Lista referatów

• 2018-04-12, godz. 10:15, 4050

  Piotr Skowron (Instytut Informatyki UW)

  Approximating Optimal Social Choice under Metric Preferences

  We consider voting under metric preferences: both voters and alternatives are associated with points in a metric space, and each voter prefers alternatives that are closer to her to ones that are further away. In this setting, it is often desirable to select an alternative that minimizes the sum of ...

• 2018-03-29, godz. 10:15, 4050

  Krzysztof Rządca (Instytut Informatyki, UW)

  Collective Schedules: Scheduling Meets Computational Social Choice

  When scheduling public works or events in a shared facility one needs to accommodate preferences of a population. We formalize this problem by introducing the notion of a collective schedule. We show how to extend fundamental tools from social choice theory---positional scoring rules, the Kemeny ru...

• 2018-03-15, godz. 10:15, 4790

  Jadwiga Sosnowska (Instytut Informatyki UW)

  Path Evaluation and Centralities in Weighted Graphs – An Axiomatic Approach

  We study the problem of extending the classic centrality measures to weighted graphs. Unfortunately, in the existing extensions, paths in the graph are evaluated solely based on their weights, which is a restrictive and undesirable assumption for a variety of settings. Given this, we define a notion...

• 2018-01-25, godz. 10:15, 4790

  Rahul CS (Instytut Informatyki, UW)

  Group Activity Selection parameterized by the Number of Agent Types

  We study the parameterized complexity of GASP (Group Activity Selection Problem) and its variant gGASP w.r.t. the number of different agent types as a parameter. We show that GASP can be solved in polynomial time if the number of agent types is a constant and complement this result with a strong par...

• 2018-01-11, godz. 10:15, 4790

  Oskar Skibski (Instytut Informatyki, UW)

  A Pseudo-Polynomial Algorithm for Computing Power Indices in Graph-Restricted Weighted Voting Games

  Weighted voting games allow for studying the distribution of power between agents in situations of collective decision making. While the conventional version of these games assumes that any agent is always ready to cooperate with all others, recently, more involved models have been proposed, where c...

• 2017-12-21, godz. 10:15, 4790

  Marcin Waniek (Khalifa University of Science and Technology)

  Strategic Network Diffusion

  Spreading of ideas in a social network is usually modelled in the literature as a stochastic process. However, in many real-life applications the exact course of the diffusion can be guided by a certain individual or authority. Given this background, we analyse a setting in which the process of spre...

• 2017-12-07, godz. 10:15, 4790

  Jan Woźnica (Instytut Informatyki, UW)

  Strategic Evasion of Centrality Measures

  Among the most fundamental tools for social network analysis are centrality measures, which are designed to rank nodes according to various criteria. Similarly to other tools, they were built around the assumption that individuals in the network do not act strategically to evade analysis. Even the c...

• 2017-11-30, godz. 10:15, 4790

  Marcin Dziubiński (Instytut Informatyki, UW)

  Hide and seek game with heterogenous hiding places

  We study a conflict with multiple battlefields where two players, the hider and the seeker, choose their respective numbers of hiding places. The hiding places have different values and the score of the hider is the sum of values of the places chosen by him and not chosen by the seeker. The score of...

• 2017-11-09, godz. 10:15, 4790

  Tomasz Wąs (Instytut Informatyki, Uniwersytet Warszawski)

  An Axiomatization of the Eigenvector and Katz Centralities

  Feedback centralities are one of the key classes of centrality measures. They assess the importance of a vertex recursively, based on the importance of its neighbours. Feedback centralities includes the Eigenvector Centrality, as well as its variants, such as the Katz Centrality or the PageRank, and...

• 2017-10-26, godz. 10:15, 4790

  Krzysztof R. Apt (Instytut Informatyki, Uniwersytet Warszawski)

  Self-Stabilization Through the Lens of Game Theory

  In 1974 E.W. Dijkstra introduced the seminal concept of self-stabilization that turned out to be one of the main approaches to fault-tolerant computing. We show here how his three solutions can be formalized and reasoned about using the concepts of game theory. We also determine the precise number o...

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