (1967); Cooper, *Rodrigues, o Intérprete*, 74; Kōichirō Takase, "Nagasaki Daikan Murayama Tōan wo meguru Hitotsu no Dekigoto" [An Event over the Chief Administrator of Nagasaki, Murayama Tōan], in *Kirishitan Jidai Taigai Kankei no Kenkyū*, 631–636.

51 Takase, "Nagasaki Daikan Murayama Tōan wo meguru Hitotsu no Dekigoto," 632. The original text: Letter of the Bishop of Japan Luís Cerqueira to the Superior General of the Society of Jesus, from Nagasaki, dated March 1, 1607. Archivum Romanum Societatis Iesu, Jap-sin 21-I, f. 137.

money transfer from the investor to the investment, whereas the latter was a loan with high interest rates. From the beginning of the Jesuit missionary work in Japan, the *daimyō* (local lords) called on the Jesuits to purchase foreign products using Portuguese ships.[52] The goal of the Jesuits was not to gain profit with this silver as capital but to use the political elite's interest in trade in order to receive approval for their missionary work. Even though the use of entrusted silver was unavoidable, Valignano notes that for the Jesuits it was "extremely troublesome."[53] He declares in his Regulations that "without order of the superior neither Japanese nor Portuguese shall entrust money from outsiders to China" (Entry 16.) Being entrusted with silver was not desirable, but on the order of the superior it was unavoidable and therefore possible. At the same time, Valignano makes it especially clear that one should:

> Note the money received from feudal lords to be sent to China in the account book. After the arrival of the ships and the money is returned to the lords it should be cleared from the account book, with the delivered commodities bought from their silver being noted in it. This should be kept in mind together with the usual caution. The reason is that these transactions take place in many *casas* the same as it took place in the past. (Entry 12)

Thus, it was not only the *procurador* who received silver but also many other Jesuits. In around 1615, the amount of money the Japanese invested through the Jesuits in trade with Macao was about 30,000–40,000 taels per year, and sometimes up to 70,000 taels.[54]

Receiving entrusted silver was unavoidable for the Jesuits, and there is no doubt that it sustained their missionary work in Japan. Rodrigues was firm when it came to taking entrusted silver from political leaders:

> From the beginning of the trade from China to Japan, the Japanese rulers asked the priest João Rodrigues, with whom they had a deep credit, to transport several things they wanted, such as textiles with rare designs, on ships from China. This priest requested these things from his fellow Portuguese Jesuits in China, who had experience of them. When the

52 Takase, "Kirishitan Senkyō-shi no Keizai Katsudō," 554.

53 Ibid., 554–555.

54 Kōichirō Takase, "Kirishitan to Tōitsu Kenryoku" [Kirishitans and the Unified Authority], in *Kirishitan Jidai no Bunka to Shosō* [Culture and Other Various Aspects of the Kirishitan Period] (Tokyo: Yagi Shoten, 2001), 26.

> ships arrived in Japan he reserved the goods to the rulers. He was well received by them. Therefore he brought benefits to the Jesuits and the Christian world.[55]

In other words, Rodrigues used entrusted silver that he received in order to build and maintain friendly relations with the political rulers to the maximum degree possible. However, he was in general opposed to receiving entrusted silver. In the Memorandum he writes: "even if dealings with the *Tenka-dono* (Lord with the supremacy) lead to a large patronage, believing it is dangerous and will definitely result in great losses" (Entry 35). His opposition is also visible in two further passages (Entries 1 and 3), which show how important this point was for him.

Again, in Entry 28, he warns about becoming too close to the *Tenka-dono* and local lords. In this entry, he writes about one *procurador* who in his dealings with the *Tenka-dono* frequently went to the capital Kyoto and spent large amounts of money in vain. The expression *Tenka-dono* often appears in Jesuit sources concerning Japan, and means the country's ruler: most often it was used either for Toyotomi Hideyoshi or Tokugawa Ieyasu. Of all the Jesuits who arrived in Japan in the 16th and 17th centuries, Rodrigues was possibly the priest with the closest relationships with the political leaders. If he was indeed the author of the Memorandum, he clearly had the opportunity to reflect on his activities in Japan.

4.2 *The Ban on Christianity and Entrusted Silver*

Entry 35 of the Memorandum contains a description that is difficult to understand:

> Many of our Society obeyed the method [of making external persons trade with entrusted silver]; with God on our side, we have been safe in Japan. For this reason we have failed and lost [ended]. This kind of dealing brings no salvation to the Society of Jesus; it is neither convenient nor does it make sense or serve the prosperity of our Christian faith.

This description gives the impression that the missionaries were expelled from Japan because of their trade in entrusted silver. To illuminate the background of the Shogunate's policy concerning its prohibition of Christianity in

55 Takase, "Nihon ni oite Ikyōto-tachi no Kaishū ni Jūji shite iru Iesus-kaishi-tachi ni taishite 1617 Nen 1 Gatsu Roma ni oite Francisco-kai no Ichi Shūdōshi ga hirometa Chūshō Bunsho e no Kaitō," 352–353.

1612 until the banishment order that was imposed on the missionaries in 1614, several causes have been investigated.[56] As an after-effect of the *Graça* incident of 1609–10 came the fraud affair that involved a retainer of Tokugawa, Okamoto Daihachi. The missionary activities of Spanish friars were regarded as an extension of Spanish territorial ambitions, and there were a number of problems with Christians alongside the illegal minting of silver.

A causal relationship between the Jesuits' trade with entrusted silver and the expulsion of missionaries, and the subsequent prohibition of Christianity, was drawn in a written exchange between the Franciscan friar Sebastian de San Pedro and the Jesuits. The relevant passage reads as follows:

> The emperor [Ieyasu] used to send annually an amount of silver to Macao. He sends this silver to invest it in the purchase of various unique and rare articles. Jesuits in Japan, as mentioned above, are deeply concerned in the ships and investments. Because they are constantly dealing with them, they are responsible. On the allowance of the emperor and in the name of the emperor's property, they acquire what they wish for themselves and hand it over to him. But at the same time he does not request a financial report. In this year their relationship with Hasegawa Sahyoe [the governor of Nagasaki] was damaged and therefore Hasegawa requested an accounting bill from them. I do not know how this turned out. That is to say, the emperor and everybody is calling the above-mentioned Jesuits as thieves.[57]

Usually, Ieyasu did not ask for a financial report on the entrusted silver. But in this year (from the context around 1610–12) a legal case was brought before the magistrate of Nagasaki, Hasegawa Sahyoe, between Vicente Rodrigues and the red-seal merchant Funamoto Yashichiro.[58]

The magistrate's office showed interest in the conditions regarding Vicente's participation in the Jesuits' entrusted trade, and therefore demanded a

56 On the background of the ban on Christianity by the Shogunate, various views are well summarized in the following article: Takashi Gonoi, "Tokugawa Bakufu Shoki no Kinkyō Seisaku: Keichō 18 Nen 12 Gatsu Hatsurei no Kinkyō-rei wo Chūshin ni shite" [Ban Policy on Christianity in the Early Stage of the Tokugawa Shogunate: Particularly on the Act of Ban Issued in December Keicho 18], in *Tokugawa Shoki Kirishitan-shi Kenkyū* [Study on the History of the Kirishitan in the Early Stage of the Tokugawa Period] (Tokyo: Yoshikawa Kōbunkan, 1983), 119–154.

57 Testimony of Sebastian de San Pedro, dated May 12, 1617. In Takase, *Iesus-kai to Nippon*, vol. 2, 328.

58 Takase, "Kirishitan Jidai ni okeru 'Kyōshō,'" 494.

financial statement from him. When irregularities were discovered in the report, Ieyasu was extremely hurt. Against San Pedro's attacks, the Jesuit Father Carvalho, who was in charge of the superior in Japan, gave further details in his Refutation, together with the Jesuits' explanations:

> The emperor (Ieyasu) and his territorial lords had given them [the Jesuits] a large amount of silver. They were responsible for investing this silver at Macao and to transfer it in Japan for raw silk. In one year the emperor demanded from them the accounting statements on the large amount of silver he had given the priests and the raw silk they had purchased with it. Significant errors in and violations of the agreement had been discovered. The emperor was informed about this matter, which supported what he had said for a long time, that the priests were swindlers and liars. He and his close associates boldly said things like the following, which were hard to bear for the priests: they were not priests but lying merchants. Now he demanded the accounting statements and discovered violations of the contract. What if he hadn't asked for it? This is what they said. The errors were the mistakes of those who did the calculations. If the priests had, for example, contradicted the principles, would it not have been better not to admit it but to correct their mistakes and to compensate for what was missing. Yet bad things accumulate. In these days we have to witness the wrath of the emperor becoming worse.[59]

This passage summarizes San Pedro's attacks. The Jesuit Valentim Carvalho's Refutation followed this statement. The small discrepancies between the texts derive from the fact that San Pedro wrote three articles on the matter. The one just quoted was the second, written in 1617. Carvalho, however, quoted and refuted the first article, which dated from 1615.[60] In his first treaty, San Pedro wrote that "the errors are the mistakes of those who did the calculation" and added that they had not been their intention. He was therefore careful in his

59 Carvalho, "Frei Sebastião no Tekiyō no Dai 5 Shō" [Response to the Chapter 5 of the Summary of Frei Sebastião], in "Valentim Carvalho Bembaku-sho," in *Iesus-kai to Nippon*, vol. 2, 495.

60 For the three treatises of Sebastião de São Pedro and the reply of the Society of Jesus, see Kōichirō Takase (trans. and notes), "Nihon no Kōtei ga Kare no Sho-Ōkoku no Kirisuto-kyō-kai ni Hakugai wo Kuwae, Kyōkai wo Hakai shi, Kanochi ni ita Subete no Shūdōshi wo Tsuihō shita Sho-Gen'in no Kanketsu na Tekiyō Kaidai" [Notes of the Brief Summary about the Various Causes for which the Emperor of Japan Persecuted the Christian Society in His Kingdoms, Destructing Christian Churches and Expelling All the Religious from Japan], in *Iesus-kai to Nippon*, vol. 2, 265–270.

statements. Considering that he erased this in the second version, San Pedro might have taken offense at the Jesuits' Refutation, and possibly it was for this reason that he deleted his milder statements. Responsible for the accounting was the *procurador* of Nagasaki. Rodrigues's successor was either Sebastião Vieira or Carlo Spinola. Concerning their dealings with Ieyasu and his entrusted silver, Vieira added the following points:[61]

1. The Jesuits did not deal directly with silver from governmental rulers. This business was delegated to agent merchants who were dealing with the Society's assets. Although the Jesuits attempted to avoid doing business like this, they were threatened by the rulers that all missionaries would be expelled from Japan if they stopped.
2. The Jesuits took on the responsibility of trading with entrusted silver so as not to worsen their relationship with local lords. They did not misappropriate the silver and they did not use it for anything other than the goods that had been ordered by them or for their own benefit.
3. The truth about the errors in the calculations was that superior quality yarn for the king (Ieyasu) was unknowingly replaced with low quality; it was for this reason that the Jesuits were regarded as unfriendly.
4. Ieyasu was enraged because the silk roll that he had ordered was not long enough. The reason was that he had ordered a better quality than usual, and the Chinese who had sold it were afraid of being disadvantaged so they cut it short. The Jesuits had been deceived by them.

Rodrigues, who had his own experience in trade, disproved Vieira's four points of Refutation based on the actual circumstances, and describes them in his Memorandum. There is such strong consistency in this material that Rodrigues possibly intended specifically to disprove Vieira having read his Refutation. Vieira's first excuse, that the Jesuits did not directly trade, makes no sense in the context of the Memorandum, which states this was part of the *procurador*'s duty. The second statement, that the *procurador* did not misappropriate the entrusted silver, loses validity when set against Rodrigues's frank complaint that "the *procuradores* used to open the boxes of entrusted silver by themselves, and used it for themselves. Not only did the owner lose it but they also lost the profits they should have made" (Supplement 3).

About the calculation errors, Rodrigues writes that "the *procurador* has not only lost his profit because of the mistakes and carelessness in the calculation. He has also lost 10,000 taels of the property of the Society of Jesus" (Entry 13). He further states: "the *procurador* has been so careless that he did not even

61 Carvalho, "Valentim Carvalho Bembaku-sho," 494–507.

note in the account book what had happened nor did he create a protocol" (Entry 16). It becomes obvious that the *procurador* was just careless in the handling of the calculation and the account book. The fourth point, about Ieyasu's rage after the Chinese had deceived the Jesuits, should be regarded as stemming from "the ignorance of the *procurador*" (Entry 2), as the Chinese were cheating the Jesuits frequently.

In 1612, Carlo Spinola, Vieira's successor as *procurador* of Nagasaki, reports the following about his witnessing of Ieyasu's wrath:

> Even while we are aware of the evil effects of entrusted silver, we conduct this trade for the sake of staying in Japan and buying the kings' [Hideyoshi and Ieyasu] favor. For investing his silver and purchasing the textiles he ordered, it is necessary to send this silver to China on account of the Society of Jesus. [...] But if there is any insufficiency we provoke the wrath of the king. He claims to have been forced to buy much more expensive goods and has therefore often called us thieves in the past.[62]

Spinola reports the reason for the mistake:

> The goods corresponding to the amount of silver from Japanese we had transported arrived here [in Japan] on a junk ship last year (1612). It has been good for more than 18,000 taels. It has taken us weeks to distribute the entrusted value to its respective owners.[63]

To summarize, a junk carried an amount of silver equivalent to 18,000 taels from Japan to Macao. The Jesuits were conducting this business for Japanese investors. On board the ship was the Visitador (Francesco Pasio). The ship left Nagasaki in March 1612. Pasio was carrying a letter from the Nagasaki magistrate Hasegawa Sahyoe, addressed to the authorities of Macao requesting the reopening of trade with Macao for merchant ships after an interruption caused by the trouble of André Pessoa.[64] Then in the summer of the same year, a Portuguese ship arrived at Nagasaki for the first time in three years,[65] with its goods being the payment for the entrusted silver, which had been carried

62 Letter of Carlo Spinola, from Nagasaki, dated March 21, 1613. Archivum Romanum Societatis Iesu, Jap-sin 36, ff. 159–161.

63 Ibid.

64 Josef Franz Schütte, *Introductio ad historiam Societatis Iesu in Japonia 1549–1650* (Romae: Institutum Historicum Societatis Jesu, 1968), 181.

65 The Capitão-mor who arrived in the port of Nagasaki in that year was Pêro Martins Gaio, and Orazio Neretti came to Japan as an envoy of the viceroy of India.

away in the spring. The silver had been entrusted from several Japanese. It was the *procurador*'s duty to calculate the return profits in order to distribute them to the Japanese. This was similar to *companhia* (*commenda*) investments. The *procurador*, Spinola, had problems with this distribution and made mistakes in his calculations. Ieyasu came to call the Jesuits thieves in the same way that Sebastian de San Pedro described it. It is highly likely that this incident happened in 1612, when Spinola was the *procurador* of Nagasaki.

The Jesuits' documents therefore supplement the Franciscan friar San Pedro's point that the policy of prohibiting Christianity was partly motivated by the collapse of the entrusted silver trade between Ieyasu and the Jesuits. Valentim de Carvalho's Refutation, the exposure of facts in the Memorandum, and letters from Spinola, who was possibly responsible for this incident, argue against San Pedro's point.

Rodrigues was possibly annoyed by the fact that while he maintained Ieyasu's favor because of his missionary activities during his stay in Japan as *procurador*, his successors failed in their business. Ieyasu regarded them as useless and finally ordered the expulsion of all missionaries. Intentionally or not, Rodrigues's frank report about the Japan *procurador*'s duties is highly suggestive as it states that the failure of the Jesuits in the trade with silver entrusted by Ieyasu was one reason for the expulsion of the missionaries.

5 The Jesuits and Maritime Loans

The Memorandum is also informative concerning the relationship of the Jesuits with *respondência* (sea loans), and clearly gives Rodrigues's opinion on this matter. As explained in Chapters 3 and 4, a maritime loan is in essence a high-interest monetary loan in which the creditor takes the risk for any danger at sea.

According to Takase Kōichirō's research, the Jesuits started to borrow silver based on maritime loan contracts in 1612.[66] Spinola's letters give further clues. Spinola was *procurador* at Nagasaki between 1612 and 1618. In 1612, the Jesuits borrowed silver through sea loans after the *Graça* incident led to a drop in fortunes. The loan was repaid by the sale of goods, which arrived in the same summer on board a ship.

Yet the Society's fortunes did not recover. Another maritime loan for silver was taken in 1613. The debt of 1612 was carried on the same junk that was

66 Takase, "Kirishitan Kyōkai no Shikin Chōtatsu," 263–331.

previously mentioned, on which the Visitador and other padres left Nagasaki in the spring. In the summer of the same year, the Capitão-mór Pêro Martins Gaio (the father-in-law of Vicente Rodrigues mentioned earlier) arrived at Nagasaki, commanding two merchant vessels full of commodities.

Spinola borrowed silver through maritime loans during his term as *procurador*, at least between 1615 and 1618. He wrote that however much silver he borrowed, the Society's fortunes did not increase:

> The silver I borrowed on maritime loans was used by the Macao *procurador* or sent to priests for their missionary work in China. The debts therefore increased. Yet the raw silk to sustain us and to repay the loans did not arrive in Japan. I thus had to borrow silver for the orphans at high interest, which led to a further increase in our debts.[67]

The debts increased because the silver borrowed on maritime loans in Japan was shipped to Macao and not used to purchase goods but was simply consumed there. Takase thinks that the Jesuits continued maritime loans even after 1619.[68]

As mentioned earlier, Spinola was the first to refer to sea loans in Japan. One of the priests who died during the Grand Martyrdom at Nagasaki in 1622 was a member of the wealthy Genoese Spinola family. This connection has not been considered in the research into maritime loans undertaken so far. I briefly mentioned at the end of Chapter 4 that the wealthy merchants of Genoa retreated from the Levant trade after the fall of Constantinople, the stopover for their journey to the Black Sea, and the rise of the Ottoman Empire. Instead, they invested their accumulated property in Spain and its overseas enterprises. The Spinola family was one of the most powerful in Genoa, especially between the late 16th century and the early 17th century under Andrea, Antonio, Bartolomeo, Gregorio, and others, when the Spinolas were in a position to influence the economics of Habsburg Spain. Their extensive business was sustained by agent merchants in different regions, who were occasionally called *procuratores*.[69]

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67 Letter of Carlo Spinola to the Superior General of the Society of Jesus, from Nagasaki, dated 8 October 1618. Archivum Romanum Societatis Iesu, Jap-sin 36, ff. 191v–193v. Cited from Takase, "Kirishitan Kyōkai no Shikin Chōtatsu," 306.

68 Takase, "Kirishitan Kyōkai no Shikin Chōtatsu," 308.

69 Carlos Álvarez Nogal, Claudio Marsilio & Luca Lo Basso "La rete finanziaria della famiglia Spinola: Spagna, Genova e le fiere dei cambi (1610–1656)," *Quaderni Storici* 42, no. 124/1 (2007): 97–110.

Many merchant families from Genoa had opened an office in Seville, which had the monopoly on managing overseas business—and again the Spinola family was the most powerful.[70] Carlo himself wanted to study the family business before he joined the Jesuits. He was therefore sent to Spain,[71] and possibly participated in the business in Seville or Madrid.[72]

It may not be a coincidence that Carlo Spinola, who was educated in such an environment, held the office of the Nagasaki *procurador* and tried to rebuild the Jesuits' finances by combining maritime loans with the *commenda*-style capital mentioned earlier. Spinola's words about his operation involving "silver for the orphans" were not unique. At this time in Western Europe, many municipalities and orphanages invested in overseas trade.[73]

In his Regulations, Alessandro Valignano mentions debts but not sea loans, and Francesco Pasio does not mention them in his Revisions (1612). Francisco Vieira added an article about sea loans to Entry 19 of his "Regulations for the Japan *procurador* staying in China":[74]

> At Macao it is not allowed to make a maritime loan (14) [...] the silver from Japan, borrowed on sea loan, is to use on nothing else than to buy raw silk in the first place (17) [...] a Jesuit has to be on the ship with the commodities purchased by the silver by sea loan. In case he will be executed in Japan, the silver is to be entrusted to an agent merchant for paying it back (19).

Spinola requested Vieira to strongly admonish the Macao *procurador* concerning the handling of maritime loans, as noted in these new entries.[75]

In other words, borrowing on maritime loan contracts, which started in around 1612, did not go well for the Jesuits from the beginning. It is highly

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70 Ruth Pike, *Enterprise and Adventures: The Genoese in Seville and the Opening of the World* (Ithaca: Cornell University Press, 1966), 2.

71 Fabio Ambrogio Spinola, *Carlo Spinola Den* (*Vita del Padre Carlo Spinola della Compagnia di Giesu morto per la Santa Fede nel Giappone*), trans. Miyazaki Kentarō, Kirishitan Bunka Kenkyū Series [Series of Study on the Kirishitan Culture], 28 (Tokyo: Kirishitan Bunka Kenkyū-kai, 1985), 26.

72 Among the Genoese noble and wealthy merchant families, there was a custom to give business training to their young men. Pike, *Enterprise and Adventures*, 74.

73 Michael Moissey Postan, *Medieval Trade and Finance* (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1973), 19–20.

74 Takase, "Shina ni Chūzaisuru Nihon no Procurador no Kisoku," 617–624.

75 Letter of Carlo Spinola to the Superior General of the Society of Jesus, from Nagasaki, dated 8 October 1618. Archivum Romanum Societatis Iesu, Jap-sin 36, ff. 191v–193v; Takase, "Kirishitan Kyōkai no Shikin Chōtatsu," 306.

possible that they continued to make loans, even with the tendency of an increasing deficit, because they saw "no other way than to borrow with an extremely high interest rate."[76]

Rodrigues recommended immediately stopping sea loan contracts, as they were raising debt without turning into profit (Entry 5). "No new loan should be taken for paying back the obligations from maritime loans" (Supplement 8). He strongly criticized this kind of snowball effect, which led to an excess of high-interest sea loans. One point to keep in mind here is that the Jesuits likely did not borrow silver on sea loans during Rodrigues's term as *procurador*. The question therefore arises why the Jesuits did not use its usual routes for loans but came to be dependent on sea loans.

The *Graça* incident had a manifold impact on this. As already mentioned, the sinking of the *Graça* in 1610 at Nagasaki caused severe damage not only to the merchants of Macao but also to the Japanese merchants who were involved in the entrusted silver trade with Namban ships. Apart from the commodities that had been already sold, raw silk for *pancada* (wholesale) and other goods were sunk with the galleon *Graça*. Having seen how their property vanished in front of their own eyes, merchants' interest in supplementary maritime insurance rose.

Spinola borrowed silver from Japanese merchants on maritime loans for the first time in 1612, the year the Visitador priest Pasio left on a Chinese junk for Macao. This was because the Portuguese ship that had been due to arrive at Nagasaki the year before (1611) was attacked and the freight looted by Chinese pirates. Among the freight were the goods that were meant to repay the debt to the Japanese. Therefore, it became necessary to produce the value of the repayment from the property belonging to the Japanese province. As a result, the Jesuits' savings were depleted.[77] After this had occurred, two local Japanese lords and numerous Portuguese living at Nagasaki lent 5,000 cruzados on sea loan contracts, which had originally been meant as a temporary method for acquiring capital. In 1612, not only merchant vessels from Macao but also ships from China and Manila shipped raw silk to Nagasaki. This resulted in an over-supply of Chinese goods, which could then be traded only at low prices. For this reason, the Jesuits had almost none of their fortune left after repaying

76 Letter of Pedro Morejon to the Vicar General of the Society of Jesus, from Macao, dated November 10, 1625. Archivum Romanum Societatis Iesu, Jap-sin 18-I, f. 53v; Takase, "Kirishitan Kyōkai no Shikin Chōtatsu," 308–309.

77 Letter of Carlo Spinola, from Nagasaki, dated March 21, 1613. Archivum Romanum Societatis Iesu, Jap-sin 36, ff. 159–161.

the maritime loans. This meant, Spinola explains, that it again became necessary to borrow silver on sea loans.[78]

Rodrigues writes:

> For us, maritime loans produce no benefits but are more dangerous than regular loans. With almost no profits they increase our debts. Instead of borrowing 10,000 taels on a sea loan it is better to borrow 3,000–4,000 taels as a regular loan on the name of the *procurador* in order to be definitely without shortage (Entry 5).

A further merit of sea loans was thus the possibility of borrowing a large amount of money. This was possible because the creditor could expect interest that was several times greater than it would have been for a usual loan if the ship operated without problems. Rodrigues writes in the same entry that "Men from outside the Society [merchants] like captains and we [Jesuits] have a different reason to borrow silver on sea loans. If the *procurador* has no silver to send to Macao, he is forced to borrow some on a sea loan."

Merchants therefore accepted sea loans because of the prospect of making a large profit. The Jesuits were under much pressure from its creditors and thus has to take on such loans. It was inevitable that the Society would borrow money under unfavorable conditions. This is reminiscent of the situation regarding the entrusted silver trade in around 1610, when the Jesuits were forced into participating. In other words, this kind of financial security compensation was demanded from the Jesuits, indicating toleration or even support, even while their concealed activities were known about.

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The Memorandum reports frankly and includes some astounding facts about the trading position of the Jesuits in Japan in the 17th century. However, this source has passages that contain unique expressions and jargon, and these are difficult to understand for anybody without insider knowledge. A thorough analysis of these phrases will no doubt reveal much more of interest.

The last *procurador* who can be confirmed to have stayed in Japan was Manuel Borges. He was arrested in Bungo in 1633. That he had been active secretly in Bungo reveals that activities at Nagasaki were impossible because of the enquiries about Christians. In the same year, the representative of the jurisdiction

78 Ibid.

province of Japan, Cristóvão Ferreira, was arrested, and he renounced Christianity. In this year, the Jesuits therefore lost both the superior for missionary work in the Japan province and the *procurador*. For these reasons, the Jesuits' organized proselytization came to an end. Ferreira's letters sent in 1633 from prison to Europe prove that at this time an underground network existed for sustaining missionary activity.

In Chapter 7, I will focus on events involving this network that are not commonly known. I will then study the demise of trade between Macao and Nagasaki as investigations about Christians intensified year by year and foreign policy changed. A major scandal concerning the Shogunate trade was closely connected to these factors and will be a focus of these reflections.

CHAPTER 7

Nagasaki during the Kan'ei Period: The Affair of Paulo dos Santos

In this chapter, I will focus on the importance of an affair that has been overlooked in previous research into the foreign policies of the Tokugawa Shogunate in the Kan'ei period (寛永, 1624–44), the so-called affair of Paulo dos Santos. I will examine its meaning, and the way in which it caused a shift called *sakoku* in the Shogunate's foreign policies.

Previous research on the Macao seminary by Takase Kōichirō proves that 12,000 taels inherited from a Japanese priest named Santos was used as capital for its establishment.[1] Takase argues that this affair caused the Shogunate to be more cautious, as Santos was in a position to financially support the training of Japanese priests who were engaged in missionary work in Japan despite the ban on Christianity.[2] Boxer also refers to this affair,[3] and introduces documents related to it.[4] He does not, however, recognize its influence on the Shogunate's foreign policies. Although Boxer and Takase use material contained in manuscripts of the Jesuítas na Ásia in the Biblioteca da Ajuda (Lisbon), the original documents exist in the Biblioteca de la Real Academia de la Historia (Madrid). I will refer to the material related to the affair as the dossier about Padre Santos.[5]

The existence of a Japanese priest named Paulo dos Santos cannot be confirmed in Japanese sources; the Japanese call him Xovão Paulo in the dossier about Padre Santos. His birth year and hometown are not known. He entered

1 Kōichirō Takase, "Macao no Seminario" [The Seminary of Macao], in *Kirishitan Jidai no Bunka to Shosō* [Culture and Other Various Aspects of the Kirishitan Period] (Tokyo: Yagi Shoten, 2001), 101–162.

2 Ibid., 127.

3 Charles Ralph Boxer, *The Great Ship from Amacon: Annals of Macao and the Old Japan Trade 1555–1640* (Lisbon: Centro de Estudos Históricos Ultramarinos, 1959), 137 (footnote 290); Boxer, "The Swan Song of the Portuguese in Japan, 1635–39," in *Portuguese Merchants and Missionaries in Feudal Japan, 1543–1640*, Collected Studies Series CS 232 (London: Variorum Reprints, 1986; first published *Transactions of the Japan Society of London* xxvii (1930): 4–11), 10–11.

4 Boxer, *The Great Ship from Amacon*, 323–330.

5 Biblioteca de la Real Academia de la História, Legajo 9–7249 (2), ff. 381–441v.

 | DOI: 10.1163/9789004463875_010

the seminary in Nagasaki (長崎) in 1601, was ordained as a priest in 1606, and was appointed as a parish priest of the church of St. John the Baptist in Nagasaki in 1612.[6] He was a diocesan priest who did not belong to a specified religious order but acted for the bishopric wherever he was active. He went to Macao together with the Jesuits when missionaries and prominent Christians were exiled in 1614.[7]

1 Outline of the Affair

The letters written by Santos to two Japanese merchants were found by officials of the Nagasaki magistrate in a merchant ship that arrived in Nagasaki from Macao in September 1634, being carried by a sailor named Luís Gouveia Botelho.[8] He was immediately captured, sent to jail, and burnt at the stake in October 1635. The entry of November 12, 1635, in the *Diaries Kept by the Head of the Dutch Factory in Japan* is as follows:

> The arriving galliot [...] came with 170 sailors. Upon their arriving, all of their cases and boxes were opened and a couple of rolls of silk textiles were leveled to find out whether they carried a letter from the priests in Macao. Some were found with one of the arriving merchants. They were not related to their religion but were written to two citizens in Nagasaki about some money they had obtained from goods they had sent. He was thrown into prison and remains there with both citizens from Nagasaki.[9]

From this, it appears that the Dutch did not initially realize how important these events were. Furthermore, in the following year, the *Diaries* record that Bothelho was called to the court in Edo to be questioned, together with

6 Hubert Cieslik, *Kirishitan Jidai no Hōjin Shisai* [Native Priests in the Kirishitan Period] (Tokyo: Kirishitan Bunka Kenkyū-kai, 1981), 425–426.

7 Letter of Valentim Carvalho to the Superior General of the Society of Jesus, from Macao, dated 30 December 1614. Kōichirō Takase (trans. and notes), *Iesus-kai to Nippon* [The Society of Jesus and Japan], vol. 2 (Tokyo: Iwanami Shoten, 1988), 174–176.

8 He seems to have been a kinsman of Manuel Gouveia Botelho, who appeared in Chapter 4 and was the Feitor of the navigation to Japan in 1635. According to the list of inhabitants of Macao in 1625 (see Chapter 4), Luís Gouveia did not belong to any of the local parishes; he was Portuguese by nationality and was from Portugal.

9 Historiographical Institute, University of Tokyo (ed.), *Diaries Kept by the Head of the Dutch Factory in Japan* (Original Text) vol. 1 (Tokyo: University of Tokyo Press, 1974), 273–274.

Suetsugu Heizō, the chief local governor of Nagasaki.[10] In October 1635, about a year after this affair had been discovered, the Dutch recorded Bothelho's execution:

> Thirteen people were sent to be executed passing in front of the door [of their building] on the 8th of this month. One Portuguese was among them who had been caught because of bringing letters. The person to whom the letter came (and his wife) and Roman Catholics, consisting of two women and three men, were also punished by burning. Further, two Japanese and three Chinese, including a son of Augustine [a Chinese pirate],[11] were executed by crucifixion.[12]

As the fleet from Macao had arrived in August 1635, the Portuguese including Gonçalo da Silveira, the Capitão-mór, were told to witness Botelho's execution.[13] At the beginning of September, Heizō came back to Nagasaki from Edo.[14] As the execution was carried out shortly afterwards, the Shogunate's decision was clearly enforced immediately. Although Botelho was guilty of carrying letters from a priest, the background to the affair was quite complicated. First, I will examine the Portuguese translation of the two letters from the Japanese priest, Santos. The originals seem to have been written in Japanese, yet only Portuguese translations exist. The first was addressed to the Nagasaki merchant Kagaya Shichibee (加賀屋七兵衛) in his hometown, dated July 12, 1634:

> I received your letter and *katabira* (帷子, single-layer kimono), folding fans, and writing boxes (*suzurebako* 硯箱) equivalent to 20 taels 7 maces and 2 condrins. [...] For you I entrusted from here (Macao) to that junk 3 picos and 50 cates [*c.* 20 kg] of Tonkin raw silks and 100 rolls of Cantonese damask. People of a ship (coming back in) October told me that they have been already sold. But you might be quite busy, I think. You haven't sent me the silver for the charge. You might have your reasons and I will wait for the next monsoon. [...] Those raw silks and damask rolls cost 1,200–1,300 taels. If I had invested these goods into trades with Manila or

10 Ibid., 194.

11 Chinese sea merchant active around Taiwan and grandson of Li Dan [李旦], who appeared in Chapter 3.

12 Historiographical Institute, University of Tokyo (ed.), *Diaries Kept by the Head of the Dutch Factory in Japan* (Original Text) vol. 1 (Tokyo: University of Tokyo Press, 1974), 273–274.

13 Boxer, *The Great Ship from Amacon*, 325.

14 Ibid., 142.

> Japan with high interest, it would have been enough for me to get profits at 40–50 percent three years later. [...] I have consulted with a Japanese named Kagaya Kasaiemon [*sic*] coming from Cambodia to this place to bring my message to you about these things. He might have already told you [...].[15]

The second letter was addressed to Nakaya Mataemon (又右衛門), also a Nagasaki merchant, and was dated July 13, 1634. Nakaya appears to have been a friend of Santos from his time in Nagasaki.

> Three years ago when the junk stopped at Macao on its way to Siam, I handed Kagaya Shichibee 3 picos of Tonkin raw silks, 100 rolls of damask dyed in Guangdong (広東), and some specialty products to sell them to you. I heard that raw silks could be sold at 280 taels (per pico) and damask 4 taels pro roll. He hasn't sent these profits yet. [...] I asked Luís Pinto and Jerónimo Luís to bring me what Kagaya Shichibee would entrust to them. If Shichibee will not hand it to me as requested, I would like to ask you to go to [execute] my request [indecipherable] with Kagaya Saemon [*sic*] and execute my request.[16]

From these two letters, it appears that the following facts form the background of the affair:

1. A Japanese ship en route to Siam stopped at Macao in 1632.
2. Santos entrusted Kagaya Shichibee, who was on board the ship, with some products such as raw silk and damask so they could be sold to Nakaya in Nagasaki. By so doing, he violated the ban on trade in Macao.
3. Shichibee did not return any profit in the following year.
4. Santos asked Kagaya Saemon to provide the silver for the payment when he visited Macao on the way to Japan from Cambodia.
5. Santos asked Luís Pinto and Jerónimo Luís de Gouveia Botelho to receive the profits from Shichibee.
6. He also asked Nakaya Mataemon, an old friend and buyer of the products, to collect the profits from Shichibee.[17]

In other words, it is clear that Santos originally had some close acquaintances who were merchants in Nagasaki, and that he joined the trade by controlling

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15 Biblioteca de la Real Academia de la História, Legajo 9–7239 (2), ff. 430v–431.

16 Ibid., ff. 431–432.

17 In the letter of Santos to Nakaya, it was written "I always miss you. One day in my life, I will return to see you again in that place [Nagasaki] (E somente sempre tenho saudades

them from Macao. Kagaya Shichibee kept goods from Santos when he called at Macao on the way to Siam as a crewman of a Japanese ship in 1632. Kagaya Saemon received Santos's message when he stopped at Macao on his way to Japan from Cambodia in 1634.

Kagaya was one of the twenty-five Dejima merchants who paid to build Dejima in order to trade with Portuguese there in 1634. These two men who were related to Kagaya were probably ships' crewmen who were experienced in sailing to Southeast Asia. But traveling to Macao was illegal for Japanese ships, as the Macao authority and the Shogunate prohibited it.

Details of the Japanese ship that reached Macao in 1632 were identified from stories about Macao merchants who joined a voyage to Japan in 1634:

> All of us joined the fleet where Sarmento Carvalho was the Capitão-mór in 1634. Governmental officials called us to the magistrate's office at Nagasaki. They interrogated us about the letter asking one Japanese to pay back the profits, which Padre Paulo dos Santos wrote in Japanese and Jerónimo Luís Gouveia brought. The profit was raised from some raw silk and rolls of clothes Padre Santos had sent on a junk fitted out by the governor in Nagasaki and Jerónimo de Macedo. It was shipped to this city from Japan.[18]

It is thus obvious that other crewmen who sailed from Macao to Japan were asked about at the magistrate's office in Nagasaki alongside Botelho. Macedo, a Portuguese and former Capitão-mór, who had been in prison in Japan since 1621, and Takenaka Shigeyoshi (竹中重義), then magistrate of Nagasaki, prepared the ship, to which Santos entrusted 3 picos of raw silk and 100 rolls of damask.

2 Takenaka Shigeyoshi, Nagasaki Magistrate, and the Portuguese

2.1 *Takenaka Shigeyoshi's Private Trading Ship*

In 1630, Takenaka Shigeyoshi sent ships abroad without a red-seal (*shuinsen*) license at least twice. The first time, he ordered Macedo to prepare a ship and

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de V.M. e tornara em dias de minha vida de ver a V.M. nessa terra)," so presumably Nakaya and Santos knew each other.

18 Testimonies of the sailors who returned from Japan (dated probably January 18, 1635, estimating from the previous and following documents). Biblioteca de la Real Academia de la História, Legajo 9–7239 (2), f. 423.

appointed Simão Vaz de Paiva, who came to Japan as Feitor for that year, to sail to Manila. According to records kept by the Viceroy of India in Goa in 1634,[19] Takenaka sent a ship to Manila: he demanded an apology and compensation from the government-general in Manila for the affair, in which the red-seal ship sent to Ayutthaya by Takagi Sakuemon (高木作右衛門), a Nagasaki Machi-doshiyori (町年寄, town leader/elder), was attacked by the Spanish fleet in Menam Chao Phraya and sunk. The Japanese crewmen were deported to Manila. At the same time, the Viceroy of India recognized that Takenaka also intended to trade with Manila. Furthermore, the record stated that instead of a red-seal license, the ship carried a letter issued by the Dutch factory, which prohibited other Dutch ships that it encountered from attacking it. The ship also flew the Dutch flag.[20]

When this ship came back to Nagasaki, Nijenrode, head of the Dutch factory in Hirado, referred to it in a letter dated March 22, 1631. But he did not write that the Dutch factory supported the voyage:

> Two junks set sail to Manila in the middle of December.[21] [...] On another junk ship—or so people said—a pilot from East India, five or six Chinese, and Japanese boarded in Nagasaki. They went there as an embassy. This junk was prepared by Jerónimo Macedo, Capitão-mór, who has been held captured since 1621 and found guilty of aiding missionaries active in Japan, namely in the western part of the country, and has been to be executed by fire in Nagasaki. He was released at the end of last year and set free. This junk ship, like the others, got under sail without the red-seal license of the emperor but with the permission of Uneme (Takenaka). Many other ships set off likewise to other places. Time will tell how this will turn out to be.[22]

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19 Historical Archive of Goa/Directorate of Archives and Archaeology, *Livro das Monções*, Livro no. 19-D, f. 1044v.

20 Ibid.

21 The other junk was sent by Matsukura Shigemasa (松倉重政) to survey for his planned expedition to the Philippine Islands. Seiichi Iwao, "Matsukura Shigemasa no Luzon Tō Ensei Keikkau" [The Expedition Plan of Matsukura Shigemasa to Luzon Island], *Shigaku Zasshi* [Journal of the Historical Society] 45, no. 9 (1934); Arcadio Schwade, "Matsukura Shigemasa no Luzon Tō Ensei Keikkau to sono Shi" [The Expedition Plan of Matsukura Shigemasa to Luzon Island and his Death], *Kirishitan Kenkyū* [Journal of Kirishitan Studies] 9 (1964).

22 Letter of the Head of the Dutch Factory Cornelis van Nijenrode to the Governor of Formosa Hans Putmans, dated 22 March 1631. Yōko Nagazumi (ed. and trans.), *Hirado Oranda Shōkan no Nikki* [Diaries Kept by the Dutch Factory at Hirado], vol. 2 (Tokyo: Iwanami Shoten, 1969), 518–519.

According to this information, the ship Takenaka ordered Macedo to fit out departed in mid-December 1630 from Nagasaki. The important point here is that the head of the Dutch factory wrote that the ship sailed with a permission issued by Takenaka (called Uneme here) himself, but without a red-seal license. He did not write that he issued any documents to the ship under the name of the Portuguese in order to escape attacks from Dutch ships or that he agreed to use the Dutch flag.

Macedo, who fitted the ship out and was the Capitão-mór from 1619 to 1620, was imprisoned in the Omura prison and charged with helping missionaries' travels. He was set free in 1630 because he cooperated with the magistrate Takenaka Shigeyoshi.[23] It is obvious that Takenaka prepared the ship by abusing his authority. He arranged the receipt for sailing arrangements and raised capital from Macedo, who was a lawbreaker. He let the Feitor in Macao on board as captain and asked the Dutch factory to prepare the flag and documents that prohibited attacks. In return, the criminal ex-Capitão-mór Macedo received his freedom. According to the *Livros das Monções* from Goa, Macedo died in November or December 1632 in Nagasaki. He left significant property, which was given by his will to his nephews, not to his wife or children.[24]

Takenaka asked Macedo to prepare another ship at the end of 1631 and send it to Siam. This was the ship that Kagaya Shichibee had boarded, carrying the goods Santos had entrusted to him in Macao. As the Dutch fleet captured the ship without knowing it had been sent by Takenaka, detailed records about it remained in the Netherlands. The records of the VOC in Batavia stated: 'The commander towed a Japanese junk owned by Takenaka Uneme, the magistrate in Nagasaki. This ship sailed to Siam but encountered our fleet on passing through the islands and was towed to Batavia.'[25] Furthermore, Jacques Specx, the temporary governor of Batavia, asked the head of the Dutch factory in Hirado to be careful:

> Although this letter is consigned to a Japanese ship, this ship departed from Nagasaki with Chinese and Japanese on board to Siam. It was seized by our ship, when it passed through Pulo Timon Island. Then it was towed

23 Boxer did not note the liberation of Macedo, and he wrote: "Macedo was kept in jail at Omura until his death in 1632." Boxer, *The Great Ship from Amacon*, 98.

24 Historical Archive of Goa/Directorate of Archives and Archaeology, *Livro das Monções*, Livro no. 19-D, f. 1010r.

25 *Diary of the Batavia Castle* on 23 January 1632. Naojirō Murakami (trans. and notes) & Takashi Nakamura (collation editing), *Batavia-jō Nisshi* [Diaries of the Batavia Castle], vol. 1, Wide-ban Tōyō Bunko [Tōyō Bunko Series of Large-Print Letter] (Tokyo: Heibon-sha, 2003; first published 1970), 124.

> to this place. During this time the crew and cargo were not damaged and I have decided to give them amenities and guard them, to let them buy and sell freely as they wish, to be exempt from customs on import/export goods, (upon consideration) to exempt them from at least 20,000 taels of a poll tax on Chinese as well, and to let them go on a good voyage. [...] As mentioned above, we agreed to sail to Japan with the company of two Dutch as free civilians and the ship's pilot and hope for a good voyage. We would like to obtain your proper support and ask you to give them proper amenities and support when they visit you.[26]

The Dutch records reveal details about the ship that Takenaka sent to Siam at the end of 1631, the ship to which Santos had entrusted his goods. It sailed from Nagasaki and stopped at Macao en route. Later, a Dutch vessel seized it near Pulo Timon (Tioman island), southeast of the Malay Peninsula. This Japanese ship was heading for the Gulf of Thailand by going around Indochina to the south.[27] The sea area here was known as a battlefield for the Dutch and Spanish fleets,[28] so the Dutch vessel was probably waiting to seize a Spanish or Portuguese ship.

When it became known in Batavia that the ship was connected to the magistrate in Nagasaki, it was guarded respectfully and sent back to Japan with a Dutch crew and pilot on board. It was judged that it would not be wise to cause any trouble with the magistrate of Nagasaki when Dutch expectations of the Japanese market were increasing since the trouble between the local magistrate in Nagasaki, the first Suetsugu Heizō (Masanao), and some of the Dutch had calmed down. This event is known as the Hamada Yahyoe affair (or the Taiwan affair).[29] When the ship arrived in Nagasaki, the letter from the governor of Batavia to the head of the Dutch factory (mentioned earlier) was delivered, on September 4, 1632, and the following note was left in the Dutch factory:

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26 Letter of the Viceroy of Batavia Jacques Specx to the Head of the Dutch Factory Cornelis van Nijenrode, dated 26 June 1632. Seiichi Iwao, *Shuin-sen Bōeki-shi no Kenkyū* [Study of the History of the Red-seal Ship Trade] (Tokyo: Kōbundō, 1958).

27 According to Nagazumi Yoko (永積洋子), a quarrel took place between the captain and sailors in this ship regarding the destination. The captain was killed, and the silver handed over to Macao was counterfeit money. Yōko Nagazumi, *Shuin-sen* [Red-seal Ship] (Tokyo: Yoshikawa Kōbunkan, 2001), 90.

28 Letter of the Head of the Dutch Factory Cornelis van Nijenrode to Matsuura Takanobu (松浦隆信), dated July 25, 1632. Nagazumi, *Hirado Oranda Shōkan no Nikki*, vol. 2, 362.

29 In 1672, Suetsugu merchant ships were interfered with by Dutch ships in Taiwan, and then the Shogunate, in accordance with the petition of Heizō, stopped trade with the Netherlands until 1631.

> The messenger came from Hirado in the evening and we received the copies of letters from the Viceroy to Cornelis van Nijenrode and Willem Janssen and the letter from the Viceroy to the Lord of Hirado. Furthermore, we received copies of this letter and the letter to Mr. Uneme.[30]

The next day, the head of the factory and Matsura Shigenobu, the Lord of Hirado, exchanged the following communication:

> The Lord of Hirado asked the following question (after reading the letter from the governor of Batavia).
> Q: From which junk did this letter come? Does it have a red-seal license from the emperor?
> A: This was the ship of Mr. Takenaka Uneme, sailing without permission [of the emperor]. Our governor treated them quite well and gave his support. He made two wheelsmen ride on board when they sailed.[31]

As the Dutch factory in Hirado received on September 4 the letter from Batavia that had been entrusted to Takenaka's ship, this ship seems to have arrived at Nagasaki at the end of August. Matsura Shigenobu, the Lord of Hirado, had an interest in the vessel and realized that it had sailed from Nagasaki without a red-seal license. In 1633, Takenaka's various violations were revealed by local officers in Nagasaki, whom the second Suetsugu Heizō (Shigesada), the local governor, represented. Takenaka was removed from the magistrate's office and forced to commit suicide. Lords from the area around Nagasaki also recognized his illegal activities.

The report from the Captain General in Macao to the Viceroy of India about the captain of the ship that reached Macao in 1632 stated that "the captain of the Japanese junk that arrived here last year [1632] died in prison and all other people sailing with him were locked up in prison."[32] There are no records saying that the captain of the junk was Portuguese and a different person than the captain of the previous year's ship; he was probably Japanese. However, taking into account the points that Dutch ships captured them, the captain of Takenaka's ship the previous year had been a Portuguese man, Paiva, and this Japanese junk stopped at Macao en route, it is possible to conclude that no small

30 *Diary of Willem Jansen* on September 4, 1632. Nagazumi, *Hirado Oranda Shōkan no Nikki*, vol. 2, 388–389.

31 *Diary of Willem Jansen* on September 5, 1632. Nagazumi, *Hirado Oranda Shōkan no Nikki*, vol. 2, 392.

32 Historical Archive of Goa/Directorate of Archives and Archaeology, *Livro das Monções*, Livro no. 19-D, f. 1012v.

number of people related to Macao were on board. The fact that Takenaka's ship arrived in Macao when sailing there had already been prohibited is very important when we consider the later reaction of the Shogunate to the Santos affair. Furthermore, the report by the Captain General in Macao discloses that Takenaka and his two retainers had invested a total of 56,000 taels of silver in the ships that anchored at Macao in 1631 and 1632.[33]

According to Iwao, no Japanese ships sailed officially to the Saiyo (西洋; literally Western Seas, or in this case Macao or South China) after 1607.[34] This reflects the troubles with the Portuguese, including murders that took place in Macao involving crews of Arima Harunobu 's red-seal ship when it came to Macao in 1608, as well as the *Madre de Deus* (*Nossa Senhora da Graça*) affair. After these events, Macao's authorities negotiated with the Shogunate to suspend visits by the Japanese, and stated that red-seal licenses to sail to Macao would no longer be issued.

Noting the fact that Takenaka's ship reached Macao in 1632 and that Kagaya Saemon, whom Santos had asked to collect his profits, visited Macao in 1633 on his way to Japan from Cambodia, it appears there may have been many cases where red-seal ships bound for Southeast Asia stopped over at Macao, although they are not noted in the official records. One piece of evidence is a resolution of the Macao city council that prohibited Macao's citizens from trading when a Japanese ship arrived in 1624. Since this ship was said to be "sailing contrary to the rule of that country [Japan],"[35] it was apparently a smuggling ship without a red-seal license. From this, it is clear that Macao prohibited trading with the Japanese in Macao, and also asked the Shogunate to suspend Japanese voyages to Macao:

> April 18, 1624 [...] resolution received today on the information about the Japanese junk ship that arrived with a large amount of silver to trade with these islands. Considering the common property in this city and the profit and significant loss of sailings to Japan from now on, we should interrogate the ignorance of these Japanese and take certain actions. Although we have already made charges and previously arrived at a consensus on such cases, we will give those connected with this junk a new punishment.[36]

33 Historical Archive of Goa/Directorate of Archives and Archaeology, *Livro das Monções*, Livro no. 19-D, f. 1012r.

34 Iwao, *Shuin-sen Bōeki-shi no Kenkyū*, 142–144.

35 "Os ditos japões vinhão contra ordem do seu rei," Biblioteca Pública e Arquivo Distrital de Évora, Códice CXVI 2–5, f. 266rv.

36 Act of the city council of Macao, dated April 18, 1624. Biblioteca Pública e Arquivo Distrital de Évora, Códice CXVI 2–5, f. 235rv.

Japanese ships often reached Macao even after 1610, but there is no record of these visits in Japan, indicating perhaps that they were officially banned. The material studied proves that the city of Macao recognized that its profits would decrease if Japanese ships returned home carrying Chinese goods similar to those transported by Macao's commercial ships. If the trading volume of raw silk in Nagasaki decreased, the price of raw silk would go down and Macao's trade revenues would sink. Macao appealed to the Shogunate to prohibit Japanese ships from going to Macao in order to control the import volume of raw silk through the elimination of competition with Japanese ships in Guangdong, as well as preempting trouble with Arima's ships. As the ship that arrived in Macao in 1624 was not a red-seal ship with a patent issued from the Shogunate, Macao decided to impound its cargo and use the profits from it in order to build a fort.[37]

2.2 *Background to the Dismissal of the Nagasaki Magistrate*

Takenaka Shigeyoshi was condemned by local rulers in Nagasaki, such as Suetsugu Heizō, for abusing his office as magistrate of Nagasaki through his private trading activities and his private impositions on Chinese ships. He was ordered to kill himself after his dismissal.[38] I will now briefly examine the changes in the magistrate's office before Takenaka and the wider context of Takenaka's irregularities.

The magistrate's office in Nagasaki gave the Shogunate a direct window onto foreigners in Nagasaki and was responsible for the control of Christians. Its duties can be summarized here, with the proviso that the importance of each duty varied over time: purchase of required items for the Shogunate, control of foreign trade, supervision of Christians, observation of Western local lords who were still potentially rebelling against the Tokugawa regime, town control, security in Nagasaki and the defensive preparation of the western coast, collection of foreign information, and responses to envoys.

Past research about the magistrate's office in Nagasaki has so far focused on Ogasawara Ichian,[39] and the Hasegawa family.[40] The most important duty in

37 Ibid.

38 Keisuke Yao, "Nagasaki Bugyō Takenaka Shigeyoshi ni tsuite: Kinsei Shoki Gaikō Seisaku ni kansuru Ichi Kōsatsu" [On Takenaka Shigeyoshi, Magistrate of Nagasaki: A Consideration on the Diplomatic Policy in the Early Stage of the Early Modern Period], *Kyūshū Shigaku* 80 (1984): 29–45.

39 In office from 1603 to 1606. Hirokazu Shimizu, "Nagasaki Daikan Ogasawara Ichian ni tsuite" [On Ogasawara Ichian, Chief Administrator of Nagasaki], *Nagasaki Dansō* 57 (1975), 65–77.

40 In chronological order, Hasegawa Shigeyoshi (長谷川重吉), Hasegawa Fujihiro (長谷川藤広) and Hasegawa Fujimasa (長谷川藤正). In office through three generations

the period from Ogasawara Ichian to Hasegawa Fujihiro (in post 1603–10) was the purchase of required items for the Shogunate. The *itowappu* system was established at this time,[41] and its role in supporting the economic system of the Tokugawa family before the establishment of a centralized control framework was the most important aspect of this.

A series of events relating to Christianity, including the incident of the galleon *Nossa Senhora da Graça* in 1609–10 and the Okamoto Daihachi affair of 1609–12,[42] had a strong impact on the Shogunate's decisions.[43] In 1612, the ban on Christianity and Christians was widely enforced. Power was delegated to Nagasaki, the center of missionary work, and control of the city became the core of the magistrate's duties.

In 1626, Mizuno Morinobu was appointed magistrate. At this time, regulations related to the searching of Christians and trade control were fixed, and they were successfully implemented. Léon Pagès, who wrote the entire missionary history of Japan, described Mizuno as the cruelest ruler when it came to oppressing Christians.[44] Mizuno took many efficient measures in this regard, such as Shimabara Unzen torture (throwing followers into boiled spring water), starting the Efumi (stepping on sacred images) system,[45] making a list of Christians in Nagasaki, and expelling powerful Christian merchants,

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from 1605 to 1625. Fukuya Ogiso, "Nagasaki Bugyō Sahyoe ni tsuite" [On Sahyoe, Magistrate of Nagasaki], parts 1–2, *Rekishi Kōron* 8, no. 2–3 (1939); Hirokazu Shimizu, "Kinsei Shotō Nagasaki Daikan no Yakuwari ni tsuite: Tokuni Hasegawa Fujihiro wo Chūshin toshite" [On the Role of the Chief Administrator of Nagasaki in the Early Stage of the Early Modern Period], *Nagasaki Dansō* 58 (1975); Shimizu "Hasegawa Gonroku Kō" [Consideration on Hasegawa Gonroku], *Gaisei-shi Kenkyū* [Study of the History of the Foreign Policy] 1 (2001); Hidetoshi Miyake, "Nagasaki Bugyō Hasegawa Sahyoe Kō" [Consideration on Hasegawa Sahyoe, Magistrate of Nagasaki], *Shien* 69 (1956); Miyake "Diary of Richard Cocks ni okeru Gonrock Dono ni tsuite" [On "Gonrock Dono" in the Diary of Richard Cocks], *Kitakyūshū Daigaku Bungaku-bu Kiyō* [Journal of the Faculty of Humanities, the University of Kitakyushu] 3, Series B, part 2 (1970).

41 This system limited the Shogunate's purchase of raw silk from Portuguese ships to authorized merchants in the defined cities.

42 A scandal emerged around Arima Harunobu, who, expecting rewards from the Shogunate after the *Madre de Deus* affair, bribed Okamoto Daihachi (岡本大八), a Christian Shogunate retainer, in the hope that he would press his case with the Tokugawa government. After this scandal was revealed, the Arima family was exiled and their lands confiscated, after which the Shogunate increased vigilance of Christians.

43 Akira Hayashi et al. (ed.), *Tsūkō Ichiran* [Survey of Intercourse], vol. 1 (Tokyo: Tosho Kankō-kai, 1912), Books 192–193.

44 Léon Pagès, *Nihon Kirishitan Shūmon-shi* [*Histoire de la Religion Chrétienne au Japon*], trans. Yoshida Kogorō, vol. 3 (Tokyo: Iwanami Shoten, 1940), 60.

45 Suspected Christians were required to do this, in order to demonstrate that they were not members of that outlawed religion.

including Machida Soka and Goto Soin. The Shogunate positively evaluated his abilities, and the Dutch noted the rumor around Nagasaki that Mizuno would be appointed again after Takenaka was dismissed:

> On April 22nd [of the year 1634], we heard from Nagasaki about the following. Mr. Onemon (Takenaka), the former magistrate of this city, cut his stomach with his son in Edo (he was imprisoned until Mr. Daisero (Imamura Masanaga) and Mr. Matezeimon (Soga Hisasuke) arrived at Nagasaki where they took control), his fellows were exiled to an island, and his territory, Bungo, had to be confiscated together with his property and expropriated. Furthermore, rumor has it that the aforementioned Mr. Daisero and Mr. Matezeimon will not take control again and Mr. Kawachi (Mizuno) will be appointed (he used to be engaged here). This is, however, not definite yet.[46]

The rumor that the Dutch had heard seems to have come from the process of confiscation of Takenaka's castle. According to the *Hosokawa-ke Shiryō* (*Historical Documents of the Hosokawa Family*), the Hosokawas moved from Buzen-Kokura in northern Kyushu to Kumamoto in the south shortly before the Takenaka process, and they were curious about the Takenaka case as he was the local lord of their neighborhood in Kyushu.

A document compiled in the *Hosokawa-ke Shiryō* says that it was decided Ogasawara Tadatomo and Nakagawa Hisamori would be dispatched to confiscate the Bungo Funai castle from Takenaka.[47] Mizuno, however, was afterwards appointed to be the Shogun's envoy. They thought it was reasonable that Mizuno would be reappointed in Nagasaki after his visit to Funai to treat Takenaka's case.[48] However, other officials, Imamura Masanaga and Sakakibara Motonao, were dispatched to conclude Takenaka's case and to deal with the remaining matters in Nagasaki. Afterwards, Kamio Motokatsu and Sakakibara Motonao were appointed to be Nagasaki magistrates in the spring of 1634.[49] As Mizuno had been appointed senior inspector (Ōmetsuke) in the autumn

46 *Diaries Kept by the Heads of the Dutch Factory in Japan* on April 22, 1634. Nagazumi, *Hirado Oranda Shōkan no Nikki*, vol. 2, 392.

47 Letter of Hosokawa Tadaoki (細川忠興), dated 8, third month, Kan'ei 11. Historiographical Institute, University of Tokyo (ed.), *Dai-Nihon Kinsei Shiryō: Hosokawa-ke Shiryō* [Historical Materials of the Edo Period: Historical Documents of Hosokawa Family], vol. 9 (Tokyo: University of Tokyo Press, 1984). Document No. 1174.

48 Nagasaki and Bungo Funai both situated in Kyushu Island far from Edo.

49 After the Takenaka case, more than one Nagasaki magistrate was appointed so as to prevent corruption.

of 1632, a change of office from senior inspector to magistrate was surprising, because the senior inspector was one of the most important positions in the Shogunate of Edo. The significant point in this process is that territorial lords such as Takenaka were no longer be allowed to take charge of the post of Nagasaki magistrate; only high-ranking bureaucrats in the court could now be appointed to that position. Takenaka's case seems to have been used to strengthen state control of trade by the Shogunate.

2.3 *The Reason for Takenaka's Dismissal*

The Dutch in Batavia understood that the reasons for Takenaka's dismissal were as follows:

> Heizō [Suetsugu] and other citizens in Nagasaki appealed to the emperor and members of the state council (cabinet ministers) and proved that the magistrate of Nagasaki, Mr. Uneme, did not conduct himself correctly. He confiscated 13 percent of Chinese goods arrived from abroad as to take them for himself. He gathered daily gifts of significant value through his misrule. He often issued licenses under his name for voyages to Tonkin, Taiwan, and Siam, and was personally involved in trade that breached Japanese law. He not only sent junks to Manila but also did not punish Christians properly. He was called to the palace by the emperor and a member of the state council. He was stripped of his office and status and his property was forfeited.[50]

According to this, the main reasons for Takenaka's dismissal were his collection of customs duties from Chinese ships for his private purposes, the over-issuing of private permits for sailing abroad, illegal trade, and half-hearted punishment of Christians. The second Suetsugu Heizō (Shigesada), the local governor in Nagasaki, and citizens of Nagasaki complained to the Shogunate, which caused Takenaka's actions to be exposed. Conflict continued between local officers and the magistrate in Nagasaki, exemplified by the downfall of Ogasawara, the first magistrate sent from the Shogunate to Nagasaki, this taking place because of complaints made by the Nagasaki Otona (local governors) about the accounting scandal caused by Ogasawara,[51] which meant there was ongoing instability. Obviously, Takenaka's tyranny intensified this conflict. Three of the points mentioned here are about trade, but the fourth

50 *Diary of the Batavia Castle*, February 19, 1634. Murakami & Nakamura, *Batavia-jō Nisshi*, 165.

51 Shimizu, "Nagasaki Daikan Ogasawara Ichian ni suite," 69–71.

concerns Takenaka's half-hearted treatment of Christians. He was known to be cruel in terms of his search for Christians,[52] but his cooperative relationship with Jerónimo de Macedo relating to the preparation and voyage of his private merchant ship, mentioned earlier, appears to indicate his punishment of Christians was limited. Takenaka allowed missionaries to sail according to his personal feelings. Luís Tavares, an interpreter at the magistrate's office in Nagasaki, wrote and sent the following letter to the city authority in Macao:

> Takenaka Uneme, the former magistrate of Nagasaki, and his son,[53] were ordered by the Shogun to die last March. He was the magistrate here for some years. But because he neglected many of his duties and because he was a close friend of Jerónimo de Macedo Carvalho, among many other things, he was forced to die. They even ordered his brother to be expelled,[54] to a far corner of this country.[55]

It is not mentioned here explicitly, but his close relationship with the Portuguese Capitão Macedo and the charge of illicit activity were the reasons for Takenaka's dismissal and death. This symbolized the relationship between Takenaka and the Portuguese. He held a flexible position with regard to the Portuguese because of his deep attachment to money, but at the same time he took a strong stand on oppressing Christians. A Portuguese interpreter working at the magistrate office, Tavares, says that Takenaka's two-sided attitude was advantageous to Macao merchants, but that the situation for the Portuguese and their trading activities was expected to be made difficult by his dismissal and death.

Furthermore, there is evidence that Takenaka's control was loosening if one considers the number of missionaries who were smuggled into the country

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52 Shigetomo Kōda, *Nichi-Ō Tsūkō-shi* [History of the Relationship between Japan and Europe] (Tokyo: Iwanami Shoten, 1942), 336–337.

53 Takenaka Genzaburo (竹中源三郎). Historiographical Institute, University of Tokyo (ed.), *Shiryō Sōran* [Overview of Historical Sources], vol. 17 (Tokyo: University of Tokyo Press, 1966), 39. Article on 22, second month, Kan'ei 11 (1634). *Seppuku* (切腹) at Kaizenji Temple (海禅寺), Asakusa.

54 The Superior of Chikugo Takenaka Shigenobu (竹中筑後守重信). Exiled to Akita in Dewa (出羽秋田). Historiographical Institute, *Shiryō Sōran*, vol. 17, 39. Article on second month 22, Kan'ei 11. Historiographical Institute, University of Tokyo (ed.), *Diaries Kept by the Head of the Dutch Factory in Japan* (Original Text) vol. 1 (Tokyo: University of Tokyo Press, 1974), 71.

55 Letter of Luís Tavares to the Government of Macao, dated November 9, 1634. Biblioteca de la Real Academia de la História, Legajo 9–7239 (2), ff. 435–436.

during his time in office. The table created by Gonoi Takashi,[56] recording the number of missionaries who entered Japan, the number of smuggled missionaries dropped from twenty-seven between 1620 and 1624 to none between 1625 and 1628. The number rapidly increased to sixteen between 1629 and 1631. Referring specifically to the Jesuits, the number of smuggled missionaries was only thirty-four between 1615 and 1621 and none between 1622 and 1629. Between 1630 and 1632, four Japanese missionaries succeeded in slipping into Japan. In other words, it appears that coastal security was relaxed for a couple of years around 1630.

The authorities in Macao understood well enough that helping missionaries to sail to Japan might endanger trade between Macao and Nagasaki. Therefore, they strictly controlled security. Most missionaries were thus smuggled by Chinese ships that were sailing from Manila to Satsuma (薩摩). This was because the Spanish in Manila had enough silver, and therefore had no reason to continue trading with Japan.

3 A Reexamination of the *Kareuta Oshioki no Hosho*

3.1 *From* Faxaque *to* Kareuta Oshioki no Hosho

In 1626, according to the dossier on Padre Santos, the magistrate in Nagasaki Mizuno issued prohibitions called *faxaques*,[57] concerning the Portuguese, which were related to Christianity.[58] These prohibitions have so far been overlooked in Kan'ei *sakoku* (seclusion policy) research,[59] mostly because no Japanese originals exist. I think this is important in the sequence of events that took place before the break with Macao in 1639, and therefore I will examine these bans again.

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56 Takashi Gonoi, *Nihon Kirishitan-shi no Kenkyū* [Study of the History of the Kirishitan in Japan] (Tokyo: Yoshikawa Kōbunkan, 2002), 329.

57 Concerning the expression *faxaque*, Boxer explains it in his book as a kind of regulation that the Portuguese were to obey, and explains "its word origin comes from Japanese small boats, *hashike* (艀)." Boxer, *The Great Ship from Amacon*, 324.

58 Biblioteca de la Real Academia de la História, Legajo 9–7239 (2), ff. 429v–430v.

59 "Sakoku (鎖国)" means literally "close a country." In the second half of the 20th century, this term has been a point for the argument among Japanese historians, because some historians started pointing out that Japan in the Edo period only took strong control of immigration and trades, besides banning Christianity, not closing a country. Cf. Ronald Toby, *State and Diplomacy in Early Modern Japan: Asia in the Development of the Tokugawa Bakufu* (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1983).

The prohibitions relating to the Portuguese were signed and received by Luís Pacheco, the Capitão-mór in 1626, and João Vaz Preto,[60] the Feitor. I will try to provide a more detailed meaning of *faxaque* in terms of the laws relating to foreign affairs in the Kan'ei period by looking at how it was used in relation to the Santos affair.

The Macao witness records from January 1635 show the contents of a *faxaque* presented to the Portuguese who were questioned at the magistrate's office in Nagasaki that year:

1. The people from Macao must not bring letters, chits, silver or supplies to the missionaries who go about in these regions.
2. Moreover the padres of Macao must not send letters, chits, or supplies to those who are in Japan, nor letters addressed to Japanese Christians nor the smallest thing concerned with trade and intercourse.[61]

These two articles banned people in general (including Japanese who had arrived after the ban on Christianity) and people involved in the Church from sending letters, trading goods, or supplies to Japan. The letter that Santos sent to Japan would have been banned by the second article. The following document is the written version of a *faxaque* that was been pronounced when Luís Paes Pacheco was the Capitão-mór in 1624, and it was still in effect in 1635:

> Japanese *faxaque* issued from the year when Luís Paes Pacheco was Capitão-mór [the year 1624] to the present are:
> 1. Do not deal with silver from Christians in Japan.
> 2. Do not take letters to priests hiding in Japan.
> 3. Priests in Macao shall not send letters to Japanese.
> 4. Do not conduct any business on behalf of the priests.
>
> This is what the government of Japan decided. No additional terms are made.[62]

Articles 2 and 3 here match the aforementioned Article 2 of 1624. The "silver from Japanese Christians" in Article 1 here and the "silver brought by people

60 Biblioteca de la Real Academia de la História, Legajo 9–7239 (2), f. 429.

61 The rules of the officials in the Kingdom of Japan and their enquiry to the Portuguese on the letters of Padre dos Santos, dated 1635. Biblioteca de la Real Academia de la História, Legajo 9–7239 (2), f. 429r-v. The book *The Great Ship from Amacon* by C.R. Boxer also has a translation of this document. Boxer's translation is employed here with some additions by the author. Ref. Boxer, *The Great Ship from Amacon*, 324.

62 Testimonies of forty-one returnees from Japan, dated January 18, 1635. Biblioteca de la Real Academia de la História, Legajo 9–7239 (2), f. 421.

from Macao to priests in Japan" in the 1635 articles contain the same word "silver," but they signify the different type of silver. The "Japanese Christians" mentioned probably correlate to "people from Macao." In other words, this points to the rich people among the Japanese Christians who lived in Macao.[63]

In Chapter 6, it became obvious, however, that some people did entrust silver to the Jesuits or bestowed silver by sea loan even after Christianity was banned. For the Shogunate, these investors were regarded to be Christians. For this reason, prohibitions including that in Section 1 were issued. In other words, it seems that Portuguese were prohibited to trade with entrusted silver and to enter agreements of sea loan with Japanese Christians in 1626. In 1635, at the time of the Santos affair, the ban on sending silver from Macao to support the activities of missionaries was renewed.

As mentioned in Chapter 6, Article 4 points to agents of the Portuguese who traded on behalf of the Jesuits. In other words, the Shogunate recognized that the Macao merchants dealt with raw silk to support the missionary work in Japan that the Jesuits were undertaking.

A closer look at the expression *escondido* (hiding) in Article 2 reveals a connection to the famous *Kareuta Oshioki no Hosho* (hereinafter *Kareuta Hosho*),[64] issued in 1639.

Yamamoto Hirofumi argues that the memorandum by Ota Sukemune, the so called final (fifth) *sakoku* edict, the *Kareuta Hosho*, has a different nature to the orders (*gechijo*) issued between 1633 and 1636 (the so-called first to fourth *sakoku* edicts) to the magistrate in Nagasaki in terms of their principles of duties. Yamamoto points to their difference in character as a result of their issuing processes, following serious discussions after the Shimabara Uprising.[65]

Kareuta Oshioki no Hosho (かれうた御仕置之奉書)

1. You and your compatriots have continued to bring missionaries into the country, despite the stringent laws against this practice
2. These missionaries and their converts have continually received aid and comfort from you and your compatriots, to help them accomplish their designs.

63 Mihoko Oka, "Nihon Kankei Macao Shiryō ni miru Kan'ei Jūichi-nen no Paulo dos Santos Jiken" [The Affair of Paulo dos Santos in Kan'ei 11: From the Macao Sources Concerning Japan], *Tōkyō Daigaku Shiryō Hensan-jo Kenkyū Kiyō* [Research Annual of the Historiographical Institute, University of Tokyo] 15 (2005): 75–94.

64 Literally it means "the decision to punish (Portuguese) galliots."

65 Hirofumi Yamamoto, "Portugal-jin Tsuihō-rei no Tokushitsu" [The Characteristics of the Act of Expel of the Portuguese], in *Sakoku to Kaikin no Jidai* [The Age of National Seclusion and Maritime Exclusion] (Tokyo: Azekura Shobō, 1995), 93–102; Yamamoto, *Kan'ei Jidai* [Kan'ei Era] (Tokyo: Yoshikawa Kōbunkan, 1989).

3. This has resulted in many of our vassals forsaking their bounden duty, and thus caused the death of many.

For all these reasons, you all people are all worthy of death and His Imperial Majesty should justly kill you, but he has condescended to spare your lives, and hereby ordains that you should leave Japan, and never return. If you should subsequently break this command, you will then infallibly be punished as you now deserve to be. Thus I inform you as he told now.

Kan'ei 16 (1639), seventh month, the day five.[66]

The letters of command to the magistrate of Nagasaki between 1633 and 1636 had been about future policy or confirmed current policy. In contrast, the *Kareuta Hosho* points out the Portuguese failure to carry out the orders that had been issued by the Shogunate.

However, to understand something as already committed, a ban must first exist. This ban, I think, is the *faxaque* issued in 1626. With regard to the corresponding circumstances expressed in the word "hiding (*estar escondido*)" in Article 2, the Japanese translation of the *faxaque* transmitted to the Portuguese in 1626 probably corresponded to the content of the *Kareuta Hosho*.

If the Shimabara Uprising referred to in Article 2 was sufficient reason to expel ships from Macao,[67] there would have been no need to list the previous and following articles. No fact is known that can prove the Portuguese in Macao provided any economic or military support to the uprising. This uprising surprised and confused the merchants in Macao, who would have rather spent all their energies defending their trade with Japan.[68] The Shogunate could therefore not use the uprising as the only reason for breaking off relations with Macao, as Macao had not been directly involved in it. The "violation of the *faxaque* of 1626" might have been mentioned to recognize that the Macao merchants were guardians of Christianity. With regard to the development of legal politics, the orders issued to the magistrate in Nagasaki between

66 The original text has been taken from Ministry of Justice of Japan (ed.), *Tokugawa Kinrei Kō* [Tokugawa Interdictory], vol. 61 (Tokyo: Ministry of Justice, 1895). Boxer's translation is employed here with some additions by the author. Boxer, *The Great Ship from Amacon*, 160–161.

67 There are many studies on the Shimabara Uprising in Japan. It is often seen as a *merkmal* that divides the Japan's medieval era from the early modern era and as a kind of uprising motivated by the ban on Christianity. However, recent studies reveal it more as a civil uprising against the rulers and their heavy taxation, based on the people's frustrations and famine. It is also fundamental to consider that the leaders of the uprising were peasant-*samurais* who belonged to the ex-lords of the region.

68 The Envoy of Portugal Castelo Blanco and others, who visited Edo at the moment of the rebellion, were arrested and imprisoned.

1633 and 1636 and the *Kareuta Hosho* of 1639 cannot be placed in the same context. The *Hosho* was rather the counterpart of a *faxaque* that had been directly communicated to the Portuguese in 1626.

The Shogunate clearly recognized the fact that Macao merchants were continuing to trade as agents for the Jesuits. The *faxaque* was therefore apparently drafted with the purpose of destroying missionary work in Japan by severing it from its financial source.

3.2 *An Investigation of the First Article*

When were Macao merchants explicitly banned from backing missionaries in their travels to Japan? The prohibition orders issued from 1612 to 1614,[69] and the "Banishment of Baterens (Priests),"[70] prohibited the Japanese from believing in Christianity and made the banishment of missionaries who were directly involved in missionary work explicit in relation to those in Japan, but not to those who were abroad.

The "Letter to the Viceroy of Nueva España,"[71] from 1612, extended the ban on Christianity in Japan to Japanese in other countries too. Even though this letter referred to Japan as a "divine realm" (*shinkoku* 神国) to indicate that Christianity was not fit for Japan to adopt it, it does not explicitly state the future direction of trade.

For Gonoi Takashi, that Dominicans and Franciscans attempted to smuggle themselves into the country from a Macao merchant ship in the same year already indicated the need to "foster from 1616 on vigilance against those returning or sneaking into Japan."[72]

A letter from Mateus de Couros dated February 24, 1626 states that it was made a duty that year to submit a list of all passengers on Macao trade vessels.[73] Boxer quotes a letter from Giran Rodrigues dated March 31, 1627 that says it was strictly forbidden for Macao merchants to allow missionaries to enter Japan.[74]

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69 Hayashi, *Tsūkō Ichiran*, vol. 1, Book 192, 150–152.

70 Historiographical Office of Tokyo Imperial University (ed.), *Dai-Nihon Shiryō* [Chronological Source Books of Japanese History], part 12, vol. 13 (Tokyo: Historiographical Office of Tokyo Imperial University, 1909). Article on 19 December Keicho 18.

71 Historiographical Office of Tokyo Imperial University (ed.), *Dai-Nihon Shiryō*, part 12, vol. 9 (Tokyo: Historiographical Office of Tokyo Imperial University, 1906). Article on July 1, Keicho 17.

72 Takashi Gonoi, *Tokugawa Shoki Kirishitan-shi Kenkyū: Hotei-ban* [Study on the Kirishitan in the Early Stage of Tokugawa Period: Revised Edition] (Tokyo: Yoshikawa Kōbunkan, 1992), 195.

73 Gonoi, *Nihon Kirishitan-shi no Kenkyū*, 201–203.

74 Boxer mentions, as a source, the letter no. 1387 in Robert Streit, Johannes Dindinger & Johannes Rommerskirchen, *Bibliotheca Missionum*, Bd. 5, *Asiatische missionsliteratur:*

The new regulations of 1626 onwards, in addition to the four paragraphs just mentioned, included an order for ships engaged upon the Macao trade that strengthened control of them and demanded lists of passengers. From this time, it was difficult for missionaries to travel from Macao to Japan; but from Spanish Manila, with which relations had already been cut, it was still possible. Macao and Manila were both dependent on the Viceroy, but they were not in the same position: they differed in their attitude towards trade with Japan as well as whether or not they supported the activities of missionaries. But as the Shogunate had received information from the Dutch about the union of Portugal and Spain, it took the following measures: 'It is obvious for us to inquire in Macao from this year about crime cases in which Japanese establish *faxaque* and in which priests travel to Japan via Manila and Formosa [Taiwan] because of warnings from the Japanese.'[75]

It is obvious that the new regulations of 1635 made the Macao government recognize their responsibility if any missionaries tried to travel from Macao, or even from Manila, to Japan. The first paragraph of the *Kareuta Hosho* mentions "secret travels at present," pointing to those five missionaries who secretly entered Japan via the Ryukyu islands and Satsuma between 1636 and 1637.[76] Four of them were Dominicans. But as the document shows, the regulation of 1635 ordered Macao also to inquire into those who come to Japan from Manila. The secret immigration of missionaries via Manila was therefore one more reason behind the *Kareuta Hosho*.

3.3 *Cristóvão Ferreira*

In addition to the Santos affair, another case was considered as violating the issued order by "offering shelter to missionaries or others of the same faith or to support their passage from other countries." Cristóvão Ferreira, who is also the main character in Endo Shusaku's novel *Silence* (1966), came to Japan as a Jesuit in 1609, when he was aged twenty-nine. After he had worked as a secretary for the successive Provincials, he was arrested at Nagasaki in 1633 and committed apostasy.[77] Documents related to the Santos affair reveal that merchant ships from Macao brought relief supplies from the priests when Ferreira was arrested. The following document is a translation from Portuguese and

1600–1699 (Rom: Herder, 1964; first published Aachen: F. Xaverius, 1929), 505–508.

75 Letter of Manuel Ramos to the Viceroy of India, dated February 11, 1636. Arquivo Nacional Torre do Tombo, *Livro das Monções ou Documentos Remetidos da Índia*, Livro 38, ff. 197v–198. Ref. Boxer, *The Great Ship from Amacon*, 275–278.

76 Gonoi, *Nihon Kirishitan-shi no Kenkyū*, 363.

77 Hubert Cieslik, "Cristóvão Ferreira no Kenkyū" [Study on Cristóvão Ferreira], *Kirishitan Kenkyū* [Journal of Kirishitan Studies] 26 (1986): 81–165.

recounts a conversation at the magistrate's office in Nagasaki with Portuguese seamen who were interrogated in the year of the Santos affair, 1634:

> The Portuguese swore that they were already adhering to these regulations. They had not, so they say, brought supplies to the missionaries in this region. But when the Superior Cristóvão Ferreira was arrested last year, many letters had been found from his servants, addressed to the Father [Iyo] Jeronimo Mozaemon Xisto. We know from his [Ferreira's] confession that ships brought supplies and assistance to the priests.[78]

On this matter, the interrogated Portuguese answered as follows:

> We investigated letters from the servants of the district superior Cristóvão Ferreira, addressed to Christians and missionaries. [...] We looked for the men from this ship but no one has come this year to Japan. The Capitão-mór and the Feitor from three years ago have not come this year. They could therefore give no excuses. As soon as they return to Macao we will investigate those people who help the missionaries hidden in Japan.[79]

The Portuguese who had been brought to the Nagasaki magistrate's office were also questioned on the contents of the letters found in the previous year that Ferreira's servants possessed. They revealed that a fleet of Portuguese ships had brought supplies in three years earlier, in 1631.

In the case of the Santos affair, the prohibition on Portuguese ships carrying letters from priests meant that a direct offence had been committed. The matter involving Ferreira the year before had prepared the ground for the magistrate's office in Nagasaki to actively deal with communication through Macao merchant ships with those related to Christianity.

3.4 *The Influence of the Santos Affair on Foreign Laws*

At this time, a legally systemized *sakoku* law did not exist. Instead, the Senior Council orders to the Nagasaki magistrate's office (1633–36) and the *Kareuta*

78 The enquiry of the officials of the Kingdom of Japan to the Portuguese on the letters of Padre dos Santos, dated 1635. Biblioteca de la Real Academia de la História, Legajo 9–7239 (2), f. 429rv.

79 Investigation record (testimonies of the Portuguese) at the magistrate office of Nagasaki, dated October 5, 1634. Biblioteca de la Real Academia de la História, Legajo 9–7239 (2), ff. 429v–430v.

Hosho issued in 1639 could together be seen as a law.[80] To pursue another line, aside from the bans included in Japanese documents, many regulations were issued to the Portuguese from the Shogunate. The 1639 ordered in 1627. The connection between this affair and the orders of the Senior Council with the magistrate's office at Nagasaki needs to be pointed out.

The order of 1633, which was the first to be issued, was a general outline for the control of Nagasaki. It was given on the occasion of the dismissal of Takenaka Shigeyoshi and the appointment of Imamura Masanaga and Soga Hisasuke. The case with Takenaka had had a substantial influence. But surprisingly this fact was left out. Instead one gains the impression that the Shogunate had hurriedly begun to tighten its pressure on foreign parties. The first and the second article of the 1633 order are about "authorized ships" (*hoshosen*): "All ships except those with a license shall be forbidden to sail abroad" and "With the exception of authorized ships, if Japanese secretly board a ship and go abroad, he shall be put to death. The ship-owner shall be detained. This shall be reported to the superiors".

These two articles are well known as indicating the change from the red-seal ship system to a system whereby ships were authorized by the Senior Councils of the Shogunate to travel abroad (*hoshosen*). With regard to this change, the main theory was that the price of raw silk imports except those traded by the *itowappu* (a union of authorized merchants for raw silk trade) had been reduced, members of the *itowappu* having appealed to the Shogunate for this.[81] Before Portuguese merchants could be expelled, the unresolved problem for the Shogunate was whether or not they could expect the same amount or even more raw silk imports by VOC.[82] Therefore, the increase in the amount of raw silk imported would please Japanese authorities.

Having considered documents from the Dutch factory, Nagazumi Yoko argues that the Shogunate learned from the event that took place at Ayutthaya (1628), when a ship belonging to the Nagasaki elder Takagi Sakuemon was burned by Spanish forces and the authority of the Shogun's red seal was

80 Regarding the so-called *Sakaku-rei* (鎖国令, the rules given by the Senior Council to the Nagasaki magistrate's office during 1633–36 concerning foreign trade and diplomacy), only full items from 1636 are translated in Boxer, *The Great Ship from Amacon*, 330–331.

81 Motoi Hayashi, "Itowappu no Tenkai: Sakoku to Shōgyō Shihon" [The Development of the *Itowappu* System: National Seclusion and the Commercial Capital], *Rekishigaku Kenkyu* [Historical Science] 126 (1947): 17. *Nagasaki Jiten: Rekishi-hen* adopts this theory; Tatsuichirō Akizuki & Kan Yamada (supervision), *Nagasaki Jiten: Rekishi-hen* [Encyclopedia of Nagasaki: Part of History] (Nagasaki: Nagasaki Bunken-sha, 1982), 58.

82 Hirofumi Yamamoto, *Sakoku to Kaikin no Jidai* [The Age of National Seclusion and Maritime Exclusion] (Tokyo: Azekura Shobō, 1995), 76–77.

ignored. For Nagazumi, the Senior Councils license was substituted for the red seal.[83] He further explains that in 1631 the Council issued a document to Nagasaki magistrate Takenaka Shigeyoshi to allow ships to travel abroad. Equipped with certificates issued by him, several ships did so. A new system had been created. But in 1633, Soga and Imamura were sent to Nagasaki to investigate some of Takenaka's irregularities. The articles passed to them should be considered as indicating further restrictions on the right to travel abroad. In other words, Takenaka's deployment of his private merchant ships and the chaotic situation at Nagasaki were behind these articles.

The regulations given to the new magistrates Sakakibara Motonao and Kamio Motokatsu at the end of the fifth month of Kan'ei 11 (1634) were basically the same as those of 1633. But the modifications and additions made in the following year were obviously influenced by the Santos affair: "All Japanese ships, including those dispatched, shall be forbidden to sail abroad" (modified) and "With regard to the missionary, all ships shall be inspected very carefully" (new entry).

In 1635, all travels abroad, which had been limited to authorized ships, were forbidden. Yamamoto Hirofumi has investigated the *Diaries Kept by the Heads of the Dutch Factory in Japan* and writes on the order of the year 1635 to abolish all authorized ship travel that "the Shogun (the third: Tokugawa Iemitsu) had heard information telling him that authorized ships brought weapons into the country, contacts to Christians and help for missionaries in Japan. That is why the Shogun himself took measures to tighten the prohibition of Christianity."[84] Details about this are not further specified in the *Diaries*. The vessels prepared by Takenaka made a stop at the port of Macao, who unintentionally took part in Santos's trade to support the missionaries in Japan. Despite the great unrest this fact caused in the Shogunate, it has been overlooked.

Santos's letters were discovered in the summer of 1634. They therefore influenced not only the regulations of that year but also those of 1635. In addition, they revealed that even after the expulsion of missionaries the trade to support the Church continued. Further, Takenaka's private merchant ships accidentally assisted this trade, convincing the Shogunate to completely prohibit all travels abroad. The chief of the Dutch factory, Nicolaes Coeckbacker, noted in his record that a red-seal ship voyage to Vietnam, scheduled for February 1635, was canceled because the Shogunate feared that it might "carry a lot of money from Tonkin and Cochinchina to support the missionaries in Japan."[85]

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83 Nagazumi, *Shuin-sen*, 82–86.

84 Yamamoto, *Sakoku to Kaikin no Jidai*, 52–53.

85 Yōko Nagazumi (ed. and trans.), *Hirado Oranda Shōkan no Nikki*, vol. 3 (Tokyo: Iwanami Shoten, 1969), 202. Article on March 12 and 13, 1635.

Coeckbacker further noted that since the autumn of 1634 "a junk with the shogun's red-seal ship sailed to Tonkin, Cochinchina, and Cambodia. It was prohibited with the death penalty to enter a harbor except those chosen for the red-seal."[86] The connection between Santos's and Takenaka's ships had shown that it was acknowledged ships could stop at Macao on their way to Siam or Cambodia. The Shogunate was cautious that this might allow contact with Christians there. The new regulation for ship inspection was obviously added because of this affair.

4 The Reaction of Macao's Government to the Santos Affair

Earlier in this chapter, I mentioned the Namban interpreter Luís Tavares of the magistrate's office at Nagasaki. He sent a warning to the authority of Macao city that shows the Shogunate further strengthened its position against Namban trade after the Santos affair. Macao's authorities had to deal with this situation seriously. The superior in command noted that in the first place Macao's citizens were not allowed to trade with Takenaka's junk when it arrived:

> In 1632 a Japanese junk arrived here. When it anchored in the vicinity of the harbor entrance it was forbidden to trade with it. The financial administrator of the royal treasury, the Ouvidor-geral Dr. Sebastião Soares Pais, decided to severely punish those who invested in this ship.[87]

It was therefore forbidden to entrust any goods to this junk. But with the authority of the Church being absolute, Macao tolerated Santos's business. The Portuguese who were interrogated at the magistrate's office in Nagasaki explained the following:

> Padre Xovão [Paulo dos Santos] is a priest but he obviously covers his life through trade. Because he is a priest nobody criticizes him. For his breaking of important regulations he should better be sent to India as the magistrate's office commands it.[88]

86 Letter of the Head of the Dutch Factory Nicolaes Coeckebacker to the Governor of Formosa Hans Putmans, dated November 24, 1634. Cited from Nagazumi, *Shuin-sen*, 94.

87 Testimony of the Captain General of Macao Manuel da Câmara de Noronha, dated January 20, 1636. Biblioteca de la Real Academia de la História, Legajo 9–7239 (2), f. 419.

88 Investigation record (testimonies of the Portuguese) at the magistrate office of Nagasaki, dated October 5, 1634. Biblioteca de la Real Academia de la História, Legajo 9–7239 (2), f. 430.

Their testimony indicates that Santos had not been judged at Macao. Takase Kōichirō and Boxer argue that Santos's trade activities were indispensable for training Japanese priests.

The Christian Church at Macao had to support these activities and not punish them officially. When they made their testimony, the Portuguese mentioned the potential of exiling Santos in India. Suetsugu Heizō, who was present at the interrogation, wrote a letter to the authorities of Macao in 1634 instructing them how to deal with this affair:

> This year, Padre Paulo Xovão brought letters addressed to two Japanese inhabitants of this city by this ship. This exposed the danger of losing our trade. As they explained to you, I am working with all my power to restore it. [...] Heaven allows us to exile Padre Paulo to India to calm down this matter. [...] It might be out of ignorance but the priests shall not go to Japan. The priests living at Macao shall also not send any letters or orders. They will be seriously punished from now on and this will lead to Macao's complete loss of profits.[89]

Suetsugu Heizō indicates that there was the potential this affair would cause a break with Macao, and advised the authorities there to exile Santos to India. The authorities decided otherwise, and instead sent Santos to Cochinchina (South Vietnam). The representative of the diocese (governador do Bispado) of Macao Francisco da Sena wrote the order for this:

> Regarding the fact that the priest Paulo dos Santos invested his money into whom came from Nagasaki on board to this city in 1632 abusing the law already existing in the diocese of Japan. We informed Father Santos to leave this city and go to Cochinchina in the diocese of Malacca on board the first ship available. His punishment will be doubled if he returns without permission.[90]

This document shows that Sena sent the city council of Macao his agreement to exile Santos to Cochinchina. Three months later, the following document reveals an astonishing maneuver concerning this treatment:

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89 Letter of Suetsugu Heizō to the Government of Macao, dated November 1, 1634. Biblioteca de la Real Academia de la História, Legajo 9–7239 (2), ff. 433, 437, 434rv.

90 Written approval of Francisco de Sena to the Government of Macao, dated January 23, 1635. Biblioteca de la Real Academia de la História, Legajo 9–7239 (2), f. 414v.

> Last year Paulo dos Santos broke regulations, which had been decided on in Japan in 1626, by sending a few letters in Japanese regarding his commodities to two Japanese. [The authorities and the council of the city of Macao] ordered Padre Santos to leave this city. As a result, we ordered that Padre Santos should be sent to Cochinchina to protect Portuguese trade with Japan. We obediently complied. This order seemed to be very harsh and we allowed Padre Santos, therefore, to return on the same ship or to board a different one after the fleet for Japan had left.[91]

Sena ordered Santos to leave Macao and at the same time allowed him to return. His condition "after the fleet for Japan had left" was carefully calculated to avoid any information about Santos's return from reaching Japan. He acknowledged this as a possible danger. After Suetsugu Heizō had learned from the Portuguese, who arrived at Nagasaki in 1635, that Santos had been exiled to Cochinchina, he sent a further warning to the authorities of Macao:

> I hope you have sent Padre Paulo to Malacca and did not let him stay on the Japanese ship for Cochinchina. This is what our government cares. If the government finds out that he has been deported to Cochinchina instead, it would amount to a great loss for Macao.[92]

He once more wrote that the Shogunate was not pleased with Cochinchina as an exile destination. How Santos was treated was a major concern when it came to the continuity of trade between Macao and Nagasaki. He should therefore be exiled to a distant place such as Malacca from which he could not easily return. However, Santos was sent to Cochinchina and ended his life there.

4.1 *The Santos Affair in the Monsoon Documents*

As well as the documents in the Biblioteca de la Real Academia de la Historia at Madrid, the Monsoon Documents contain detailed information about the Santos affair. They also contain reports sent from Macao in the first half of the 17th century.

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91 Letter of Francisco de Sena to the Bishop of Cochin Miguel da Cruz Rangel, dated April 16, 1635. Biblioteca de la Real Academia de la História, Legajo 9–7239 (2), ff. 383–384v.

92 Letter of Suetsugu Heizō to the Government of Macao, dated November 1, 1634. Biblioteca de la Real Academia de la História, Legajo 9–7239 (2), f. 409rv.

Some of these reports are about the connection with Japan.[93] Before Francisco Mascarenhas took his position as the first Captain General in 1623, these were few in number; but reports on the relationship with Japan started to appear more prominently from the 1630s, when the continuity of trade was already threatened. As seen in Chapter 4, from 1633 onwards the trade between Japan and Macao was in danger. For its financial reconstruction, an administrator of the royal property (Fazenda Real) was appointed to manage the Japan voyage.[94] Manuel Ramos, who took the office in 1635, wrote many reports to the Viceroy of India about problems that had occurred at Macao. These are written with the most serious event of the year at their center. From them, we learn that the Santos affair was an important matter for the authorities of Macao. The following report that Ramos sent to the Viceroy of India gives an outline of the Santos affair, and expresses the possibility that the Shogunate might break off its relations with Macao because of it:

> On board the *Santo Antonio*, which Lopo Sarmento de Carvalho boarded,[95] was also a married man (*casado*) of this city, Jeronymo Luis [Jerónimo Luís]. This man carried a few letters the Japanese priest Paulo dos Santos had addressed to other Japanese to regain the silver these men had taken care of. Whatever his destiny might be, the letters were confiscated and sent to the Shogun for consultation. A new *faxaque* was issued on this occasion, adding even stricter punishment. Gaspar Borges, who worked as administrator for the voyages, discussed the matter with intellectuals and lawyers. They decided to order the diocese superior to send the priest to Cochinchina. But he returned to Macao. Many Japanese and interpreters at the magistrate's office tell us that Jeronymo Luis Gouvea [Jerónimo Luís Gouveia] will be burnt to death.[96] Suetsugu Heizō had ordered us to exile Father Paulo to Malacca, where the Japanese don't go. From there he

93 Isaú Santos, *Macau e o Oriente nos Arquivos Nacionais Torre do Tombo* (Macao: Instituto Cultural de Macau, 1995).

94 Charles Ralph Boxer, "Portuguese Commercial Voyages to Japan Three Hundred Years Ago," in *Portuguese Merchants and Missionaries in Feudal Japan, 1543–1640*, Chapter III, Collected Studies Series CS 232 (London: Variorum Reprints, 1986; first published *Transactions of the Japan Society of London* xxxi (1934): 27–77), 27–78.

95 Capitão-mór of the navigation to Japan in 1617, 1620, 1630, 1631 and 1634. He was from Bragança, in the northern part of Portugal.

96 At the magistrate office of Nagasaki at this time, three Namban translators (Pêro Rodrigues, António Carvalho and António Neretti) have been confirmed other than Luís Tavares. Biblioteca de la Real Academia de la História, Legajo 9–7239 (2), f. 429rv.

> could neither trade nor write letters. This priest is here and preparations are being made for the voyage to Japan. We fear to lose everything, and nobody and nothing will be shipped.[97]

Three months after he wrote this report, Ramos sent a further report to the Viceroy of India:

> I have already written to your Excellency. Here (Macao) lives a Japanese priest called Paulo dos Santos. [...] He broke regulations which had been already set by the Captain General here and deposited his commodities to a Japanese junk which arrived in Macao. He asked Lopo Sarmento's new fleet to carry his profits (from the deposited commodity) from Japan and wrote letters to Japanese who would take care of it. These letters were delivered by Luis Gouvea [Luís Gouveia], a resident of this city. Luis Gouvea was arrested for his breaking of Japanese regulations. All to whom these letters were addressed and those involved in the matter have been arrested under suspicion of being Christians. A further problem has arisen with another priest. As long as Padre Paulo remains at Macao the Japanese will not trust Portuguese merchants. This information is based on a letter the administrator of Nagasaki, Lord Heizō, has sent. The city council took this into account and ordered exile of Santos, but the diocese superior Padre Francisco de Sena approved his return to Macao in secrecy. Owing to this person's behavior the trade with Japan has faced great danger. It has been possible to lose Portuguese from several places, their capital and ships. [...] This year, according to the regulations ser by Japanese authorities and their warnings, it has become clear that Macao will be held responsible if missionaries proceed towards Japan from Manila or Formosa. Even if God does not allow it, their ships, people, and funds will all be burned and lost. The partnership for the trade will be passed to the Dutch. They [Dutch] have lectured every possible inconvenience relating us to Japanese.[98]

97 Letter of Manuel Ramos to the Viceroy of India Miguel de Noronha, dated December 11, 1635. Arquivo Nacional Torre do Tombo, *Livro das Monções ou Documentos Remetidos da Índia*, Livro 35, f. 286v.

98 Arquivo Nacional Torre do Tombo, *Livro das Monções ou Documentos Remetidos da Índia*, Livro 38, ff. 197v–198.

To summarize the content of Manuel Ramos's two letters to the Viceroy of India:

1. Ramos followed Suetsugu Heizō's warning and supported strict treatment of Santos.
2. Ramos understood the details of the affair and saw the danger it caused with regard to relations to Japan. He was further aware of the diocesan superior Sena's secret plan for dealing with Santos's banishment.
3. He did not hide his opinion that the city of Macao should restrain itself in sending missionaries to Japan. He was aware of the risk that trade with Japan would be passed into the hands of the Dutch.

Concerning the first two points, he might have consulted the documents about the case of the priest Paulo dos Santos before preparing his two letters to the Viceroy. He also recognized that helping missionaries to travel to Japan would turn into a disadvantage when there was future competition with the Dutch for the Japanese trade. It is easy to understand why, in many entries of the *Diaries Kept by the Heads of the Dutch Factory in Japan*, the Portuguese are strongly recognized as rivals, and why the Portuguese regarded the Dutch as their opponents in the competition for trade rights with Japan.

It was obvious to the authorities of Macao that the Santos affair had a fatal impact on the trade between Nagasaki and Macao. This affair also urged the Shogunate to alter its foreign policy. It was, in my opinion, the turning point for the Shogunate towards seriously thinking about breaking off its relationship with Macao.

The importance of this affair lies not so much in what these letters brought about in Nagasaki but more in the discovery that the Portuguese supported the activities of missionaries under the official ban on Christianity. Furthermore, these letters are directly related to the damage to governmental authority in Nagasaki. The Shogunate reacted very sensibly to Santos's letters. This was because of their connection with the misconduct of Takenaka, the magistrate of Nagasaki, and the fact that Portuguese merchants secretly supported the missionary work. This was discovered when Ferreira, the Superior of the Jesuits' missionary in Japan, was arrested.

Concerning Santos's treatment, the authorities of Macao and the Church had opposing views. His trade activities were not for his private profit but were deeply related to the training of Japanese priests, who were indispensable for proselytization. In the Church, Santos was favorably judged even after his death, as we see in Jesuit sources that speak of him.

EPILOGUE

The Final Phase of the Namban Trade

The Macao merchants believed they could resume trade with Japan as long as the Japanese (in particular Suetsugu Heizō and the investment group at Hakata and Nagasaki) were expecting repayment of liabilities. Even after the break in 1639 had been announced, a legation was sent, but this ended tragically. Thus, merchants, like missionaries, also became martyrs. During the period of Namban trading, missionaries sustained their missionary work with trade profits and were called "merchants" by Tokugawa Ieyasu (Chapter 6). This conflation of merchants and missionaries was grounded in their mutual interests, which had synergistically developed at a distance from Portugal on the eastern boundaries of Eurasia.

In this book I have described the people who were involved in Namban trade, the traded commodities, the silver entrusted by the Japanese, which was vital capital for the Portuguese trade, and the resulting liabilities. I have made it clear that all these elements were adapted to the different needs of the Macao merchants and Christian missionaries and changed over time. It has not been possible, however, to examine all Namban trade; our picture has to remain fragmentary.

The Namban trade, which started with interdependence of private maritime trade and missionaries in the Far East, came to a close after the Tokugawa Shogunate prohibited Christianity and regulated foreign trade. A large number of debts that had arisen from loans, which enabled Japanese merchants to sustain the trade, were not paid back, and any possibility of recovering the money was lost. In Chapters 3, 4, and 7, I examined the trade dynamics during the Kan'ei period (1624–44). For a further overview of the situation, I will now discuss diplomatic activities during this period. Kōda Shigetomo,[1] as well as Boxer,[2] have written about the movements of the Portuguese in and around Nagasaki during the Kan'ei period. I analyze some new sources here and bring the book to its conclusion.

1 Shigetomo Kōda, *Nichi-Ō Tsūkō-shi* [History of the Relationship between Japan and Europe] (Tokyo: Iwanami Shoten, 1942).

2 Charles Ralph Boxer, *The Great Ship from Amacon: Annals of Macao and the Old Japan Trade 1555–1640* (Lisbon: Centro de Estudos Históricos Ultramarinos, 1959).

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1 The Macao Delegation up to the Break in Relations

In 1628, troubles arose at Ayutthaya between a Spanish warship and the red-seal ship of the town elder (Machi-doshiyori) of Nagasaki, Takagi Sakuemon. In the so-called Ayutthaya incident, Takagi's red-seal ship was burnt and its Japanese crew members were taken away to Manila. Nagazumi Yōko explains that this conflict between Takagi and the Spanish warship reflected seriously the diplomatic policy of Japan because the Shogun's authority signified by the red seal was ignored. She further writes that this system was abolished and changed to the Shogunate's decree ship (奉書船 *hōshosen*) system, in which the magistrate of Nagasaki issued a permit for travel abroad.[3] Following this incident, the Shogunate detained vessels from Macao that arrived at Nagasaki during the following year.

In 1630, Gonçalo da Silveira was sent from Macao to ban relations with Spaniards who had caused the conflict in Ayutthaya and to appeal for the release of the prisoners who had been taken. The Shogunate possibly received information from the Dutch factory on the union of Spain and Portugal. This could explain why a ship from Macao was detained after the clash between the Spanish warship and the Japanese red-seal ship in Ayutthaya. Even before Silveira arrived at Nagasaki in 1630, it had been decided that the detained ships would be released. Thus, two ships that had been detained the previous year and Silveira's ship returned to Macao. Silveira, however, was put under house arrest together with the Capitão-mór Aranha in Nagasaki. During this time, Simão Vaz Paiva, the Feitor of Silveira's ship, received orders from the magistrate of Nagasaki, Takenaka Shigeyoshi, and was sent to Manila to demand reparations (see Chapter 7).

Again because of heavy liabilities against the Japanese, the ship from Macao that anchored at Nagasaki the following year was held in custody. To release the ship, the necessary money was paid, in silver that had been invested by Manila in Macao in 1634 (see Chapter 4). Also in 1634, Silveira and his men, who had been detained in Nagasaki, were released, as Heizō says:

> Macao should be filled with joy about the return of Gonçalo da Silveira and António de Oliveira [Aranha]. As they will have told you, I appealed to the Shogunate for more than three years to release them so they could return home. It is my delight to have accomplished this for Macao.[4]

Silveira and Aranha had been released thanks to Heizō's negotiations with the Shogunate. Heizō tried to support the Portuguese because he "gives great

3 Yōko Nagazumi, *Shuin-sen* [Red-seal Ship] (Tokyo: Yoshikawa Kōbunkan, 2001), 82–86.
4 Biblioteca da Ajuda, *Jesuítas na Ásia*, Códice 49-V-11, ff. 615–617.

importance to the trade with Macao and the profits gained from it," as he stated himself in his letter. He sought to maintain his family's long-established relationship with merchants from Macao, even while he was aware of the Shogunate's favoring the VOC at the time. This was not just because Macao's merchants were acquainted with the Suetsugu family but because the Suetsugus at Nagasaki and Hakata were controlling an investment structure of sea loans to Macao merchants and Heizō was managing this trade through his own investment structure (see Chapter 3). Heizō's idea was to continue the trade with the Portuguese because they had a good partnership with him, rather than with VOC, which held the systematic and exclusive trade activities in Asia.

During Silveira's stay in Japan, conditions for the Portuguese changed. In the spring of 1633,[5] an edict enumerating seventeen articles was issued by the Senior Council to the magistrate of Nagasaki. Its main contents were as follows: except "Shogunate's decree ships" (*hōshosen*) no other vessels were allowed to travel overseas; Japanese living abroad were not allowed to return; the prohibition of Christianity was reinforced; restrictions were placed upon business methods at Nagasaki; the handling of foreign ships was controlled; and the price for imported silk was to follow the price at Nagasaki even if it was dealt in somewhere else.[6] In 1634, boards listing an additional three prohibitions in addition to the edict of 1633 were erected throughout Nagasaki.[7] In addition to "Christian priests (*bateren*) shall not come to Japan" and "except by the Shogunate's decree ships (*hōshosen*) no other vessels are allowed to travel overseas," it was further decreed that "no Japanese armor shall leave Japan."

In 1635, a new edict from the senior council was again issued to the magistrate of Nagasaki, stating that "no Japanese ship is allowed to travel overseas."[8] This meant that traveling abroad was completely prohibited for all Japanese.[9] This raised the profile of the crisis management that was taking place to prevent the entanglement of trade entrusted to Japanese priests living at Macao

5 Kan'ei 10th, second month, the 28th day (April 6, 1633).

6 Ministry of Justice of Japan (ed.), *Tokugawa Kinrei Kō* [Tokugawa Interdictory], vol. 61 (Tokyo: Ministry of Justice, 1895), Chapter 67, 566–567.

7 Ibid., 567–568.

8 Ibid., 568–569.

9 For the circumstances up to the so-called Act of National Seclusion in Kan'ei period, I refer to Naohiro Asao, *Sekai-shi no naka no Kinsei* [Early Modern Period of Japan in World History] (Tokyo: Chūō Kōron-sha, 1991); Seiichi Iwao, *Sakoku* [National Seclusion], *Nihon Rekishi* [Japanese History] 14 (1966); Tadashi Nakamura, "Shimabara no Ran to Sakoku" [The Rebellion of Shimabara and the National Seclusion], in Saburō Ienaga (ed.) *Iwanami Kōza Nihon Rekishi 9: Kinsei I* [Iwanami Lecture of Japanese History, vol. 9: Early Modern Period I] (Tokyo: Iwanami Shoten, 1975).

with the magistrate Takenaka's ambition to privatize the Nagasaki trade (see Chapter 7).

In 1635, Silveira went to Japan again, as Capitão-mór, after having returned to Macao only shortly before. In the same year, the Capitão-mór system was abolished after Macao accumulated too much Japanese debt. Up to that time, the rights for voyages to Japan had either been granted to or purchased by the Capitão-mór. He was taking his own goods to Japan as well as commodities entrusted to him by the citizens of Macao. The commission from the consignor became the monopolistic income of the Capitão-mór. But in 1635, a ship was fitted out using official funds and a Capitão-mór was selected from among the citizens of Macao to be employed with a regular salary. He gathered a group of ships and went to Japan (Chapter 4). In 1635, António de Távora Pinto was chosen from among Macao citizens for the voyage, but he was attacked by Dutch warships and shipwrecked. Succeeding Távora Pinto, Silveira, who had planned to return to Goa, went again to Japan.[10] Manuel Ramos, the royal administrator for the financial affairs of Macao, wrote to the Viceroy of India about Silveira in a letter dated February 11, 1636:

> Last year, Gonçalo da Silveira was selected Capitão-mór for the voyage to Japan because of his character, his natural talent, his disposition, and his rich experience with Japan. It is of great importance that he goes to Japan. The Japanese respect him and in the same way as he controls the Portuguese he knows very well how to interact with the Japanese. The Portuguese know his nature and will not have the nerve to continue their disorder.[11]

The business undertaken in 1635 during Silveira's term was successful, and he also controlled the "disorder" at Nagasaki. Judging from the context of the quote, this refers to circumstances around the sea loan contract, which was regarded as a serious problem in the relationship between Japan and Macao. As rumors spread about breaking off mutual relations (Chapter 3), the reasons for the bad reputation that the Portuguese had gained were not only problems concerning Christians (Chapter 7), but also the high levels of debt. If Macao wished to improve its relationship with Japan, it was essential that Silveira should be hurriedly selected as representative Capitão-mór, because he had been detained from 1630 for four years and had rich experience from his stay

10 Boxer, *The Great Ship from Amacon*, 141.

11 Arquivo Nacional Torre do Tombo, *Livro das Monções ou Documentos Remetidos da Índia*, Livro 38, f. 193rv. This letter is transcribed in Boxer, *The Great Ship from Amacon*, 275–278.

in Japan. Ramos reported to the Viceroy of India that the trade in the following year brought 1,500 boxes of "silver contracted by sea loan," corresponding to 70,000 taels, from Japan to Macao.[12]

In 1635, Suetsugu Heizō wrote to the officials at Macao about Silveira: "Gonçalo da Silveira had been in Japan for a long time. He knows the customs of our land very well. His manners and his conduct are admirable."[13] This letter was written shortly before Silveira left the port with his fleet. Its content was possibly the reason why Silveira was elected Capitão-mór for the journey to Japan the following year. He returned to Japan as Capitão-mór with four galiot ships in 1636. In 1635, the Senior Council of Edo decreed additional regulations,[14] both to banish the descendants of Portuguese,[15] and to intern incoming Portuguese from Macao on Dejima, an island that was built in 1636 for this purpose. In the *Diaries Kept by the Heads of the Dutch Factory in Japan*, it is mentioned that because of the rumor that "this year the last ship from Macao had arrived," the price for commodities rose very fast and the income for the merchant ships from Macao was extremely high.[16] But even with these excellent sales, the debts were not yet repaid.

In 1637, Francisco de Castelo Branco, instead of Silveira, led a mission to Japan. On his way to the Edo court, the Shimabara and Amakusa uprising broke out. Together with taking measures against the revolting troops, the Shogunate was urged to decide speedily whether or not to break off relations with Macao. Castelo Branco and his group of Portuguese were arrested and confined at Dejima. In addition, the Capitão-mór who arrived in Japan the following year, João Pereira, was arrested and detained, and his merchant ships were sent back to Macao.[17] The contract for 1636 is included in the bonds for the sea loan contracts in the Suetsugu Documents (see Chapter 3). Even in this situation, Japanese merchants continued to lend money via sea loans.

In the summer of 1639,[18] the Senior Council sent a memorandum to the magistrate of Nagasaki, Ōta Sukemune,[19] in which a prohibition on galiots

12 Arquivo Nacional Torre do Tombo, *Livro das Monções ou Documentos Remetidos da Índia*, Livro 35, ff. 285–286v.

13 Biblioteca da Ajuda, *Jesuítas na Ásia*, Códice 49-V-11, ff. 599–601. Ref. Boxer, *The Great Ship from Amacon*, 326–330.

14 Ministry of Justice of Japan, *Tokugawa Kinrei Kō*, 568–569.

15 Ibid., 570.

16 "2,350 boxes of silver, which contained 1,000 taels per each, were transported." Historiographical Institute, University of Tokyo (ed.), *Diaries Kept by the Head of the Dutch Factory in Japan* (Original Text) vol. 2 (Tokyo: University of Tokyo Press, 1974), 130.

17 Boxer, *The Great Ship from Amacon*, 152–154.

18 Kan'ei 16, seventh month, the fourth day (August 3, 1639).

19 Ministry of Justice of Japan, *Tokugawa Kinrei Kō*, 570–571.

traveling to Japan was finally issued. The confined Castelo Branco, Pereira, and the Capitão-mór Vasco Palha de Almeida were brought to the magistrate's office of Nagasaki and ordered to leave Japan quickly.

After this, not a single ship from Macao was allowed to travel to Japan.[20] The reasons given at the magistrate's office for this breaking off of relations included the assistance given to missionaries in traveling to Japan and the Shimabara and Amakusa uprising, which was led by Christian retainers of the previously baptized lords of the region; business relationship between Macao and Japan were not stated as a cause. But after the Shogunate discovered that hidden missionaries were receiving support from Macao, and putting this discovery alongside the Shimabara and Amakusa uprising, it was convinced of the inseparable connection between Christians with Macao merchant ships. With this in mind, the break was announced (see Chapter 7).

2 The Martyrdom of the Macao Merchant Legation in 1640

The city council of Macao hurriedly decided to dispatch a legation that would appeal to restart trade, as it had been informed by the returning Portuguese about the break.[21] They thought that this was possible as long as they had their debt obligations to Japan. In other words, the goal of this legation was to transmit their wish to "reopen trade for the sake of Japanese creditors."

On May 18, 1649, Luis Paes Pacheco (Luís Pais Pacheco), who was previously the Capitão-mór and Feitor for Japan, Rodrigo Sanches de Paredes, Gonçalo de Carvalho, and Simão Vaz Paiva were selected as ambassadors.

Benjamin Pires writes about this mission as a "martyr legation."[22] His research is based on the book *Fasciculus e Iaponicis Floribus* edited by the Jesuit António Francisco Cardim.[23] This is also used as my main source. Boxer introduces and analyzes the Portuguese version of the document.[24] Hino Hiroshi translated it into Japanese and compares it with additional information, from

20 Historiographical Institute, University of Tokyo (ed.), *Diaries Kept by the Head of the Dutch Factory in Japan* (Original Text) vol. 4 (Tokyo: University of Tokyo Press, 1981), 125–126.

21 See Chapter 3, Table 1.

22 Benjamin Pires Videira, *A Embaixada Martir* (Macao: Instituto Cultural de Macau, 1988).

23 Antonius Franciscus Cardim, *Fasciculus e Iaponicis floribus* (Romae: typis Heredum Corbeletti, 1646).

24 Charles Ralph Boxer, *Embaixada de Macau ao Japão em 1640* (Lisbon: Imprensa da Armada, 1933).

sources such as *the Diaries Kept by the Dutch Factory at Hirado*.[25] The report was printed in Spanish in Macao in 1641. A Portuguese version was printed in Lisbon in 1643 and a Latin one in Rome in 1646. They were read throughout Europe. Léon Pagès also quoted it almost verbatim in his *Histoire de la Religion Chrétienne au Japon*.[26]

According to Pires, Pacheco was born in Kochi, India, in 1572. He married in 1613 in Malacca and came to Japan as Capitão-mór in 1626, receiving from the magistrate of Nagasaki the order about the strict prohibition imposed on supporting missionaries (see Chapter 7). Paredes was born in Tomar, a city in central Portugal, in 1584, and married Maria Cordeiro, who had Chinese and Portuguese parents. He served as Feitor for the voyages to Japan twice and was one of the wealthy merchants at Nagasaki who was employed as agent merchant by the Suetsugu family (Chapter 3). Carvalho was born in Mesão Frio in the northern region of Portugal in 1589. He married in Macao and was several times the Feitor for the Japanese voyages. Paiva was born in Lisbon in 1587. He married in Macao and was the Feitor for the voyages to Japan in 1631 and 1637. His name was confirmed as secretary for the city council of Macao in November 1639. When he came to Japan as Feitor in 1631, as mentioned earlier, Paiva was dispatched to Manila by the magistrate of Nagasaki Takenaka to demand reparation for the Ayutthaya incident (see Chapter 4).[27] I will summarize briefly the movements of this legation.

On June 22, 1640, the legation left Macao, arriving at Japan on July 6 the same year. The report says that they "had a ship with sails made of straw," indicating that the delegation used a junk with a wickerwork sail. Upon their arrival at Nagasaki a barge with an interpreter (*tsūji*) on board approached their ship and received their petition to the magistrate. Officers from the magistrate's office also arrived. The names of all members of the legation were listed and their cannons were confiscated. They were allowed to disembark but were confined to Dejima. Some days later, they were brought to the magistrate's office and questioned by the magistrate, Baba Saburōzaemon.

Because "inhabitants of Nagasaki were favorable to the Portuguese," they were kept at a distance from Dejima, and Ōmura's retainer guarded them

25 Hiroshi Hino, "1640 Nen ni Macao kara Nagasaki e Haken sareta Portugal Shisetsu ni kansuru 'Hōkoku': Sono Hon'yaku, Chūshaku narabi ni Jakkan no Mondai-ten" [A "Report" on the Portuguese Envoy Sent from Macao to Nagasaki in 1640: Translation and Notes of the Text and Some Questions], *Nagasaki Dansō* 86 (1997).

26 Léon Pagès, *Nihon Kirishitan Shūmon-shi* [*Histoire de la Religion Chrétienne au Japon*], trans. Yoshida Kogorō, vol. 3 (Tokyo: Iwanami Shoten, 1940), 337–347.

27 Historical Archive of Goa/Directorate of Archives and Archaeology, *Livro das Monções*, Livro no. 19-D, f. 1044v.

(Ōmura was the local lord near Nagasaki). During this time, the petition was sent to Edo. Together with the answer, the chief inspector (*Ōmetsuke*) Kagatsume Tadasumi and the inspector Nonoyama Kanetsuna, who were sent from Edo, urgently arrived in Nagasaki.

On August 2, the legation was brought to the magistrate's office to hear the decree from the Senior Council. Because the mission had traveled to Japan despite the prohibition order announced the year before, and because they did not clearly state in their petition that they would not propagate Christianity, all members except a handful of servants received the death sentence. The original document is lost, but decrees to the local lords (*daimyō*) of western Japan (Kyushu) covering the same events are preserved in the *Tsūkō Ichiran* (通航一覧).

The Dutch factory copied the content and made a Dutch translation, which survives. At this time, a Japanese who named himself António Carvalho served as interpreter at the magistrate's office.[28] Thirteen members of the legation were allowed to return to inform Macao about these events; they were selected by designation from the magistrate's office and lottery. All the other sixty-one members were to be executed at Nishizaka and were brought there the following day, August 3. During this time, officials accompanied by the interpreter visited the prison three times. They explained that the prisoners' lives would be spared if they renounced Christianity, but all sixty-one declined. For this reason, they were later named the "martyr legation."

In the same report, there is a list of all their names. Apart from the four already mentioned, there were eleven Portuguese who had come from Portugal (one was born in Hormuz), two Spaniards, one with mixed parentage from Portugal and India, one with mixed parentage from Spain and India, four with mixed parentage from China and Portugal, twelve Chinese, five Bengali, one Acehnese, nine Indians from Malabar, three from Mozambique, and one each from Malar, Solor, the Philippines, Timor, and Java. Details about ethnic groups are noted for those from India and Mozambique. The six Bengali and thirteen Chinese are recorded in a list. In the same list, the four ambassadors, eleven delegation members from Portugal, and the one from Hormuz are counted as "Portuguese."

Luis Fialho from Hormuz and the ambassador Pacheco from Kochi were of mixed parentage. Those with mixed parentage born in Macao and those with an Indian mother were separately recorded from other mixed race "Portuguese." Thus, in the case of Pacheco and Luís Fialho from Hormuz, their fathers

28 For the Namban translators at the Magistrate Office of Nagasaki, see Chapter 4.

were Portuguese and had moved to India. Their mothers were descendants from Portuguese settlers of an earlier generation who had married in India and naturalized there. This classification provides valuable information about how "Portuguese" was defined in India. The next largest group executed were Chinese, mostly sailors, the rest servants. Sailors were usually selected from among those men who were most accustomed to specific sea routes. Therefore, Chinese should usually have been numerous on board the merchant ships that traveled from Macao to Nagasaki. Differently from those from Southeast Asia or India, the majority of whom are noted as servants or slaves, sailors were usually recorded as Chinese or Portuguese with mixed parentage. This is an interesting point.

Among the thirteen names of those who were allowed to return to Macao, many are noted as "blacks" or "slaves." The former designation was used at this time in Portuguese language sources to indicate everybody with a darker skin; it does not necessarily point only to those from Mozambique but also includes people from Southeast Asia or India. The record also names the Portuguese navigator Fernandes, the ship's clerk Delgado, the ship's doctor Quadros from Malabar, and others, showing that it was not solely men of low social status who were allowed to survive. Fernandes was appointed pilot for the way home (in essence the captain), because he "could read sea charts, knows the techniques to observe the sun." When compared with the doctor and clerk, he was relatively well educated. These three (Fernandes, Delgado, Quadros) were designated by the magistrate's office to serve as pilot, deck officer, and doctor. The rest were chosen by a lottery that took place among the Chinese and the "blacks."

The fact that the thirteen men who returned to Macao were not just illiterate men of low social status is important when it comes to reevaluating the Shogunate's intention. The Shogunate sent them out on a small boat but did not intend to let them die on the way. Quite the opposite: the Shogunate wanted them to return safely to Macao, and therefore spared one Portuguese seaman and several men who were accustomed to sea voyages. The magistrate's office in Nagasaki gave them a "license for safe passage" in case they encountered Dutch or Chinese pirates. This would prohibit anyone from capturing them or doing them harm. In other words, the Shogunate planned their return in detail so that the officials in Macao should realize clearly that the situation should not be repeated. The Shogunate not only selected educated men to secure a safe return but also to make sure they could sufficiently explain matters to Macao officials when they got back. As the Shogunate wished, the men returned to Macao on September 2 the same year, and explained in detail what have happened to the legation.

In the record, there is also a paragraph about the magistrate's civil servants interrogating the Portuguese about the weapons they were carrying with them. The legation responded that the weapons had been to defend themselves from Chinese pirates and the Dutch during their voyage. The Shogunate, however, recalled the rumors about Namban reinforcement ships that had been widespread during the Shimabara and Amakusa uprising.[29] As the Shogunate was preparing its coastal defense system in the aftermath of this, the legation's weapons were possibly a provocation.

The legation had also prepared 800,000 taels for repaying the sea loan, but this money was burned together with the ship in the bay of Nagasaki. According to the report, the liabilities to Japanese merchants had accumulated to 70,000 taels in total, but the merchants of Nagasaki hesitated to mention this.

The reasons why the Shogunate finally broke off relations and why Macao acknowledged this break were obviously different. To break with the Portuguese after the Shimabara and Amakusa uprising was essential for the Shogunate, which had made consolidation of its domestic rule on the basis of the Shogunate-domain system (Baku-Han Taisei) its principal task. The main concern after the break with Macao was the amount of raw silk that was carried by ships from other countries and had to be unloaded. The Shogunate feared that the price for such commodities would rise in response to the jump in the domestic price of raw silk. Yamamoto Hirofumi thinks that the Shogunate finally made its decision about this after it had repeatedly requested the Dutch to carry no more raw silk than the Portuguese of Macao had transported to Japan.

Having denied access to Japan for merchant ships from Macao, the Shogunate examined whether it could control the raw silk price by encouraging direct trade with Chinese ships.[30] In 1641, the Dutch factory at Hirado was moved to Nagasaki. The Shogunate's expectations proved to be correct in regard to the amount of raw silk that was carried and the rapidly growing sales of raw silk through VOC.[31]

Concerning the need for funding, so the Shogunate's troops could subjugate the Shimabara and Amakusa uprising,[32] as well as the urgent need to speed up the search for and eradication of Christians, the decision to break off

29 Yukihiro Ōhashi, *Shimabara Amakusa Ikki* [Uprising of Shimabara-Amakusa] (Tokyo: Yoshikawa Kōbunkan, 2008), 47.

30 Hirofumi Yamamoto, *Sakoku to Kaikin no Jidai* [The Age of National Seclusion and Maritime Exclusion] (Tokyo: Azekura Shobō, 1995), 68–92.

31 Teijirō Yamawaki, "Oranda Higashi Indo Gaisha no Tainichi Kiito Bōeki" [Trade of Raw Silk with Japan by the Dutch East India Company], *Nippon Rekishi* 305 (1973), 76–77.

32 Nagasaki City (ed.), *Hara-jō Kiji* [Article on Hara Castle], Nagasaki Sōsho, vol. 1 (Tokyo: Hara Shobō, 1973; first published. Nagasaki: Nagasaki City, 1926), 260–282.

relations was taken without considering the merchants in Nagasaki who had been trading with Macao. Macao, however, still thought itself indispensable to the Japanese because of the widespread sea loans and entrusted silver. It was still seen as possible that trade could be resumed with Japan. It is very likely that Macao officials expected to be able to moderate the break with the Shogunate. From their perspective, not only Japanese merchants but also the Shoguns themselves and their retainers (at least during Ieyasu's reign) and the *daimyō* in Kyushu profited considerably from their investment in and commitment to Macao merchants.[33]

In 1647, two galleons appeared in the bay of Nagasaki. On board one of them was Gonçalo Siqueira de Sousa, who had been sent by the King of Portugal with a delegation to report on Portugal's independence from Spain since 1640, in the hope that this would help to persuade the Japanese to resume trade (the Portuguese believed that the Japanese regarded the Spanish empire as a threat to Japan, so they were keen to impress on the Japanese that Spain and Portugal were separate countries). The delegation had left Lisbon in 1644 but had been shipwrecked en route and was later detained by the Dutch at Batavia. The ships took almost three years to reach Nagasaki.

According to Yamamoto Hirofumi and Matsukata Fuyuko, in 1645 the Shogunate had heard rumors about the delegation through the Dutch factory.[34] When the delegation arrived two years later, the coastal guard of Kyushu was speedily mobilizing *daimyō* forces in the region. In the end, the delegation anchored for more than a month in the bay of Nagasaki, but was denied permission to disembark. De Sousa's delegation returned to Macao.

Among the citizens of Macao, there were quite a few people who opposed dispatching this delegation to Japan. In 1640, a delegation from the Viceroy of Portuguese India was planned to request the resumption of trade. But after the legation from Macao was executed, this plan was hurriedly dropped. The merchants living in Macao, the Viceroy of Portuguese India, and the King of Portugal all viewed the Japanese situation in completely different ways.

In this book, I have tried to make clear that commercial networks did not always completely succumb to state control: smuggling and other such groups

33 The head of the Dutch factory told the cabinet officials of the Shogunate that the Dutch fleet hesitated to surrender Macao because of the maritime loans and silver entrusted by the Japanese accumulated there. Historiographical Institute, University of Tokyo (ed.), *Diaries Kept by the Head of the Dutch Factory in Japan* (Original Text) vol. 2 (Tokyo: University of Tokyo Press, 1974), 149–150.

34 Fuyuko Matsukata, *Oranda Fūsetsu-gaki to Kinsei Nippon* [Dutch News Reports and Japan in the Early Modern Period] (Tokyo: University of Tokyo Press, 2007), 46; Yamamoto, *Sakoku to Kaikin no Jidai*.

are obvious examples. Many puzzles remain concerning the background to Macao's existence as the only settlement in China where Europeans were allowed to reside between the 16th and 19th centuries. The small port city can therefore serve as a perfect illustration of a vibrant, complex community that connected East and West.

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Index of Names

Index of Subjects