Nie jesteś zalogowany | zaloguj się

Wydział Matematyki, Informatyki i Mechaniki Uniwersytetu Warszawskiego

  • Skala szarości
  • Wysoki kontrast
  • Negatyw
  • Podkreślenie linków
  • Reset

Seminarium „Gry, mechanizmy i sieci społeczne”

Cotygodniowe seminarium badawcze (brak strony WWW)

Lista referatów

  • 2016-03-17, godz. 12:15, 1770

    Piotr Skowron (University of Oxford)

    Committee Scoring Rules: Axiomatic Classification and Hierarchy

    We present and advertise the class of committee scoring rules, recently introduced as multiwinner analogues of single-winner scoring rules. We present a hierarchy of committee scoring rules (while includes all previously studied subclasses of committee scoring rules, as well as two new subclasses), ...

  • 2016-03-03, godz. 12:15, 3320

    Marcin Dziubiński (Instytut Informatyki, Wydział MIM UW)

    Network elicitation in adversarial environment

    We consider a problem of a defender who wants to protect a network against a contagious attack. The defender could only protect a fixed number of nodes and does not know the network. Each of the nodes in the network does not know the network either, but knows his/her neighbours only. We propose an i...

  • 2016-01-07, godz. 12:15, 3320

    Jaideep Roy (Deakin University)

    Optimal size of majoritarian committees under persuasion

    We analyse the `optimal' size of non-deliberating majoritarian committees with no conflict of interest among its members when committees can be persuaded by a biased and informed expert. We find that when this bias is small, the optimal size is one; when it is intermediate, the optimal size increase...

  • 2015-12-17, godz. 12:15, 3320

    Piotr Skowron (Google)

    Multi-Winner Elections: What do we Elect Committees for?

    We present a brief overview of several interesting multi-winner election rules and we identify a broad natural class of multi-winner score-based rules (called committee-scoring rules), and we show that several existing interesting rules can be captured by this class. Within this class we identify th...

  • 2015-11-19, godz. 12:15, 3320

    Qiang Zhang (Instytut Informatyki, Wydział MIM UW)

    Truthful Cake Cutting Mechanisms with Externalities

    Cake cutting is a fundamental problem that studies fair resource division among agents. In this talk, I will review some classical cake cutting algorithms and discuss research directions in cake cutting problems. In particular, we will see truthful cake cutting mechanisms when agents not only value ...

  • 2015-11-05, godz. 12:15, 3320

    Tomasz Michalak (Instytut Informatyki, Wydział MIM UW)

    Game-Theoretic Centrality Measures

    In this talk, we discuss the computational properties of game-theoretic centrality measures. The key idea behind game-theoretic approach to network analysis is to treat nodes as players in a cooperative game, where the value of each coalition of nodes is determined by certain graph properties. Next,...

  • 2015-10-29, godz. 12:15, 3320

    Jakub Pawlewicz (Instytut Informatyki, Wydział MIM UW)

    Game of Hex - Solving 10x10 board

    Hex is a famous board game with very simple rules invented by Piet Hein in 1942 and independently by John Nash in 1948. Since finding a winning strategy is PSPACE-complete it is unlikely that we will find it. However, for this game many theories were developed. On the last decade, research made by U...

  • 2015-10-22, godz. 12:15, 3320

    Marcin Waniek (Instytut Informatyki, Wydział MIM UW)

    Disguising centrality

    Various centrality measures have been developed to identify key members of a social network. We study how such members can escape detection without giving away much of their influence on the network.In our work, we focus on the best-known centrality measures and influence models. In particular, we s...

  • 2015-10-08, godz. 12:15, 3320

    Oskar Skibski (Institute of Informatics, University of Warsaw)

    Full Additivity with Basic Division Imply the Shapley Value

    The principle of Additivity states the sum of payoffs in two separate games should equal the payoff in the combination of those games. Typically, the literature considers limited version of this principle in which both games have exactly the same set of players. In contrary, in this paper we study t...