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Gry, mechanizmy i sieci społ.
Efficient assignment mechanism with endowments and distributional constraints
Seminarium Gry, Mechanizmy i Sieci Społeczne
Prelegent: Takamasa Suzuki
2016-10-13 10:15
We
consider an assignment problem of multiple types goods to agents, where
each type of a good has multiple copies (e.g., multiple seats of a
school). Each agent is endowed with a good. Some distributional
constraints are imposed on the allocation (e.g., minimum/maximum quotas,
the balance of racial/gender distributions within a school). We develop
a mechanism that is based on the Top Trading Cycles mechanism, which is
strategy-proof, feasible (always satisfies distributional constraints),
Pareto efficient, and individually rational, assuming the
distributional constraints are represented as an M-convex set.
2016-10-10
Marcin Dziubiński
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