Lista referatów

• 2019-06-27, godz. 10:15, 4050

  Joanna Kaczmarek (Uniwersytet Adama Mickiewicza w Poznaniu)

  Generalised Nash bargaining solution in multiplayer games on graphs

  The presentation is about the algorithm of Jon Kleinberg and Éva Tardos for multiplayer coalition games. Its purpose is to create two-person coalitions and to divide the gain between the players. These games are represented on graphs, where the nodes correspond to the players and the edges correspo...

• 2019-06-13, godz. 10:30, 4050

  Gleb Polevoy (Instytut Informatyki, UW)

  Solutions to Games, Transitions and Efficiency

  For any solution concept, we extend the solution set of a strategic-form game to a transition set. This set contains profiles where various agents simultaneously follow different solutions, e.g. different Nash equilibria. This models the fact that in practice, complicated agents are rarely perfectly...

• 2019-06-06, godz. 10:15, 4050

  Kajetan Chmielewski (Instytut Filozofii, Uniwersytet Warszawski)

  Percepcja i rozumienie znaków przez przedstawicieli różnych kultur

  Z powodu coraz częstszego wprowadzania pojazdów autonomicznych do ruchu w przestrzeni publicznej, których liczba ma do 2020 roku osiągnąć ponad 10 milionów 1, zauważyliśmy potrzebę stworzenia i wprowadzenia sytemu znaków informacyjnych biorących pod uwagę nowe interakcje pomiędzy ludź...

• 2019-05-30, godz. 10:15, 4050

  Dorota Celińska-Kopczyńska (Wydział Nauk Ekonomicznych, UW)

  Applying non-Euclidean geometries to Social Network Analysis

  Most data analysts take it for granted to use some subregions of a flat space as their data model, which means utilizing constructs that follow the principles of the Euclidean geometry. However, it is not the only option. We may use non-Euclidean geometries. The first of them, and probably the most ...

• 2019-04-25, godz. 10:15, 4050

  Marcin Waniek (New York University Abu Dhabi)

  Hiding in Multilayer Networks

  Multilayer networks allow for modeling complex relationships, where individuals are embedded in multiple social networks at the same time. Given the ubiquity of such relationships, these networks are increasingly gaining attention in the literature. We present the first analysis of the robustness o...

• 2019-04-11, godz. 10:15, 4050

  Michał Jaworski (Instytut Informatyki, UW)

  Multiwinner Elections - model with Issues

  We study a model of Multiwinner Elections with Issues, in which we assume that an instance consists of a set of individuals (voters and candidates), desired committee size k and p Issues, which will be voted on by the winning committee. The goal is to select a winning committee such that decision ma...

• 2019-03-28, godz. 10:15, 4050

  Tomasz Wąs (Instytut Informatyki, UW)

  An Axiomatic Approach to the Manipulability of Centrality Measures

  Centrality measures are among the most fundamental tools for social network analysis. Since network data is often incomplete, erroneous, or otherwise manipulated, increasing attention has recently been paid to studying the sensitivity of centrality measures to such distortions. However, thus far no ...

• 2019-03-07, godz. 10:15, 4050

  Piotr Skowron (Instytut Informatyki, UW)

  Proportionality Degree of Multiwinner Rules

  We study multiwinner elections with approval-based preferences. An instance of a multiwinner election consists of a set of alternatives, a population of voters---each voter approves a subset of alternatives, and the desired committee size k; the goal is to select a committee (a subset) of k alternat...

• 2019-01-24, godz. 10:15, 4050

  Michał Godziszewski (Instytut Informatyki, UW)

  Judgement Aggregation and Multiwinner Elections

  In most general terms, the theory of judgement aggregation (JA) investigates rules for making consistent collective judgements on a set of propositions on the basis of the group members' individual judgements on these propositions. A multiwinner election rule is a formal process for selecting a sub...

• 2018-12-06, godz. 10:15, 4050

  Grzegorz Pierczyński (Instytu)

  Approval-based elections and distortion of voting rules

  We consider elections where both voters and candidates can be associated with points in a metric space and each voter prefers candidates that are closer to him/her to those that are further away. Such a metric space can be e.g. an issue space of their political views. We will measure the quality...

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