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Wydział Matematyki, Informatyki i Mechaniki Uniwersytetu Warszawskiego

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Seminarium „Gry, mechanizmy i sieci społeczne”

Cotygodniowe seminarium badawcze (brak strony WWW)


Lista referatów

  • 2020-03-05, godz. 10:15, 4050

    Michał Godziszewski (Instytut Informatyki, UW)

    Complexity of some multi-winner election rules over two-dimensional Euclidean single-peaked preferences

    For a given election E=(V,C) the preferences \{\leq_i\}_{i \in V} of voters are single-peaked when, intuitively speaking, a single issue dominates their formation. This single dominating issue is normally represented by a one-dimensional real axis and each voter is characterized by a single point on...

  • 2020-01-30, godz. 10:15, 4050

    Piotr Skowron (Instytut Informatyki, UW)

    Proportionality and the Limits of Welfarism: Fairness with respect to power

    We study two influential voting rules proposed in the 1890s by Phragmen and Thiele, which elect a committee or parliament of k candidates which proportionally represents the voters. Voters provide their preferences by approving an arbitrary number of candidates. Previous work has proposed proportion...

  • 2020-01-23, godz. 10:15, 4050

    Piotr Skowron (Instytut Informatyki, UW)

    Proportionality and the Limits of Welfarism

    We study two influential voting rules proposed in the 1890s by Phragmen and Thiele, which elect a committee or parliament of k candidates which proportionally represents the voters. Voters provide their preferences by approving an arbitrary number of candidates. Previous work has proposed proportion...

  • 2020-01-09, godz. 10:15, 4050

    Gleb Polevoy (Instytut Informatyki, UW)

    Hiders' Game

    A number of recent models in the literature studied various versions of the adversarial social network analysis problem. Generally speaking, this problem involves some members of a network---e.g. leaders of a covert network, political activists, or simply privacy-concerned members of the public---at...

  • 2019-12-19, godz. 10:15, 4050

    Dorota Celińska-Kopczyńska (Instytut Informatyki, UW)

    Hyperbolic pseudo-betweenness -- initial proposition

    Centrality measures identify nodes that play an important role within the network. Betweenness centrality is interpreted roughly as the fraction of all shortest paths in the network between two nodes that contain the given node. The node is more important, the more shortest paths go through it. T...

  • 2019-10-17, godz. 10:15, 4050

    Oskar Skibski (Instytut Informatyki, UW)

    Complexity of Computing the Shapley Value in Games with Externalities

    We study the complexity of computing the Shapley value in games with externalities. We focus on two representations based on marginal contribution nets (embedded MC-nets and weighted MC-nets). We show that every embedded/weighted MC-nets rule can be represented as (one or more) graphs and that each ...

  • 2019-09-26, godz. 10:15, 4050

    Michał Godziszewski

    Proportionality and Consistency in Judgment Aggregation and Belief Merging

    Proportionality of a voting rule can be characterized as the ability to reflect all shades of political opinion of a society within the winning committee. The purpose of our project is to apply the voting theory tools concerning proportionality with respect to the rules which take approval ballots a...

  • 2019-06-27, godz. 10:15, 4050

    Joanna Kaczmarek (Uniwersytet Adama Mickiewicza w Poznaniu)

    Generalised Nash bargaining solution in multiplayer games on graphs

    The presentation is about the algorithm of Jon Kleinberg and Éva Tardos for multiplayer coalition games. Its purpose is to create two-person coalitions and to divide the gain between the players. These games are represented on graphs, where the nodes correspond to the players and the edges correspo...

  • 2019-06-13, godz. 10:30, 4050

    Gleb Polevoy (Instytut Informatyki, UW)

    Solutions to Games, Transitions and Efficiency

    For any solution concept, we extend the solution set of a strategic-form game to a transition set. This set contains profiles where various agents simultaneously follow different solutions, e.g. different Nash equilibria. This models the fact that in practice, complicated agents are rarely perfectly...

  • 2019-06-06, godz. 10:15, 4050

    Kajetan Chmielewski (Instytut Filozofii, Uniwersytet Warszawski)

    Percepcja i rozumienie znaków przez przedstawicieli różnych kultur

    Z powodu coraz częstszego wprowadzania pojazdów autonomicznych do ruchu w przestrzeni publicznej, których liczba ma do 2020 roku osiągnąć ponad 10 milionów 1, zauważyliśmy potrzebę stworzenia i wprowadzenia sytemu znaków informacyjnych biorących pod uwagę nowe interakcje pomiędzy ludź...

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